The position of the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, looks untenable, after a host of political, military and tribal allies have deserted him in recent months, and massive, ongoing nationwide protests have resulted in the deaths of over 140 demonstrators. Under strong pressure from the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), the US and UK, in April he agreed to a plan that would entail him leaving office in 30 days, in return for legal immunity for himself and those close to him. According to the proposals, the vice-president would subsequently take charge for 60 days, and presidential elections would occur thereafter. Although the plan has won the guarded backing of the opposition parliamentary coalition, the Joint Meeting Parties, the Economist Intelligence Unit is sceptical that the plan will be implemented in its present form. (Indeed, the president failed to sign the agreement as scheduled on May 1st.)

In particular, the deal has failed to satisfy the demands of the protesters, who continue to call for Mr Saleh's immediate removal, and the GCC proposal lacks sufficient guarantees (and allots insufficient time) to ensure free and fair elections after the interim period. As a result, the stand-off will persist, although the president's authority will continue to ebb, despite a host of earlier measures to appease his opponents, including sacking his government and promising new populist fiscal measures. Eventually, we expect that either an improved and more thorough GCC-mediated proposal, or perhaps a decisive intervention by one of Yemen's military or tribal leaders, will cause Mr Saleh to leave office before the end of this year. In his stead, a caretaker administration will probably be put in place until elections can be organised (and perhaps a new constitution drawn up). Meanwhile, it appears that elements within the military are looking to emulate the oversight role played by their Egyptian counterparts during any interregnum, as demonstrated by the decision by General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a former key ally of the president, to side with the protesters. However, Yemen's Republican Guard, headed by the president's son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, has remained loyal to the president thus far.

As a result, there are risks that the military will split along political and familial lines, which, if unchecked, could lead to an outbreak of large-scale internecine violence. Although we expect this to be avoided, there are concerns that the military will prove an ineffective administrator-General Mohsen in particular provokes strong objections among several key groups-raising the prospect of large areas of this already weakly administered country drifting away under the sway of their respective tribal leaders. Similarly, even if Mr Saleh remains in power (no longer our central scenario), the frenetic and fractured contest for power in the centre will consume most of his energies, leaving the localities in effect to fend for themselves (and encouraging the secessionist Southern Movement to declare outright independence).

Whatever the case, the need to resolve the present impasse is urgent. Even before the current bout of protests, the country was confronted with a range of disparate security and socioeconomic challenges, ranging from fast-depleting oil and groundwater reserves to growing secessionist sentiment in the south and an on-off Zaydi Shia uprising in the north. International concern will be focused mainly, however, on the prospect of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP; comprising the Yemeni and Saudi arms of the group) exploiting the political vacuum to consolidate its presence and step up its activities (both in Yemen and potentially abroad). In an indication that these fears are already being realised, a small town in the southern province of Abyan was reportedly seized by Islamist militants in late March and an armaments factory was looted. (The factory subsequently blew up, killing 150 civilians.)