Outlook for 2011-12

• The position of the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, looks untenable, after a host of political, military and tribal allies have deserted him in recent months.
• Although an internationally formulated proposal, which would entail Mr Saleh leaving office in 30 days, has been accepted by the president and the opposition, we do not expect it to be implemented in its present form.
• There are risks that the military will split along political and familial lines, which, if unchecked, could see an outbreak of large-scale internecine violence.
• Although Yemen's neighbours and a number of Western powers would seek to assist in the country's post-Saleh transition, in reality their concerns will predominately be security-related.
• The unstable political climate will slow economic reform, and for the time being the ten-point programme of economic reform will be superseded by the government's desire to restore stability.
• Given the growing public pressure on the leadership, we now believe that any major moves to rein in spending will be deferred this year. As a result, we expect the fiscal deficit to widen in 2011, despite rising oil prices.
• We expect that economic growth will slow in 2011-12, hindered by falling oil output and the disruption to the economy caused by widespread unrest.
• We have revised higher our inflation forecast for 2011, to 16%, in line with anecdotal reports of fast-rising foodstuffs and gas prices (the latter reflecting supply disruptions).

Monthly review

• Following weeks of negotiations, the president and the opposition parliamentary coalition have agreed to a plan that would see Mr Saleh stand down after 30 days, and a new presidential election occur 60 days thereafter.
• Despite winning the backing of the political establishment, the so-called 30:60 plan has failed to win the backing of the protesters, who want Mr Saleh to stand down immediately and reject a proposal to grant him immunity.
• Tribesmen in Marib have blocked the supply of propane into Sanaa, causing the price to spike and leaving irate consumers empty-handed.
• According to the Yemen General Authority for Investment (YGIA), construction has been postponed on five plants financed by Yemeni and Gulf investors, owing to the ongoing instability and political tensions.
• The Central Bank has announced that its foreign-exchange reserves fell to US$5.1bn in mid-April, compared with US$5.9bn at end-2010. This will erode its ability to support the riyal, and will in turn have inflationary implications.

The position of the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, looks untenable, after a host of political, military and tribal allies have deserted him in recent months, and massive, ongoing nationwide protests have resulted in the deaths of over 140 demonstrators. Under strong pressure from the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), the US and UK, in April he agreed to a plan that would entail him leaving office in 30 days, in return for legal immunity for himself and those close to him. According to the proposals, the vice-president would subsequently take charge for 60 days, and presidential elections would occur thereafter. Although the plan has won the guarded backing of the opposition parliamentary coalition, the Joint Meeting Parties, the Economist Intelligence Unit is sceptical that the plan will be implemented in its present form. (Indeed, the president failed to sign the agreement as scheduled on May 1st.)

In particular, the deal has failed to satisfy the demands of the protesters, who continue to call for Mr Saleh's immediate removal, and the GCC proposal lacks sufficient guarantees (and allots insufficient time) to ensure free and fair elections after the interim period. As a result, the stand-off will persist, although the president's authority will continue to ebb, despite a host of earlier measures to appease his opponents, including sacking his government and promising new populist fiscal measures. Eventually, we expect that either an improved and more thorough GCC-mediated proposal, or perhaps a decisive intervention by one of Yemen's military or tribal leaders, will cause Mr Saleh to leave office before the end of this year. In his stead, a caretaker administration will probably be put in place until elections can be organised (and perhaps a new constitution drawn up). Meanwhile, it appears that elements within the military are looking to emulate the oversight role played by their Egyptian counterparts during any interregnum, as demonstrated by the decision by General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a former key ally of the president, to side with the protesters. However, Yemen's Republican Guard, headed by the president's son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, has remained loyal to the president thus far.

As a result, there are risks that the military will split along political and familial lines, which, if unchecked, could lead to an outbreak of large-scale internecine violence. Although we expect this to be avoided, there are concerns that the military will prove an ineffective administrator-General Mohsen in particular provokes strong objections among several key groups-raising the prospect of large areas of this already weakly administered country drifting away under the sway of their respective tribal leaders. Similarly, even if Mr Saleh remains in power (no longer our central scenario), the frenetic and fractured contest for power in the centre will consume most of his energies, leaving the localities in effect to fend for themselves (and encouraging the secessionist Southern Movement to declare outright independence).

