Country Report Bahrain April 2011

The political scene: Crown prince calls for dialogue, but protests escalate

For a period of three weeks in late February and early March, talks between the government and opposition groups stalled and protests escalated. An initial meeting between government and opposition representatives took place on February 20th but did not lead to a fully-fledged national dialogue. Al-Wefaq, the main legally recognised Shia opposition group, has tended over the past few years to seek dialogue and take a conciliatory approach, but it now faces pressure from a range of other opposition groups and protesters that said that the government was not serious about reform and should step down. Al-Wefaq therefore said in mid-February that the government should accept the idea of a constitutional monarchy as a precondition for dialogue. Later, on March 4th, al-Wefaq and six other opposition societies demanded the resignation of the government-including the long-serving prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa-before taking part in the dialogue.

It appears that the demand for the departure of Sheikh Khalifa was the main stumbling block. Several other Arab countries, including Oman and Kuwait, have changed their cabinets this year. However, Sheikh Khalifa, the uncle of King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, is one of the most powerful figures in Bahrain, as well as one of the most senior members of the Al Khalifa family, and is the only prime minister Bahrain has ever had.

On March 13th the crown prince, Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, said that a wide range of issues would be on the table for discussion, including corruption, fair electoral representation and naturalisation policy. This was the closest he had come to using the opposition's language and recognising their demands. But Sheikh Salman's call for a wide-ranging dialogue was undermined both by protesters and by other parts of the government: on the same day that he made his statements, street protests escalated and the decision was taken to call in troops from member states of the Gulf Co-operation Council.

Protesters and opposition groups had been divided over the issue of negotiating with the government, with many saying that they needed to see actions rather than promises. The opposition groups are also split over whether to seek the overthrow of the monarchy (favoured by Haq and al-Wafa, two hardline opposition groups) or a constitutional monarchy (favoured by al-Wefaq). Some of the street protesters hardened their tactics to put further pressure on the government. Two days before Sheikh Salman's address, they had already marched to the Royal Court, which is located in the wealthy Sunni area of Riffa, where many royals live. Many residents of the area saw the march as an act of aggression. The marchers were in turn met by vigilantes who said that they would defend their neighbourhood. Serious clashes were averted, but the incident created fears of sectarian violence. After this point, many government supporters lost sympathy with the protesters, with Bahrainis polarised into "pro-government" and "anti-government" blocs. The political split has also become increasingly sectarian as fears spread among the Sunni community that the protesters were following an Iranian agenda, as alleged by the government.

Also on March 13th, protesters began to set up roadblocks to disrupt traffic and business in the diplomatic area of Manama, the capital. They blocked access to the Bahrain Financial Harbour, a high-profile property development by the sea where many international financial institutions have their operations. Meanwhile, pro-government vigilante groups emerged and a few violent incidents stoked fears of more serious sectarian conflict. In addition, at least four Asian migrant workers were murdered in March. Mona Almoayyed, the president of the Migrant Workers' Protection Society, said that it thought that anti-government youth protesters had attacked them, mistaking them for members of the security forces.

© 2011 The Economist lntelligence Unit Ltd. All rights reserved
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