Political and economic outlook
Key indicators | ||||
2020a | 2021b | 2022c | 2023c | |
Real GDP growth (%) | -33.6 | 31.0 | 12.0 | 8.5 |
Consumer price inflation (av; %) | -1.4 | 0.5a | 2.5 | 2.0 |
Government balance (% of GDP) | -27.6 | -15.7 | -9.1 | -6.3 |
Current-account balance (% of GDP) | -35.5 | -9.9 | -19.4 | -18.7 |
Exchange rate Rf:US$ (av) | 15.38 | 15.37a | 15.38 | 15.39 |
a Actual. b EIU estimates. c EIU forecasts. |
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Key changes since April 10th
The quarter ahead
Land area
298 sq km
Population
407,660 (2014 Population and Housing Census of Maldives)
Major islands
Thiladhunmathi Atoll (resident population 57,078 according to 2014 census; includes Miladhunmadulu group)
Northern Maalhosmadulu Atoll (resident population 15,819 in 2014 census)
Southern Maalhosmadulu Atoll (resident population 9,601 in 2014 census)
Malé Atoll (resident population 14,092 in 2014 census)
Capital
Malé (population 157,935 in 2014 census)
Climate
Tropical; average temperature range: 25-32°C
Weather in Malé (altitude 2.4 metres)
Average rainfall is 1,945 mm per year. There is a dry season from January to April and a rainy season from May to December
Languages
Dhivehi (official language; English also widely spoken among officials)
Measures
Metric
Currency
Maldivian rufiyaa. Rf1 = 100 laari. Average exchange rate in 2021: Rf15.37:US$1
Fiscal year
January 1st-December 31st
Time
5 hours ahead of GMT
Public holidays
January 1st (New Year); April 3rd (beginning of Ramadan); May 1st (Labour Day); May 3rd-5th (Eid-ul Fitr); July 10th-12th (Eid-ul Adha); July 26th (Independence Day-observed); September 27th (Quamee Dhuvas); October 9th (Mawlid al-Nabi); October 26th (celebration of the day that the Maldives embraced Islam); November 3rd (Victory Day); November 11th (Republic Day)
Official name
Republic of Maldives
Form of state
Presidential republic
The executive
The president is elected by direct popular vote; a cabinet is appointed by the president and approved by parliament
Head of state
Ibrahim Mohamed Solih (president)
National legislature
Unicameral parliament with 87 members. Legislators are elected by a simple majority in single-seat constituencies and serve five-year terms
Legal system
Each inhabited island has a magistrate's court. There is also a network of other courts with varying specific responsibilities (such as a family court or a juvenile court), as well as a High Court. The country's top judicial body is the Supreme Court
National elections
The last presidential election was held in September 2018; the next is due in September 2023; the last parliamentary election was held in April 2019; the next is due in April 2024
National government
The Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) controls both the presidency and the legislature
Main political parties
MDP, led by a former president and current speaker of the People's Majlis (the legislature), Mohamed Nasheed; Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM); Jumhooree Party, allied with the current government
Key ministers
President: Ibrahim Mohamed Solih
Vice-president: Faisal Naseem
Defence: Uza. Mariya Ahmed Didi
Economic development: Uz. Fayyaz Ismail
Finance & Treasury: Ibrahim Ameer
Foreign affairs: Abdulla Shahid
Health: Abdulla Ameen
Home affairs: Sheikh Imran Abdulla
Tourism: Abdulla Mausoom
Central bank governor
Ali Hashim
2017a | 2018a | 2019a | 2020a | 2021b | |
GDP at market prices (Rf m) | 73,153.0 | 81,586.0 | 86,788.0 | 57,568.7 | 70,712.0 |
GDP (US$ m) | 4,754.2 | 5,301.0 | 5,642.2 | 3,742.8 | 4,599.8 |
Real GDP growth (%) | 7.2 | 8.1 | 7.0 | -33.6 | 31.0 |
Consumer price inflation (av; %) | 2.8 | -0.1 | 0.2 | -1.4 | 0.5a |
Population (m) | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
Exports of goods fob (US$ m) | 318.3 | 339.2 | 360.7 | 257.6 | 285.4a |
Imports of goods fob (US$ m) | -2,226.5 | -2,764.2 | -2,753.1 | -1,708.3 | -2,392.0a |
Current-account balance (US$ m) | -1,026.7 | -1,502.5 | -1,489.7 | -1,327.4 | -457.6a |
Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m) | 587.4 | 712.2 | 753.5 | 984.9 | 805.8a |
Total external debt (US$ m) | 1,515.4 | 2,339.3 | 2,679.7 | 3,352.2 | 3,309.5 |