Whatever the case, the need to resolve the present impasse is urgent. Even before the current bout of protests, the country was confronted with a range of disparate security and socioeconomic challenges, ranging from fast-depleting oil and groundwater reserves to growing secessionist sentiment in the south and an on-off Zaydi Shia uprising in the north. International concern will be focused mainly, however, on the prospect of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP; comprising the Yemeni and Saudi arms of the group) exploiting the political vacuum to consolidate its presence and step up its activities (both in Yemen and potentially abroad). In an indication that these fears are already being realised, a small town in the southern province of Abyan was reportedly seized by Islamist militants in late March and an armaments factory was looted. (The factory subsequently blew up, killing 150 civilians.)

The parliamentary election has already been postponed from 2009, and we do not expect a new date for a parliamentary poll to be set until Mr Saleh's future is resolved. Given the likelihood that Mr Saleh will relinquish power before the end of this year, it is increasingly probable that both parliamentary and presidential elections will occur in the outlook period. (At present, the next presidential poll is not scheduled until 2013.)

The worsening security situation has prompted Yemen's neighbours and a number of Western powers to attend more seriously to the country's problems. It appears that the GCC and the US are ready to abandon Mr Saleh, but the US will generally defer to the more influential Gulf states (and in particular Saudi Arabia) to mediate a solution-a state of affairs that may well disappoint Yemen's pro-democracy activists. In the event that Mr Saleh is forced from office, the "Friends of Yemen" group, formed in 2010 and composed of Yemen's neighbours and a number of Western powers, would almost certainly reconvene in an effort to assist the country's transformation. In reality, however, international security concerns would remain predominant, with the US, for example, likely to launch occasional unilateral air strikes on specific al-Qaida targets if it felt that the new government was unwilling or unable to counter the terrorist threat.

Faced with a mounting struggle to wean Yemen off its reliance on the diminishing oil sector, which contributes the bulk of export and fiscal revenue, the government had stepped up efforts to impose fiscal austerity. However, these efforts, which included passing a contractionary budget for 2011 and implementing a ten-point reform programme, will be superseded for the time being by the urgent desire to quell the spreading protests. In an attempt to appease demonstrators, the government has implemented several economic support measures-including raising the wages of public-sector workers-that are likely to strain the already stretched public finances. In addition, the programme to phase out fuel subsidies, which began in 2010, is now on hold and likely to remain so for some time.

Yemen will require substantial foreign aid, including the full disbursal of the US$5.7bn promised at a donor conference in London in 2006, if it is to avoid a full-blown economic crisis. However, although the GCC states have gradually overcome their reticence to support Yemen financially, the current weakened position of Mr Saleh will delay any further aid disbursements until his future is clearer. In addition, the economic support plan agreed with the IMF in August has also seemingly been put on hold, in light of the current political uncertainty.

In conjunction with the IMF, the government has set itself a target to reduce the fiscal deficit to the equivalent of 3.5% of GDP in 2013-an ambitious goal, in light of declining oil production. Under the government's recently published medium-term budgetary plans, the shortfall would decline to below that target by 2012, but achieving this will prove difficult. Although the public finances will benefit from full production at Yemen's first liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, Yemen LNG, the bulk of the deficit adjustment is to come from expenditure cuts. However, given the strong and growing public pressure on the leadership, we now believe that any major moves to rein in spending (including lowering fuel subsidies further) will be deferred this year-indeed, moves to raise public-sector wages and broaden the scope of the Social Welfare Fund will add to spending.

Overall, we now expect that the government's new spending and tax commitments will cause the fiscal deficit to widen slightly in 2011, to 5.6% of GDP, despite higher oil prices. In 2012 it is forecast to widen further, to 7.2% of GDP, as oil prices decline. Financing these deficits could prove challenging, given the shallowness of the domestic financial sector. In addition, given the present widespread social unrest and the history of disgruntled tribes sabotaging pipelines, there is considerable risk that oil (and possibly gas) export revenue could be disrupted.

