In view of external and internal factors, the Economist Intelligence Unit expects Tajikistan to face a threat of instability in 2011-12. Although the president, Imomali Rahmon, has been credited with restoring peace and stability following the civil war in 1992-97, and memories of the war remain a force for restraint among older people, popular discontent has been rising. There is also a risk that insurgent activity in Afghanistan, or the ethnic unrest in the Kyrgyz Republic in June 2010, could spread to Tajikistan. Tajikistan is less ethnically mixed than the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, but has a sizeable ethnic Uzbek minority. Although outright inter-ethnic conflict in the Kyrgyz Republic has receded, the situation remains unstable, and a possibility of ethnic conflict spreading to neighbouring countries with mixed populations remains. The recent spread of unrest in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is unlikely to have any direct contagion effect on Tajikistan. However, given rising instability within the country, any popular uprising in another member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would increase the possibility of unrest, as it would be more likely to have a demonstration effect on the population.

Mr Rahmon has intensified official harassment of those perceived to pose a threat to stability. However, public dissatisfaction has been rising because of the government's failure to resolve pressing social and economic problems. Public disaffection with the authorities will continue to increase, and widespread economic hardship, in a context of high unemployment and lower remittance inflows than in 2007-08, will exacerbate social tensions. More Tajiks will seek work abroad as economic prospects in Russia and Kazakhstan pick up, and the departure of these workers-overwhelmingly young men-will go some way towards removing a potential source of social unrest. However, Tajikistan will increasingly have to rely on international financial assistance, and the authorities' management of the situation will be crucial in maintaining stability.

In view of Mr Rahmon's crackdown on opposition voices, the lack of political and other public channels for the expression of dissent further undermines long-term prospects for stability. Although some opposition parties are allowed to operate, they have been increasingly constrained by harassment of opposition figures and by state interference in media outlets. In addition, the often heavy-handed methods of the authorities in strengthening state control over religious practice and cracking down on signs of Islamist extremism risk boosting support for radical Islamist movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Freedom) and the banned Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). There are signs that radical Islamist activity is increasing-although the authorities are prone to cracking down on any opposition under the guise of quelling terrorism. A suicide bomb attack on a police station in September 2010 and attacks on troop convoys in October are likely to be linked to Islamist extremists, highlighting the threat of instability and the possibility of a spillover of insurgent activity from Afghanistan.

Despite the heightened risks, our baseline scenario is that Mr Rahmon will remain in power in 2011-12. Sporadic clashes with regional groups hostile to the regime will probably continue, and the opposition could succeed in mounting limited protests against the regime. However, the authorities are likely to deal harshly with any extensive social unrest. A repeat of the unrest seen in the Kyrgyz Republic is also unlikely, as the response of the security forces to any public discontent would be much harsher. The West and Russia are keen to see stability preserved in Tajikistan, in view of the situation in neighbouring Afghanistan. The West is therefore unlikely to be outspoken in its criticism of the regime, and Russia would offer military assistance to Mr Rahmon if necessary.