Outlook for 2011-15

• The emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, will focus on economic and foreign policy issues. However, given the ongoing regional social unrest, he may feel increasingly inclined to initiate domestic political reforms.
• Qatar will continue to pursue an independent foreign policy, maintaining a high profile through its mediation efforts in various countries. Balancing its conflicting relations with the US and Iran will remain the top priority.
• Real GDP growth will remain high in 2011, reaching 15.8%, but will slow to an average of 5.4% in 2012-15, as no new major energy projects are planned over the period.
• The fiscal surplus (excluding most LNG revenue) widened to an estimated 12.4% of GDP (QR57.2bn; US$15bn) in 2010/11. It will widen further to 14.8% of GDP in 2011/12 and is expected to average 10.8% of GDP in 2012-15.
• The consumer price index declined by an estimated average of 2.4% in 2010, but consumer prices will rise again in 2011, by 4.2%, as property prices begin to recover and domestic demand stays strong.
• The current account recorded an estimated surplus of US$15.1bn (13% of GDP) in 2010 and is expected to remain heavily in surplus in 2011-15, owing to continued strong hydrocarbons exports.

Monthly review

• The emir has hosted a prominent Iraqi Shia cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, in Doha. The meeting was organised to discuss efforts to mediate between the government and opposition in Bahrain.
• Qatar has withdrawn from the Gulf Co-operation Council's initiative to mediate between Yemen's president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the opposition in the country, as tensions between Qatar and Yemen worsened in May.
• The Qatari government has doubled the loan amounts available to citizens at zero interest. The move is seen as a bid to ensure popular support for the government at a time of increasing tensions throughout the region.
• The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) has announced that it will start issuing three-month Treasury bills in June. The QCB hopes that the first two US$2bn issues will mop up excess liquidity in the banking system.
• Qatar Petroleum has signed an exploration and production sharing agreement with two Japanese energy companies. The deal gives the companies the right to explore for oil and gas in the pre-Khuff formation under the North Field.
• Qatar has held talks with several Japanese power companies to provide extra supplies of LNG. Japan already imports 10m tonne/year of Qatari gas.

The Economist Intelligence Unit expects Qatar to remain stable and secure under the rule of the emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, in 2011-15. There will be little vocal opposition to his rule and economic policies, largely because the government has ensured that most Qatari citizens have benefited from the wealth that the country has accrued over the past decade, but also because the Qatari press exercises self-censorship. Recent unrest across the region is unlikely to spread to Qatar, which, despite having limited freedom of expression, faces few of the unemployment and poverty issues seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain. Regional unrest may, however, encourage the emir to take pre-emptive steps to ensure that the Qatari population remains content with the system of governance, including by introducing several, long-delayed elements of the 2005 constitution, such as the inauguration of a two-thirds-elected Majlis al-Shura (Advisory Council). Any moves to increase political participation will, however, meet opposition from among the key families in Qatar, some of whom favour a more conservative political system that protects their vested interests.

There is occasional friction within the ruling family and a history of internal coups, most recently when the emir overthrew his father in 1995, but the country has appeared stable in recent years. Although the emir (born in 1952) is younger than other Gulf rulers, there have been concerns about his health. His fourth son, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, was appointed as heir apparent in 2003 (replacing his third son) and has been taking an increasingly active role in government. The emir's cousin (twice removed), Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani, who is prime minister and foreign minister, would help to ensure a stable transition were the emir to die. After a suicide bombing at a theatre popular with Westerners in 2005, there have been no further attacks, and a sustained terrorist campaign is unlikely given that there is little social discontent in the country and the security apparatus has been strengthened considerably.

An electoral law was passed in May 2008 that settled a number of disputes about the franchise and paved the way for the creation of a two-thirds-elected Advisory Council with limited legislative powers, although the term of the current (fully appointed) Council was subsequently extended until June 2011 (and will be extended again). Even if an election is held, a prospect that is becoming increasingly likely, the ruling family will maintain its hegemony over policymaking because of the limited powers granted to the Council by the 2005 constitution. An election to the Central Municipal Council (CMC) was held in May. The CMC is a 29-member advisory body that is elected by Qatari citizens and has no executive or legislative power.

