Outlook for 2011-12

• The Economist Intelligence Unit's core forecast is that the president, Paul Biya, will stand in and win re-election in 2011, in view of his dominance of the political scene and the lack of credible opposition.
• Mr Biya's party, Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC), is expected to follow suit in the legislative election scheduled for 2012 and to further consolidate its overwhelming majority in parliament.
• Rivalries between ethnic groups and regions, spikes in the cost of living, and a chronic lack of jobs, social welfare and services will increasingly manifest in outbursts of popular unrest in advance of the presidential election.
• Increased economic activity will support the fiscal position, but the government will struggle to control spending during a presidential election year. We forecast a fiscal deficit equivalent to 2.4% of GDP in 2011-12.
• Investment and increased mining output will raise real GDP growth to 3% in 2011 and further, to 4.3%, in 2012.
• The current-account deficit is expected to widen from an estimated 3.7% of GDP in 2010 to 4.5% of GDP in 2011 owing to falling oil production, before narrowing to 3.8% of GDP in 2012 as oil production recovers.

Monthly review

• The president paid a visit to the opposition-dominated anglophone North West region in December-his first trip to the region in nearly 20 years-to gather support in advance of the 2011 presidential election.
• During Mr Biya's trip to North West region and in his New Year's address he announced a raft of populist promises, including free malaria vaccination for under-fives and the building of an English-language university in Bamenda.
• Mr Biya has announced reforms to the security services, in order to placate junior officers, who have limited opportunities for advancement.
• The long-awaited Treasury-bond issuance on the Douala Stock Exchange was concluded in December and raised over CFAfr200bn (US$409m), which will finance the government's share of several infrastructure projects.
• A recent report from the Groupement inter-patronal du Cameroun (Gicam), Cameroon's main private-sector association, indicates that GDP growth in 2010, estimated at 2.6%, fell below the government's projections.
• Inflation remained subdued, falling to 1.1% at mid-year.
• Figures from the National Institute of Statistics indicate that Cameroon's trade balance worsened further during the first half of 2010, with the country having recorded its first trade deficit during 2009.

After 28 years as president, Paul Biya remains the pivot around which the state apparatus in Cameroon turns, and the Economist Intelligence Unit expects him to remain in office beyond the end of his term in 2011. However, political and social stability is fragile, owing to the lack of a clear successor to the 77-year-old president and the consequent jockeying for position within the ruling party, Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC). Rising insecurity, popular discontent and factionalism within the armed forces also pose serious risks. The dangers posed to regional stability by a fracturing regime are clear, and the international community has been called upon by civil society groups to put pressure on the regime to consolidate democracy and clarify the rules for the transfer of power.

The rules for presidential succession are, perhaps intentionally, unclear. According to the 1996 constitution, in the event of the president's death or incapacity the leader of the Senate succeeds to the office. However, the Senate has not yet been created. Mr Biya's age and reportedly fragile health mean that there is a chance that he will become incapacitated while in office. In that event there would be a power vacuum in which the country's 21 generals, military intelligence and the RDPC barons would struggle to take power.

Elites within the RDPC have been jockeying for position since Mr Biya's re-election in 2004, which would have been the start of his final term of office had he not changed the constitution to allow himself to run again in 2011. Signs of competition in the RDPC-and even between regional and ethnic alliances within the party-have become increasingly apparent. Although the president's frequent cabinet reshuffles and his manipulation of the anti-corruption campaign, known as Opération épervier, have reinforced his influence over the party elites, they have also intensified competition between his underlings.

Corruption within the bloated ranks of government, together with reports of the president's frequent and costly foreign trips, will continue to fuel popular resentment towards an administration perceived to be self-serving and out of touch with the hardships faced by most Cameroonians. Citizens have few avenues for democratic expression, as opposition political parties have been largely marginalised and freedom of speech is curtailed. As a result, rivalries between and within ethnic groups and regions, spikes in the cost of living, high unemployment and poor public services are all likely to trigger popular unrest. To compensate for the regime's lack of popular legitimacy, Mr Biya has relied heavily on the security services to maintain his authority and suppress discontent. However, rising indiscipline and dissatisfaction in the armed forces could become a threat to the regime itself. In recent months rumours of coup plots have circulated in the capital, Mr Biya has increasingly shied away from public appearances and there has been an observed increase in the presidential guard surrounding the presidency. Recently announced reforms within the military appear to be an attempt to appease junior officers and, given the president's long-standing hold on power, we assign a low probability of a successful coup plot.

