The president, Mahinda Rajapakse of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), is idolised as the man who in May 2009 defeated the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, Tamil Tigers), and runs a highly personalised, populist administration. However, his government's harsh treatment of its critics has raised concerns. The arrest in the aftermath of the January 2010 presidential election of defeated opposition candidate, Sarath Fonseka, a former head of Sri Lanka's armed forces, highlighted the government's authoritarian instincts.

Mr Rajapakse exerts a strong grip over the military and police, reinforced through recent appointments and retirements. The president's authority was also bolstered by the passage of a constitutional amendment in 2010 that strengthened his powers and reduced checks on his office. The splits in Sri Lankan society are set to deepen as a result of Mr Rajapakse's hardline approach. Mr Fonseka won strong backing during the presidential election among Muslims and Tamils, and to a lesser extent among more cosmopolitan urban voters. The likelihood that Mr Rajapakse will be able to unite these groups appears remote, and the spectre of an eventual resumption of ethnic violence will therefore continue to loom.

The ruling United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA, of which the SLFP forms the main component) claimed that it would address Tamil grievances by devolving more power to the island's provinces. However, as a shortage of fiscal resources will limit the funds available, and as Mr Rajapakse favours a centralised style of leadership, it is doubtful that devolution will make real progress in the forecast period. Anti-Tamil discrimination will remain a major social problem. If the government can promote economic development in the east and north, this could help to lessen resentment in the Tamil community. However, there is concern about how obtrusive the army will be in the economic and political life of Tamil-dominated areas.

The current dominance of government by Mr Rajapakse and his relatives is worrying. The concentration of power among a small group linked to the president has irked many within the UPFA, leading to complaints, from senior ministers among others, that they lack real authority or resources-essential factors in the island's patronage-driven politics. Minority parties representing Tamils and Muslims, whose allegiances are flexible, may eventually emerge as forces in parliament, but the size of the UPFA's majority currently limits their influence. The UPFA also controls most of the country's provincial assemblies. Nevertheless, the ebbing of the government's popularity since late 2010 amid large increases in the cost of living has reduced the danger that Mr Rajapakse's government will entrench itself over the longer term. As yet, the main opposition party, the United National Party (UNP), has been unable to capitalise on public discontent. However, if the UNP leader, Ranil Wickremasinghe, is replaced by Sajith Premadasa, a younger, more charismatic figure, the party could begin to seriously challenge the UPFA in the polls.

The UPFA's critics in the media, civil society and abroad will face an aggressive response. Many members of the press have been physically attacked, abducted or killed, and media outlets that have criticised Mr Rajapakse's administration have been forced to close. Nonetheless, this does not seem to have silenced media critics of government policy.

Social unrest could rise in the next five years if opposition parties take their grievances out into the streets, while unusually slow growth in public-sector pay and reforms affecting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) could also stoke labour activism. The LTTE is not expected to re-emerge as a major threat. However, the Tamil separatist movement has deep roots, and isolated terrorist attacks may occur across the island. Security in the north and east will remain poor, with abuses perpetrated by soldiers and also by former terrorists, who have been reduced to engaging in more traditional forms of crime.