After Tunisia and Egypt, could mass protests challenge the Chadian regime?

Much has happened since the 2006 presidential election, when Idriss Déby won a crushing victory after many of his opponents boycotted the vote. His deeply unpopular decision to change the constitution, which allowed him to stand for a fourth term, was a significant factor in the violence affecting the country in the intervening years. Rebels from the east swept into the capital, N'Djamena, in April 2006-the month of the vote. This was followed in February 2008 by a bigger attack on the capital that came close to unseating Mr Déby. Having survived, the president has spent much of the intervening three years entrenching his position.

However, as recent events in Tunisia and Egypt underline, autocratic rulers such as Mr Déby are not invulnerable. In common with both North African countries, allegations of electoral fraud undermine the credibility of elections in Chad, leading to frustration among opponents of the regime. Meanwhile, the Chadian security services stand accused of a series of human-rights abuses, not least for their role in the death of a leading figure of the civilian opposition, Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, during the February 2008 rebel assault on the capital. There are also clear socio-economic similarities, in that high unemployment co-exists with sharp inequalities of wealth-two factors likely to spark rebellion.

Nonetheless, several key differences will probably prevent a popular uprising from occurring in Chad, even if Mr Déby is controversially re-elected in April. Although a coup attempt led by a disgruntled general or member of Mr Déby's inner circle should not be discounted as a possibility-many of the rebel leaders are defectors from the president's camp-the armed services appear to remain loyal to the government. Having refused an offer of safe passage from the French when the presidential palace was under attack from rebels in February 2008, Mr Déby is not one to lose his nerve in the face of unrest. Also militating against a popular revolution in the country are its inter-ethnic rivalries and extremely low population density, which reduce the potential for mass protests.

However, although the risk of a popular revolution in Chad is slim in the short term, the government may offer a few sweeteners in the coming weeks. In particular, it may increase subsidies on everyday goods (reflecting the fact that global commodity prices are expected to rise rapidly in 2011). The regime will be aware that rapid food price inflation is more likely than either political oppression or income inequality to spark outbreaks of unrest, which could escalate and take on a political dimension.