Country Report Cameroon January 2011

Outlook for 2011-12: Political stability

After 28 years as president, Paul Biya remains the pivot around which the state apparatus in Cameroon turns, and the Economist Intelligence Unit expects him to remain in office beyond the end of his term in 2011. However, political and social stability is fragile, owing to the lack of a clear successor to the 77-year-old president and the consequent jockeying for position within the ruling party, Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC). Rising insecurity, popular discontent and factionalism within the armed forces also pose serious risks. The dangers posed to regional stability by a fracturing regime are clear, and the international community has been called upon by civil society groups to put pressure on the regime to consolidate democracy and clarify the rules for the transfer of power.

The rules for presidential succession are, perhaps intentionally, unclear. According to the 1996 constitution, in the event of the president's death or incapacity the leader of the Senate succeeds to the office. However, the Senate has not yet been created. Mr Biya's age and reportedly fragile health mean that there is a chance that he will become incapacitated while in office. In that event there would be a power vacuum in which the country's 21 generals, military intelligence and the RDPC barons would struggle to take power.

Elites within the RDPC have been jockeying for position since Mr Biya's re-election in 2004, which would have been the start of his final term of office had he not changed the constitution to allow himself to run again in 2011. Signs of competition in the RDPC-and even between regional and ethnic alliances within the party-have become increasingly apparent. Although the president's frequent cabinet reshuffles and his manipulation of the anti-corruption campaign, known as Opération épervier, have reinforced his influence over the party elites, they have also intensified competition between his underlings.

Corruption within the bloated ranks of government, together with reports of the president's frequent and costly foreign trips, will continue to fuel popular resentment towards an administration perceived to be self-serving and out of touch with the hardships faced by most Cameroonians. Citizens have few avenues for democratic expression, as opposition political parties have been largely marginalised and freedom of speech is curtailed. As a result, rivalries between and within ethnic groups and regions, spikes in the cost of living, high unemployment and poor public services are all likely to trigger popular unrest. To compensate for the regime's lack of popular legitimacy, Mr Biya has relied heavily on the security services to maintain his authority and suppress discontent. However, rising indiscipline and dissatisfaction in the armed forces could become a threat to the regime itself. In recent months rumours of coup plots have circulated in the capital, Mr Biya has increasingly shied away from public appearances and there has been an observed increase in the presidential guard surrounding the presidency. Recently announced reforms within the military appear to be an attempt to appease junior officers and, given the president's long-standing hold on power, we assign a low probability of a successful coup plot.

© 2011 The Economist lntelligence Unit Ltd. All rights reserved
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