Update Country Report Maldives 13 Jun 2019

With the Indian Ocean region emerging as a key global strategic hotspot, India has in recent years been stepping up its naval engagements in its marine neighbourhood. This includes several naval exercises that its forces have held with countries it shares strategic interests with, such as Australia, France, the US and Japan. Given China's growing footprint in India's traditional sphere of influence-which India considers to be countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives-and given India's pursuit of its "Act East" policy, the war games are strategically and geopolitically significant. However, India's approach to security co-operation in the region will remain carefully calibrated over the forecast period, in an effort to prevent a build-up of tensions with China.

There has been a renewed push for India's maritime ambitions since the start of 2019, with its navy embarking on a series of crucial military exercises. In the first two weeks of April, India's navy conducted its largest-ever military exercises with its Australian counterpart. The third edition of this India-Australia maritime defence exercise, called AUSINDEX, included a focus on tracking and engaging enemy submarines, and was particularly notable given China's rapid expansion of its submarine fleet in recent years. Although the Indian Ocean is not Australia's primary zone of marine interest, it has adopted the "Indo-Pacific" terminology relatively generously in its strategy documents, and has recognised India as a country of "first order" importance, with a strategic partnership since 2009.

The four-way exercise between naval forces of the US, Japan, the Philippines and India in the South China Sea in the first week of May was another significant show of partnership and naval strength. The week-long drills were primarily aimed at demonstrating the four countries' commitments to ensuring safe and open sea lanes in the contested waters. They are closely aligned with what both India and the US have emphasised in recent years-a "rules-based" international order, a reference to China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. The broader Indian Ocean region is also key for India, as over half its trade passes through the Strait of Malacca, which opens into the South China Sea and is the principal channel between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Another issue of concern for India is the applicability of the laws of the sea. It is worth noting that statements by senior Indian officials, particularly in relation to maritime strategy, have often emphasised a "rules-based" international order, in line with the American stance on laws of the sea in the region. Meanwhile, China continues to claim sovereignty over large sections of the South China Sea, arguing against several international maritime conventions.

This is accentuated by fears that China's ambitions for a blue-water navy (a force capable of ocean-based operations far beyond its territorial waters) are resulting in it developing a force capable of projecting power far beyond its territorial waters, such as in the Horn of Africa region. These fears were evident in India's decision to hold naval exercises with France in May. They were held off the coast of Djibouti, a country that hosts China's first overseas military base. India itself has made efforts to set up military bases in the Indian Ocean region, notably in Seychelles, although its plans in that country remain in limbo owing to domestic opposition in Seychelles.

Contested waters

Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean over the past several years has been one of India's chief concerns from a strategic perspective. India has traditionally seen its marine neighbourhood as a place with a clear strategic advantage over China. However, in recent years China's influence has grown, led by developments like Beijing's push for a maritime Silk Road as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, its military base in Djibouti and its close involvement in the development of ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan. This, as well as its increased influence in the Maldives, point to growing Chinese intrusion in South Asia, a region where (except for Pakistan and Bangladesh), most countries have historically enjoyed very close ties with India.

In addition, India realises that its military cannot match China's. China's navy was historically more coastal throughout the cold war, with the Communist Party regime focusing on land and air forces, in order to repel the possibility of an overland invasion by the former Soviet Union. By contrast, India's government invested in creating a blue-water navy and has operated aircraft carriers (warships that are seen as the most critical elements of a blue-water navy) since 1961. However, since the 1990s, China's navy has grown at a rapid pace, and it now heavily outnumbers India's. Given the circumstances, international co-operation on security matters has become the only way for India to counter China's growing might.

Not all hawks

It would, however, be inaccurate to interpret India's strategic response to China's growing clout in the Indo-Pacific region as purely hostile. In fact, India and China have indicated interest in strategic co-operation in recent years, particularly as part of efforts to manage tensions after the two countries had a military standoff in Doklam-near the trijunction between India, China and Bhutan-in June-August 2017. This also includes interactions between their naval forces that took place earlier this year. For instance, the Indian navy participated in a display by the Chinese navy on April 23rd, on the 70th founding day of China's People's Liberation Army.

Notwithstanding its strategic partnership with other countries in the region, India has also been careful not to antagonise China. Given the large volume of Indian trade that passes through the South China Sea, and the growing value of their bilateral trade, the protection of naval routes is a serious economic concern for both India and China. Also, despite the somewhat outsized attention given to the co-operation between Australia, the US, Japan and India, most security co-ordination between India and other countries in the group has not been multilateral, but bilateral, and occasionally, trilateral. India's rejection of Australia's bid to join the 2018 Malabar naval exercises along with the US and Japan-which would, in effect, have been the first time the four countries participated in such exercises together-is likely to have been a gesture to allay China's concerns. Overall, over the forecast period, India will remain a somewhat reluctant participant in multilateral strategic overtures against China.