Yemen's financial system is underdeveloped and its economy is largely cash-based. This means that the direct impact of the global financial crisis on the country was limited. It does, however, also reduce the efficacy of interest-rate adjustments, depriving the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) of an important monetary policy tool. As a result, the CBY's efforts to manage liquidity will remain primarily focused on the issuance of Treasury bills. Although the CBY has a stated goal of liberalising interest-rate policy, it will be hindered in this by the vulnerability of the Yemeni riyal. It raised interest rates sharply in the first half of 2010, and they are expected to remain elevated over the forecast period, given high inflation and domestic political instability.

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After strengthening in 2010 on the back of newly commissioned gas export capacity (which will also assist in propping up growth in 2011), we expect real GDP growth to be hindered by falling oil output and the disruption to the economy caused by widespread social unrest. A number of investment projects have been delayed in the wake of the worsening domestic security situation, although foreign investment into Yemen is modest in any case. Domestic demand will also be hit by problems in the agricultural sector-the country's largest employer-where persistent groundwater shortages look set to get worse. However, the government's decision to raise public-sector wages and increase social welfare payments, although not fiscally prudent, will provide a measure of stimulus this year.

In 2012, assuming the country is through the worst of the current unrest, the economy should be buttressed by recovering investment (especially if the GCC steps up its donor funding) and private consumption. However, export volumes will decline in line with falling oil production, and fiscal spending growth will slip as the government is forced to implement renewed fiscal austerity. Overall, we forecast that real GDP growth will fall from an estimated 6.2% in 2010 to an average of just 2.7% in 2011-12-insufficient to prevent increasing economic hardship.

We have revised higher our inflation forecast for 2011, in line with anecdotal reports of fast-rising foodstuffs and gas prices (the latter reflecting supply disruptions). In addition, the riyal has begun to weaken once more, pushing up the cost of imports. As a result, we forecast that average inflation will rise from 11.2% in 2010 to 16% in 2011, before dipping to 11.6% in 2012 as global non-oil commodity prices decline.

Having weakened markedly in mid-2010, the riyal stabilised at around YR214:US$1 from September. This recovery stemmed from a combination of CBY intervention (which included buying riyals) and the fillip to confidence provided by the IMF's recent lending deal. However, undermined by the uncertain political situation, the riyal has begun to weaken once more, forcing the CBY to dip into its stock of foreign-exchange reserves. Given the prevailing political headwinds, the CBY will struggle to manage this depreciation, and we expect the riyal to decline from an average of YR220:US$1 in 2010 to YR230:US$1 in 2011. In 2012, with foreign reserve stocks expected to decline to just four months of import cover, the pace of riyal depreciation will probably accelerate, and we expect the currency to average YR251:US$1.

Yemen is expected to return widening current-account deficits in 2011-12, as the impact of a growing import bill is exacerbated by falling oil production. We expect the import bill to increase by 10% this year, as global commodity prices surge, although import growth should slow in 2012 once the fuel subsidy reduction programme recommences (which will lessen demand for imported refined oil products). Export earnings, meanwhile, will rise by 16% in 2011, lifted by rising oil prices and higher LNG exports, before falling in 2012, in line with declining oil production. Nevertheless, the trade deficit is projected to widen markedly over the forecast period, from an estimated US$815m (2.5% of GDP) in 2010 to US$1.8bn in 2012.

We expect the non-merchandise deficit to narrow over the forecast period, however, as high income debits (reflecting the repatriation of profits by Yemen LNG's foreign investors) are more than offset by rising current transfers credits, as donor aid rises and Yemeni workers' remittances from the GCC recover. Overall, the current-account deficit is expected to widen from an estimated US$1.9bn in 2010 to US$2.6bn in 2012.

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Following weeks of negotiations brokered by the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC-comprising six Gulf states), the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, appears to be on the verge of finally agreeing to leave office. The deal proposed that Mr Saleh stand down within 30 days of accepting the agreement, during which a national unity government between the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) and the main opposition bloc, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), would be formed, before briefly handing power to the vice-president, Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, who would then rule for 60 days until a presidential election.

As an incentive for the president to approve the plan, Mr Saleh would be given immunity from prosecution for him, his family and his aides (albeit after parliamentary approval, which would in reality be a foregone conclusion given the dominance of the GPC). Mr Saleh issued a cautious initial acceptance of the plan, stating: "We will work with the Gulf initiative, within the framework of the Yemeni constitution." A more concrete commitment was subsequently issued by Abdoh al-Janady, the deputy information minister, however, who, speaking on behalf of the president and the GPC, voiced approval of the plan, adding that "there are no reservations".

