Outlook for 2011-12

• The president, Ali Bongo Ondimba, will continue to secure his rule over the country and the governing Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG), but grievances about his election and reforms will lead to periodic protests and strikes.
• The dissolution of the opposition Union nationale removes this electoral threat to the PDG ahead of the next legislative election in 2011.
• Turning Gabon into an "emerging" economy will remain the guiding policy principle, but success will depend on the government's ability to develop much-needed infrastructure and diversify into higher value-added activities.
• Real GDP growth is forecast to average 5.6% in 2011-12 as a new oil well comes on stream, following the estimated rebound of 5.7% in 2010, supported by public spending and sectors such as wood and manganese.
• Consumer price inflation will accelerate from a revised 1.5% in 2010. External price pressures and a weaker currency will see average inflation of 3.9% in 2011 and 3.2% in 2012, despite price caps and tax cuts.
• The current-account surplus is forecast to improve from an estimated 12.5% of GDP in 2010 to 17.4% in 2011, on the back of elevated oil prices and rising non-oil exports, before falling to 9% in 2012 as export prices fall.

Monthly review

• The government has revealed plans to introduce a biometric electoral roll in advance of the next legislative election, due in December 2011, which will boost the government's credibility in being seen to address corruption.
• The biometric electoral roll was a precondition for the potential alliance between the PDG and the opposition Union du people gabonais. Its leader, Pierre Mamboundou, is expected to be appointed vice-president.
• The country's main oil workers' union went on strike on March 31st-April 4th, demanding a limit to the number of foreign workers and an increase in the provision of training for locals, to which the government assented.
• Oil output has been interrupted briefly, causing fuel shortages. An audit of the sector is planned, with the findings to be incorporated in a new mining code.
• Two teachers' unions have also gone on strike, one demanding better pay and conditions, the other the reinstatement of members sacked for their involvement in the short-lived parallel administration of André Mba Obame.
• An Indian firm, Tata Chemicals, has acquired a 25.1% stake in a project to build an ammonia-urea factory near Libreville, reducing the holdings of both the government and the project's originator, Olam, of Singapore.

The spike in political risk-in one of the region's most stable countries-16 months after the election of the president, Ali Bongo Ondimba, has subsided. Although many opposition politicians continue to contest the legitimacy of Mr Bongo's presidency, the insistence of André Mba Obame, the former leader of the Union nationale (UN) party, that he was the rightful winner of the 2009 presidential election has produced limited fallout. Strengthened by recent-unsubstantiated-allegations by former French officials that the poll was rigged, Mr Mba Obame proclaimed himself as such in January, leading the government to dissolve the UN. Despite early public rejection of Mr Bongo's victory, popular support for Mr Mba Obame has been limited, as has been backing from his UN colleagues. Foreign governments have reiterated their support for Mr Bongo, and the Economist Intelligence Unit does not expect the election result to be overturned. The government's light touch regarding Mr Mba Obame himself-who now faces prosecution along with a number of supporters-is probably an attempt to forestall localised unrest as the 2011 legislative elections approach, especially in Port-Gentil, Gabon's economic centre, which saw the worst unrest after the 2009 presidential election.

A rapprochement between another opposition veteran, Pierre Mamboundou, who came second in the 2009 presidential election and leads the Union du peuple gabonais (UPG), and the ruling Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG) is becoming increasingly likely. Such a move would entail the UPG-the largest opposition party in the National Assembly-recognising Mr Bongo's legitimacy and supporting his policy agenda in parliament, which would benefit political stability, especially as Mr Mamboundou is expected to be rewarded with the vice-presidency. However, perhaps fearful of upsetting senior PDG members, Mr Bongo did not offer the opposition any positions in his January cabinet reshuffle. This will not necessarily preclude co-operation between the parties. An alliance is not a done deal, given the risk of UPG defections in response to Mr Mamboundou's preparedness to co-operate with a regime that he previously decried as illegitimate. Such a rapprochement would increase the government's support among the Punu-Lumbu ethnic group, which comprises around 20% of the population and is based mainly in the south-west, including Port-Gentil.

