Country Report Myanmar January 2011

Outlook for 2011-12: Political stability

There have been a number of dramatic political developments in Myanmar in recent months. National elections were held for the first time in two decades on November 7th, and six days later the iconic pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, was released from house-arrest. Although these events mean that in the next year or two the country will undergo its most profound political shake-up for many years, the Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that there will be no major change in the balance of power in the country and that the military regime will remain the dominant force.

The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, the ruling military junta) is no doubt disquieted by the scenes of thousands of people massing to see and hear Aung San Suu Kyi following her release from house-arrest on November 13th. But the fact that the military regime allowed her to go free less than a week after the elections suggests that it is confident of its position. The leading generals must be satisfied that they have achieved their domestic aims in the recent polls, given that the main military-aligned party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won a landslide victory. With the elections out of the way, the regime may have calculated that it was advantageous to allow Aung San Suu Kyi a degree of freedom, both to deflect foreign criticism of the poll result (and divert attention away from it), and also to reduce the potential for a violent domestic backlash (especially as Aung San Suu Kyi is likely to be especially authoritative in her advocacy of a non-violent approach by the opposition).

There is no suggestion, though, that the generals, having released their most formidable opponent, are now set to embark on an inclusive reform process. They remain firmly focused on implementing controlled reforms that will cement the military regime's grip on power under so-called "disciplined democracy". They are also trying to limit the risk that generational change will result in a major split within the military elite. The SPDC's ageing leader, Senior General Than Shwe, has sought to establish and control a new political order, still military-dominated and with his allies at the helm. This process has involved the promulgation in 2008 of a new constitution that ensures the perpetuation of a leading role for the military in running the country. It is also the likely rationale behind the decision to hold the elections, which were rigged to ensure that the majority of seats in the new lower and upper houses of parliament went to the USDP. General Than Shwe himself could also still choose to take up the new post of president (and head of state). Apart from ongoing battles with the armed wings of ethnic-minority groups in the border regions, the SPDC so far has succeeded in stage-managing every aspect of the political transition.

Freeing Aung San Suu Kyi was undoubtedly a calculated risk on the part of the generals, as there is still the possibility that the military regime will struggle to contain the popular forces for change that will be galvanised by her leadership. Scenes of euphoria in the streets of the former capital, Yangon, confirm that Aung San Suu Kyi has lost none of her mass appeal, despite having spent the past seven and a half years in detention, mainly under house-arrest. She remains the figurehead for the pro-democracy movement, and the military's efforts to undermine her-not least by depriving her of her freedom for some 15 of the past 21 years-have failed utterly. Although stating that she is willing to work with the generals, Aung San Suu Kyi appears determined to effect change that will ultimately deprive the military of political control and will place power in the hands of the people. It seems inevitable, therefore, that at some stage Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters will again overstep the boundaries of the generals' limited tolerance of opposition and dissent. Myanmar's history contains a number of bloody reminders of the generals' brutality in suppressing those who dare to challenge their authority.

Although the military will remain on the alert to quell any nascent pro-democracy uprising in the country's major cities during the coming months of political transition, it is in the border regions, which are populated-and in part controlled-by numerous ethnic-minority groups, where the military faces the major threats to its dominance. During the past year or so tensions have escalated in several areas (even where ethnic-minority organisations have signed ceasefire agreements) because of the junta's policy of forcing ethnic groups to transform their armies into Border Guard Forces controlled by the military. Most are reluctant to do so, as they see their armed wings as a guarantee of a degree of self-determination. Tensions and fighting have already escalated in several areas in recent weeks, partly in protest against the conduct of the elections, voting in which was banned in a number of regions dominated by ethnic-minority groups.

© 2011 The Economist lntelligence Unit Ltd. All rights reserved
Whilst every effort has been taken to verify the accuracy of this information, The Economist lntelligence Unit Ltd. cannot accept any responsibility or liability for reliance by any person on this information
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