Debt-service ratio, paid (%) | 5.0 | 12.2 | 12.1 | 15.8 | 16.5 |
Exchange rate (av) Rf:US$ | 15.39 | 15.39 | 15.38 | 15.38 | 15.37a |
a Actual. b EIU estimates. |
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Origins of gross domestic product 2020 | % of total | Components of gross domestic product 2020 | % of total |
Agriculture | 7.2 | Private consumption | 52.6 |
Industry | 12.8 | Government consumption | 16.9 |
Services | 80.0 | Fixed investment | 40.6 |
Stockbuilding | 10.2 | ||
Exports of goods & services | 49.5 | ||
Imports of goods & services | 69.8 | ||
Domestic demand | 120.3 | ||
Main destinations of exports 2021 | % of total | Main origins of imports 2021 | % of total |
Thailand | 24.6 | Oman | 13.1 |
Germany | 6.1 | UAE | 12.9 |
UK | 3.6 | China | 12.6 |
France | 2.2 | India | 12.4 |
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2020 | 2021 | 2022 | ||||||
2 Qtr | 3 Qtr | 4 Qtr | 1 Qtr | 2 Qtr | 3 Qtr | 4 Qtr | 1 Qtr | |
Prices | ||||||||
Consumer prices (av; 2000=100) | 131.3 | 135.1 | 135.6 | 135.9 | 134.3 | 135.8 | 135.7 | 136.7 |
Consumer prices (% change, year on year) | -4.0 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -0.7 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.6 |
Financial indicators | ||||||||
Exchange rate Rf:US$ (av) | 15.40 | 15.37 | 15.38 | 15.37 | 15.36 | 15.37 | 15.39 | 15.38 |
Exchange rate Rf:US$ (end-period) | 15.41 | 15.40 | 15.41 | 15.35 | 15.32 | 15.40 | 15.39 | 15.37 |
Deposit rate (av; %) | 3.92 | 3.79 | 3.76 | 3.83 | 3.64 | 3.67 | 3.60 | 3.58 |
Lending rate (av; %) | 11.62 | 11.58 | 11.55 | 11.55 | 11.62 | 11.59 | 11.38 | 10.83 |
M1 (end-period; Rf m) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
M1 (% change, year on year) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
M2 (end-period; Rf m) | 37,753.8 | 37,182.1 | 41,385.0 | 44,428.7 | 45,608.2 | 46,410.8 | 52,415.1 | 55,883.1 |
M2 (% change, year on year) | 7.4 | 10.1 | 14.2 | 18.9 | 20.8 | 24.8 | 26.7 | 25.8 |
Foreign trade (US$ m) | ||||||||
Exports fob | 41.9 | 80.2 | 73.4 | 73.1 | 63.5 | 63.0 | 85.8 | 108.3 |
Imports cif | 350.9 | 387.2 | 431.5 | 584.0 | 572.1 | 616.6 | 800.7 | 697.3 |
Trade balance | -309.0 | -307.0 | -358.1 | -510.9 | -508.5 | -553.6 | -714.9 | -589.0 |
Foreign reserves (US$ m) | ||||||||
Reserves excl gold (end-period) | 703 | 696 | 985 | 845 | 912 | 1,017 | 806 | 865 |
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics. |
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The ruling Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) dominates the People's Majlis (parliament), with 65 of the 87 seats. This has enabled the president, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, to pass the bulk of his administration's agenda. EIU's core forecast is that the MDP will serve out the remainder of its term, which expires in 2024.
The risks to political stability have risen however, after Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, the former president of the Maldives (2013-18), was acquitted from a five-year prison term in November 2021. This makes Mr Yameen, who leads the main opposition Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), eligible to contest the 2023 presidential election. He had lost the 2018 election with a 42% vote share, meaning that the MDP no longer enjoys a guaranteed victory in the poll.
Political in-fighting within the MDP has also weakened its support base, as reflected in the party's defeat in local government polls in April 2021. The two main party figures-Mohamed Nasheed, the leader of the MDP, speaker of the People's Majlis and a former president (2008-12), and Mr Solih-are believed to have often fallen out over matters of complacency and corruption in government functioning. Their tug-of-war has created confusion in the ranks of the party, as well as within the country's security forces. This could hinder the response in the face of a security threat to officials, locals and foreign tourists; however, we do not currently expect the impact of this to be significant. The Taliban's control of Afghanistan is likely to embolden local fringe groups in the Maldives, increasing the risk of social unrest in the country.
