Outlook for 2011-12

• The dominance of the ruling party, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), over the economy and state will remain largely uncontested in 2011-12, as the political opposition is too weak to mount a serious challenge.
• The risk of widespread social unrest, particularly in poor urban areas, cannot be discounted, particularly given the outlook for sharp rises in global food prices in 2011.
• Policy will be guided by the three-year policy support instrument (PSI) with the IMF and the five-year strategy paper, Programa Quinquenal do Governo para 2010-14. Both target poverty reduction and economic diversification.
• The fiscal deficit in 2011 is forecast at the equivalent of 4.9% of GDP, falling to 4.4% of GDP in 2012 as subsidies are unwound. The deficit will be funded overwhelmingly by concessional loans from donors.
• Real GDP growth is expected to remain brisk in 2011-12, averaging 7.4% a year, on the back of increasing inflows of foreign aid and foreign direct investment into minerals and infrastructure mega-projects.
• In line with the latest outlook for global commodity prices and expected losses to local agricultural output owing to flooding, inflation is now forecast to average 7.5% in 2011, easing to 5% in 2012.
• The current-account deficit is forecast to narrow from an estimated 11% of GDP in 2010 to 10.7% of GDP in 2011 and 9.1% of GDP in 2012.

Monthly review

• Mozambique has reached an agreement with South Africa to allow patrols in the Mozambique Channel by the South African navy to counter the threat of Somali piracy.
• An official crackdown on private minibus taxis in the capital, Maputo, has led to chaos in the capital's transport system.
• The extractive industries sector in Mozambique should involve stronger economic linkages, transparency and dialogue, according to a recent report by a local research institute, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE).
• The state rail company, Companhia de Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique (CFM), has signalled that it will end the contract granting an Indian firm, Ricon, the concession to operate the Beira-Tete railway line.
• The public works ministry has announced that the construction of a new bridge over the Zambezi River by Tete city is to begin this year. It is due for completion within three to four years, at a projected cost of around US$95m.

The ruling party, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), is set to remain the dominant figure in the political and economic landscape throughout the forecast period, following its crushing but flawed victory in the legislative and presidential elections held in October 2009. After more than five years in power, the president, Armando Guebuza, has consolidated his influence, wielding near-total control over his party, and can rely on the support of the security services. Mr Guebuza's micromanagement and the centralisation of power in the presidency have weakened the tradition of debate inside Frelimo. As a result, there are grave concerns that this is undermining the effectiveness of government decision-making and management.

Bloody riots that erupted in the capital, Maputo, in September 2010 over the cost of living pose a greater threat to Frelimo's hegemony than do the enfeebled opposition parties. The unrest was brutally repressed by the security services, resulting in several deaths, before the government was forced to capitulate and reinstate some price controls. Although the restoration of food subsidies and cuts to planned price increases for water and electricity are likely to assuage popular anger in the short term, widespread subsidies are fiscally unsustainable. Moreover, the government's acquiescence may set a precedent for social unrest to win concessions. Consequently, the risk of further such instability in 2011-12 is considerable. In addition to price rises, other triggers of future unrest include power cuts, a localised rise in unemployment or a delayed official response to a disease outbreak or flooding. Overall, the Economist Intelligence Unit expects political stability to deteriorate slightly in the forecast period.

The next national and presidential elections are not due until late 2014. However, before then jockeying for position among potential successors to Mr Guebuza-who cannot serve another term in office-is likely. The political opposition will undergo radical and much-needed change over the next few years, as the previously dominant opposition party, Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (Renamo), is in disarray and may gradually be supplanted by a new challenger, the Movimento Democrático de Moçambique, to which it is losing talent and support.

Relations between the government and donors are likely to remain fraught in 2011-12, despite the resumption of aid disbursements following a "donor strike" in early 2010. However, the amount of aid pledged for 2011 has stagnated in nominal terms (meaning a drop in real terms), bucking the trend of recent years and reflecting donors' concerns over governance. Given the need for fiscal retrenchment in the West and the fact that Frelimo is unlikely to loosen its dominance of the state and the economy, aid pledges in 2012 are also expected to stagnate rather than rise. Ties with South Africa, Mozambique's main trading partner, will remain strong, driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and long-standing commercial links. Strong commercial, political and personal ties will ensure continued close relations with Portugal, which will remain a key source of FDI and diplomatic support. Investment from China, Brazil and India, particularly in railways and mining, will help to strengthen ties with those countries.