Good relations with the armed forces, fostered when Mr Bongo was defence minister, will be essential to prevent them from becoming a threat. Corruption probes and leadership reshuffles are therefore unlikely. Army discipline is good, and the risk of a coup is low; the expanded French garrison in the capital, Libreville, will increase the deterrent. Nonetheless, the administration will remain under pressure to improve living standards; frequent power cuts and water shortages, decrepit infrastructure and inadequate healthcare and education provision are a drag on economic growth and a source of popular anger. The government will need to address these if it is to stem the rise in trade union militancy.

Balancing the preservation of political stability with his desire to root out the patronage networks that marked his father's 42-year regime, Mr Bongo will maintain a careful ethnic balance in his political appointments and allocate state funds selectively. To achieve this, the president, of Téké ethnicity, will need to appeal to political leaders of Fang origin-Gabon's largest ethnic group. Significantly, the Fang prime minister, Paul Biyoghé Mba, retained his position in the recent cabinet reshuffle, despite tensions between him and the president.

With a seven-year mandate, the next presidential election is not due until 2016, and Senate elections are due in January 2015. National Assembly elections, however, are due by December 2011. The PDG lost only two seats to the UN in the June 2010 by-elections; the latter's dissolution and prospective prosecutions following Mr Mba Obame's presidential self-proclamation will make it very difficult for the party remnants to contest the forthcoming election. Limited public support for Mr Mba Obame's political theatre suggests that the PDG is likely to retain its majority even if a new party emerges. Indeed, symptomatic of the UN's fragility-its heavyweight leaders had little in common beyond shared antipathy towards Mr Bongo-is the fact that few have supported Mr Mba Obame. Thus, whether or not a new party contests the poll, the PDG is likely to remain dominant, particularly in partnership with the UPG. The PDG may also try to tempt remnants of the UN leadership back into the fold.

Gabon's close relations with France (Gabon being France's preferred partner in central Africa since independence) are attested to by the hosting of France's regional military base and Mr Bongo's frequent visits to Paris. A French judicial probe into the Bongo family's French assets, as well as recent claims by former French officials that his election victory was stolen, have barely affected relations. Conversely, commercial relations with China continue to warm, despite stalled progress on the giant Bélinga iron ore project. Gabon is assiduously courting investment from Asia. Links with the US-the primary market for Gabonese oil-will remain favourable, especially given Gabon's relatively good human rights record, bolstering the country's regional standing, which had previously largely depended on the late Omar Bongo Ondimba's close relations with African leaders. An ongoing border dispute with Equatorial Guinea over the potentially oil-rich zone around Mbañe, Conga and Cocotiers is edging closer to resolution, despite the historic support of the EquatoGuinean president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, for Mr Mba Obame.

Economic policy in 2011-12 will be driven by the goal of transforming Gabon into an "emerging" economy able to compete globally for foreign direct investment. Achieving this ambitious target will depend largely on the progress of efforts to accelerate economic growth. To this end, the government will hasten investment and try to diversify the economy into more value-added activities in order to reduce its oil dependency, building on policies such as the ban on unprocessed timber exports. The country is seeking to overtake Nigeria as Africa's largest palm oil producer within a decade. However, oil will remain the economy's primary pillar, although the creation of a new state oil firm, Gabon Oil Company, to increase its share of sector revenue and its control of logistics and infrastructure, has stalled. Addressing concerns about strong labour unions is still a key challenge to encouraging new investment. A similar entity is planned for mining projects. Fighting corruption and waste is another priority, building on the public-sector purge of "ghost" workers and increasing scrutiny of state spending. In recognition of reform progress, Gabon has been declared "close to compliance" with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. A new deal to restart the Bélinga iron ore project is expected.

Gabon's fiscal surplus is forecast to improve in 2011 owing to buoyant oil revenue-its primary driver-before narrowing in 2012 on lower oil prices, ambitious public investment plans and costly populist concessions that would increase current spending. The draft 2011 budget submitted to the state council for review in December, full details of which remain unavailable, sees spending increase from CFAfr2.2trn (US$4.4bn) in the supplementary 2010 budget to CFAfr2.37trn, funded by buoyant international oil prices. Fulfilling government rhetoric to invest in infrastructure and development, capital spending will accelerate faster than current spending. The latter will still grow strongly, however; further to an enlarged public payroll, trade union-appeasing tax cuts and price caps on various consumer essentials came into effect in January, following the bread subsidy implemented in October in response to higher wheat prices. The president has also stated his intention to clear long-standing arrears to the private sector, increasing borrowing from local banks to CFAfr911bn (US$1.9bn) to fund such payments. The public payroll audit will generate some efficiency gains.

