The immediate political focus is now firmly on the April 2011 presidential election. The decisive victory of the president, Goodluck Jonathan, in the People's Democratic Party (PDP) presidential primaries has significantly reduced the risk of Nigeria's largest party breaking apart over the issue of power-sharing between the north and south. Under an unwritten arrangement within the PDP, the presidency is supposed to rotate every two terms between politicians from the north and the south-an important geopolitical divide. The death in May 2010 of the incumbent president, Umaru Yar'Adua (a northern Muslim), saw the then vice-president, Mr Jonathan (a southern Christian), ascend to the presidency. As Mr Yar'Adua had served only one term, a faction of northern political heavyweights demanded that another northern candidate succeed him. However, at the primary election many northern delegates in fact chose to back Mr Jonathan, suggesting that the PDP remains largely undivided. While the significant powers of incumbency enjoyed by Mr Jonathan played an important role in his victory, the result also suggests that the party membership is not as opposed to his rule as his critics make out. Those who remain opposed to his leadership may still leave the party, but their options are limited. It is now too late for them to leave to take up the presidential candidacy of any of the major opposition parties, which have already selected their leaders.

The run-up to April's elections is likely to be fraught, with outbreaks of political violence. There has already been evidence of political unrest and mounting tension in some parts of the country, which could escalate if competing politicians choose to exploit existing fault lines and social divisions for their own ends. Likely hotspots include Plateau state, at the crossroads of Nigeria's Muslim north and Christian south, where dozens of people have been killed in sectarian fighting in recent months. The long-standing unrest in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, where armed militants and criminal gangs have been attacking oil facilities, could worsen if local politicians decide to use the region's problems for their own ends or recruit militants to intimidate their opponents, as has happened in previous elections. Even assuming that the elections pass off without any catastrophic breakdown in security, the political situation will remain tense during the remainder of the forecast period. Much of 2011 is likely to be taken up with court cases over disputed polls, as happened after the 2007 elections. In addition, Nigeria will remain troubled by political and social tensions, arising mainly from the underlying problems of poverty and underdevelopment.

The Niger Delta situation is set to remain precarious throughout 2011-15. Hopes were raised by a government amnesty in 2009, but the administration has struggled to live up to its promises to create jobs and improve infrastructure in the region. Whoever the next president is, they are likely to prioritise the calming of tensions in the region after coming to power, given the importance of the oil sector to Nigeria's prospects. Although a military solution would be messy and impractical given the Delta's complex terrain, peaceful resolution will be difficult for a number of reasons, including the fact that the militants' demand for local control of mineral resources is unacceptable to the political elites in other regions of the country, especially the north. An additional complicating factor is that the militia groups form an amorphous and fragmented movement with which it is hard to negotiate and which has attracted large numbers of criminals motivated by greed rather than grievance.