The opposition JMP remained guarded, however, saying that it agreed to the main points of the plan, but that it rejected the notion of joining a coalition government during the initial 30-day period (when Mr Saleh would still be at the helm). The US, which, along with the UK, is believed to have contributed to the crafting of the deal, stated that it encouraged "all parties to move swiftly to implement the terms of the agreement".

It seemed that neither the brokers of the deal nor the protagonists had sufficiently considered public sentiment, however. Activists on the street wholeheartedly rejected it, insisting that Mr Saleh go immediately. Having in the past heard the president agree to deals and then renege upon them, the protesters said that they would not leave the streets until the president left, a stance that contravened the agreement, since part of the bargain was that the demonstrations would cease immediately. They also objected to a separate clause in the plan that gives Yemen's parliament the right to reject the president's resignation, arguing that since Mr Saleh's party, the GPC, held a vast majority in parliament, this was highly likely. The granting of immunity also proved to be a particular bugbear, with the youth movement adamant that Mr Saleh face trial. In a statement, the movement voiced its rejection of "any proposal that does not hold Saleh accountable for the killing of more than 140 revolutionary protesters".

The protesters believe themselves to be in a strong position, and are unwilling to settle for anything less than a comprehensive change that would not only entail Mr Saleh departing immediately, but also put in place the framework for the creation of a federal democratic state. Indeed, some demonstrators have argued that the rather piecemeal and shallow transition plan is a deliberate attempt by the GCC leaders, unnerved by Yemen's display of people power, to undermine the revolution. Either way, the protesters' combative stance served to enrage Mr Saleh, who intimated the next day that he would not accept the deal after all. In an interview with the UK-based BBC, he described the move to topple him as a "coup", adding: "We will do it through ballot boxes and referendums ... a coup is not acceptable." With an eye on the US administration, Mr Saleh also sought to play up the terrorist threat posed by a disorderly transition in Yemen, asking, rhetorically: "Why is the West not looking at this terrorist activity and the dangers it holds for the future?" Certainly al-Qaida activity has increased in recent weeks as militants have sought to exploit the growing instability. However, whether they pose the level of threat that Mr Saleh claims remains a moot point, particularly given the widespread suspicion in Yemen that he has sought to leverage the al-Qaida danger in order to gain financial support from the West.

The economic impact of the political unrest is deepening and is having an increasingly apparent effect on everyday life. This is most noticeable in the supply of propane gas, used almost universally in Yemen for domestic cooking. The bulk of local supplies of propane comes from the northern province of Marib, and is distributed from there around the country. In early March, according to the Yemeni Gas Company (YGC), local tribesmen started to block the route to the capital, in solidarity with the opposition, saying they would not lift their blockade until Mr Saleh left office and a new government was installed. The YGC diverted its distribution through Shabwa but, once this route was blocked, it was subsequently forced to use a hugely circuitous route through the remote Hadramawt province. Even the Hadramawt route has suffered from disruptions, however.

Not only have the supply disruptions extended the time taken for the gas to reach the capital, Sanaa, it has also increased the cost significantly. In order to counter this, and ensure that sufficient supplies get through, the Yemen Observer, an English-language newspaper, reported that the YGC had even started importing gas from abroad, at a premium cost of US$1,100/tonne. However, gas is heavily subsidised, at less than US$350/tonne, which in turn left the company nursing heavy losses. Adding to the frustration, YGC is also a shareholder in the Yemen LNG (liquefied natural gas) export project, which supplies around one-third of total gas production to South Korea at a discount price of some US$200/tonne, according to Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

High prices and supply disruptions have caused tensions on the streets of Sanaa. Long queues of residents waiting for deliveries have transformed into mini-protests, with consumers blocking roads and refusing access to traffic. Such is the gap between supply and demand, that, according to local reports, the contents of delivery trucks are selling out within ten minutes, leaving hundreds of increasingly irate consumers empty-handed.