The government intends to finance spending through higher oil and other extractive sector receipts. Yet, despite higher current spending, the government is unlikely to achieve its overall spending goals owing to limited structural capacity to implement capital spending plans. Reform will improve both revenue collection and budget execution. The historically strong fiscal surpluses should remain relatively low over the forecast period, coming in at 5.2% and 4.5% of GDP in 2011 and 2012 respectively.

Monetary policy is managed by the regional central bank, Banque des Etats de l'Afrique centrale (BEAC), which prioritises controlling inflation and maintaining the franc's euro peg. The BEAC broadly tracks European Central Bank (ECB) policy. However, in mid-2010 the BEAC cut its main policy rate, taux des appels d'offres (the auction rate), by 25 basis points to 4%, slightly narrowing the differential with record low ECB policy rates. The latter raised rates in April-with the likelihood of further tightening in 2011-on inflation concerns; with worsening regional inflation prospects, the BEAC may follow suit. However, credit growth remains sluggish; the bank plans to increase access by standardising and capping loan charges across member countries with two new rates, the taux effectif global and the taux d'usure (expected to be operational by mid-2011), suggesting a dovish outlook for rates.

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With real GDP growth estimated to have rebounded by 5.7% in 2010, following a 1% contraction in 2009, growth is expected to accelerate in 2011 to 6.1%, easing slightly to 5.1% in 2012. The key driver in 2011 will be a new oil well coming online that could boost waning output by up to 10% to 250,000 barrels/day, although output at other fields may continue to weaken as fields mature and labour remains restive. Growth will be further supported by investment in and output from other sectors-such as forestry and manganese-that are increasing value-added operations and volume output. Take-home pay may be rising, but purchasing power will be undermined in 2011 by accelerating price growth. Fixed investment, such as the construction of Gabon's first special economic zone, will also be important, driven by the government's generous spending plans, which are supported by buoyant oil prices. Banking and telecommunications should also drive non-oil growth. Industrial unrest presents a constant risk to output over the forecast period.

Revised data have inflation averaging 1.5% in 2010 (compared with a previous forecast of -1.4%, due to aggressive price competition from a new mobile telecoms provider). A stronger currency in 2011 has led to a moderation in our inflation forecast, taking the edge off elevated commodity and import prices (especially food) and higher wages and government spending, although average consumer price growth will still accelerate in 2011. Despite subsidies and cuts in the value-added tax rate, we envisage average consumer price inflation of 3.9% in 2011, easing to 3.2% in 2012.

Being pegged to the euro at CFAfr655.96:EUR1, the CFA franc fluctuates in line with euro:dollar movements. Despite improving growth in the US and ongoing fiscal and sovereign debt concerns in the euro zone, the euro is now expected to sustain its recovery since mid-2010 given the tightening of ECB rates. We now envisage a firming of the euro-pegged franc from an average of CFAfr495:US$1 in 2010 to CFAfr481:US$1 2011, before drifting back to CFAfr507:US$1 in 2012.

Exports are forecast to rise from an estimated US$7.3bn in 2010 to US$9.7bn in 2011, on the back of both elevated oil prices and a boost to output from a major new well coming on stream, which has reversed hitherto waning production, as well as a strong recovery in mining and forestry output. Exports will fall back to US$8.4bn in 2012 as oil and manganese prices retreat, despite output rising further. Imports should rise from an estimated US$2.5bn to US$3.1bn over the same period, owing to higher import prices and robust demand for capital goods to service the investment programme. A strengthening CFA franc in 2011 could further boost non-capital goods imports. The services deficit will rise, being largely determined by import-associated transport costs and technical services. The income deficit typically reflects fluctuations in export receipts, being mainly driven by the repatriation of profits by foreign oil and mining companies. We envisage a current-account surplus of 17.4% of GDP in 2011, driven by higher oil prices and output, as well as by iron output possibly coming on stream, narrowing to 9% of GDP in 2012 on lower commodity export prices.

