The position of the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, looks less secure than at any time since the 1994 civil war, and of late the ire of protesters, emboldened by the example of the overthrow of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents, has increasingly been focused on Mr Saleh personally. In an effort to appease the protesters, the president has pledged to not run in the next presidential election in 2013 and promised various new populist fiscal measures. In addition, the government has also delayed the parliamentary election, in order to facilitate a "national dialogue" with the opposition. However, this has not stopped the protests from spreading, which in turn has led to the authorities adopting increasingly more forceful measures to counter the demonstrators. However, this approach risks backfiring-for example, the opposition is highly unlikely to enter talks given the heavy-handed methods of the security forces, while the recent reports of attacks on demonstrators have led several members of the ruling party to resign. Indeed, even before the present bout of protests, the Yemeni government was struggling to cope with a host of disparate and deepening security and socioeconomic challenges. Arguably, any one of the economic and political problems confronting Yemen-ranging from fast-depleting oil and groundwater reserves to growing secessionist sentiment in the south-could fatally undermine the regime.

Aside from these domestic political disputes, the regime is also confronted by a host of security challenges. An on-off war in the northern Saada region has persisted since mid-2004, and, although a ceasefire between the government and Zaydi Shia rebels (known as Houthis), has held, the truce remains precarious. Providing a "peace dividend" to help counter the underlying grievances of the Zaydi Shia, who complain of economic, political and religious marginalisation, will be essential in ensuring a lasting peace.

Arguably, the government has been even less effective in dealing with the grievances underlying the wave of protests that have spread across the south since early 2008, and we expect unrest to grow further. This growing discontent culminated in 2009 in the creation of the increasingly vociferous, albeit loosely organised, Southern Movement. Although the movement espouses only peaceful means, it appears that elements in the south are increasingly employing violent methods, with attacks against security outposts on the rise. Despite this, the president has recently sought to incorporate the Southern Movement (and the Houthis) into a national dialogue-a demonstration of both the regime's weakness and the increasing relevance of the group.

Although Islamist militants have in the past been co-opted by the regime, for example during the 1994 civil war, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP; comprising the Yemeni and Saudi arms of the group) will not be invited into the national dialogue. However, the recent spate of government attacks on AQAP targets, including several large-scale assaults on town centres, will probably end, as the attention of the security forces is focused on regime survival in the face of nationwide protests. This will no doubt allow AQAP to regroup and consolidate-a process that will be assisted by the weakening ties between the government and the tribes.