Since surviving an assassination attempt in May 2021 (allegedly launched by a local Islamist group), Mr Nasheed has been pushing for a national referendum to shift from presidential to parliamentary governance, which would enable a party to form a government via majority rather than through coalition negotiations under the current system. This has irritated the MDP's coalition allies, mainly comprising conservative lawmakers who view Mr Nasheed's stance as an attack on religion. Mr Solih seems to be in favour of supporting the parliamentary scheme after the 2023 presidential election, should he return as president, when he believes that the country's tourism industry will have emerged from the shadow of covid-19.
We believe that Mr Yameen's political comeback is likely to encourage Mr Nasheed and Mr Solih to lay their differences to rest, albeit temporarily, as an MDP victory in the upcoming presidential election in 2023 remains paramount for both. On Mr Nasheed's part, this will require a softening of his demands for changing the country's political structure and pushing for controversial legislation such as the hate-crime bill (which is viewed by conservative lawmakers as an attack on religion) to heal internal party fractures, while Mr Solih will have to win back lost public support through supportive welfare schemes in 2022.
The next presidential election is due in September 2023, and the next parliamentary election in early 2024. In the previous presidential campaign the absence of Mr Nasheed (who was living in exile in the UK) resulted in Mr Solih being chosen as the presidential candidate for an MDP-led coalition against the then incumbent PPM. The MDP's endorsement for the upcoming election will be contested by both individuals in the primary elections this time round. The losing candidate is likely to support the winning one in the presidential poll, despite their disagreements, in order to suppress the PPM's chances of victory.
A divided MDP will also encourage other contenders to enter the presidential race, but the PPM will remain its main contender. Mr Yameen's release has breathed life into the PPM's effort to rally its support base by suggesting that the current administration's "India first" foreign policy threatens the country's sovereignty. For the public, however, growing tourism and trade ties with India are likely to overshadow security concerns over its military presence on the islands, suggesting that this campaign may not be a vote winner. Although a close call, we continue to expect the MDP to retain presidency in 2023 on the condition that it is able to heal internal fractures.
Maldivian foreign policy will continue to be guided by the country's substantial external financing requirements, resulting from a wide deficit on the current account and high levels of external debt, much of which is owed to China. The Maldives' strategic location in the Indian Ocean means that it will continue to garner interest from India and China, which are keen to expand their influence in the region.
Despite being divided over matters of corruption and religious extremism, the MDP lawmakers are united in their support for the administration's "India first" foreign policy. India has offered regular fiscal and investment support to the Maldives, and emerged as the main source of tourism for the country in 2021-22. It is also operating a US$1.5bn line of credit to fund various projects, including the Greater Malé Connectivity Project, with the aim of matching China's role in the archipelago's infrastructure projects. We expect India to remain the first port of call for the Maldivian administration for economic and maritime aid in 2022-23.
By contrast, relations between China and the Maldives, which flourished under the administration of Mr Yameen, have had less room to prosper under Mr Solih. A PPM victory in 2023 would therefore also affect the Maldives' foreign relations, with realignment away from India and towards China under Mr Yameen's presidency. This remains outside our forecast, however. In the interim, the free-trade agreement with China that was signed in December 2017 remains in limbo and is unlikely to be implemented in 2022-23.
Under its Indo-Pacific strategy, which seeks to limit China's growing influence in the region, the US will increase its engagement with the Maldives (and other small nations in South Asia). This is reflected in the Framework for a Defence and Security Relationship with the US, the country's first military agreement with any country other than India, which was signed in 2020. The US government has also announced its plan to open an embassy in the Maldives, but a timeline has yet to materialise. Notably, the Indian government has welcomed closer US-Maldives relations, in sharp contrast to its stance in 2013, when it blocked Mr Nasheed's plans to sign a Status of Forces Agreement with the US.
The tourism sector, along with the services ecosystem, is the main driver of the Maldivian economy. Reliance on tourism earnings left the county especially vulnerable to the ill-effects of the covid-19 pandemic. The government has focused its efforts on bolstering activity in the sector in 2022 and is expected to retain this policy focus in 2023. This will involve marketing the country as a safe holiday destination, owing to its "one island, one resort" set up and widespread vaccination. Since March 2022 tourists arriving in the country are no longer required to present a negative covid-19 test, and will continue to be offered a 30-day visa on arrival. The government is also relying on rapid booster-dose programmes to maintain immunity levels of resort employees and the local population. These initiatives are likely to be welcomed by tourists, the majority of whom are from high-income groups.