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In mid-March Faustin Boukoubi, the secretary-general of the ruling party, Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG), announced that the government would introduce a biometric electoral roll in advance of the next legislative election, due in December 2011. The move may be a sop to the leader of the opposition Union du people gabonais (UPG), Pierre Mamboundou, who is rumoured to be on the verge of joining the government, possibly as vice-president, by the end of April. Mr Mamboundou, who officially came second in the presidential poll of August 2009 but claimed he was the rightful winner, has called for the introduction of biometric voter data to reduce the possibility of electoral fraud and allegations thereof. According to a pan-African newswire, Panapress, Mr Mamboundou met the president of the Constitutional Court, Marie Madeleine Mborantsuo, to discuss the logistics of introducing biometric data.

The decision appears to be a shrewd move by the PDG. The president, Ali Bongo Ondimba, has faced accusations of having stolen the August 2009 election ever since he was declared the winner. Although acceptance of his election increased thereafter, the allegations have resurfaced with a vengeance since a documentary about Franco-African relations, entitled "Françafrique", was broadcast in December 2010 (January 2010, The political scene). The programme included allegations by several former French officials that the presidential poll held in Gabon in August 2009 was rigged, with French assistance, and that the third-placed candidate, André Mba Obame, was the rightful winner, as he has claimed ever since. Consequently, any move that appears to reduce opportunities for fraud will reflect well on the ruling party and boost its legitimacy. More importantly, perhaps, the concession to Mr Mamboundou will help to seal an alliance between the PDG and the UPG. Indeed, a coalition that supported Mr Mamboundou's candidacy, Alliance pour le changement et la restauration (ACR), in the presidential election may also come on board.

If the experience of other African countries is anything to go by, the introduction of biometric voter cards will prove to be a costly and lengthy process that could lead to further delays in holding the next legislative poll, which was originally due to take place in April. Any gains in legitimacy from tying ballots to biometric data could be more than offset by a deferral of the polling day. The support of the UPG and the ACR would offer a serious boost to the ruling party's fortunes come the legislative elections scheduled for December 2011, but will require more than just improving the security of elections. Both parties will demand considerable government representation in exchange for their support. This may lead to clashes with PDG members, who would view the loss of their privileges to make way for former opponents as poor recompense for their loyalty to the president. Mr Mamboundou has already come under fire from some UPG members for his ties with the government, but Mr Bongo would welcome some defections from the UPG, as this would intensify the fragmentation of the opposition.

In March a number of local newspapers published allegations that nearly CFAfr8bn (US$16m) of public money earmarked for extending the National Assembly building was not accounted for. The president of the lower chamber, Guy Nzouba Ndama, has vigorously denied any wrongdoing but has not yet explained the money's whereabouts. As Mr Nzouba Ndama is ultimately responsible for the National Assembly's budget, unless the allegation is disproved his position as Assembly president is at risk. Moreover, as a PDG stalwart, his possible disgrace would reflect badly on the ruling party, which has struggled to throw off the reputation for corruption that it earned under the rule of the previous head of state, Omar Bongo Ondimba, despite the efforts of his son and successor in the presidency, Ali, to make the fight against graft a priority of his administration.

Meanwhile, a local news website, Gaboneco, reported in mid-March that Mr Mba Obame would not contest the lifting of his parliamentary immunity from prosecution, which the public prosecutor has reportedly requested. It is likely that the former Union nationale leader will face charges imminently for having tried to establish a rebel government. Mr Mba Obame may have accepted his fate in the-probably correct-belief that any prosecution would only serve to raise his profile and win him sympathy by allowing him to portray himself as a political prisoner.

The country's main oil workers' union, Organisation nationale des employés du pétrole (ONEP), which represents around 4,000-5,000 workers, went on strike from March 31st to April 4th in furtherance of its demands that the government limit the number of foreign workers in the sector and increase the provision of training for locals. This is a long-running grievance, which was behind an earlier brief strike in April 2010 (May 2010, Economic policy). To avert further industrial action, in October the government acquiesced to the union's demands, promising to limit the number of foreigners working in the sector to a maximum of 10% and to ensure that all executive level positions be filled by local staff (October 2010, Economic policy). However, as expected, the government has since failed to honour its word, for two main reasons. First, sweeping nationalisation of personnel in this economically crucial sector, which is dominated by foreign companies, would greatly harm the company's image among international investors as an appealing place to do business. Second, there are not enough skilled Gabonese workers to fill the 90% of operational posts that unions would like reserved for locals, let alone all of the executive posts. In recognition of this, in March 2010 the government announced the creation of an institute specialising in education relevant to the hydrocarbons sector, Institut supérieur de formation aux métiers du pétrole et du gaz, in the economic capital, Port-Gentil (March 2010, Economic policy).

