The Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, has ruthlessly repressed political dissent, and there are now few real domestic threats to his rule. He has been in power for over 40 years and will continue to be careful to balance the competing power structures within the political hierarchy. Colonel Qadhafi is likely to withdraw gradually from domestic politics, investing more time in international politics. There is no agreed process for the transfer of power, but Colonel Qadhafi's tacit support for a number of reforms proposed by his son, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, has made him the most likely successor. However, Saif al-Islam faces considerable resistance from conservatives within the regime with large vested interests. They appear to be resisting any liberal reforms and have forced some of Saif al-Islam's news organisations to close down and his charitable foundation to narrow its remit. Saif al-Islam has long been in favour of creating a formal constitution and of implementing administrative and market-oriented reform. Other possible successors include one of Colonel Qadhafi's other six children. However, many Libyans would deeply resent an orchestrated dynastic arrangement, and someone may emerge from within the political elite. Competing claims on power could lead to a period of instability immediately after Colonel Qadhafi departs the scene. However, the succession is unlikely to become a pressing issue while Colonel Qadhafi retains power, which he is expected to do throughout the forecast period.

Significant political reform is unlikely. Colonel Qadhafi remains wedded to Libya's opaque and ineffective jamahiriya (republic of the people) system and continues to manipulate its structure to maintain the illusion of democracy-as demonstrated in 2009 by the apparent rejection by the local-level Basic People's Congresses (BPCs) and the General People's Congress (GPC, akin to a national parliament) of the Wealth Distribution Programme. The Libyan leader will continue to deny any individual minister the opportunity to build a personal power base. He will also be careful to balance the interests of reformers against those of the old guard.

There is at present little immediate threat to the ruling elite. However, if the socioeconomic environment were to deteriorate through, for example, rising unemployment, collapsing oil prices or growing inequality, the government could be faced with increased unrest. Feelings of political exclusion have been exacerbated by the disruption of Libya's independent media. However, with the economy expected to remain relatively strong and the opposition, with the exception of domestic Islamists, either in exile or lacking clout and coherence, the prospect of any threat to the regime appears limited.

The greatest fear for the authorities remains the challenge from militant Islamist groups, which have been responsible for assassination attempts against Colonel Qadhafi. There are also regionwide concerns over the threat posed by al-Qaida affiliates. Reconciliation and rehabilitation negotiations have proceeded secretly, and a steady stream of Islamists has been released from prison in recent months, including 39 from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group-the largest local militant organisation, which recently renounced violence. This suggests that the local militant Islamist threat is declining.