The rapprochement with Sudan is expected to continue in 2011-12, although the risk of domestic conflict in Sudan could destabilise this. Continuing instability in the neighbouring Central African Republic may lead to further inundations of refugees to southern Chad. Following the final departure of MINURCAT, due at the end of 2010, the foreign military presence in Chad may diminish further in view of recent demands from Mr Déby that France pay the cost of having 1,100 French troops garrisoned in the country as part of Opération épervier (Operation Sparrowhawk). The French authorities have not yet responded to the president's demand but they may well decide to redeploy troops to more strategically important areas in Africa or elsewhere. Nonetheless, diplomatic and commercial ties with France will remain important.

The Chadian government will pursue closer relations with Libya, and Libyan investment will be sought to fund infrastructure projects. However, current unrest in Libya could lead to the overthrow of the government. Rumours that Chadian mercenaries were involved in suppressing recent protests there could strain ties with a future Libyan regime. China will remain a leading player in helping to sustain Chad's declining oil sector and other areas of the economy. Both China and Libya (assuming that its government is not overthrown soon) are expected to extend soft loans to finance the fiscal deficit. The stake held by the US in Chad's oil industry and a small counterterrorism programme-which could soon be enlarged if a regional terrorist group, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, is deemed to be active in the country-will ensure co-operation between the two countries. The US is set to remain by far the largest market for Chadian oil exports.