According to ONEP's estimates, the latest strike cost the oil firms and the government together around CFAfr60bn (US$120m) in lost income, halting output, which averages around 240,000 barrels/day. By April 2nd there was a shortage of petroleum at filling stations around the capital, Libreville, as employees of the national distribution monopoly, Société gabonaise d'entreposage des produits pétroliers, affiliated to ONEP, downed tools. To bring the latest strike to a swift close the government announced measures to expedite an increase in the proportion of local workers in the oil industry. It promised to expel any foreign workers identified by an imminent audit of the sector as lacking the correct documents to work in the country. ONEP estimates that the number of foreign workers without the proper paperwork is around 1,300, although it is unclear how it arrived at this figure, which may be based on nothing more than a desire to see at least as many posts currently filled by expatriates turned over to local staff.

Although the government has ostensibly promised to comply with the unions' demands, it seems implausible that the foreign oil companies currently operating in Gabon would willingly replace all their current non-local executives with untried Gabonese staff. In practice, large exemptions are likely to be granted, either formally or tacitly. For example, foreign oil executives may be granted Gabonese citizenship in order to be kept on. Alternatively, companies may swell their payrolls with low-paying sinecures for Gabonese staff to improve the ratio of local to foreign workers. The Economist Intelligence Unit believes that the government still hopes that ONEP will in fact be satisfied with a significant increase in local employment rather than the near-total expulsion of foreigners that has been agreed.

A US firm, Alex Stewart International, has been employed by the government to carry out an audit of the sector, which will examine the industry's entire value chain, from exploration to production, and will examine every revenue-sharing agreement signed in the sector, comparing them with international norms to ensure that they are in the national interest of Gabon. The findings of this audit are due to be incorporated in a new mining code that is currently being developed. It may also go some way towards promoting the country's candidacy to join an international scheme to boost transparency in developing countries' mining sectors, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). In October the EITI designated Gabon as a country that was close to compliance.

The latest concessions will encourage the country's other unions to threaten strike action. In particular, the militant teachers' unions, grouped as the Convention nationale des syndicats du secteur de l'éducation (Conasysed), which represents around 12,000 teachers, began a walkout on April 11th. They went on strike in furtherance of their demands for better pay and conditions-including the restoration of the monthly teaching incentive bonus currently paid annually-in effect a continuation of the strikes that disrupted the start of the school year for two weeks. On this occasion, however, the strike has been less widely observed. Conasysed has been joined for a more limited strike by another teachers' union, the Syndicat national des enseignants et chercheurs (SNEC), albeit for different reasons. SNEC are demanding the reappointment of members suspended from their teaching positions for their involvement in the brief-lived parallel administration of Mr Mba Obame, a demand that is unlikely to be met.

In mid-April a leading Indian firm, Tata Chemicals, acquired a 25.1% stake in a project to build an ammonia-urea factory near Libreville. The majority stakeholder, with 62.9%, is Olam International of Singapore; the government of Gabon holds the remaining 12% interest. In its first phase of development the factory, which is expected to cost some US$1.3bn to build, will have capacity to produce 2,200 tonnes of ammonia per day and 3,850 tonnes of urea per day by 2014. This total may double in the second phase of development, although that will be contingent on future market conditions and the success of the first stage of development. A decision on whether to press ahead with the second phase will be reached by 2013. One-quarter of the plant's output will be sold by Tata in India, where demand for fertiliser is growing rapidly.

The ammonia-urea plant is just one of a series of large investment projects led by Olam. The company is developing both a special economic zone to process logs in Nkok-25 km from Libreville-and a vast plantation in the country's south-east to produce palm oil, a commodity widely used in foodstuffs, cosmetics and biofuels. The timber-processing zone at Nkok, which is relatively well-connected by rail and road to the rest of the country, as well as to planned airports, would be expected to create some 6,000 jobs in its first few years of operation. The zone is expected to become the largest of its kind in central Africa. It will also dovetail with the government's 2010 ban on the export of unprocessed logs so as to boost the value added to the country's exports. Olam is also considering building a refinery and a new port to export palm oil. This deal comes amid record high global prices for palm oil, driven largely by increasing demand for biofuels. This project and the ammonia-urea factory will go some way towards tapping Gabon's large agricultural potential and reducing its economic dependence on hydrocarbons.