Qatar will maintain its high-profile foreign policy, spearheaded by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem. By using its web of myriad (and, at times, conflicting) alliances in the region and beyond, Qatar has projected itself as an impartial mediator in many of the region's conflicts, often backing up its efforts with financial assistance. Although its mediation was initially successful in Lebanon in 2008, and its efforts in the Darfur conflict in Sudan have made some headway, Qatar's involvement in Palestinian affairs has been controversial, and its success in Lebanon proved transitory. Its high-profile diplomatic engagement on multiple fronts also increases the risk of straining relations with allies that disapprove of its policies or feel that Qatar is interfering in their own spheres of influence. However, recently Qatar has temporarily abandoned its intermediary role and participated militarily in the current NATO-led intervention in Libya. This move will probably only further antagonise some of its regional peers, especially in light of the statement by the chief of staff of the Qatari Air Force, who told reporters in March: "Certain countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt haven't taken leadership for the last three years." Recent Qatari backing for a Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) initiative in Yemen, which proposes that the country's president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, step down, led to Yemen recalling its ambassador in April, giving a further insight into the potential downsides of Qatar's increasingly assertive foreign policy.

Qatar will struggle to distance itself from the stand-off between the US and Iran over the latter's nuclear programme, not least because of the large US military presence on its soil. However, it is unlikely that the US would launch an attack on Iran (although an Israeli strike is slightly more likely). Although Iran and Qatar have strong economic links-they share the giant North Field gas reservoir, for instance-and the emir has hosted Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's president, several times, the growing US military presence in the region will inevitably affect relations.

In the past, Qatar has maintained some low-level relations with Israel, and it would be one of the first Arab countries to make moves towards normalisation in the low-probability scenario that the Arab-Israeli peace process progresses. Relations with Saudi Arabia have improved, following the reinstatement of a Saudi ambassador to Qatar in 2008 after a five-year hiatus and the subsequent signing of a bilateral agreement. However, there may be occasional setbacks over the forecast period as Qatar pursues an independent foreign policy, rather than deferring to its larger neighbour.

In spite of the global squeeze on credit in 2008-09, Qatar pressed ahead with infrastructure projects (such as a causeway to Bahrain and a railway network) and expanding its liquefied natural gas (LNG) production capacity, to 77m tonnes/year (t/y), a target it achieved earlier this year. A moratorium on signing new gas export agreements is in place, until at least 2013, and will only be lifted on the basis of the results of a study into the North Field's long-term potential and projections of global gas demand. Once the moratorium is lifted, the government will probably concentrate on projects that further domestic economic diversification, in particular in the downstream sector and petrochemical production, rather than on export-oriented schemes. Qatar has traditionally used loans and bonds to finance economic development projects, and a number of major Qatari firms successfully tapped credit markets in 2009 and 2010 for both refinancing and expansion. However, if any key projects faced delays owing to an unavailability of credit, the government would draw on its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), to ensure that they proceed as planned. (Qatar began the development of its LNG programme during the 1997-98 oil price crash and so has positive experience of investing through downturns.)

In a signal of Qatar's confidence, branches of the QIA, such as Qatari Diar, are even taking on new debt to finance major foreign investments. The government re-evaluated some of its previous reform priorities during the global recession-in January 2010, for example, the Qatar Financial Centre (set up in 2005, under its own byelaws, to attract major global financial institutions) cut one-third of its workforce-but it has implemented a long-promised cut in corporation tax to 10%, in line with a proposed flat tax across the GCC, and will further encourage investment by streamlining licensing and financial sector regulations.