Mr Biya is expected to win re-election in 2011 for another seven-year mandate, and the RDPC will add to its overwhelming majority in parliament in 2012. Through co-option and repression the president has marginalised the opposition parties. The largest of them, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), which relies largely on its regional and anglophone support base, now holds only 16 parliamentary seats out of 180, compared with 43 in 1997. The alleged manipulation of census results to favour the RDPC and recent amendments to electoral law, such as the restoration in April of the government's influence over the administration of elections, were met with scattered demonstrations. However, only the SDF leader, John Fru Ndi, continues to stand by his conditional boycott of the election, and this has led to a split in the SDF that is expected to further divide the opposition vote. Moreover, vain protests by the opposition against the ruling party's manipulations in the census and the organisation of the presidential elections have so far merely highlighted its impotence, increasing popular disillusionment with politics.

More significant challenges to Mr Biya's candidacy are expected to come from within the ruling party. However, as seen by the stillborn campaign bid by an RDPC member of parliament, Ayah Paul Abine, Mr Biya will continue to receive support from most of the higher cadres of government and the RDPC, who owe their privileged position to him. Moreover, none of the RDPC elites has managed-or been given the opportunity-to build much support beyond its particular region or ethnic group.

Although France will remain Cameroon's main foreign backer, the country will seek closer ties with other countries that are interested in its natural resources, which include oil, timber, metals and diamonds. Chinese demand for raw materials will remain strong, and China will continue to try to secure interests in Cameroon's oil, mining and forestry sectors, as well as contributing to infrastructure projects. The US ambassador has also made several recent statements indicating that the US is interested in investing in the country, perhaps as a challenge to China's presence in the region.

Economic policy over the forecast period-and beyond-will be guided by a medium-term development policy, published in January 2010 as Document de stratégie pour la croissance et l'emploi (DSCE). The key objectives of the DSCE are to accelerate economic growth, create employment and reduce poverty. To achieve these goals the government plans to increase infrastructure investment, improve access to finance for the private sector and foster human development through higher spending on health and education. However, the limited absorptive capacity of the various ministries, due in part to inefficiencies in public financial management systems, will cause actual investment expenditure to fall short of budgeted capital spending. Moreover, despite the administration's modest efforts to improve it, the business environment will remain among the most difficult in the world, owing to bureaucratic bottlenecks, corruption, poor infrastructure, lack of access to credit and an inefficient court system.

The government's current expenditure plans cannot be reconciled with the large stock of unsettled payment obligations carried forward from 2009, and the government is under pressure to reduce its budget. Local media had anticipated a reduction in the 2011 budget, but overall expenditure in 2011 is almost identical to the 2010 budget, producing a slight reduction in real terms. However, the government will struggle to contain recurrent expenditure and the accumulation of new domestic payment arrears, particularly in advance of the presidential election scheduled for late 2011. For example, in recent months the government has begun subsidising electricity costs and has boosted the size of the military. After the presidential election is held the government is expected to start tackling the budget deficit by reducing expenditure.

Oil revenue will fall in 2011 as prices stabilise and production continues to fall, but production will pick up in 2012 and revenue will increase. Non-oil revenue is forecast to continue to rise on the back of increased investment in sectors such as telecommunications, timber, mining, gas and construction. However, budgeted increases in the tax base from the informal sector are unlikely to be strictly enforced in the lead-up to the presidential election. In view of these trends, we forecast that the fiscal deficit will expand to 3.5% of GDP in 2011 but that in 2012 the deficit will reduce to 1.3% of GDP. The government should have no difficulty financing the deficits through domestic or concessional external borrowing.

Monetary policy is determined by the regional central bank, Banque des Etats de l'Afrique centrale (BEAC), which prioritises the control of inflation and the maintenance of the CFA franc's peg to the euro. Concerns about the fiscal sustainability and coherence of the euro area are set to persist into 2011 and the European Central Bank (ECB) is expected to maintain low interest rates over the forecast period. The BEAC rarely makes changes to the policy rate, as it has only a small effect on liquidity levels given the lack of depth in regional financial markets. Consequently, we expect the BEAC broadly to track the ECB and maintain its main policy rate, taux des appels d'offres, at 4% in 2011 and to raise it by 50 basis points towards the end of 2012.

