Overall, the Economist Intelligence Unit's central forecast remains that the president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, will remain in power until the next presidential election, in 2014, despite the protests sweeping across the region. However, the outlook for political instability has risen markedly in the past several months. Supporting the president is the fact that he won an election, which was generally endorsed as fair by independent observers. Although most opposition parties still cry foul over the poll and the fact that it derived from a military coup, the issue no longer resonates with the wider public, which mostly accept that Mr Abdel Aziz's election was fair or is at least a fait accompli to be accepted grudgingly. Somewhat hindered by the country's low population density, so far the February 25th Movement, a youth movement inspired by the mass protest movements elsewhere in the Arab world, has not developed a critical mass so as to threaten the existence of the regime through the street, and the movement has not engaged the regime in genuine dialogue to advance practical issues such as electoral reform.

The government's campaign against a regional Islamist terrorist group, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is expected to reduce the number of attacks perpetrated by the group. In addition, the positive outlook for economic activity and foreign aid inflows will reduce the potential for popular unrest, as this will have a positive impact on local livelihoods (although it may be unevenly distributed) and development spending. Furthermore, the opposition appears to be increasingly willing to negotiate with the regime rather than simply insist that the election of Mr Abdel Aziz in 2009 was illegitimate.

The primary threat to the stable forecast stems from the handling of popular protests. The government has attempted to placate protestors by offering to increase civil service recruitment and by subsidising food prices. However, poor handling of local single-issue protests (such as the recent water shortage protests in Vassala) and of violent repression of February 25th Movement protests may undermine the regime's credibility and generate support for the movement. Moreover, although the opposition political parties have preferred to follow events rather than lead them, a popular and credible leader such as Messaoud Ould Boulkheir-the leader of the Alliance populaire progressiste (APP), the National Assembly president and the leading runner-up in the 2009 presidential election-may be able to crystallise support against the regime, particularly if the National Assembly elections scheduled for the end of April are considered to be unfair.

The other threats to the positive outlook stem from AQIM and, to a lesser extent, the military. On the first point, the government will continue to pursue a carrot-and-stick approach to AQIM and militant Islam, targeting AQIM militarily while offering amnesties to militants. We expect this strategy to succeed in limiting AQIM's capacity to carry out attacks and to recruit. However, although the number of attacks is expected to diminish, they will not cease altogether, given the difficulty of policing the vast desert areas where AQIM operates. Furthermore, there is considerable opposition among both nationalist and mainstream Islamist groups to the involvement of Western intelligence and security services in the government's campaign against terrorists. Invaluable though such foreign support is, it could turn popular opinion against the campaign, particularly if civilians are harmed during joint operations. The terrorists, aware of this, will continue to portray themselves as national defenders against "infidel" invaders, despite the fact that their own ranks comprise many foreign militants. Furthermore, a recent assassination attempt against the president, although apparently poorly organised, highlights the institutional risk of the concentration of power in a single figure. The president, who is a former general, still commands the respect of the army. However, another coup attempt cannot be ruled out altogether, given Mauritania's recent history of military interventions in politics.