We estimate that officially recorded government revenue rose by an estimated 31.6% in fiscal year 2010/11 (April 1st-March 31st), on the back of rising oil prices and condensate export volumes and increasing investment income. Current expenditure will continue increasing significantly over the forecast period, as will capital expenditure, which is expected to rise by 33% this year. Qatar's fiscal revenue will grow considerably over the forecast period, although well below the rate of the previous five years. Officially recorded revenue (which excludes most LNG revenue) is forecast to grow by an average of 9.1% between 2011/12 and 2015/16, as oil prices are expected to stay relatively strong. The actual revenue growth rate (including all LNG revenue) will be slightly higher, at 9.7%. Oil and gas will continue to represent about three-quarters of revenue, although the composition will tilt increasingly towards LNG. We estimate that income on foreign assets represented around 25% of officially recognised government revenue in 2010/11 and forecast that this ratio will remain substantial over the next five years, providing a cushion for the public finances if energy prices prove weaker than forecast. Following the decision to host the football World Cup in Qatar, the government will focus much of its efforts on ensuring that the vast infrastructure projects outlined in its bid are carried out, necessitating a large increase in the capital budget towards the end of the forecast period. Qatar may also follow steps taken by other countries in the GCC, most prominently Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, by increasing public-sector spending, to pre-empt discontent among its citizens.

We estimate that the official budget surplus in 2010/11 reached QR57.1bn (US$15.7bn), or 12.4% of GDP, based on a fiscal year average oil price of US$78.4/barrel for Qatari crude. However, most LNG revenue is excluded from the official fiscal account and, were this to be included, our estimate would be an even larger surplus of 20.6% of GDP. In 2011/12 we expect the surplus to widen to 14.8% of GDP on the narrow, official method of recording revenue, owing to increases in oil prices, oil export volumes, tax revenue and investment income from the QIA. The official budget surplus will average 10.8% of GDP in 2012-15.

Monetary policy is constrained by the Qatari riyal's peg to the US dollar. In October 2008, when the US cut its main interest rate to 0.25%, the Qatar Central Bank (QCB) broke with its previous policy of mirroring US rate changes and held rates steady. In keeping with its contrarian approach, and in contrast to much of the rest of the emerging world, in April Qatar reduced its lending rate by 50 basis points, to 5%, the first change since 2006, in an effort to boost private-sector credit growth (which was only 8.5% last year, compared with a 40% rise in public-sector credit). However, the QCB will seek to mop up any excess liquidity by issuing Treasury bills, as it did recently with the massive sale of QR50bn worth of bonds to domestic banks. The QCB recently announced that another round of T-bill issuance would take place in June. Speculative flows will be dampened by the decision not to press ahead with the GCC single currency for the time being, which will mean that the authorities are unlikely to consider a revision to Qatar's exchange-rate regime. Separately, Qatar will maintain its support for the banking system, retaining substantial equity stakes in domestic banks (including additional 10% stakes taken in January 2011) and holding on to parts of their domestic loan books until liquidity concerns have eased in the latter part of the forecast period.

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Qatar avoided recession in 2008-09, and the economy surged ahead in 2010 because of the global recovery and the domestic boost provided by a near doubling of LNG production. The final LNG "super-train" (with a capacity of 7.8m t/y) came on stream earlier this year. Concerns have been growing about the combined impact on the economy of a global slump in demand for LNG, particularly in the US, and the coming on stream of new LNG capacity in Qatar and further afield, but these have been allayed temporarily by increased demand in Japan (which will import at least an additional 4m tonnes of LNG from Qatar this year). The next two years will be still be difficult; however, Qatar's dominant position in the market and low production costs should enable it to maintain export volumes, although profit margins will be squeezed and it will increasingly rely on the spot market. Although crude production capacity will rise by about 25% over the forecast period-largely owing to expansion at the Al Shaheen oilfield-production will remain constrained by OPEC quotas. The country's allocation could be revised upwards should production from Libya remain offline for a while, however. A further boost to growth in 2011 will be provided by the commissioning of the first 70,000-barrel/day train in the Pearl GTL (gas-to-liquids) project, which is operated by Royal Dutch Shell, the Anglo-Dutch energy giant.

The government is expected to maintain high levels of capital spending on education, health and transport. Population growth is projected to remain strong over the forecast period owing to immigration, although at an annual average of around 8% it will be well down from its peak of 17.9% in 2007. This in turn will support domestic demand. Growth will benefit from high levels of investment in infrastructure. Overall, we estimate that real GDP growth surged to 14% in 2010. We expect growth to remain very high, at 15.8%, in 2011 as the final LNG super-train comes on stream, before dropping considerably to an average of 5.5% a year in 2012-15, once the current round of investment in the country's gas export capacity has been completed.