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Following estimated real GDP growth of 2.8% in 2010, the economy is forecast to improve over the forecast period and to grow by 3% in 2011 and 4.3% in 2012. Growth in 2011 will be supported by government consumption (despite government claims to the contrary), investment and mining, but oil production will decline further, to 57,400 barrels/day (b/d). In 2012 oil production is expected to recover, to 64,100 b/d, as new wells start producing, which will drive exports and stronger growth. Investment in mining increased substantially in 2010, and several mines will begin production towards the end of the forecast period, further supporting growth in 2012.

The important timber subsector will remain buoyant, and a successful policy to stimulate first-stage wood processing locally will contribute modestly to job creation in the sector. Mining and infrastructure projects will drive construction, while other services such as banking, insurance and telecommunications will be supported by foreign investment. Camair, the revived national airline, is expected to start operating in 2011 and will contribute to growth in the services sector. Agricultural production will increase in 2012 as various agricultural development projects begin to show effects, despite falling international prices for agricultural exports and structural impediments in the sector, such as a lack of land rights and poor access to agricultural credit.

Owing to Cameroon's heavy dependence on imported food and fuel, consumer price inflation is affected considerably by movements in global prices for those commodities. Although the oil price will remain stable until 2012, investment and spending in 2010 will generate some inflation, and we forecast average inflation of 3.4% in 2011 and 3% in 2012.

The CFA franc is likely to remain pegged to the euro at a rate of CFAfr655.96:EUR1 during the forecast period, and will therefore fluctuate against the US dollar in line with the exchange rate between the dollar and the euro. We forecast a weaker euro in 2011 and in the medium term, amid persistent concerns about debt default and a break-up of the euro area. Although our assumptions about monetary policy in the euro zone and the US now imply that trends in interest-rate differentials will be broadly neutral for the exchange rate, concerns about euro-zone debt sustainability are likely to be the dominant factor in movements in the currency pair. Overall, we forecast that the CFA franc will average CFAfr524.8:US$1 in 2011 and CFAfr546.6:US$1 in 2012.

World prices for oil are expected to remain at around current levels over the forecast period but oil production will continue to fall in 2011. Overall, goods exports are expected to increase by only 3.6% in 2011, driven by agricultural and manufacturing exports. Exports will improve further in 2012, by 6.1%, as new oil production comes on stream. Increasing public capital investment and private inflows in the energy and mining sectors will stimulate import volumes over the period, and the trade balance will remain in deficit over the forecast period.

As international trade increases, the services deficit will increase to 2.2% of GDP in 2011-12 to pay for transport of goods. The income deficit will also creep up over the forecast period, to an average of 1.6% of GDP, in line with profit repatriation by foreign firms. Inflows of donor funds and a small increase in remittances will help to maintain the surplus on the current transfers account at an equivalent of 2.2% of GDP on average in 2011-12. Driven by trends in the trade account, the current-account deficit is forecast to widen in 2011, to 4.5% of GDP, before narrowing to 3.8% of GDP in 2012.

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In December the president, Paul Biya, travelled to the opposition-dominated North West province for the first time in almost 20 years for the Armed Forces' 50th anniversary celebrations. Although Mr Biya is yet to officially announce his candidacy for the 2011 presidential election due later this year, he appeared to be seeking votes during his visit by promising a university, roads and electricity to the region. His rare visit to the impoverished anglophone region took place amid tight security, although few signs of protests were visible despite prior threats from local political groups. People in North West province have long accused the regime of neglecting the region, and the area has been the major support base of the largest opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), since the first multiparty elections in 1992. It has also been the scene of occasional outbreaks of political violence and the centre of anglophone federalist and secessionist movements.

Consequently, scepticism was expressed as to whether the government will deliver on its promises or whether these were merely populist rhetoric. Similar pledges have been made to the region with little or no improvement on the ground. Mr Biya's most popular promise was the creation of a university in the region's capital, Bamenda, and within days the local higher education institution was upgraded to a university by a presidential decree. A group of community leaders immediately established a development fund to raise money to equip the university; however, since no provisions for its improvement have been made in the 2011 budget, its development may be slow and gradual. On the other hand, the president may seek to fast-track projects to increase his electoral support.