Policy in the outlook period will be guided by the three-year policy support instrument (PSI) agreed with the IMF in June, as well as the government's five-year strategy paper, Programa Quinquenal do Governo para 2010-14, which is implemented through annual social and economic plans (Planos Económicos e Sociais-PES). The objectives of the latest PSI include unwinding some of the fiscal stimulus policies enacted during the global economic slowdown in 2008-09 and into 2010. The PSI aims to keep the primary deficit stable and to develop a debt-management strategy. The five-year strategy, meanwhile, aims to cut poverty, improve social development and foster key sectors, including agriculture, fishing, minerals, tourism and transport.

Despite troubled relations with donors, the government will remain heavily dependent on aid to implement its policy agenda. Moreover, it intends to take on some private borrowing to fund its ambitious infrastructural development programme, so a clear strategy for debt management is a priority. A programme of reforms to tax policy and collection, public financial management and the supervision of banks will carry on from the previous PSI. However, progress in these structural reforms is expected to be slow, owing to both the scale of the challenges to be overcome and the fact that many officials have vested interests in preserving the inefficient status quo.

The 2011 budget, approved by parliament in December, provides for total expenditure of MT132.4bn (US$4.1bn), equivalent to an officially forecast 35.3% of GDP. Current spending, half of which is accounted for by public-sector wages, is budgeted at MT68.8bn. This is just over one-half of total spending and forecast at equivalent to 18.3% of GDP. Capital spending of MT60bn (around 16% of GDP) is set to rise by nearly 15% on the latest estimates of executed spending in 2010. Investment in agriculture is budgeted at just MT1.6bn, less than 10% of the MT19bn allocated to capital spending on infrastructure. Education, meanwhile, is set to receive MT3.6bn in capital spending, and health MT2.3bn. As regards revenue, the domestic component is expected to rise by a brisk 19.5% on the latest estimates for outturn in 2010, to MT73.3bn. The increase is expected to be led by higher income tax receipts, which are projected to rise by 34% on 2010 estimates to MT23.4bn on the back of rapid economic growth and improved collection. External revenue is budgeted at MT58.1bn (44% of the total). Total revenue is set to rise by nearly 15% on the latest estimates of outturn in 2010. Overall, we expect a fiscal deficit equivalent to 4.8% of GDP in 2011.

We expect foreign aid to continue to drop in real terms in 2012, although domestic revenue should continue to pick up strongly on the back of still rapid growth. We expect spending growth to be slower in that year as subsidies are slowly unwound. Consequently, we expect a slightly narrower fiscal deficit in 2012, equivalent to 4.3% of GDP.

In 2011 we expect that the key policies of the central bank, Banco de Moçambique (BDM), will be to restrain money supply growth and allow a gentle appreciation of the metical in order to check imported inflation, which has accelerated recently, in part because of the weakening of the currency. In 2012 the BDM is expected to try to keep the local currency steady, as further appreciation would undermine competitiveness. Although the BDM formally targets sustainable levels of monetary aggregates, policy will increasingly prioritise keeping inflation in check, even if this requires further strengthening of the metical.

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We estimate real GDP growth of 8.5% in 2010, driven by the minerals sector. Growth is expected to remain brisk in 2011 on the back of increasing inflows of FDI into minerals and infrastructure mega-projects, as well as ongoing donor contributions. Agriculture will benefit from growth in the output of food and cash crops, as well as from the implementation of the government's national food production plan. The recent flooding in the south of the country will have a negative impact on agricultural output, although a relatively small one, as the main producing regions are in the north. Moreover, this loss of agricultural production may be offset by the boost to construction from repairs to flood-damaged infrastructure. Output from industry is expected to rise briskly on the back of strong inflows of foreign investment into the minerals sector, particularly to develop coal reserves. However, industrial production will remain below potential owing to the fitful power supply. The services sector is also expected to continue the strong performance registered in 2010. In particular, hotels and restaurants, and financial services are expected to maintain double-digit growth as tourism and foreign interest in the country's banking sector pick up. Growth is expected to ease in 2011, to a still rapid 7.3%, in line with tougher global economic conditions, before picking up slightly in 2012, to 7.5%, largely on the back of increased coal production.