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A period of high inflation came to an abrupt end in 2009, when deflation averaged 4.9%, mainly because of a fall in rents and global commodity prices, and prices continued to fall, by 2.4%, in 2010, largely owing to a continued dip in rental prices. Consumer prices are forecast to begin to rise again this year, by an average of 4.2%, as demand from the ongoing influx of immigrants and an expansionary budget, a well as rising international commodity prices, outweigh any further declines in rents. Ongoing volatility of the dollar will influence short-term imported inflation. We expect inflation to average 4% in 2012-15, close to Qatar's long-run average, boosted by continued strong domestic demand. There are both downside and upside risks to the forecast, depending on the level of immigration and the outlook for the dollar.

The riyal is pegged to the dollar at a rate of QR3.64:US$1. The authorities are committed to maintaining the current exchange-rate regime, arguing not only that Qatar's gas and oil exports are denominated in the US currency, but also that the peg offers stability and reassurance to investors. Pressure for revaluation is unlikely to return unless the dollar weakens substantially later in the forecast period, although the constraints that a peg imposes on monetary policy remain problematic. The peg is likely to remain in place until the GCC decides on a co-ordinated move in preparation for the establishment of a single currency, a project that will remain in abeyance in order to allow the GCC to assess the fallout of the euro crisis. Although both Oman and the UAE have withdrawn from the monetary union project, Qatar is still committed to it. Monetary union is unlikely to happen before 2015.

After narrowing sharply in 2009, the current-account surplus recovered in 2010, reaching an estimated 13% of GDP. The surplus will reach record levels during the forecast period, averaging 30.7% of GDP in 2011-15. The surplus will be driven by strong export earnings growth in 2011-12, of 43.5% a year, and relatively flat imports in the first half of the forecast period, as rising demand for consumer goods from a growing population only just offsets falling capital goods imports as the gas industrialisation programme winds down. The increase in exports will be driven mainly by new LNG, GTL and oil production coming on stream, which will cause the trade surplus to surge to US$67.7bn in 2011, and to widen further to an average of US$79.8bn in 2012-15. With workers' remittances rising and income debits surging as foreign companies' profits recover, net non-merchandise outflows will remain substantial over the forecast period.

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A prominent Iraqi Shia cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, visited Doha and met the emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, on May 5th, triggering speculation about Qatar's bid to resolve the Bahraini crisis through mediation. Quoting Mr Sadr's website, a number of international news agencies have reported that the emir has promised to participate personally in the mediation effort and ''meet with Arab presidents and kings to resolve the crisis''. The emir has also suggested that Qatar and Mr Sadr should form a committee to find a solution to the crisis and follow up on the situation. Mr Sadr's visit came at the invitation of the emir and followed an exchange of visits between the Qatari crown prince, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, to Tehran and a reciprocal visit by the Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, leading to suggestions that Iran may be willing to co-operate with mediation efforts. Mr Sadr, who is based in Najaf in Iraq, is one of the most influential religious and political figures in the country. He enjoys close ties with Iran, which is thought to provide his group, which controls 39 seats in the Iraqi parliament, with training and supplies for its militia.

Qatar, which employs mediation in regional conflicts as an integral part of its foreign policy, hopes to win Mr Sadr's support to persuade Bahrain's Shia majority to resolve their grievances with the Sunni-led regime through dialogue. According to the Bahrain Human Rights Society, at least 21 people were killed during demonstrations and rallies, which started on February 14th, calling for more democracy and civil rights in the kingdom. The island nation only came out of a state of national emergency on June 1st, having been placed under martial law on March 15th.