The government's policy focus will return to other matters that had been put on the back-burner amid the pandemic. In the months ahead it will seek to roll out its planned reform measures under the Strategic Action Plan 2019-23, which include tackling corruption and human-rights abuses, which had increased under the previous administration. Reforms to the judiciary to reduce its tendency to intervene in the country's political struggles will also be on the government's agenda, although progress is likely to be slow as attention turns to looming elections.
The current government inherited significant external debt associated with the infrastructure spending boom under Mr Yameen. The servicing of this debt, much of which is owed to China, will keep the country's budget balance in deficit. The government deficit widened sharply in 2020 on account of a steep decline in earnings, but will narrow gradually over the forecast period. With the phasing-out of covid-19 relief on resort lease rent and rising tourist arrivals boosting the collection of the goods and services tax, the deficit is forecast to narrow to 6.3% of GDP by 2023, from an estimated 15.7% of GDP in 2021. The ratio is smaller than the one recorded in 2019, even as elevated global prices increase the cost of the government's extensive subsidy programme, which covers utilities and food prices. We do not expect significant cuts in subsidies in 2022-23.
Grants and loans received by the Maldivian government from multilateral donors and other countries, especially India, will cover part of the fiscal shortfall in 2022-23. The persistent deficit will increase the country's public debt levels, but a strong economic recovery will temper the public debt/GDP ratio, which the national authorities expect to fall to 104.5% of GDP in 2022, from 115.6% in 2020.
The primary job of the Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA, the central bank) is to maintain price stability, although legislation also tasks it with preserving an adequate level of international reserves. The MMA achieves monetary stability in part through the peg between the currency (the rufiyaa) and the US dollar. In view of this peg, the MMA has little scope to conduct independent monetary policy.
The MMA uses minimum reserve requirements (MRRs) for banks and open-market operations as instruments to control local credit creation and money supply. We expect the MRR on foreign-currency deposits to be raised back to 10% during the remainder of 2022, from 5% currently, as steady tourism earnings reduce the risk of dollar illiquidity in the local currency market. The increase is likely to be delivered in two increments of 2.5 percentage points each over the year, matching the rise of MRR on local-currency deposits to 10% in 2021.
International assumptions summary | ||||
(% unless otherwise indicated) | ||||
2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | |
GDP growth | ||||
World | -3.7 | 5.7 | 2.8 | 2.7 |
US | -3.4 | 5.7 | 2.3 | 1.3 |
China | 2.2 | 8.1 | 4.0 | 5.5 |
EU27 | -6.1 | 5.4 | 2.4 | 1.8 |
Exchange rates | ||||
US$ effective (2000=100) | 117.8 | 115.4 | 121.0 | 122.9 |
¥:US$ | 106.8 | 109.8 | 126.3 | 131.7 |
US$:€ | 1.14 | 1.18 | 1.10 | 1.14 |
Financial indicators | ||||
US$ 3-month commercial paper rate | 0.56 | 0.07 | 1.52 | 3.20 |
¥ 3-month money market rate | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.08 |
Commodity prices | ||||
Oil (Brent; US$/b) | 42.3 | 70.4 | 107.9 | 95.5 |
Gold (US$/troy oz) | 1,770.3 | 1,799.6 | 1,882.1 | 1,637.5 |
Food, feedstuffs & beverages (% change in US$ terms) | 7.8 | 36.1 | 28.9 | 0.7 |
Industrial raw materials (% change in US$ terms) | -3.2 | 40.4 | 16.5 | 1.2 |
Note. GDP growth rates are at market exchange rates. |
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Given the dominant role played by tourism in the Maldivian economy, real GDP growth in 2022-23 will be tied closely to the recovery of activity in the sector. The country's lenient visa procedures and natural separation of resorts from the main island inhabited by locals will underpin its popularity as a top tourist destination. The emergence of more contagious strains of the coronavirus, like Omicron, presents the biggest risk for the country's growth outlook, as the imposition of travel restrictions would disrupt economic recovery.
Growth momentum in 2023 will be partly driven by the return of tourists from China, a leading source of tourism in 2019, as we expect China's strict zero-covid measures to be eased from mid-2023. Tourism demand in 2022-23 will also improve as travel restrictions are lifted globally. We forecast 1.5m tourist arrivals cumulatively in 2022, improving from 1.3m in 2021, but below the 1.7m recorded in 2019. The pace of economic recovery will slow in 2023 compared with 2022, but we still expect real GDP to be 5.7% larger than the 2019 level.
We do not expect another nationwide lockdown in 2022-23, therefore work on ongoing infrastructure development projects will be able to continue undisrupted. Tourism-affiliated services such as transport and the retail trade will benefit from the anticipated return of visitors. Improving household earnings and continued subsidies from the government will prop up private consumption.