World commodity prices have recently returned to record highs and are expected to remain high for the remainder of 2011. Of particular relevance to inflation in Mozambique is the outlook for global food prices, as the country is highly dependent on imports of food, which has a heavy weighting in the consumer price basket. We expect global food prices to rise by a very rapid 19.3% in 2011 and consequently expect inflation in 2011 to average 7.5%. World commodity prices are expected to ease slightly in 2012 as monetary policy tightens worldwide, encouraging a withdrawal of investment from commodities (speculation having partly driven the rapid rise in prices in 2010). However, the government is likely to use this opportunity to finally withdraw fiscally unsustainable food price subsidies, so the impact on inflation will be broadly neutral. Consequently, we expect inflation to ease only slightly in 2012, averaging 5%.

In view of recently rapid imported consumer price inflation, efforts to reduce the metical's overvaluation to boost export competitiveness are now likely to be put on hold. Through its interventions, the central bank appears to have put a floor under the value of the metical at around MT37:US$1 and MT5.1:R1 since late July. We expect the recent unrest over the high cost of living to encourage the authorities to let the metical strengthen slightly amid strong expected inflows of foreign investment in 2011. The BDM will probably seek to hold the value of the metical steady in 2012 at a level that limits imported inflation while not eroding the country's export competitiveness through strong appreciation. Consequently, we forecast that the exchange rate will average MT32:US$1 in 2011 and MT31:US$1 in 2012.

The outlook for Mozambique's aluminium-dominated exports is positive, as global demand is expected to grow even though prices are set to moderate in 2011-12. The other two main exports, gas and electricity, are governed by fixed contracts with buyers in South Africa that are priced in rand, and any changes in value will reflect fluctuations in the rand:dollar exchange rate. However, the planned expansion of gas exports will have some positive impact by 2011, as will the increase in coal exports. Agricultural export volumes are expected to increase in response to government investment in the sector. Our revised forecast for a sharp rise in global food prices in 2011 will boost receipts from crops in which the country is a net exporter, although prices are expected to ease in 2012. We expect total goods exports to rise from an estimated US$2.7bn in 2010 to US$3.3bn in both 2011 and 2012. Goods imports will also rise strongly in 2011-12, to an average of US$4.5bn, from an estimated US$3.7bn in 2010, given the outlook for sustained high oil prices and the demand from large-scale investment projects in minerals and infrastructure. Overall, the trade deficit will narrow from an equivalent of 10.9% of GDP in 2011 to 9.5% of GDP in 2012.

The services deficit will drop from US$439m in 2010 (an estimated 4.7% of GDP) to an average of US$414m (3.3%) in 2011-12 as an increase in service imports for the mining sector is more than offset by a recovery in service exports from the tourism and transport sectors. The income deficit will rise in nominal terms in line with profit repatriation by foreign firms, but owing to rapid economic growth will fall as a proportion of GDP, equivalent to 4.3% and 3.9% of GDP in 2011 and 2012 respectively. In view of the chronic tensions between Frelimo and the country's donors, aid pledges are set to stagnate in 2011-12, so the transfers balance will rise in dollar terms but will fall as a share of GDP, averaging US$965m or 7.7% of GDP. In view of these trends, the current-account deficit is forecast to narrow from an estimated 11% of GDP in 2010 to 10.7% of GDP in 2011 and 9.1% of GDP in 2012.

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Mozambique has reached an agreement with South Africa to allow patrols in the Mozambique Channel by the South African navy. South Africa's naval patrol is to consist of a single frigate-with helicopter capability-and a supply vessel. The patrol is scheduled to last for one month, but this is likely to be extended. Mozambique itself has little naval capability: its navy is estimated by a global survey of military capability, The Military Balance 2010, to comprise just 200 personnel and five patrol boats. It is therefore woefully under-equipped to police the country's coastline, which is over 2,000 km in length, let alone further offshore.

