Political stability is expected to improve in 2011-12 compared with the previous two years. However, we expect outbreaks of unrest, particularly after the upcoming announcement of the results of the legislative election held on February 13th 2011. The opposition has already voiced allegations about electoral irregularities, which could prompt demonstrations or even rioting in its strongholds. Although the rump of the rebel forces, grouped as the Alliance nationale pour le changement démocratique, has vowed to topple the regime of the president, Idriss Déby, it is unlikely to have much impact given its loss of Sudanese backing. The insurgency is set to be a diminished force, as the non-aggression pact signed between the governments of Chad and Sudan looks likely to hold, thereby depriving the Chadian insurgents of the support and safe haven previously available to them in Sudan. Many of the Chadian rebels repatriating from Sudan are likely to be integrated into the national army, which should improve stability. Both countries' governments seem keen to keep supporting joint military patrols of the common border.

Nonetheless, the east of the country will remain highly insecure, as the joint force is expected to be even less capable of imposing order than the departing UN force (known by its French acronym, MINURCAT). UN-trained local gendarmes in the Détachement de sécurité intégré will take responsibility for security in and around the refugee camps near the eastern border, but there are too few of them for the task. However, the high potential for internal conflict in Sudan in 2011-12 means that joint security efforts in the border region could fall by the wayside. Fighting in Sudan could lead to a further influx of refugees into the east of Chad, as well as armed groups seeking rear bases; both represent a big risk to political stability in Chad. The Central African Republic may also be a source of instability: in addition to the risks posed by its own civil conflict spilling across Chad's southern border, the country reportedly serves as a base for Chadian insurgents.

The president will continue his policy of stifling dissent, handing out patronage to his ethnic kinsmen and concentrating power in the hands of a small number, particularly in the lead-up to the presidential poll due in April 2011. Mr Déby broadly commands the support of the army, but there is a persistent danger of him being toppled in a palace coup. Despite the current weakness of the rebels, further defections of senior members of the president's inner circle to the insurgent camp remain a possibility. The civilian opposition is likely to remain enfeebled, although there could be isolated incidents of unrest in the run-up to the elections. Opposition grievances over the organisation of the polls could lead to protests in towns and cities. Another risk to stability is posed by spikes in consumer price inflation. Domestic agricultural output is expected to be up on the past two years, but extreme climatic events such as drought and flooding could lead to sharp price rises for food. Moreover, in 2011 the Economist Intelligence Unit expects global food prices to rise by a brisk 27%, so household budgets in Chad may be stretched to such a degree that unrest results. There is also potential for inter-ethnic hostilities, particularly if Mr Déby's Zaghawa ethnic group is seen to have preferential access to state services and funds.