Tunisia faces a period of instability following the ousting of the president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, in mid-January as a result of a popular uprising. The public's trust in the interim government remains fragile, as shown by the anti-government protests in the capital, Tunis, in May. This trust will be further tested following an announcement delaying the National Constituent Assembly election from July to October. At the very least, this will prolong the state of uncertainty but may also result in renewed protests. The weakening security situation also leaves Tunisia open to attacks by militant groups such as al-Qaida-Tunisian police fought a gun battle at a checkpoint in northern Tunisia with members of al-Qaida in mid-May, according to some reports. Although political protests have diminished, economic and social unrest is widespread. Steps have been taken to release the state and the economy from the grip of the former ruling party, the Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique (RCD). The dissolution of the RCD prevents it from putting forward candidates in future elections, but does not bar its members from standing as independents or as representatives of another political party. Indeed, many of these former members have formed their own parties. Many members of Mr Ben Ali's extended family are under arrest, and their assets have been sequestered. Former RCD members no longer form part of the government and are being removed steadily from the highest echelons of the civil service, state organisations and state-owned industries. However, most of those who occupy middle and lower levels of management remain in their posts, although they often face insubordination and recrimination from their non-RCD colleagues. The removal of senior RCD members from national and regional government and state enterprises and disputes over who should replace them are likely to disrupt decision-making and reduce government efficiency.

Much progress has also been made in opening up the democratic process, with more than 70 parties, including Hizb al-Nahda, an Islamist party, now participating in the elections. However, three other Islamist parties have been banned. How to accommodate the popular appeal of Islamism is a problem that has beset regimes across North Africa for some time. In Tunisia, the uprising was a result of economic conditions, with religion playing a negligible role in the protests. Islamist parties were also ruthlessly suppressed during Mr Ben Ali's rule, with party leaders living in exile for most of his time in office. Al-Nahda probably enjoys some support, especially in the impoverished south, but we do not expect it to be the dominant party in parliament.

The army will continue to play a pivotal role in the Tunisian crisis. So far at least, it seems content to hold the ring for the politicians and to act, in the words of the head of the army, General Rachid Ben Ammar, as "the guarantor of the country, the people and the revolution". The army is likely to maintain this stance unless the security situation deteriorates markedly or the efforts to build a new political consensus collapse, in which case a coup is possible.