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The decision follows increased activity by Somali pirates in the area and concerns that risks to merchant shipping caused by marine piracy could now spread from East to Southern Africa. According to a London-based shipping security lobby, the International Maritime Bureau, many attacks by Somali pirates now take place over 1,000 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia, often using "mother ships" as bases for their skiffs. In an example of the Somali pirates' increasing range, on December 28th a Mozambican fishing vessel was hijacked; its Somali captors demanded a ransom of US$1.8m for release of the vessel and her 14 crew.

As the seas surrounding Somalia have become increasingly policed, not least by an EU force known as Atalanta, the pirates are likely to operate further afield. Sea traffic in the little-policed Mozambique channel could be an increasingly tempting target, posing a threat to South Africa's external trade. In other developments, a ship carrying illegal immigrants from Somalia and Ethiopia sank off Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province in early February, causing 51 deaths. The vessel's occupants were believed to have been destined for South Africa.

Following months of government-induced chaos in the urban transport system in the capital, Maputo, the authorities have announced that they will attempt to solve the problem-through yet more state intervention. The situation has arisen following a decision taken in January by Maputo's city council to stop issuing licences to the small, privately owned, 15-seater minibus taxis known as chapas, which have dominated the city's urban transport system for decades. At the same time, an arbitrary police crackdown on the chapas was launched, under which even minor infractions have been heavily punished. The result has been to sharply reduce the number of transport operators, creating chaos for the many thousands of people who depend on these services. By showing such disregard for the needs of the poorest Maputo residents, who depend on public transport, the city council-which is dominated by the nationally ruling party, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo)-is playing with fire. This risks sparking the type of unrest seen in the city in September in response to rising bread prices (September 2010, The political scene).

At the same time, the government has been promoting the introduction of larger buses, some of them privately operated, but has taken action against the chapas before the new ones are operational. The government's preferred option is to strengthen the state bus company, Transportes Publicos de Maputo (TPM), which has received increasing state investment lately. TPM currently accounts for just 8% of public transport journeys, although it is more than doubling its total fleet, with buses being imported from China and India. Despite growing investment, TPM has weak operational capacity and around half of its buses have been out of service at any given time in recent years. It also operates with heavy subsidies: fares reportedly account for around just 20% of costs. The government decision to direct public funding toward subsidising urban transport has been criticised as a poor choice for alleviating poverty, as it benefits the poor and better off alike, as well as encouraging operational inefficiencies at TPM.

The extractive industries sector in Mozambique should involve stronger economic linkages, transparency and dialogue, according to a recent report by a local research institute, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE). The report's findings were presented in early February at the "Alternative" Mining Indaba, a fringe event that took place in tandem with the Mining Indaba, an international mining conference held in Cape Town, South Africa. The IESE's paper provides a useful commentary on the need for transparency and assessing the benefits from extractive industries in Mozambique, which are growing rapidly.

Although a valuable resource for developing countries, extractive industries also carry risks, as they provide governments with easy revenue streams and are correlated with increasing corruption and deteriorating governance quality. Strong systems that promote transparency, published tax payments by foreign companies, active civil society and effective domestic regulation and oversight are the principle means of addressing these risks. Mozambique is committed to ensuring such safeguards are in place as part of its candidacy to join an international scheme to boost transparency in the mining sectors of developing countries, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The deadline for Mozambique's validation as a member of the EITI is May 14th 2011.

Minerals mined in Mozambique include both base and precious metals, forest products and natural gas. Hopes are high that oil may also be present, and exploration is ongoing. Minerals projects are typically capital intensive. For example, the Pande gas project operated by Sasol of South Africa, the Moma mineral sands project run by the UK-based Kenmare and the Tete coal project of Brazilian mining giant have capital:jobs ratios of around US$1m:1. The sector also has few linkages to the broader economy in local supply, processing or end use by other industries, and almost all output is exported. Local tax revenues from these projects are relatively low (February 2011, Economic policy), while social offset funds, which are typically included as a condition of winning mining concessions, are underdeveloped and often have weak community participation. As the report notes, such shortcomings are primarily the responsibility of the Mozambican government, not the corporations concerned, although they no doubt welcome lenient fiscal treatment.