Despite the government's poor record on implementing capital projects, the president has made a raft of campaign-style promises to fast-track public works in advance of the presidential election. For example, contracts have already been awarded to a local construction firm to tar the Bamenda ring road, a road linking the commercial centres of the North West region (Wum, Nkambe, Kumbo, Ndop and Bamenda) and tarring is expected to begin soon. CFAfr12bn (US$24.5m) of the recent successful issuance of over CFAfr200bn-worth of bonds on the Douala Stock Exchange (DSX) in December are earmarked for upgrading the road, and the 2011 budget included the road in the capital budget of the Ministry of Public Works. This road would be expected to increase commerce and bring growth and jobs to the region, and, together with Mr Biya's visit, the regime hopes that these improvements will help it to gain a foothold in the country's main opposition stronghold in the forthcoming presidential and legislative elections. In addition to the president's pledges in the region, Mr Biya made a series of promises in his annual New Year's Eve speech, including free malaria treatment to all children under five and several social housing projects.

Political rivals since the nation's first multiparty presidential election in 1992, the founder and long-standing leader of the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF), John Fru Ndi, and the president, Paul Biya, met during Mr Biya's recent visit to the anglophone North West region, sparking rumours of a unity government. The regime hailed the meeting as a sign of the maturing and tolerant nature of Cameroon's democracy, and local media portrayed the opening of a dialogue as a historic moment in the country's democratic development. This image was further confirmed when, also for the first time, Mr Fru Ndi was invited to the presidential palace for the annual ceremony at which the country's political elites and foreign representatives greet the president.

During the meeting Mr Fru Ndi reportedly handed the president an 11-point memo, which is suspected to have been his 11 conditions for participation in the presidential election scheduled for late 2011 (November 2010, The political scene). Although the SDF may not pose an electoral threat to Mr Biya or his ruling party, Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC), the president's visit to the region and the two leaders' first-ever face-to-face meeting may indicate that the regime felt threatened by the SDF's proposed election boycott and the potential political alienation of the anglophone region. So far, the SDF's conditional boycott has not been met with much enthusiasm by some party members and has led to several high-profile members deserting the party (December 2010, The political scene). However, some of the SDF's election complaints have been seen by the Supreme Court and have generated small changes.

Mr Fru Ndi has been accused of being co-opted by the regime in the past. During the last presidential election, in 2004, local groups accused Mr Fru Ndi of accepting bribes from the ruling regime to disrupt the dynamism of the opposition. The recent meeting has been viewed by other opposition parties as a sign of Mr Fru Ndi's weakness. However, within days of their meeting Mr Fru Ndi again criticised the national election commission, Elecam, and threatened to organise nationwide demonstrations if the commission was not reformed. Although this was a somewhat vacuous threat from a politician whose support base is largely confined to his home region, it appears to rule out any possibility that the SDF has been bought out and bodes well for the continuation of discourse on the country's weak democratic institutions.

In an effort to ease tensions inside the armed forces, the president has announced several military reforms. The security services are characterised by internal frictions and many junior officers are disgruntled over the refusal of senior officers to retire for fear of losing their economic and political privileges. According to the reform programme, military ranks will be streamlined to speed up promotion from junior to senior positions and there will be a harmonisation of the retirement age. Furthermore, junior gendarmerie and army officers will be introduced in order to rejuvenate the army. What this will mean in practice for the country's 21 generals and their senior staff is uncertain, particularly as the president relies on their support to maintain his hold on power (November 2010, The political scene).

In addition to an overhaul of the military's career progression, Mr Biya also announced the introduction of a military housing scheme, a review of food allowances and the creation of a state secretariat for veteran affairs. He also promised to look into the possibility of a health assistance fund. Low pay, idleness, and frustration in the armed forces have led to criminality and a lack of discipline, which poses a threat to political stability. These reforms, unless they are associated with significant improvements in living standards in regular military units (rather than only for the elite units), are unlikely to placate junior officers.