Meanwhile, Qatar has withdrawn from the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) initiative to mediate between the Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and protesters in the country (May 2011, The political scene). The Qatari government cited Mr Saleh's ''procrastination'' in signing a deal to cede power as being behind their withdrawal. In a telephone call on May 12th to the GCC secretary-general, Abdul Latif al-Zayani, Qatar's prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr al-Thani, said that the delay in signing the proposed agreement and escalation of violence in Yemen was ''incompatible'' with the spirit of the initiative. Qatar's withdrawal may also have been prompted by Mr Saleh's remarks on May 1st during an interview with a Russian television station in which he said he would have ''reservations'' about signing the GCC-brokered deal, if a Qatari representative was present. Mr Saleh accuses Qatar of funding the opposition, and singled out the Qatari-based al-Jazeera news channel of instigating the rebellion against him. GCC foreign ministers have rejected the allegation. However, on May 22nd, the foreign ministers themselves suspended mediation efforts after Mr Saleh insisted that he would only sign the deal if the opposition leaders, who had already signed it a day before, came to the presidential palace and signed it once again in his presence. Qatar has ''temporarily'' suspended the operations of its embassy in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, and has withdrawn its diplomatic staff, fearing for their safety after an eruption in violence following Mr Saleh's refusal to sign the deal. Mr Saleh has since left Yemen for Saudi Arabia, where he is being treated for injuries he sustained during an attack on his compound.

On Libya, however, Qatar has continued to step up its support for the Transitional National Council (TNC), which is fighting Libyan government forces. Co-chairing a meeting of the contact group on Libya with the Italian foreign minister, Franco Frattini, in Rome on May 5th, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem announced that Qatar would provide US$500m in aid to the rebels, and pleaded for the establishment of an international fund to help them. On May 11th, Qatar hosted a conference of 23 of Libya's regional councils to gather the support of Libya's tribes for the TNC under the leadership of Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, a former justice minister who broke away from Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's regime to lead the rebellion. Qatar has already contributed six fighter planes to the NATO force, helping to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya, and has undertaken to market crude oil for the rebels (May 2011, The political scene).

With an apparent eye on the popular unrest that has swept the Middle East, the Qatari government has doubled the amount of home loans given to citizens at zero interest to QR1.2m (US$329,670) and extended the period of repayment to 37 years. The loans will be distributed through the state-owned Qatar Development Bank (QDB). A provision of QR5.2bn has been made in the 2011/12 budget (April 1st-March 31st) for this purpose. The concessions will mean that a borrower will have to pay no more than QR2,703 (US$743) a month on a loan of QR1.2m. The QDB's executive director, Mansoor Ibrahim al-Mahmoud, told reporters that loan applications would be processed on a fast-track basis and funds will be disbursed within four days. The announcement follows a similar move by the Saudi Arabian government, which in March raised the upper limit on home loans from US$80,000 to US$133,000.

The facility comes on top of a number of other benefits already being provided by the state to Qatari citizens including free education, free healthcare, free utilities and subsidised food. The vulnerable and the disadvantaged are entitled to free housing, while widows and the destitute are entitled to cash transfers, and the unemployed to job assistance stipends. The government has also earmarked QR25.2bn (US$6.9bn) in the 2011/12 budget for increasing the salaries and allowances of its employees.

Starting from June, the Qatar Central Bank (QCB) will start issuing Treasury bills to mop up excess liquidity from the banking system. The QCB's governor, Sheikh Abdullah bin Saud al-Thani, told reporters on May 16th that the first two T-bills, valued at US$2bn each and with a three-month maturity, would be issued in June and July. According to Sheikh Abdullah, the question of auctioning further bills, and details of their maturity would be considered in July. The QCB move has been prompted by the rapid expansion of money supply since the start of 2010. After posting a 3.8% quarter-on-quarter decline in the second quarter of 2010, broad money supply (M2) rose by 7.3% in the third quarter and 6.1% in the fourth quarter of 2010. Data released by the QCB reveal that the trend has persisted-albeit at a more moderate pace-despite the issuance of domestic bonds for local banks worth QR50bn in January 2011 (February 2011, Economic policy). In February, the latest data released by QCB, M2 rose by 15% year on year (3.8% since end-2010) to QR275.4bn, while narrow money (M1) expanded by 18.3%, to QR72.5bn. The QCB move is also aimed at reining in inflation, which has been creeping up since 2010 after a period of sharp deflation in 2009.