The state rail company, Companhia de Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique (CFM), has given notice that it will terminate its contract with an Indian firm, Ricon, which holds a long-term concession to operate the Beira-Tete rail line, if performance benchmarks are not met by March 24th. Engineering work to rehabilitate the line is reportedly over a year behind schedule. Ricon has held the concession to rehabilitate and run the 550-km Beira-Tete route-which it won by international tender-since 2004. It holds 51% of the local operating firm, the Beira Railroad Company, with CFM holding the remainder. The authorities are evidently preparing the ground to terminate the contract as soon as possible. Following an inspection of the entire length of the line, which was completed on February 8th, CFM's chairman declared that "not a single kilometre" met agreed standards.

If Ricon's contract is terminated as threatened, it will be the latest in a long line of international companies that have invested in Mozambique's port and rail infrastructure but fallen foul of CFM and other state agencies. Firms have had their contracts terminated or broken them off in frustration. The process of turning port and rail management over to international companies, on the understanding that they would invest in infrastructure on long-term contracts, was initiated in the late 1990s. The policy was viewed as preferable to the outright privatisation of CFM, at the time a large and poorly managed parastatal firm lacking capital and expertise but still regarded domestically as a national champion. The policy left CFM as more a holding company than an operational one, overseeing its concession contracts in which it is a joint-venture partner, and was deeply unpopular among the company's management and nationalists. During what has been a lengthy rearguard action, CFM's management has generally taken a combative approach to its joint-venture partners, which has undermined efficiency in joint projects. CFM has made little secret of its desire to resume control of its assets and declared that it will allow most of the remaining concessions to expire when they come to term.

Uncertainty over management of the rail line to Tete comes shortly before it is scheduled to begin providing coal export service in the third quarter of 2011, with a possible capacity of 5m tonnes per year. This is far below potential coal exports from the two largest mining companies, Brazil's Vale and Australia's Riversdale, of 35m tonnes/year (t/y) in total. Furthermore, if planned investment and expansion by all the companies involved is realised, coal exports could reach 85m t/y by the end of the decade. The exact role of the existing rail line is unclear, as Vale has stated that its preferred option is to build a short rail link to connect with the rail and port facilities at Nacala. Riversdale is examining transporting its output by barge, 500 km downstream on the Zambezi River, although the feasibility of this plan and its environmental impact have yet to be confirmed (December 2010, The political scene).

A new "national" stadium has opened in Maputo, following a formal handover by the Chinese contractor in a ceremony attended by officials from the two countries. The stadium has seating capacity of 42,000 and is supposedly built to "Olympic standards". Although the project is covered under a bilateral accord between China and Mozambique, it is not strictly an aid project, as the US$65m cost of the stadium is to be assumed as sovereign national debt. There is growing concern about the government borrowing that has funded several questionable prestige and infrastructure projects, such as the US$300m airport planned for Pemba (February 2011, Economic performance). Moreover, the extra debt is being contracted shortly after the country benefited from large-scale debt relief through the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that in 2011 debt service will more than double from its level in 2009 of US$65m to US$133m. The external debt stock is set to rise from US$4.2bn to US$5.5bn over the same period.

The Ministry of Public Works and Housing has announced that the construction of a new bridge over the Zambezi River by Tete city is to begin this year. It is due for completion within three to four years, at a projected cost of EUR70m (US$95m), with financing from donors and the government. The new bridge is intended to ease capacity constraints for the sole existing bridge at Tete, completed in the 1970s, and will be 6 km away in an undeveloped area outside the city. The bridge will be for use primarily by heavy goods vehicles, around 800 of which use the existing bridge every day.

The Tete corridor is an important logistical point both for Mozambique and the region, involving transit traffic destined for Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Investment in transport and other infrastructure in Tete is both a cause and an effect of an economic boom in the area resulting from millions of dollars-worth of investment in Mozambique's emergent coal mining industry. Air transport links at Tete are also improving, and since last year the area has had a direct service to South Africa with SA Airlink, which added an additional weekly flight in January.