Ayah Paul Abine, the outspoken Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC) member of parliament for South West province, has officially declared his intention to stand in the upcoming presidential election. The ruling party's constitution stipulates that the national chairman of the party, currently Mr Biya, is automatically its presidential candidate; however, Mr Ayah Paul has claimed that an ordinary congress, during which the leader of the party will be elected, is "imminent", referring to a recent statement by the secretary-general of the RDPC, René Emmanuel Sadi. Internal elections in the ruling party have in the past been criticised for being rigged, and Mr Sadi, together with other party leaders, has repeatedly said that the party remains united behind Mr Biya's candidacy. Mr Ayah's bid to become RDPC candidate is unlikely to succeed, and although his regular critiques of the regime's policies-such as the unpopular 2008 constitutional amendment-have won him plaudits among his constituents, he will not pose a serious challenge even if he decides to form his own party.

The president of the board of directors of the DSX, Benedict Belibi, has hailed the long-awaited issuance of CFAfr200bn-worth (US$409m-worth) of Treasury bonds in December as a "huge success". The bond issuance, which was the government's first (October 2010, Economic policy), attracted over 800 subscribers from across the regional economic grouping, Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale (CEMAC), as well as from Belgium, China and France. Despite an extension of the subscription period from seven to fifteen days-which suggests an initial lack of interest-the government appears to have exceeded its funding target. The Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development assigned CFAfr206bn-worth of the funds raised to infrastructure spending.

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The public offering comprised at least 20m shares issued at a price of CFAfr10,000 (US$20.40). The maturity period of the bond is five years and the interest rate is 5.6%. Although interest earnings will apparently be exempt from taxation, the government has a one-year grace period before repayment-interest will start to accumulate from end-December 2011 and be payable from end-December 2012. According to local media, the government, in order to reassure investors, will establish an autonomous account at the regional central bank, Banque des Etats de l'Afrique centrale (BEAC), into which monthly payments will accrue. Given the success of the first bond issue, another issuance equivalent to CFAfr150bn is planned for May 2011. In the light of the excess liquidity in the banking sector (October 2010, Economic performance) the crowding-out of private investment is not a major concern of increased domestic borrowing. However, domestic borrowing comes at a higher price than concessional foreign debt and may begin to raise alarm bells about sustainability if the government becomes addicted to this new source of funds.

The government had announced that funds raised from the CFAfr200bn bond issuance would be used to co-finance the much-anticipated infrastructure projects, and on December 28th (one day before the issuance was officially validated by the financial markets commission) local media reported that bulldozers had started clearing land at the site of the Kribi deep-sea port. The project had been delayed by six months owing to negotiations over compensation to locals-which is expected to cost a total of CFAfr24bn-and uncertainties over the financing of the project. The majority of the port project, estimated to cost CFAfr215bn, will be financed by the Chinese government; the government of Cameroon's financing contribution will be roughly 10%.

A quick disbursement to kick-start the port project is a positive sign, considering the poor execution of capital projects-estimated at roughly 50% between 2006 and 2009 (September 2010, Economic policy)-but spending on infrastructure will remain below target in the 2010 budget. Although the government raised the equivalent of 30% of the 2010 capital budget in the bond issuance, several regions reported execution rates of less than 10% during the first nine months of the year, and the norm was between 30% and 40%. Moreover, the bond issuance itself was delayed until the end of the financial year, which implies that it will be used largely either to settle payment arrears or to boost execution rates in 2011. In addition to poor execution rates, the government has a poor record on implementing quality projects. According to an audit of road projects conducted in November 2010, only 53% of roads constructed between November 2008 and September 2010 were considered "good" or "satisfactory".

Although the government has clearly prioritised infrastructure spending in the 2011 budget (December 2010, Economic policy), distorted procurement processes, embezzlement and weak monitoring will continue to haunt development projects in Cameroon. Acknowledging this problem in his New Year's speech, Mr Biya laid the blame for his government's poor record on the shoulders of "egocentric" and "unpatriotic" officials. A number of reforms in recent years to strengthen parliamentary and citizen control in the implementation of public investment projects have achieved little, casting doubts on how efficiently the funds raised from the bond will be spent if the government is responsible for implementation.

The Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index ranks Cameroon 126th out of 167 countries, placing it in the list of states considered to be governed by authoritarian regimes. Cameroon's ranking is above that of neighbouring Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, which are placed at 133rd and 160th, but is marginally below Nigeria, which is ranked 123rd. Cameroon's lowest score, of 1.17 (with 10 being the best possible score), is for electoral process, reflecting the frequent allegations of electoral fraud and the amendment of the constitution in 2008 to allow presidents to serve an indefinite number of terms in office. Cameroon's highest-scoring indicator, of 5, for political culture, is just above the regional average, 4.96, benefiting from the country's relative political and economic stability. Cameroon receives its next-best score, of 4.29, for functioning of government, reflecting the relative quality of the bureaucracy, which nonetheless suffers from severe shortcomings, and the government's overwhelming parliamentary majority, which facilitates the passage of its legislative agenda.