The ongoing political tensions and instability have also taken a toll on business and the wider economy. The construction sector, in particular, has been badly hit, forcing the laying-off of labourers and reducing employment opportunities for casual workers. Local media report the Yemen General Authority for Investment (YGIA) as stating that construction has been postponed on five plants financed by Yemeni and Gulf investors. The projects, covering steel, cement and sugar production, are worth a total US$900m and the temporary loss of employment for scores of workers at the plants will cause considerable economic distress among local communities. Encouragingly, however, the YGIA claims that it registered more investment projects during the first quarter of 2011 than in the same period of 2010. Most of these are unlikely to go ahead, however, until the political situation is resolved.

Another sector to have been affected is banking. Banks have long suffered from low levels of deposits, but in recent months they have had to cope with high levels of withdrawals, as Yemeni savers have looked to transfer their funds into hard currency or even send their money overseas (April 2011, Economic performance). As a result, the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) has imposed strict limits on the withdrawal of foreign currency, and businesses can only withdraw US$10,000 a day. In order to help banks meet the increased demand for funds, the CBY has reduced the reserve requirements on foreign-currency deposits to 10% from 20%, not least to provide sufficient liquidity for banks to cover letters of credit for imports.

Lack of funding as well as the deterioration in the political climate has in any case slowed external trade. Insurance premiums on Yemeni-bound freight have risen considerably, deterring all but the most essential of goods. According to the Ports of Aden Authority, throughput at the port has decreased considerably since the outbreak of unrest. There has been a considerable decline in vessel calls at Aden port, with 100 ships docking at the port in March, compared with 133 the previous month. In April, only 83 ships had docked up to the 24th of the month.

In turn, this has affected Yemen's retailers. The March edition of the Yemen Economic Journal reported that retail and wholesale sales in Sanaa had fallen by 37% over the month. This report was supported by a particularly downbeat interview with the trade and industry minister, Hisham Sharaf, on April 25th, in which he claimed that the unrest had cost the country some US$4bn-5bn over the past three months-equivalent, on an annualised basis, to 40% of GDP.

Declining imports also affects the government accounts, through reduced tax and customs revenue. Combined with the social welfare package and pay increases that the president offered early on in the crisis (March 2011, Economic policy), this will put the fiscal account under severe strain this year, particularly given that it already suffers from a large chronic deficit. Overall, economic growth in Yemen this year is likely to be severely impaired. Certainly, the economy has stagnated over the last quarter and we have already lowered our projection for real GDP growth in 2011, to 2.7%-below the rate of population increase. However, our growth forecast could be revised down further should the unrest continue.

The governor of the Central Bank, Mohammed Awadh bin Hammam, told local media in April that the CBY's stock of foreign reserves had continued to fall, reaching US$5.1bn by mid-April, down from US$5.9bn at the end of December 2010, a decline of 13.6%. According to the governor, some US$800m had been used to help cover the bank's foreign-exchange liabilities, which totalled a gross US$1.6bn, with a further US$596m set aside for the purchase of oil derivatives; US$257m to cover import credit; and US$343m to cover foreign-currency demand by local commercial banks. The remainder was utilised for Yemen's overseas operations, including diplomatic expenditure, paying interest on foreign-currency loans, as well as, surprisingly, the expenses of the state-owned Safer Exploration and Production Operations Company.

The drawdown of the CBY's foreign-currency holdings comes despite a sharp increase in international oil prices, which would, typically, have been expected to buttress the country's reserve holdings. In comparison, for example, foreign reserves leapt higher in 2008, reaching their all-time highs that year, in line with record international oil prices at the time.

Demand for hard currency has placed unstinting pressure on the Yemeni riyal. Since the start of the protests in February, the riyal has lost about 20% of its value. It is unclear exactly how much the riyal has fallen in the last three or four months, since the CBY has failed to update its daily exchange-rate web page over that period. The riyal was trading at around YR213:US$1 before the outbreak of the unrest, and it reportedly slipped to YR240:US$1 in April. The medium-term concern is that additional depletion of Yemen's reserves could further weaken the riyal. However, the more immediate short-term concern is the impact the depreciation of the riyal is having on domestic consumer prices.