Seeking to expand the country's hydrocarbons reserves, state-owned Qatar Petroleum (QP) signed an exploration and production-sharing agreement (EPSA) with JX Nippon Oil & Gas Exploration of Japan on May 8th,giving the latter the right to explore for oil and natural gas in Qatari waters. The offshore area, Block A, falls in the pre-Khuff reservoir formation beneath the North Field, which holds the largest single concentration of natural gas in the world, and covers 6,173 sq km. The agreement is the third that will allow exploration of the formation-QP previously signed similar deals with the China National Offshore Oil Exploration Company (CNOOC) for Block B/C and with Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands/UK) and PetroChina for Block D. The EPSA is for 30 years, staring with a five-year exploration period followed by a 25-year development and production phase. During the exploration phase, the Japanese firm will invest US$100m to implement a work programme, including technical studies, 2D and 3D seismic surveys and drilling a number of wells. If oil or gas is found in commercial quantities, the Japanese company will start production. Both the Qatari oil minister, Mohamed bin Saleh al-Sada, and JX Nippon Oil & Gas Exploration's president and chief executive, Makoto Koseki, told reporters after signing the deal that there was a great possibility of finding natural gas in commercial quantities in Block A as it fell beneath the North Field. Qatar's total oil exploration area is divided into 22 hydrocarbons blocks covering a total surface area of 43,426 sq km. Since the early 1990s, QP has entered into a number of EPSAs and development and production-sharing agreements (DPSAs) with foreign companies to develop its production potential. Under an EPSA, the foreign partner is granted the right to explore for oil and/or gas in the relevant block and, if any is discovered, to develop the fields. Under a DPSA, the partner is required to cover appraisal and development of already discovered structures or further development of existing fields. According to UK-based BP's Statistical Review of World Energy, Qatar's proven oil reserves are 25.3bn barrels, and its gas reserves 910trn cu ft, the third largest in the world.

After committing to supplying 4m tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Japan over the next 12 months (May 2011, Economic performance), Qatar is in talks with Japanese power companies once again for additional supplies. The need for extra supplies arose after the Japanese government asked Chubu Electric on May 8th to halt all operations at its Hamaoka nuclear plant, following an earthquake and tsunami that damaged the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) Fukushima Daiichi plant in March, and which has led to a global debate around the safety of nuclear power. Japan faces the loss of about 15 gw of generation capacity from the closure of the Fukushima, Hamaoka and Onagawa nuclear plants.

The country will step up its LNG imports by an estimated 12m tonnes/year to make up for the lost supplies from the three nuclear plants. In 2010 Japan imported 70m tonnes of LNG, including 7.63m tonnes that it sourced from Qatar. On May 10th the chairman of Chubu Electric, Toshio Mita, met the Qatari energy and industry minister, Mohammed bin Saleh al-Sada, and Qatargas's chief executive, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa al-Thani, to discuss a possible deal for additional LNG supplies. Qatar is also in talks with other Japanese utilities, including Tepco and Tohoku Electric, for extra supplies. Sources indicate that Japan may ask for an additional 2m tonnes.

Meanwhile, Qatargas, one of two state-owned LNG companies, announced on May 22nd that it has added Greece to its customer portfolio, after delivering its first cargo of 141,014 cu metres of LNG to the Revithoussa LNG terminal for Greece's public gas supply corporation, Depa. Qatargas's chief executive, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa al-Thani, did not disclose the amount or the period for which the two companies have signed the contract. In May 2010, Qatar and Greece signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to build an LNG terminal in the Aitoloakarnania region, to provide feedstock for a plant that would supply 70% of its output to the Italian grid and 30% to the Greek Acheloos grid. The project was conceived at a time when Qatar was struggling to find new customers for its growing LNG production in an over-supplied market. Now, with the increasing LNG demand coming from Japan, China and India, Qatar may have to reconsider the project.

