The global spread of the novel coronavirus (Covid-19) is inducing comprehensive changes in the economic, political and social systems of countries the world over. In one of a series of articles exploring the impact of the pandemic, we examine its political implications for countries in Asia.
A false authoritarian promise
China has taken a series of draconian containment measures-including sealing off Hubei province (where more than 59m people reside), imposing strict national travel restrictions and increasing surveillance of the population-since the epidemic became apparent in late January. These unprecedented containment measures seem to have been effective: in the week beginning March 13th, China reported no domestic transmissions. As a result, the government started to unwind containment measures, although the country began to experience a rise in imported cases, and the risk of a new wave of outbreaks remains high as people return to work.
While China has launched a campaign boasting of the advantages of its political system in fighting the virus, some outside the country have started to wonder if an authoritarian regime is better suited to face a collective crisis. While there are clear advantages, three factors cast doubt on the argument for the superiority of an authoritarian system during this type of crisis.
First, China's mix of a Leninist party-state, a state-guided market economy and a widespread reverence and trust in the leadership at the national level is rare even among authoritarian countries and is not easily replicated. In Iran, another authoritarian system, the virus has spread rapidly and public resentment against the regime has soared. This demonstrates the helplessness of authoritarian rulers when mistrust in the ruling elite runs deep while state capacity is lacking. Second, China's initial suppression of the news of an outbreak of an infectious disease in the city of Wuhan, in an attempt to maintain social stability, wasted precious time available to contain and study the virus, which eventually evolved into a global pandemic. As it turned out, the authoritarian instinct to censor information can only delay mass panic over the epidemic, while citizens and the healthcare system are subsequently caught off guard, aggravating the damage wrought by the epidemic.
More importantly, many Asian democracies have been successful in their endeavour to contain the virus without resorting to the extreme social control observed in China. Despite their proximity to China and frequent trade and human flows, Japan and Taiwan have experienced a relatively small spread of the virus and a remarkably low death toll, while South Korea has stemmed domestic transmission after an initial spike of infections. What these countries share in their efforts is transparency, from early warnings of the disease and public hygiene campaigns to timely updates as it spread. Meanwhile, democratic countries are capable of making resolute decisions when the situation requires: these three countries, as well as Australia, have all recommended social-distancing measures and imposed restrictions on mass gatherings, while New Zealand has declared a month-long nationwide lockdown from March 25th.
The viral topic
One of the imminent political repercussions of the coronavirus pandemic will be its impact on election outcomes.
South Korea is committed to holding its parliamentary election on April 15th, in spite of concerns over the pandemic, and the incumbent government's response to the outbreak is a prominent campaign issue. The conservative opposition has accused the government of putting public health in danger by deciding not to close borders immediately to arrivals from China. Meanwhile, the ruling Minjoo Party has turned the pandemic into an opportunity to bolster its governing credentials and highlight its emphasis on small businesses and disadvantaged social groups. In addition to deploying mass testing and contact-tracking, the Minjoo government has poured fiscal resources on households and small businesses to support employment, facilitate credit flows and encourage spending. These moves seem to have boosted its electoral prospects, as polls have shown a steadily rise in support for the ruling party.
As the pandemic persists, voters' focus will shift to the resulting economic losses and social strains generated by prolonged containment measures. In countries where general and local elections are due to take place in the second half of 2020, governments will be judged increasingly on how well they can mitigate the impact on employment and household income, as well as how soon they return social and economic life to normality.
The governments in Singapore, where a general election is due in 2020, and Hong Kong, with the legislative election in September in sight, have both unveiled massive stimulus packages, including cash handouts and employment support measures, aimed at cushioning the anticipated economic slump. Both administrations have also opted for less stringent social-distancing measures over an outright lockdown, thereby minimising disruption to residents' lives. In contrast, the challenge for the rulers of Indonesia and Myanmar, who respectively face local elections in September and a parliamentary election late in the year, is much more formidable, as they are constrained by scarcer fiscal resources and weaker healthcare systems.
Return of the state
Major external shocks have powerful effects on societies-especially on citizens' expectations of the state. The enormous loss of life and mass dislocation in China during the second world war forced the parallel Nationalist and Communist governments both to expand public provision for the population, in spite of their divergent class backgrounds and ideological convictions. In a similar vein, the collective shock of the coronavirus pandemic will transcend differences in political systems, as people raise demand for their governments to improve national health systems and job security.
Meanwhile, the pandemic has led governments to extend their reach into business and individuals' lives, and many will find these new tools for economic intervention and social control wieldy and difficult to relinquish, at least in terms of combating the next health or economic crisis.
One outstanding area is the expansive use of personal data and mass surveillance mechanisms. China, Hong Kong and South Korea have all changed rules to expand the use of personal health and location data in order to implement quarantine and trace contact-a crucial factor in their successful containment of the spread of the virus-and other countries may soon follow suit.
Unlike city lockdowns or travel bans, these measures will be more difficult to unwind after the threat of the coronavirus recedes. In an authoritarian setting, the rulers will find these technologies useful for monitoring dissidents and preventing unwanted collective action, as well as less conspicuous than the traditional deployment of police forces. Even in democratic countries, their value in fighting crime and tracing infectious diseases will tempt politicians to keep them in place.
On the economic front, much of the emergency fiscal support consists of one-off stimulus measures, but some of the state's increasing role in economic life is here to stay. A stronger public health system and improved social benefits to safeguard people from unexpected health problems and economic woes enjoy broad public support and will be beneficial to long-term economic growth. However, these will need to be supported by a higher level of taxation and requirements for companies to contribute more to the social security system. Businesses would be better advised to adjust to higher taxes and social contributions.