The spike in political risk-in one of the region's most stable countries-16 months after the election of the president, Ali Bongo Ondimba, has subsided. Although many opposition politicians continue to contest the legitimacy of Mr Bongo's presidency, the insistence of André Mba Obame, the former leader of the Union nationale (UN) party, that he was the rightful winner of the 2009 presidential election has produced limited fallout. Strengthened by recent-unsubstantiated-allegations by former French officials that the poll was rigged, Mr Mba Obame proclaimed himself as such in January, leading the government to dissolve the UN. Despite early public rejection of Mr Bongo's victory, popular support for Mr Mba Obame has been limited, as has been backing from his UN colleagues. Foreign governments have reiterated their support for Mr Bongo, and the Economist Intelligence Unit does not expect the election result to be overturned. The government's light touch regarding Mr Mba Obame himself-who now faces prosecution along with a number of supporters-is probably an attempt to forestall localised unrest as the 2011 legislative elections approach, especially in Port-Gentil, Gabon's economic centre, which saw the worst unrest after the 2009 presidential election.

A rapprochement between another opposition veteran, Pierre Mamboundou, who came second in the 2009 presidential election and leads the Union du peuple gabonais (UPG), and the ruling Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG) is becoming increasingly likely. Such a move would entail the UPG-the largest opposition party in the National Assembly-recognising Mr Bongo's legitimacy and supporting his policy agenda in parliament, which would benefit political stability, especially as Mr Mamboundou is expected to be rewarded with the vice-presidency. However, perhaps fearful of upsetting senior PDG members, Mr Bongo did not offer the opposition any positions in his January cabinet reshuffle. This will not necessarily preclude co-operation between the parties. An alliance is not a done deal, given the risk of UPG defections in response to Mr Mamboundou's preparedness to co-operate with a regime that he previously decried as illegitimate. Such a rapprochement would increase the government's support among the Punu-Lumbu ethnic group, which comprises around 20% of the population and is based mainly in the south-west, including Port-Gentil.

Good relations with the armed forces, fostered when Mr Bongo was defence minister, will be essential to prevent them from becoming a threat. Corruption probes and leadership reshuffles are therefore unlikely. Army discipline is good, and the risk of a coup is low; the expanded French garrison in the capital, Libreville, will increase the deterrent. Nonetheless, the administration will remain under pressure to improve living standards; frequent power cuts and water shortages, decrepit infrastructure and inadequate healthcare and education provision are a drag on economic growth and a source of popular anger. The government will need to address these if it is to stem the rise in trade union militancy.

Balancing the preservation of political stability with his desire to root out the patronage networks that marked his father's 42-year regime, Mr Bongo will maintain a careful ethnic balance in his political appointments and allocate state funds selectively. To achieve this, the president, of Téké ethnicity, will need to appeal to political leaders of Fang origin-Gabon's largest ethnic group. Significantly, the Fang prime minister, Paul Biyoghé Mba, retained his position in the recent cabinet reshuffle, despite tensions between him and the president.