After 28 years as president, Paul Biya remains the pivot around which the state apparatus in Cameroon turns, and the Economist Intelligence Unit expects him to remain in office beyond the end of his term in 2011. However, political and social stability is fragile, owing to the lack of a clear successor to the 78-year old president and the consequent jockeying for position within the ruling party, Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC). Rising insecurity, popular discontent and factionalism within the armed forces also pose serious risks. As the franc zone's major economy, the dangers caused to regional stability by a fracturing regime are clear, and civil society groups have called upon the international community to put pressure on the regime to consolidate democracy and clarify the rules for the transfer of power.

Mr Biya's age and reportedly fragile health mean there is a risk of him becoming incapacitated while in office. Revisions to the electoral laws in April state that if the presidency were to become vacant, then a presidential election would be hastily organised within 120 days. However, disagreements over who should assume the acting leadership of the country during the transition would result in a power struggle between the country's generals, military intelligence and the RDPC barons. Under the 1996 constitution the leader of the Senate should be named president; however, the Senate does not exist.

Elites within the RDPC have been jockeying for position since Mr Biya's re-election in 2004, which would have been the start of his final term of office had he not changed the constitution to allow himself to run again in 2011. While the RDPC officially remains united behind Mr Biya, there are signs of fierce competition within the party-between regions, age groups and ethnic alliances. Although the president's frequent cabinet reshuffles and his manipulation of the anti-corruption campaign, known as Opération épervier, have reinforced his influence over the party elites, they have also intensified competition between his underlings.

Corruption within the bloated ranks of government, together with reports of the president's frequent and costly foreign trips, will continue to fuel popular resentment towards an administration perceived to be self-serving and out of touch with the hardships faced by most Cameroonians. Living standards have improved little in the past ten years and citizens have few avenues for democratic expression, as opposition political parties have been largely marginalised and freedom of speech is curtailed. In light of this and a growing youth unemployment problem, a popular uprising of the type seen in Egypt and Tunisia cannot be ruled out (although it remains unlikely in Cameroon, as demonstrated by the weak popular response to the recent efforts by opposition parties and civil society groups to mobilise the population). The government has played up the expectations of economic and social development in the run-up to the presidential election. This could backfire if it fails to deliver, and particularly if the election process is considered to be rigged. To compensate for the regime's lack of popular legitimacy, Mr Biya has relied heavily on the security services to maintain his authority and suppress discontent. Recent reforms within the military appear to be an attempt to appease junior officers and prevent indiscipline and dissatisfaction in the armed forces from threatening the regime. As a result of the recent reforms and the president's long-standing hold on power, we assign a low probability to a successful military coup plot or a popular overthrow of the regime.