Post-Saleh scenarios

The growing protests calling for the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to go has raised the prospect of an end to his 32-year rule, especially in light of the removal of his peers in Tunisia and Egypt. The consequences of regime change in Yemen are hugely uncertain. At present, a post-Saleh Yemen can largely be viewed according to three scenarios.

In the first, and most benign scenario, a constitutional quorum would be set up, comprising the key parties in parliament, including elements from within the ruling General People's Congress (GPC), which may split, and some extra-parliamentary forces (including representatives of the Houthi and southern secessionist movements). A more parliamentary-oriented system would be inaugurated, with a parliamentary and presidential election occurring in the second half of 2011. Under such a scenario, a more decentralised, federalist political structure would be introduced, sufficient to allay the secessionist leanings across the south.

However, given Yemen's current top-down polity, there is arguably a greater risk that the toppling of Mr Saleh would paralyse government, and, in the absence of a single individual able to draw together the country's disparate powerbrokers, a free-for-all would ensue as the various tribes and sheikhs battle for control. More seriously still, there is potential for at least parts of Yemen to come under the sway of al-Qaida. Under such a scenario, it is difficult to see how the armed forces would cope, and, without the sudden emergence of a capable leader or foreign intervention, it is possible that they would split along regional and tribal lines, threatening the unity of the country itself.

Finally, and in a corollary to the second scenario, there is the possibility of a military coup, in which a number of generals, citing the general disorder, would be able to co-opt several political and tribal leaders to support a "temporary" military interregnum. However, such an outcome could well see a repeat of the period of military rule that lasted from 1974-78. During that period (until Mr Saleh took power), successive presidents were either removed or assassinated, as no one leader was able to balance the authority of the state and the whims of the tribes. Under such a scenario, it is probable that the south would drift away, as the struggle for power in the capital, Sanaa, consumes the military's energies. Under all these scenarios the role of Saudi Arabia, which plays a key financial role in tribal politics in Yemen, will be important.