The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the emir, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jabr al-Sabah, to remain the ultimate executive authority in 2011-15. Despite the concentration of power in the hands of the emir and executive, Kuwait has the strongest National Assembly (parliament) of any of the Gulf Arab monarchies. Parliament is wholly elected, with the first female members of parliament (MPs) elected in 2009, and there is robust political debate. Relations between the Al Sabah-dominated government and parliament are often fraught and are expected to remain tense throughout the forecast period. In the most recent sign of continuing friction, the cabinet resigned for the sixth time since 2006 at the end of March. Although opposition forces in parliament are highly vocal and regularly impede the legislative process, they lack coherence and are deeply divided on many issues.

The outbreak of popular unrest and opposition to authoritarian regimes in North Africa and some Middle Eastern countries since the beginning of 2011 poses a challenge to the authorities. There were protests in February and March in Kuwait by the bidoon (stateless) population, seeking improved living conditions and greater rights. However, the demonstrations do not constitute a new or major threat. Indeed, the bidoon are probably seeking to capitalise on the fact that regimes across the region are feeling more vulnerable and will be more inclined to make concessions to keep their populations happy.

Perhaps more ominous were protests by the Shia community (about 30% of the population) in March, although the demonstrations were in support of the Bahraini Shia cause rather than being directed against the Kuwaiti authorities. There were calls from the Shia population for greater religious freedom and accusations of discrimination in March, but the protests are likely to be contained. Periodic rises in tension between the Sunni Muslim majority and the Shia minority in the past-often inflamed by broader regional confrontations-have typically been short-lived.

We believe that if unrest were to break out on a wider scale in Kuwait, it would probably target members of the cabinet or the prime minister, Sheikh Nasser Mohammed al-Ahmed al-Sabah, rather than the monarchy itself. The government, dominated by members of the ruling family and led by the prime minister, resigned in late March after several interpellation requests from MPs. Following the previous five resignations by the cabinet, the emir reappointed Sheikh Nasser Mohammed every time and did so once again on this most recent occasion. However, the prime minister's authority has repeatedly been called into question by parliament and even by members of the Al Sabah. Youth groups and other factions say that they will continue to lobby for a new prime minister and government. Political bickering is expected to continue for much of this year, with negative consequences for legislative effectiveness.

In the first half of 2010 the parliamentary opposition seemed to recognise the urgent need for economic legislation and adopted a more conciliatory approach to a number of important economic bills. However, tensions resurfaced in the second half of the year. A violent crackdown on a meeting of opposition MPs in early December led to the leaders of the three largest opposition groups filing for an interpellation of the prime minister, on the issue of public freedoms. The questioning took place behind closed doors in late December, with the opposition subsequently filing a non-co-operation motion against Sheikh Nasser Mohammed. The prime minister won the motion by a narrow 25 votes to 22, but this compares unfavourably with a motion against him in December 2009, which he won by 35 votes.

The political succession is uncertain. The emir is in his 80s and the crown prince, Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmed al-Jabr al-Sabah, who is the emir's half-brother, is in his 70s. Another brother, Sheikh Mishaal al-Ahmed al-Jabr al-Sabah, the deputy head of the National Guard who acts as a mediator within the family, is a strong candidate. The prime minister is a nephew and protégé of the emir, but his status has been undermined by his parliamentary difficulties. The head of the emiri diwan (akin to a royal court), Sheikh Nasser Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, the emir's son, is another possible contender, and has good relations with members of the ruling elite, but his succession so soon after his father's tenure might prompt resentment. There is also a chance that a member of the sidelined Al Salem branch of the ruling family-which formerly alternated leadership with the now dominant Al Jabr line-could become the next crown prince. Whatever the outcome of the debate, it is likely to take place well out of the public glare, with the ruling family closely bound by intermarriage and well aware that open squabbling would pose a threat to their overall legitimacy.