Global prices dominate inflationary trends in the Maldives, as domestic consumption is driven mainly by tourism expenditure and is met mostly through imports. Inflation is therefore susceptible to global travel and price swings, and the pass-through is set by the rufiyaa:US dollar peg. However, the government's comprehensive policy of capping the cost of utilities (making up more than one-fifth of the consumer price index) and other living expenses for citizens strongly blunts the pass-through of global price pressures. We expect the government to maintain its current subsidies in 2022-23 owing to which, despite a surge in global energy and commodity prices, the pick-up in the headline inflation rate over the forecast period will be relatively modest, averaging 2.3% per year. Our consumer price inflation forecast of 2.5% in 2022 factors in the effect of a new minimum monthly wage, which was set in the range of Rf4,500-7,000 (US$291-453) by the Ministry of Economic Development.
The rufiyaa is pegged to the US dollar. The mid-point of the exchange rate is Rf12.85:US$1, and the rate is permitted to fluctuate within a band of ±20%. In recent years the currency has consistently grazed the weak edge of the exchange-rate band.
Although we maintain an optimistic tourism outlook for the Maldives, the country's significant external debt burden will weigh on its external buffers, and monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve (the US central bank) will increase refinancing costs. The Ministry of Finance has allocated about US$400m for debt obligations in its 2022 budget projections, which will be funded through credit assistance from bilateral and multilateral sources.
Our core forecast is that the peg will be maintained in 2022-23 as tourism receipts recover, but there is a significant risk that the government will be forced to weaken the currency if foreign-exchange reserves remain under pressure for a prolonged period. We believe that the currency will continue to test the weaker edge of the band, especially as the US dollar continues to strengthen.
The value of merchandise imports dwarfs that of exports, and the country has historically run a wide deficit on its goods trade account. We expect the trade deficit to widen in 2022-23, inflated further by elevated global oil prices. The strengthening of external demand over the forecast period and ongoing efforts to extend the country's shipments of fisheries (the main export commodity) to Russia and China will underpin a recovery in goods exports. This will nonetheless be overshadowed by resurgent tourism activity in the islands that will fuel the import bill, the size of which will continue to exceed exports by a wide margin.
By contrast, services exports from tourism (accounting for 90% of total services credits) have consistently exceeded services debits. We expect these exports to exceed their pre-pandemic (2019) levels this year, supported by a swift revival in tourism activity-the country remain a leading destination for luxury tourism.
The current account will remain firmly in deficit in 2022-23, as the services surplus will be insufficient to offset the goods trade deficit. However, the shortfall will widen from an estimated 9.9% of GDP in 2021 to the equivalent of 19.4% of GDP by end-2022, owing to higher import costs. The primary and secondary income accounts will remain in deficit in 2022-23, reflecting high interest payments and negligible remittance inflows.
Forecast summary | ||||
(% unless otherwise indicated) | ||||
2020a | 2021a | 2022b | 2023b | |
Real GDP growth | -33.6 | 31.0c | 12.0 | 8.5 |
Gross fixed investment growth | -32.0 | 20.0c | 8.5 | 6.0 |
Gross agricultural production growth | 7.0 | 14.8c | -15.3 | 8.1 |
Consumer price inflation (av) | -1.4 | 0.5 | 2.5 | 2.0 |
Consumer price inflation (end-period) | -1.3 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 |
Lending interest rate | 11.6 | 11.4 | 11.5 | 11.7 |
Government balance (% of GDP) | -27.6 | -15.7c | -9.1 | -6.3 |
Exports of goods fob (US$ m) | 257.6 | 285.4 | 330.0 | 360.0 |
Imports of goods fob (US$ m) | 1,708.3 | 2,392.0 | 2,939.8 | 3,208.6 |
Current-account balance (US$ m) | -1,327.4 | -457.6 | -1,003.1 | -1,040.7 |
Current-account balance (% of GDP) | -35.5 | -9.9c | -19.4 | -18.7 |
External debt (year-end; US$ m) | 3,352.2 | 3,309.5c | 3,557.5 | 3,708.5 |
Exchange rate Rf:US$ (av) | 15.38 | 15.37 | 15.38 | 15.39 |
Exchange rate Rf:US$ (end-period) | 15.41 | 15.39 | 15.38 | 15.39 |
Exchange rate Rf:¥100 (av) | 14.41 | 14.00 | 12.18 | 11.68 |
Exchange rate Rf:€ (av) | 17.55 | 18.19 | 16.89 | 17.58 |
a Actual. b EIU forecasts. c EIU estimates. |
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