In early April a Moroccan company, Managem, announced that its Bakoudou-Manigma gold mine, in the south-east of the country, would begin production in July. The mine is now expected to cost around US$35m, with annual production of gold estimated at 1.2-1.4 tonnes/year. According to the former mines minister, Julien Nkoghé Bekalé, the project-which has taken some five years to reach contract stage-will create 178 direct jobs. The mine will also contribute to some extent to the goal of economic diversification, providing sources of growth alternative to the oil sector. However, the project is fairly small in scale and will not help to break the economy's more general dependence on the extraction and exportation of primary commodities. Nonetheless, gold offers some insulation at least from the strong cyclicality of most industrial commodities.

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Please see graphic below

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Land area

267,667 sq km

Population

1.82m (2010 estimate, IMF)

Main towns

Population ('000; 2010 World Gazetteer estimates)

Libreville (capital): 754

Port-Gentil: 142

Franceville: 56

Climate

Tropical

Weather in Libreville (altitude 35 metres)

Hottest month, January (23-31°C); coldest month, July (20-28°C); driest month, July (3 mm average rainfall); wettest month, November (373 mm average rainfall)

Languages

French (official), Fang, Myene and other Bantu languages: Batéké, Bapounou, Eshira, Bandjabi

Measures

Metric

Currency

CFA franc (CFAfr), fixed to the euro, backed by a guarantee from the Banque de France. It was devalued from CFAfr50:FFr1 to CFAfr100:FFr1 in 1994, and has been pegged at CFAfr655.96:EUR1 since France adopted the euro in 1999.

Time

1 hour ahead of GMT

Public holidays

Fixed public holidays: January 1st (New Year's Day), April 17th (Women's Day), May 1st (Labour Day), August 15th (Assumption), August 16th-17th (Independence Day), November 1st (All Saints' Day), December 25th (Christmas Day)

Movable public holidays: Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, Easter, Pentecost

Official name

République Gabonaise

Form of state

Unitary republic

Legal system

Based on the constitution of March 1991, amended by the National Assembly in 2003 to remove the restriction on the number of terms that a president may serve

National legislature

The National Assembly (the lower chamber) has 120 members, who are elected for five years by universal adult suffrage; the Senate (the upper chamber) has 91 members, who are elected for six years by municipal and regional councillors

National elections

December 2006 (legislative) and August 2009 (presidential); next legislative election due in 2011 and next presidential election in 2016

Head of state

Ali Bongo Ondimba was elected president in late August 2009 and was sworn in to office in mid-October following a recount of votes

National government

The government is led by the prime minister and an appointed Council of Ministers

Main political parties

Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG, the ruling party); Union nationale (UN, dissolved in February 2011); Union du peuple gabonais (UPG); Parti gabonais du progrès (PGP); Rassemblement pour le Gabon (RPG; formerly Rassemblement national des bûcherons); Parti social démocrate (PSD); Union gabonaise pour la démocratie et le développement (UGDD); Alliance démocratique et républicaine (Adere); Cercle des libéraux réformateurs (CLR)

Prime minister: Paul Biyoghé Mba

Key ministers

Agriculture, livestock & rural development: Raymond Ndong Sima

Budget, state reform & civil service: Emmanuel Issozet Ngondet

Communications, post & the digital economy: Laure Olga Gondjout

Defence: Ruffin Pacôme Ondzounga

Economy, trade, industry & tourism: Magloire Ngambia

Education: Séraphin Moundounga

Energy & hydro resources: Régis Immongault

Equipment, public works & infrastructure: Léon Nzouba

Foreign affairs: Paul Toungui

Health, social affairs, national solidarity & family: Flavien Nzengui Nzoundou

Housing, urbanisation & sustainable development: Blaise Louembé

Interior, public security, immigration & decentralisation: Jean-François Ndongou

Justice: Ida Réteno Assonouet

Labour, employment & welfare: Angélique Ngoma

Mines, oil & hydrocarbons: Alexandre Barro Chanbrier

Small & medium-sized businesses & crafts: Jean-Félix Mouloungui

Transport: Julien Nkoghé Bekalé

Water & forestry: Christian Magnagna

Central bank governor

Lucas Abaga Nchama