The government will remain a major force in the economy, although there is a long-term effort to encourage a greater role for the private sector. The state will continue to monopolise crude oil production, although private firms will have some involvement in gas exploration and joint-venture refineries. Oil export revenue will continue to provide the bulk of government income, and fiscal policy will thus be constrained by oil market developments. Nonetheless, substantial savings built up in recent years will enable the government to play a significant role in financing new industrial and infrastructure projects, with a long-term strategy of reducing the country's dependence on crude oil exports, using more of its energy resources as feedstock for value-added, energy-intensive industries and creating jobs in manufacturing, tourism and other services (for example, the government has announced that Saudi Arabia is planning to produce as much as 70% of its military hardware and spare parts in-house, instead of ordering from abroad). The eventual retirement of Ali al-Naimi as oil minister is unlikely to lead to any significant change in oil and gas policy. The private sector will continue to benefit from soft loans from five public-sector credit institutions.

Public investment worth US$373bn is planned in 2010-14. Having completed a large-scale expansion of crude oil production capacity to 12m barrels/day, Saudi Aramco, the state oil company, will focus on maintaining capacity and ramping up output of gas, refined products and petrochemicals. The government is also increasing spending on health and education, backing major new rail and infrastructure projects, and planning to invest in food production abroad. The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) will seek to make the business environment more conducive to foreign investment, but a number of deterrents will persist, including excessive bureaucracy and an unpredictable and restrictive visa policy. Investment opportunities will result from gradual liberalisation in several sectors, including power generation, ports and transport. SAGIA is also seeking to attract investment into four new "economic cities", although the plans may take some time to implement, or may not fully materialise.

Some of the state-owned enterprises will be part-privatised, but the restructuring of large companies, such as Saudi Arabian Airlines and the loss-making Saudi Electricity Company, will take time. Privatisation will often be carried out through initial public offerings on the local stock exchange, which are open only to Saudi citizens, in order to redistribute wealth while allowing the state to remain the largest shareholder. Government institutions will retain shares in some of the banks, given concerns about the health of the global financial sector. The state will continue to guarantee bank deposits and (implicitly) borrowing by parastatals.

Overall, policy implementation will be mixed, given the lack of co-ordination between ministries and the inefficiency of the overstaffed bureaucracy. "Saudiisation" quotas on the proportion of expatriates firms can hire will remain a drawback for businesses.