Country Report Sudan March 2011

The political scene: In focus

Abyei in the middle

The outbreak of fighting in Abyei province on February 27th highlights that many key issues between north and south remain unresolved, despite January's referendum on southern independence. Abyei has long been a disputed region and is increasingly referred to as "Sudan's Kashmir": a region that may provide an intractable conflict between north and south in years to come. Abyei lies between the northern state of South Kordofan and the southern state of North Bahr al-Ghazal. Under the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended Sudan's civil war, Abyei was declared simultaneously part of both states, subject to a separate referendum to determine whether it would join the north or the south. However this referendum, scheduled for January 9th 2011, did not take place, after the north and south governments failed to agree on its terms. With little indication of when this vote will eventually happen, increased tension and violence remain likely.

The dispute has historical and ethnic components and much to do with oil and water resources. Abyei is dominated by two tribal groups. To the south are the largely Christian and Animist sedentary Ngok Dinka, kin of the Dinka who dominate the ruling Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Southern Sudan. To the north are the largely Muslim nomadic Missiriya, who herd their cattle into Abyei during the dry season and depend on the River Kiir's year-round flows. Despite an historical cohabitation, Sudan's first civil war (1956-72) divided the province's communities. During the second civil war (1983-2005), these differences were exacerbated as the Ngok Dinka largely sided with the south, with many of the SPLM's leaders originating from Abyei, and the Missiriya became clients of the north's ruling National Congress Party (NCP), with many eventually joining government-backed militias. Abyei formed a key battleground, and several thousand inhabitants, mostly Ngok Dinka, were displaced. Moreover, even after the civil war officially ended in 2005, Abyei was the source of direct clashes between the SPLM and northern backed militias, and later Sudanese army troops in 2007-08, causing a further 25,000 to be displaced.

One of the key questions is whether such refugees, currently living in the south, should vote in the long-awaited referendum. Moreover, should the Missiriya, who are resident in the province for only a few months a year when they are grazing, be entitled to vote too? Even without the refugees, the Ngok Dinka outnumber the Missiriya in Abyei for most of the year and would probably vote to join the south, fearing persecution from the Islamist northern government if they remain in the north. However, during the dry season the Missiriya outnumber the Ngok Dinka and, if classed as residents in the referendum, would probably ensure Abyei became northern, fearing the loss of crucial water resources if it was given to the south.

All about oil?

Augmenting these ethnic disputes has been Abyei's oil. Part of the reason why the north sponsored Missiriya militia to harass the Ngok Dinka during the civil war was to get access to the oil discovered there in the 1970s and 1980s. By 2003 Abyei was producing 76,000 barrels/day (b/d), or 25% of Sudan's total oil production at that time. However, since then production has declined as other fields have come on stream. Moreover, after a long-drawn-out dispute between north and south over what the borders of Abyei were, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague decreed that the key oilfields of Bamboo and Heglig 2B were outside Abyei and actually part of the northern state of South Kordofan. With both sides accepting this ruling in 2009, the only field left in Abyei was Diffra, which produced less than 4,000 b/d in 2009. Overall, 85% of Sudan's oil production comes from southern oil fields and only 15% (including Diffra) comes from the north. Although oil revenue is currently split equally between north and south, after independence, Southern Sudan will switch to paying the north a transit fee for using its Red Sea pipeline, depriving Sudan of previous revenue. Although this might increase the importance of Diffra, Sudan's Ministry of Oil is confident that new fields elsewhere and more efficient extraction will compensate the north and that it will eventually produce more oil than its newly independent southern neighbour. Oil then should not be exaggerated as the cause of the continued Abyei dispute.

The determination of the NCP and the SPLM to hold onto Abyei has as much to do with domestic politics as oil. Both Ngok Dinka and some southern politicians have accused the Sudanese government of deliberately stirring up trouble in Abyei to both secure Abyei's resources for the north and to simultaneously undermine southern Sudan's preparations for independence. Yet some reports suggest that the president, Omar al-Bashir, has less control over the actions of the Missiriya and other militias than often supposed, and is turning a blind eye to avoid being damaged domestically. The Missiriya traditionally supported the opposition Umma Party before being won over to the NCP during the civil war. The NCP want to retain Abyei to keep Missiriya support and deprive their rivals at a time when their authority is questioned by the secession of the south and continued unrest in Darfur. They also fear that losing more territory will weaken them further. The north, in turn, has accused the south of encouraging Ngok Dinka militancy. For the south too, the Ngok Dinka are a key constituency of the SPLM's and their credibility will be damaged if Abyei's sedentary residents feel abandoned to the north. Moreover, if Abyei joins the north it could spark yet another refugee crisis of Ngok Dinka fleeing south, which the fragile new state would struggle to cope with.

The beginning of the dry season, when the Missiriya traditionally enter the disputed region to seek water has only exacerbated the current violence. Tribal leaders have looked to Mr Bashir and southern president, Salva Kiir, for a solution but, since both pledging in late January 2011 that a referendum would happen in March, little has happened, and none of the key disputes standing in the way of the vote taking place have been resolved. Both leaders are due to meet with Thabo Mbeki, a former South African president, to discuss the matter in the capital, Khartoum, later in March. However, many of Abyei's residents may begin wondering if the current impasse will share the fate of a similar vote promised after the end of the first civil war in 1972 that never came to take place. This proved to be one of the many unresolved issues that helped reignite the second civil war in 1983, and the war-weary residents of Abyei will hope that history does not repeat itself.

© 2011 The Economist lntelligence Unit Ltd. All rights reserved
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