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More of the same

Reflecting the country's political stagnation and the 28 years that the president, Paul Biya, has been in power, the underlying indicators of the quality of Cameroon's democracy have changed very little since the 2008 index was prepared. Overall Cameroon's score fell from 3.46 in 2008 to 3.41 in 2010, and its global ranking was unchanged. The sole, slight improvement to Cameroon's score was for political participation, as a result of the greater representation of women in parliament; 14% of the members of parliament in Cameroon were women in 2009. The score for political participation, however, still remains low, at 2.78, well below the regional average of 3.74. The overall score decline was driven by a fall in the country's score for civil liberties, which fell from 4.12 in 2008 to 3.82 in 2010 as a result of two new laws regulating Internet usage. The new laws were introduced ostensibly to fight Internet criminality. According to a US-based computer security company, McAfee, Cameroon's web domain suffix, ".cm", was the world's riskiest web domain in 2009: more than one-third of websites using the suffix were considered a "security risk". However, the new law regulating electronic media, among other things, extends libel laws to the Internet (including to newspapers, blogs and discussion boards) and appears to be a further step in the government's crackdown on dissent ahead of the 2011 presidential election.

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Democracy index 2010: Democracy in retreat, a free white paper containing the full index and detailed methodology, can be downloaded from www.eiu.com/DemocracyIndex2010.

Note on methodology

There is no consensus on how to measure democracy and definitions of democracy are contested. Having free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political freedom, is the sine qua non of all definitions. However, our index is based on the view that measures of democracy that reflect the state of political freedom and civil liberties are not "thick" enough: they do not encompass sufficiently some crucial features that determine the quality and substance of democracy. Thus, the index also includes measures of political participation, political culture and functioning of government, which are, at best, marginalised by other measures.

Our index of democracy covers 167 countries and territories. The index, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. The five categories are inter-related and form a coherent conceptual whole. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five category indexes.

The category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator scores in the category, converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Adjustments to the category scores are made if countries fall short in the following critical areas for democracy:

• whether national elections are free and fair;
• the security of voters;
• the influence of foreign powers on government; and
• the capability of the civil service to implement policies.

The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regime:

• full democracies-scores of 8 to 10;
• flawed democracies-scores of 6 to 7.9;
• hybrid regimes-scores of 4 to 5.9;
• authoritarian regimes-scores below 4.

Recently released statistics from the Groupement inter-patronal du Cameroun (Gicam), Cameroon's main private-sector association, indicate that GDP growth in 2010 fell below the government's projections. According to Gicam the economy grew by 2.6% in 2010; the IMF also estimated economic growth of 2.6% in its November regional overview. This is below the forecast that the government used in the 2010 budget, of 3.9%, and its forecast after the first quarter, of 3.7% (April 2010, Economic performance). Moreover, the latest estimates are well below the government's objective of 5.5% average growth between 2010 and 2020.

Both the chairman of Gicam and the finance minister, Lazare Essimi Menye, largely blamed the poor economic performance on the fall in oil production. Mr Menye also highlighted gaps in domestic spending due to the payment of arrears (September 2010, Economic policy), while the Gicam chairman emphasised the country's increasing dependence on agricultural imports and the poor business environment, particularly lamenting procedures for cross-border trade and lengthy tax procedures (November & December 2010, Economic performance). These poor growth figures will add even greater urgency to the government's investment plans.

According to the National Institute of Statistics, in mid-2010 annual consumer price inflation stood at 1.1%, compared with 5% a year earlier. The minimal price rises were driven primarily by beverages, education and recreation. The political and economic capitals, Yaoundé and Douala, enjoyed the lowest levels of annual inflation, of 0.7% and 0.6% respectively. The far-flung provincial capitals, Garoua and Bamenda, had higher levels of inflation, at 2.3% and 2% respectively, although these levels remain easily within comfortable margins. The regime will be eager to maintain the low levels of inflation, given the recent history of food price-related riots in 2008, in which a number of people were killed, and particularly in advance of the presidential election scheduled for late 2011.

