Update Country Report Maldives 24 Feb 2021

• Initial signs point to continuity in US policy in Asia under the administration of the new US president, Joe Biden. He has embraced the "Indo-Pacific'' strategy aimed at combating Chinese influence that was developed under his predecessor, Donald Trump.
• Diplomatic tactics have shifted, however, from the unilateral approach favoured under Mr Trump to one of closer co-operation with bilateral partners and multilateral organisations. This has been apparent in the US response to the military coup in Myanmar.
• The US strategic objective is clear, but ambiguity surrounds supporting economic policies in Asia. This reflects Mr Biden's hesitance about committing to free-trade agreements-a further similarity with the Trump administration.

The Biden administration's embrace of the term "Indo-Pacific" has provided the most revealing sign in terms of the US government's emerging strategic approach in Asia. The goal of fostering a "free and open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) was coined by Japan but embraced by the US under Mr Trump. The adoption of the term indicated an effort to broaden US regional strategy beyond the Asia-Pacific region (indicating primarily East Asia) to include the Indian Ocean, as well as a desire to counter Chinese influence through a cohesive approach across Asia's subregions. The US National Security Council (NSC) issued a strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific in 2018, which was declassified just days ahead of Mr Biden assuming office.

Here to stay: the Indo-Pacific

The new US administration has reiterated support for the concept. Besides repeated references to an FOIP in statements by Mr Biden and his top officials, an Indo-Pacific directorate has been set up within the NSC under Kurt Campbell, an experienced diplomat known for developing the US "pivot" to Asia (an antecedent of the FOIP strategy) under the presidency of Barack Obama (when Mr Biden served as vice-president). The directorate includes senior directors for both China and India and is the largest within the institution, in an indication of the region's rising strategic heft compared with the traditional foreign policy focus of the US on Europe and the Middle East.

In time, Mr Biden's team will want to update the Indo-Pacific strategy it has inherited. However, the broad objectives of the policy are unlikely to change significantly from those set out under Mr Trump. These included maintaining US "pre-eminence" in the region; protecting a "liberal" political and economic order; the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula; and deeper co-operation with India and the member states of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It clearly excludes the possibility of a grand bargain over interests in the region with China.

Shoring up alliances

The diplomatic tactics used to pursue the goal of an FOIP will be different, however. Mr Trump's administration was distinctively unilateral (direct nuclear negotiations with North Korea being a case in point), and this often had the effect of undermining trust among regional allies and partners. Under Mr Biden, the US is shifting to a more multilateral approach in the region, involving closer co-ordination with allies and regional bodies. This will also mean less bilateral pressure on Asian partners on issues such as defence cost-sharing and trade.

The Biden administration has already made an effort to shore up relations in the region, especially with defence treaty allies. The president has confirmed that the US-Japan defence treaty covers the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China (where they are known as the Diaoyu Islands). Although this was asserted earlier under Mr Obama, it became a point of ambiguity under Mr Trump. The new US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, has similarly confirmed the application of the US-Philippines defence treaty to attacks on Philippine armed and public vessels in the South China Sea. The Biden administration has also indicated that it would like to boost the role played in regional security by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue group (the Quad), consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the US. It has made a particularly strong effort, as indicated by official call records, to engage with India, even though that country is not a defence ally.

The US response to the military coup in Myanmar-perhaps the first major foreign policy test for Mr Biden-has indicated a more multilateral approach. The administration's diplomatic efforts on the issue have been important in securing strong statements on the coup from the UN Security Council, the G7 and ASEAN. US re-engagement with the UN Human Rights Council has also strengthened that body's response to the crisis. Overall, while this indicates a multilateral turn, it would be wrong to conclude that the Biden administration will not act unilaterally; the US initially proceeded alone to impose sanctions on those involved in the coup.

Tough but pragmatic on China

On the key issue of ties with China, meanwhile, the team assembled to develop policy appears hawkish by the standards of a Democratic administration. Besides Mr Campbell, whose views towards China have hardened since his previous time in office, the team includes Ely Ratner, a special assistant to the US secretary of defence, who will oversee an assessment of defence policy towards China. As the US Trade Representative, senior advisor Mark Wu is likely to spearhead efforts to develop a multilateral response to Chinese economic policy, including through reform of the World Trade Organisation.

Mr Biden's call in early February with China's president, Xi Jinping, indicated that the US will continue to raise issues of concern, including Chinese economic policies, human rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and encroachment on Taiwan (particularly as US ties with the latter continue to deepen). At the same time, the call signalled room for co-operation on issues including health, climate change and weapons proliferation. Overall, this aligns with The Economist Intelligence Unit's assumption that US-China relations will remain frayed.

Ambiguity on regional trade

The economic strategy to support the goal of an FOIP is less clear. Mr Biden's administration has stated that it will focus on the US economic recovery and noted that domestic investment will be prioritised above free-trade deals. Realistically, this pushes the timeframe for US entry into any major regional agreement, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), into a future administration. Whether the Biden administration seeks to renew the Trade Promotion Authority upon its expiry in July 2021 will indicate its intention.

While there will still be trade negotiations at bilateral level (we expect, for example, US trade talks with India to progress), the absence of the US from the deals shaping trade and investment rules in Asia represents what is likely to be the weakest element in Mr Biden's regional strategy. The same challenge under Mr Trump left the field open for China to push the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and, more recently, to indicate its interest in joining the CPTPP. With most Asian countries focused on their post-coronavirus recovery, a regional strategy without an economic policy risks having weak foundations.