North Korea's domestic political scene remains notoriously opaque, but events in 2010 seemed to confirm Kim Jong-eun, the third son of the country's leader, Kim Jong-il, as the heir-apparent to the Kim dynasty. He was appointed to a series of senior posts in the military and the nominally ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). Foreign analysts and policymakers may be relieved that almost two years of uncertainty about the succession are finally over, but it is still possible that the relatively young dauphin may lose his elevated status before his father passes away. Moreover, Kim Jong-eun's promotion will mark not an ending, but rather the beginning of a transition period. This period may prove lengthy and fraught, but could also conceivably be brief and dramatic, should Kim Jong-il, whose health remains fragile, die sooner rather than later.

The next phase of the succession will involve Kim Jong-eun having to prove himself and convince any doubters of his fitness to rule. The "young general" has already been seen frequently at his father's side on so-called guidance visits, and there is speculation that the recent incidents of military aggression by North Korea against the South may be designed to shore up his credibility. He may yet take on a weightier role in his own right. Celebrations for 2012, long hailed by the regime as a landmark year for the country-it marks the 100th anniversary of the birth of North Korea's founder and Kim Jong-il's father, Kim Il-sung-will provide ample opportunities for grandstanding. Yet the succession process, which is managed so smoothly in public, is clearly sparking unusual volatility behind the scenes in North Korea's political sphere. Rumours from South Korean sources (which must always be treated with caution) speak of purges and factional jockeying.

Such political struggles have institutional as well as personal roots and dynamics. Last year's rare delegate meeting of the WPK may mark a comeback for the party, after more than a decade during which its top organs atrophied while Kim Jong-il instead declared a military-first policy (Songun) and prioritised the Korean People's Army (KPA). However, the KPA still seems to retain primacy. In addition to these two largely separate and rival bureaucracies, each with their own interests and input into policy formation, the cabinet remains an important and independent player. Some observers suggest that the cabinet may favour market reforms while the military is more hawkish, although the full picture is probably more complex.

Meanwhile, the National Defence Commission (NDC), as the highest executive organ of state, outranking the cabinet, remains the body most likely to take control if Kim Jong-il does pass away suddenly. Under the traditional communist model, the NDC would be outranked by its party shadow, the Central Military Commission, of which Kim Jong-eun is joint vice-chairman. The other vice-chairman is North Korea's most influential soldier, the chief of the general staff, Vice-Marshal Ri Yong-ho. However, the NDC, of which Kim Jong-eun is not a member, has outgrown rival institutions in power and is unlikely to have had its grip loosened by the political developments of 2010.

Jang Song-taek, a vice-chairman of the NDC and alternate politburo member, is widely seen as a likely regent if the commission does need to oversee a regime transition. He is married to Kim Jong-il's sister, Kim Kyong-hui, who was made both a four-star general and a full politburo member in late 2010. Other leading figures are also reported to be relatives by marriage or close allies of the Kim dynasty, confirming the status of the family as an institution in itself. Such a set-up suggests that the system is riddled with patronage ties and entrenched interests that will fight any efforts to change policy direction suddenly. However, the country's recent tendency to live on the edge, economically speaking, suggests that there will be no shortage of crises that might galvanise reforms if the leadership were inclined towards change.