Saudi Arabia will pursue a fitfully active foreign policy. Although it will at times seek to counter rising Iranian influence, such as occurred in Lebanon (although it has for the time being abandoned its diplomacy in the country), and will retain a close eye on the instability afflicting Yemen, it will generally defer to the US on wider regional security issues. However, mindful of its own Shia minority and the likely destabilising impact of a US or Israeli strike against Iran, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to support any military action overtly. Elsewhere, alarmed by the spread of social disorder in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere, Saudi Arabia may dispense increasing economic largesse to those countries, such as Jordan, that it considers to be both allies and vulnerable to interference from outsiders (namely Iran or militant groups connected to it).

Saudi Arabia's hostility to the Shia-dominated government in Iraq is likely to moderate following the inclusion of Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National Movement, the main electoral vehicle of the Sunni Arab minority, in the coalition government. Saudi Arabia is likely to become increasingly involved in Yemen, where an offshoot of al-Qaida has gained a foothold and the possibility of state failure looms. Saudi Arabia will lead efforts to provide economic and military aid, and there is a possibility of military intervention before the end of the forecast period. The US will remain Saudi Arabia's most important strategic partner and the two countries' interests will remain broadly aligned in terms of preventing state collapse in Yemen and containing Iran.

Relations with fellow Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) members will be bolstered by economic co-operation. However, relations with the UAE are likely to remain frosty because of an ongoing border dispute and the damage caused by the UAE's withdrawal from the planned GCC single currency. The kingdom will continue to try to maintain cohesion among the Arab states and to present a united Arab front in the face of security risks.