The president, Yahya Jammeh, and the ruling party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), are expected to retain a firm grip on power during the forecast period. Mr Jammeh has ruled the country since coming to power in a coup in 1994 and is almost certain to win the next in a series of flawed presidential elections in 2011. Previous landslide victories have largely reflected the APRC's powers of patronage and its repression of the opposition. This will remain the case in 2011-12. Mr Jammeh will continue to reshuffle his cabinet frequently to prevent potential rivals from building political support bases. Partly as a result, he will remain firmly in control of the APRC. The regime's censorship of the media will continue; journalists, publishers and activists who criticise the government will be detained, and critics of the president-from any corner of society-will not be tolerated. The weakened opposition will continue to lack a sufficient presence in either parliament or local government to influence policy. It may try to harness economic dissatisfaction to provoke social unrest, but any such effort would be thwarted by the dominance and repressiveness of the APRC.

With the opposition posing little threat to the president, the main prospect of a change in power is from a coup. The risk of a coup is low at present. However, recent events have indicated that unexpected changes could well occur on this front. In mid-2010 a former chief of the defence staff (the highest-ranking officer in the army), Lieutenant-General Lang Tombong Tamba, was sentenced to death for allegedly plotting a coup in 2009. A series of recent trials and arrests have meant that almost everyone with the political influence and financial backing to carry out a coup-including the former heads of the army, the navy and the national intelligence agency-is in jail or in exile. For the moment, therefore, a coup is unlikely. However, insofar as the accusations against General Tamba are true, they point to the potential fragility of Mr Jammeh's hold on power: the general was previously believed to be a loyal supporter of the president and, moreover, was promoted to the head of the armed forces because of his apparent loyalty to Mr Jammeh during another alleged coup attempt in 2006.