Country Report Bangladesh April 2011

Outlook for 2011-15: Political stability

Assuming that it retains the support of the security forces, the ruling Awami League (AL) is expected to dominate parliamentary proceedings until 2014, when its term expires, following its landslide victory in the December 2008 general election. The AL currently controls 229 of the 300 parliamentary seats, more than the two-thirds majority needed to pass constitutional amendments. Its commanding position in the legislature also means that the AL can continue to govern without the support of any of the other members of the Grand Alliance, the group of 14 parties that it leads. The main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has just 31 parliamentary seats. The government faces no immediate challenge to its rule. However, there are two main potential sources of political instability before the next parliamentary election, which must be held by April 2014: an escalation in social unrest (perhaps sparked by food, power or water shortages, or by a sustained programme of dissent by the BNP), and a new campaign of violence by militant groups.

As has long been the case for the party in opposition in Bangladesh, the BNP will try to capitalise on public discontent, and will use parliamentary boycotts and street agitation as a means of protesting against the government and attempting to wrest power from the AL. However, there is a limit on the number of days for which a member of parliament (MP) can boycott the legislature. Under the current rules, MPs stand to lose their membership of parliament if they are absent for 90 consecutive days. Having boycotted parliamentary sessions since June last year, members of the opposition parties returned to parliament briefly on March 15th. The opposition are likely to continue with this strategy of absenteeism during the remainder of the current parliament.

Aside from the BNP's use of public disgruntlement over rising consumer prices and energy shortages as a means of attacking the AL, other developments in the months ahead are likely to lead to street clashes between the two parties. One source of tension is the war crimes tribunal that began its work last year. A number of senior figures in the BNP and its main ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami party, stand accused of committing atrocities during the 1971 war of secession with West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and so face possible execution. The BNP and Jamaat are united in their opposition to the trials, which they claim are politically motivated (although the BNP does not object to a war crimes tribunal in principle). The tribunal could have other repercussions, possibly including violent acts perpetrated by Jamaat's supporters and an Islamist fringe that is well disposed towards the party.

Unlike the country's previous democratically elected government, led by the BNP, the current government has admitted that a number of terrorist groups are active in Bangladesh. It has adopted a proactive approach that involves closer surveillance and attempts to restrict the flow of funds to these organisations. The Economist Intelligence Unit believes that the risk of a severe deterioration in the internal security situation in the forecast period is low, primarily because officials will continue to exercise firm control over the army and the police, both of which can be deployed quickly to reinforce law and order. Should the situation deteriorate drastically, the government could impose emergency rule as a last resort.

Another possible source of political instability is the army itself. Although its leadership does not appear to harbour political ambitions, any breakdown of the political process similar to the stalemate that prevailed in the run-up to the imposition of emergency rule in January 2007 would carry the risk of intervention by the military. However, the risk of army interference in government appears to be far lower now than in the past. The army chief of staff, General Muhammad Abdul Mubeen, is thought to have been chosen by the current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed. More importantly, he threw his support behind the government during a mutiny in February 2009 by members of a paramilitary force, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB).

© 2011 The Economist lntelligence Unit Ltd. All rights reserved
Whilst every effort has been taken to verify the accuracy of this information, The Economist lntelligence Unit Ltd. cannot accept any responsibility or liability for reliance by any person on this information
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