The Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, has ruthlessly repressed political dissent, and there are now few real domestic threats to his rule. However, there are indications that the regime is concerned political turmoil in Tunisia and Egypt could spill over into Libya. Home to a young disaffected population and experiencing high unemployment, Libya faces some of the same threats to stability as its neighbours. The prominence of opposition to dynastic succession in the Egyptian revolution in particular now makes the prospect that Colonel Qadhafi will hand power to one of his children less likely. There is no agreed process for the transfer of power, but Colonel Qadhafi's tacit support for a number of reforms proposed by his son, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, has made him the most likely successor. Saif al-Islam faces considerable resistance from conservatives within the regime. He has long been in favour of creating a formal constitution and of implementing administrative and market-oriented reform. Other possible successors include one of Colonel Qadhafi's other six children. Many Libyans would deeply resent an orchestrated dynastic arrangement, and someone may emerge from within the political elite. Competing claims on power could lead to a period of instability immediately after Colonel Qadhafi's departure. However, the succession is unlikely to become a pressing issue while Colonel Qadhafi retains power, which he is expected to do throughout the forecast period. Hereditary succession has been a focal point of anti-regime demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia, and Colonel Qadhafi could come up against strong opposition to his plans as a result.

Significant political reform is unlikely. Colonel Qadhafi remains wedded to Libya's opaque and ineffective jamahiriya (republic of the people) system and continues to manipulate its structure to maintain the illusion of democracy-as demonstrated in 2009 by the apparent rejection by the local-level Basic People's Congresses (BPCs) and the General People's Congress (GPC, akin to a national parliament) of the Wealth Distribution Programme. The Libyan leader will continue to deny any individual minister the opportunity to build a personal power base. He will also be careful to balance the interests of reformers against those of the old guard.

There is at present little immediate threat to the ruling elite. However, if the socioeconomic environment were to deteriorate through, for example, rising unemployment, collapsing oil prices or growing inequality, the government could face increasing unrest similar to that seen in Tunisia and Egypt. Feelings of political exclusion have been exacerbated by the disruption of Libya's independent media. However, with the economy expected to remain relatively strong and the opposition, with the exception of domestic Islamists, either in exile or lacking clout and coherence, the prospect of any threat to the regime appears limited.

The greatest fear for the authorities remains the challenge from militant Islamist groups, which have been responsible for assassination attempts against Colonel Qadhafi. There are also regionwide concerns over the threat posed by al-Qaida affiliates. Reconciliation and rehabilitation negotiations have proceeded secretly, and a steady stream of Islamists has been released from prison in recent months, including 39 from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the largest local militant organisation, which recently renounced violence. This suggests that the local militant Islamist threat is declining.