The scale of the task facing the new prime minister of the transitional federal government (TFG), Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo, became clear in October, when the debate over his endorsement at the Federal Transitional Parliament (FTP) degenerated into fisticuffs. The fact that parliamentary approval for Mr Farmajo's appointment took more than two weeks, and that approval of his cabinet was a similarly drawn-out affair, indicates that the political rifts within the TFG that led to the resignation of Mr Farmajo's predecessor, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, have not gone away. Mr Sharmarke left his post because of long-running differences with the interim president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and a similar rift is now developing between the president and the parliamentary speaker, Sharif Hasan Sheikh Aden. Such in-fighting is an important reason why many Somalis have no faith in the interim government; another is that it remains entirely dependent on foreign assistance for its survival.

Foreign governments will continue to support the security forces loyal to the interim administration by providing training and materials. However, Mr Farmajo's administration will remain heavily reliant on the small African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) for the remainder of its mandate, which expires in August 2011; its successor is likely to be just as dependent on Amisom, at least until 2012. Repeated calls for the strengthening of the Amisom force, which numbered 8,000 troops in mid-January, may be met by Uganda, already the biggest contributor to the force, but only if it receives help with funding, logistics and equipment. This became more likely with the UN Security Council's decision in December to authorise the expansion of the African Union (AU) force to 12,000 soldiers. A larger Amisom presence, together with a more committed national security force, could greatly expand the TFG's currently limited sphere of military influence. However, Amisom's main role of protecting the TFG has also made it a focal point for the Islamist insurgency.

Moreover, the threat from the insurgency will grow in the coming months following an agreement to merge by the two main insurgent groups, al-Shabab (Youth) and Hizbul Islam (Party of Islam). Large swathes of central and southern Somalia are expected to remain under the control of al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam in 2011-12. Compounding an already dire security situation, the recent failure of the deyr rainy season (September-December), upon which most Somalis depend for farming and pastoralism, is set to increase food insecurity from already alarmingly high levels. The Islamists' refusal to allow foreign humanitarian agencies to operate in their territory will condemn many thousands to hunger. The number of internally displaced people is therefore set to increase, particularly in the capital, Mogadishu, where many pastoralists will flee in search of food, despite the high security risks.

Acts of piracy by Somalis off the Horn of Africa, including the hijacking of ships and the kidnapping of their crews for ransom, are likely to remain frequent throughout the forecast period, given the expected continuation of instability onshore. The greater focus of US policy towards Somalia on the semi-autonomous region of Puntland will mean more efforts towards the development of viable alternative livelihoods for those currently engaged in piracy. However, a well-equipped and organised hard core will remain unwilling to forgo such a lucrative racket in favour of legitimate occupations such as fishing.