Qatar continues to look for investment opportunities overseas. In late May the international co-operation minister led a delegation of businessmen to Cairo, pledging to earmark up to US$10bn for investment in projects across Egypt. The idea behind the investments-which were agreed in principle during a meeting between the emir and the Egyptian prime minister, Essam Sharaf during his visit to the Qatari capital, Doha, in April-is to generate jobs and help the Egyptian economy after the uprising that ousted the former president, Hosni Mubarak, in February. The Egyptian finance minister, Samir Rezwan, was reported as saying on May 24th that Qatar had expressed its readiness to help finance the construction of two ports, one in Alexandria, and a US$9bn project in Port Said.

Qatar is also in talks with the Cyprus government to set up a joint venture to build a hotel, shopping, office and apartment complex, costing over US$150m, in Nicosia. The Qatari plan was approved by the Cypriot cabinet on May 20th.

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Land area

11,521 sq km

Population

1,631,728 at end-2009 (Qatar Statistics Authority)

Main towns

Doha (capital), Messaieed and Ras Laffan (industrial cities)

Climate

Summer, hot and humid; winter, mild with minimal rainfall

Weather in Doha (altitude 5 metres)

Hottest months, July-September, when maximum temperature can be 45°C and humidity 85%; coldest months, December-March, average temperature 10-20°C; driest month, August; wettest month, December; annual average rainfall 39 mm

Language

Arabic; English widely used

Measures

UK (imperial) and metric systems

Currency

Qatari riyal (QR) = 100 dirhams. Exchange rate pegged at QR3.64:US$1

Time

3 hours ahead of GMT

Fiscal year

April 1st-March 31st

Public holidays

The dates of Islamic holidays are based on the lunar calendar and are therefore approximate: Eid al-Fitr (end of Ramadan, August 31st-September 3rd 2011); Eid al-Adha (November 6th 2011)

Fixed secular holidays are the Emir's Accession (June 27th); Independence Day (September 3rd); National Day (December 18th)

Official name

State of Qatar

Form of state

Emirate

Legal system

The 2005 constitution provides for an independent judiciary that should be answerable to "no power but the law". Judges may only be dismissed "in cases to be defined by law"

Legislature

Qatar's current Advisory Council was established in 1972, and is wholly appointed. It can issue advice on policy matters, but has no formal legislative role. The 2005 constitution makes provision for a two-thirds-elected, 45-member parliament to be formed, which will have the power to draw up laws and question ministers. However, the parliamentary election has been repeatedly delayed, and the inauguration of the new body is not expected within the forecast period

Head of state

The emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, succeeded to the throne in June 1995. In October 1996 he appointed as his heir his third son, Sheikh Jassem bin Hamad al-Thani. However, in August 2003 Sheikh Jassem unexpectedly resigned as crown prince and was replaced by his younger brother, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani

Executive

The cabinet is headed by the prime minister, who is appointed by the emir. In April 2007 the first deputy prime minister and foreign affairs minister, Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr al-Thani, replaced Abdullah bin Khalifa al-Thani as prime minister

Main political parties

Political parties are not permitted

Government

Prime minister & foreign affairs: Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr al-Thani

Deputy prime minister: Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyah

Key ministers

Business & trade: Jassem bin Abdulaziz al-Thani

Defence: Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani

Education: Saad bin Ibrahim al-Mahmoud

Energy & industry: Mohammed bin Saleh al-Sada

Endowments & Islamic affairs: Ghaith bin Mubarak al-Kuwari

Environment: Abdullah bin Mubarak al-Midhadhi

Finance & economy: Youssef Hussein Kamal

Interior: Abdullah bin Khaled al-Thani

Justice: Hassan Abdullah al-Ghanem

Labour: Sultan bin Hassan al-Dhabit al-Dawsari

Municipal affairs & urban planning: Abdel-Rahman bin Khalifa al-Thani

Public health: Abdullah bin Khalid al-Qahtani

Social affairs: Nasser bin Abdullah al-Hemaidi

Key ministers of state

Cabinet affairs: Nasser bin Mohammed al-Thani

Emiri diwan: Abdel-Rahman bin Saud al-Thani

Foreign affairs: Ahmed bin Abdullah al-Mahmoud

Interior: Abdullah bin Nasser al-Thani

Central Bank governor

Abdullah bin Saud bin Abdel-Aziz al-Thani