The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will continue to dominate the political scene in the forecast period (2011-15). The CCP monopolises political power in China and suppresses any challenge, real or perceived, to its authority. It has proved highly successful in maintaining its dominant position. The CCP controls the institutions of law and order, the security apparatus and the media. As a last resort, it can count on the armed forces to guarantee the continuance of its rule. Consequently, threats to the party-state structure are likely to remain subdued in 2011-15. However, factional rivalry is a potentially destabilising factor within the upper echelons of the party. During the early part of the forecast period more overt jostling between factions is likely in the run-up to the 2012 party congress, which will see the installation of a new CCP leadership.

Social tensions will continue to be generated by a number of issues, including unemployment, poor working conditions, environmental pollution, late payment of wages and benefits, illegal eviction from homes and land, official corruption and abuse of power. The majority of protests take place in the countryside, where illegal land seizures from farmers are a major problem. However, the rural population tends to be poorly organised and easily controlled by the state security organs, so that such protests pose little threat to national political stability. Social spending, especially in rural areas, has been increased in the past few years, and further rises in expenditure are likely. This will go some way towards reducing tensions.

Unrest in urban areas could pose a greater threat, but the CCP suppresses non-governmental organisations that might co-ordinate or channel social discontent. The government's strategy of punishing those who lead protests while trying to alleviate the underlying causes of social unrest has also proved highly effective-the authorities took many steps to cushion the painful social impact of the slowdown in economic growth in 2008-09, for example. Yet in an economic or political crisis it is possible that unrest could suddenly coalesce in a fashion that would be hard to control without bloodshed.

Separatist forces will remain weak, but ethnic unrest will probably erupt occasionally in the ethnic-minority regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, and related incidents of terrorist violence elsewhere in China are possible. Violence by Tibetans in early 2008 was followed in mid-2009 by race riots in Xinjiang in which nearly 200 people were killed. Separatism in Xinjiang poses a greater risk of escalating into a full-blown insurgency than unrest in Tibet, given the proximity of Xinjiang to separatist and Islamist groups in Central Asia. However, a new generation of Tibetans is less receptive to calls from their own leaders (including the Dalai Lama) for a peaceful approach, and this increases the potential for violence. Both regions are likely to see further protests. The Dalai Lama is growing old, and the Chinese authorities will be concerned that his death could provide a catalyst for further Tibetan instability. The government continues to take a harsh approach, including the use of the death penalty, to curbing separatist or ethnic unrest. It is also increasing development spending in Xinjiang and Tibet in an attempt to pacify these regions by boosting economic opportunities, although this tactic has failed there in the past.