Consumer price data after January 2011 is not yet available, but local media have reported estimates from economists at the University of Aden, who claim that inflation may have risen to as high as 18% at the end of the first quarter, up from 11% at the end of 2010 (it had reached 12.9% at the end of January). Certainly, anecdotal evidence corroborates this; a 50-kg sack of sugar currently sells for YR11,000 (US$50) in Sanaa-and as high as YR14,000 in remote rural areas-up from its normal price of YR9,000. Similarly, the price of other staples, such as wheat, cooking oil and milk, are all believed to have increased by as much as 25%. Yemen relies heavily on imports of foodstuffs to meet its domestic needs, with imports of foodstuffs and live animals typically reaching around 22% of the total.

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Please see graphic below

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Land area

527,968 sq km

Population

23.6m (IMF, mid-2009 estimate)

Main towns and provinces

Population in '000 (2004 census)

Taiz: 2,403 Hajjah: 1,481

Ibb: 2,138 Dhamar: 1,339

Hodeida: 2,161 Hadramawt: 1,029

Sanaa city (capital): 1,748 Sanaa (province): 918

Climate

Northern and central highlands: warm in summer but cold in winter; Tihama and southern coast including Aden: hot; eastern plains and desert: hot, arid and harsh

Languages

Arabic (official); English is also used in official and business circles

Measures

Predominantly metric in the northern provinces and UK (imperial) in the south; local measures are also in use

Currency

Yemeni riyal (YR) = 100 fils. The riyal was floated on the open market in July 1996

Time

3 hours ahead of GMT

Public holidays

The dates of Islamic holidays are based on the lunar calendar and are therefore approximate. New Year's Day (January 1st); Mawlid al-Nabi (the birthday of the Prophet; February 15th 2011); Labour Day (May 1st); Unity Day (May 22nd); Revolution Day (September 26th); Eid al-Fitr (end of Ramadan; August 30th 2011); National Day (October 14th); Independence Day (November 30th); Eid al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice; November 6th 2011); Islamic New Year (November 26th 2011)

Official name

Republic of Yemen

Form of state

Republic, unified on May 22nd 1990

Legal system

Under the constitution of May 1991, sharia (Islamic law) is the principal source of law

Legislature

Unicameral assembly directly elected for a six-year term

National elections

September 20th 2006 (presidential); April 2003 (parliamentary). Next parliamentary election had been scheduled for April 2009, but was postponed for two years; next presidential election scheduled for 2013. However, the timing of both the presidential and parliamentary elections will depend on the outcome of the ongoing negotiations surrounding Mr Saleh's departure

Head of state

President (directly elected for a seven-year term): Ali Abdullah Saleh; vice-president: Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi

Executive

Council of Ministers headed by the prime minister. In March 2011 the president sacked the government, but a new cabinet has yet to be appointed

Political parties

There are 22 legal parties, five of which are represented in parliament: the General People's Congress (GPC, the ruling party); the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah, a religious-based party with tribal and Islamist wings); the Arab Socialist Baath Party; the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP); and the Nasserist Unionist Party (NUP). These, together with two opposition groups without parliamentary representation, the Union of Public Forces and al-Haq, form a loose parliamentary coalition, the Joint Meeting Parties

Government

Prime minister: Ali Mohammed Mujawer

Deputy prime minister for defence & security affairs, & local administration: Rashad al-Alimi

Deputy prime minister for interior affairs: Sadiq Amin Abu Ras

Deputy prime minister for economic affairs & planning & international co-operation: Abdel-Karim al-Arhabi

Key ministers

Agriculture & irrigation: Mansour Ahmed al-Hawshabi

Defence: Mohammed Nasser Ahmed Ali

Electricity & energy: Awad Saad al-Soqotri

Finance: Nouman Taher al-Souhaibi

Fisheries: Mohammed Saleh Shamlan

Foreign affairs & immigration: Abu Bakr Abdullah al-Qirbi

Human rights: Vacant

Interior: Mutaher al-Masri

Justice: Ghazi Shayef al-Aghbari

Labour & social affairs: Amat al-Razzak Ali Hamad

Oil & minerals: Amir Salem al-Edroos (suspended)

Public health & population: Abdel-Karim Rasei

Public works & roads: Omar Abdullah al-Qurshumi

Teaching & education: Abdel-Salam al-Jufi

Trade & industry: Hisham Sharaf

Transport: Khaled al-Wazir

Water & environment: Vacant

Central Bank governor

Mohammed Awadh bin Hamam