With a history of political instability, ethnic strife and civil war, Burundi is positioned in the lower half of the Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index, ranked 110th out of 167 countries, four places lower than its rank in 2008. Although Burundi's slow transition towards democracy has placed it in the category of a "hybrid" regime, rather than in the category of "authoritarian regime", worrying signs of politically-motivated repression during and after the mid-2010 election period generated a downward revision of the country's ranking and score. The country's performance in functioning of government remained stable at 3.29. The ruling Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) no longer struggles with legislative paralysis as a result of its decisive electoral victories in 2010 in the face of a near-complete opposition boycott; however, the president, Pierre Nkurunziza, and his government are much less accountable (so far refusing to meet with opposition parties) as a result. Moreover, investors and foreign agencies cannot rely on speed or predictability in their dealings with the slow-moving government agencies on which they depend, and neither can the justice system be relied on to enforce contracts or property rights. Political participation has improved in a historical context: the constitution was approved in 2005 and outlines a requirement for balance of power between Hutus and Tutsis at all levels of government. In practice, however, abiding by the constitutional requirements for gender and ethnic participation in the government appears to be a box-ticking exercise for Mr Nkurunziza. With only two parties-the Union pour le progrès national (Uprona), a predominantly Tutsi party that ruled the country during the 1970s and 1980s, and a small breakaway faction of the predominantly Hutu Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu), called Frodebu-Nyakuri-participating in legislative elections, the government was not forced to branch out widely to form a unity government.

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Zero accountability and a muzzled media

Documented cases of politically-motivated violence in the lead up to the 2010 elections and after took place in an atmosphere of zero accountability. Moreover, the pace at which journalists and opposition activists are arrested appears to have quickened, which has led to a large downward revision in the civil liberties category. The selection of a senior member of the ruling party as ombudsman-which took place after the democracy score was finalised-indicates that domestic institutions designed to control the government's excesses will be silenced. Meanwhile, the expulsion of a Human Rights Watch researcher in May 2010 in response to the publication of a report that claimed members of the government were both involved in political violence and did nothing to hold perpetrators to account, will reduce the ability of the international community to monitor human-rights abuses within the country.

Squeezing democratic space

Burundi's score for electoral process also fell in the 2010 index. Although international observers were broadly satisfied with municipal elections, opposition parties alleged fraud and boycotted the remaining polls (with the exception of Uprona and Frodebu-Nyakuri contesting the legislative election). As a result, the presidential election in 2010 resembled a referendum for the president, which failed to generate a dynamic democratic exchange. Political culture is still Burundi's best scoring category in the democracy index in 2010, propped up by the general support among its citizens for democracy. However, the score fell from 2008, as citizen's perception of democracy deteriorated during the recent election cycle.

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Democracy index 2010: Democracy in retreat, a free white paper containing the full index and detailed methodology, can be downloaded from www.eiu.com/DemocracyIndex2010.

Note on methodology

There is no consensus on how to measure democracy and definitions of democracy are contested. Having free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political freedom, is the sine qua non of all definitions. However, our index is based on the view that measures of democracy that reflect the state of political freedom and civil liberties are not "thick" enough: they do not encompass sufficiently some crucial features that determine the quality and substance of democracy. Thus, our index also includes measures of political participation, political culture and functioning of government, which are, at best, marginalised by other measures.

Our index of democracy covers 167 countries and territories. The index, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. The five categories are inter-related and form a coherent conceptual whole. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five category indexes.

The category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator scores in the category, converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Adjustments to the category scores are made if countries fall short in the following critical areas for democracy:

• whether national elections are free and fair;
• the security of voters;
• the influence of foreign powers on government; and
• the capability of the civil service to implement policies.

The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regime:

• full democracies-scores of 8 to 10;
• flawed democracies-scores of 6 to 7.9;
• hybrid regimes-scores of 4 to 5.9;
• authoritarian regimes-scores below 4.