The government has signed a deal with a Chinese company, Tong Jian Investment, to build a vehicle-assembly plant in the country. Under the agreement the proposed plant would be located in an industrial area of Maputo and will possibly create as many as 3,000 jobs if the investment is fully realised. The scheme envisages production of 10,000 vehicles per year-rising to 30,000-50,000 per year-with over 70% being exported to the Southern African region.

However, the plan faces serious hurdles, including local-content requirements under the rules of origin provisions of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) free-trade agreement in order to qualify for duty-free entry to the market. The Mozambican authorities will also have to satisfy the concerns of South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry, and the country's powerful automotive industry, which could lose out from the extra competition. Other challenges are that Tong Jian Investment is not primarily an automotive manufacturer but rather a construction and engineering company. The firm describes itself as "mainly" targeting investment in African countries with which it has "friendly" relations. The proposed deal follows from the signing of a multi-billion-dollar bilateral investment agreement by China and Mozambique in 2010 (October 2010, Economic performance).

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Please see graphic below

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Land area

799,380 sq km

Population

22m (2010, World Gazetteer estimate)

Main towns

Population, 2010 (World Gazetteer)

Maputo (capital): 1,888,144(a)

Nampula: 534,820

Beira: 440,404

Chimoio: 259,211

Nacala: 221,371

Quelimane: 204,705

Tete: 169,967

Pemba: 160,525

(a) Including Matola and Maputo province.

Climate

Tropical and subtropical

Weather in Maputo (altitude 59 metres)

Hottest month, February, 22-31°C (average daily minimum and maximum); coldest month, July, 13-24°C; driest months, July, August, 13 mm average rainfall; wettest month, January, 130 mm average rainfall

Languages

Portuguese (official) and three main African language groups: Makua-Lomwe, Tsonga and Sena-Nyanja

Measures

Metric system

Currency

Metical (MT); average exchange rate in 2009: MT26.3:US$1

Time

2 hours ahead of GMT

Public holidays

January 1st (New Year's Day), February 3rd (Heroes' Day), April 7th (Women's Day), May 1st (Labour Day), June 25th (Independence Day), September 7th (Victory Day), September 25th (Armed Forces Day), November 10th (Maputo City Day-Maputo only), December 25th (Family Day)

Official name

República de Moçambique

Form of state

Unitary republic

Legal system

Based on Portuguese-Roman law and the 1990 constitution, updated in 2004

National legislature

250-member Assembleia da República (parliament) elected by direct, universal suffrage every five years

National elections

October 28th 2009 (legislative and presidential); next national, provincial and presidential elections are due in late 2014

Head of state

President, chosen by direct universal suffrage

National government

The president and his appointed prime minister and Council of Ministers; new cabinet appointed in January 2005; last reshuffle in October 2010

Main political parties

Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) is the ruling party; the main opposition party is Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (Renamo); the Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM) was formed in March 2009 with the mayor of Beira, Daviz Simango, as its leader; it is drawing strong support from disaffected Renamo members and is bidding to replace Renamo as the main opposition party; another opposition party, Partido Humanitário de Moçambique (Pahumo), was launched by former Renamo members in April 2010

President: Armando Guebuza

Prime minister: Aires Bonifácio Ali

Ministers in the presidency

Parliamentary affairs: Adeleaide Amurane

Social affairs: Feliciano Gundana

Key ministers

Agriculture: José Pacheco

Defence: Filipe Nhussi

Education: Zeferino Martins

Energy: Salvador Namburete

Environmental co-ordination: Alcinda Abreu

Finance: Manuel Chang

Fisheries: Victor Manuel Borges

Foreign affairs & co-operation: Oldemiro Baloi

Health: Alexandre Manguele

Industry & trade: Armando Inroga

Interior: Alberto Mondlane

Justice: Maria Benvinda Levi

Labour: Helena Taipo

Mineral resources: Esperança Bias

Planning & development: Aiuba Cuereneia

Public works & housing: Cadmiel Muthemba

Science & technology: Venâncio Massingue

State administration: Lucas Chomera

Tourism: Fernando Sumbana

Transport & communications: Paulo Zucula

Women's affairs & social welfare: Iolanda Cintura

Central bank governor

Ernesto Gouveia Gove