According to the National Institute of Statistics (NIS), Cameroon's trade deficit in the second quarter of 2010 was worse than during the same period in 2009, which was the first year in which Cameroon had run a trade deficit, according to data from the IMF dating back to 1979 (April 2010, Economic performance). The quarterly data released by the NIS indicate that exports in the second quarter of 2010 were 8.5% lower than in the same quarter in 2009, driven by a fall in oil exports (down by 16.7%). Meanwhile, imports increased by 12.2% in value terms over the same period. According to the NIS, cereals and rice increased by 70.6% and 54.9% in value terms over the period, while crude oil imports increased by almost 50%, driven by higher international prices.

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Land area

475,442 sq km

Population

19.1m (IMF estimate for 2009)

Main towns

Population in '000 (2010; World Gazetteer estimates)

Douala: 2,132

Yaoundé (capital): 1,812

Garoua: 574

Bamenda: 546

Maroua: 437

Bafoussam: 383

Ngaoundéré: 314

Bertoua: 297

Loum: 249

Climate

There is a large variation from north to south; the north has seven or eight months of dry season, whereas the equatorial south has a similar period of rain

Weather in Yaoundé (altitude 770 metres)

Hottest months, January-March, 19-29°C; coolest month, August, 18-27°C; driest month, January, 23 mm average rainfall; wettest month, October, 295 mm average rainfall

Language

French and English are the official languages; around 200 local languages are also spoken

Measures

Metric system

Currency

CFA franc; CFAfr100:FFr1; CFAfr655.96:EUR

Fiscal year

January 1st-December 31st (before 2003, July 1st-June 30th)

Time

1 hour ahead of GMT

Public holidays

Fixed: January 1st (New Year's Day); February 11th (Youth Day); May 1st (Labour Day); May 20th (National Day); August 15th (Assumption); December 25th (Christmas Day); Moveable: Eid al-Fitr; Eid al-Adha; Good Friday; Ascension

All Islamic holidays are observed in accordance with the lunar calendar; this may mean that the following dates are approximate: Mawlid al-Nabi (the birthday of the Prophet, February 15th 2011); Eid al-Fitr (end of Ramadan, August 30th); Eid al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice, November 6th); Islamic New Year (November 26th)

Official name

République du Cameroun

Form of state

Unitary republic

Legal system

Based on English common law and the Napoleonic Code

National legislature

National Assembly with 180 members; elected by universal suffrage; members sit three times a year, in March, June and November, and serve a term of five years

National elections

October 2004 (presidential) and July 2007 (legislative); next elections due in October 2011 (presidential) and July 2012 (legislative)

Head of state

President; elected by universal suffrage

National government

Consists of the prime minister and Council of Ministers; includes representatives of the RDPC, the UDC and the UNDP; the cabinet was last reshuffled in June 2009

Main political parties

Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC), 153 seats in the National Assembly; Social Democratic Front (SDF), 16 seats; Union démocratique du Cameroun (UDC), six seats; Union nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès (UNDP), four seats; and Mouvement progressiste (MP), one seat

President: Paul Biya

Prime minister: Philemon Yang

Deputy prime minister & minister of justice: Amadou Ali

Deputy prime minister & minister of agriculture & rural development: Jean Nkuete

Ministers of state

Post & telecommunications: Jean Pierre Biyiti Bi Essam

Presidency: Laurent Esso

Territorial administration & decentralisation: Marafa Hamidou Yaya

Urban development & housing: Clobert Tchatat

Key ministers

Communications: Issa Tchiroma Bakary

Defence: Edgar Alain Mebe Ngo'o

Economy, planning & regional development: Louis Paul Motaze

Energy & water: Michael Tomdjio Ngako

Environment: Pierre Hele

External relations: Henri Eyebe Ayissi

Finance: Lazare Essimi Menye

Health: André Mama Fouda

Higher education: Jacques Fame Ndongo

Industry, mining & technology: Ndanga Ndinga Badel

Livestock & fisheries: Aboubakary Sarki

Primary education: Youssouf née Adjidja Alim

Public works: Bernard Messengue Avom

Tourism: Baba Hamadou

Trade: Luc Magloire Mbarga Atangana

Transport: Maïgari Bello Bouba

Governor of Banque des Etats de l'Afrique centrale

Lucas Abaga Nchama