The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will continue to dominate the political scene in the forecast period. Although recent events in the Middle East and North Africa have once again raised questions about the sustainability of long-lived authoritarian regimes, China's circumstances are fundamentally different from those of the troubled states in that region. Despite many grumbles among the public over corruption and the privileges of the CCP elite, there is little appetite in the country for regime change. Most Chinese citizens have seen their standards of living rise sharply in recent years and expect further improvements in 2011-15. The CCP also retains the strong support of the military.

Importantly, the transition of power to new generations of leaders, which occurs roughly once per decade, means that China lacks a figure like Egypt's recently ousted president, Hosni Mubarak, who personally embodied public disenchantment with that country's government. The next transfer of power in China will begin in late 2012 at the CCP party congress. However, factional rivalry within the upper echelons of the party may intensify in a disruptive fashion in the run-up to the congress, as recently highlighted by the dismissal of the head of China's Ministry of Railways, Liu Zhijun, against the backdrop of a corruption investigation.

Although regime change looks unlikely, social tensions will continue to be generated by a number of issues, including unemployment, poor working conditions, environmental pollution, late payment of wages and benefits, illegal eviction from homes and land, official corruption and abuse of power. The majority of protests take place in the countryside, where illegal land seizures from farmers are a major problem. However, the rural population tends to be poorly organised and easily controlled by the state security organs, and such protests therefore pose little threat to national political stability. Social spending, especially in rural areas, has increased in the past few years, and further rises are likely. This will help to reduce tensions.

Unrest in urban areas could pose a greater threat, but the CCP suppresses non-governmental organisations that might co-ordinate or channel social discontent. The government's strategy of punishing those who lead protests while trying to alleviate the underlying causes of social unrest has also proved highly effective. Yet in an economic or political crisis it is possible that anti-government forces could suddenly coalesce in a way that would be hard to control without bloodshed. The nascent force of labour activism, especially in skilled industries such as vehicle production, could also prove troublesome.

Separatist movements will remain weak, but ethnic unrest will probably erupt occasionally in the ethnic-minority regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, and related incidents of terrorist violence elsewhere in China are possible. Violence by Tibetans in early 2008 was followed in mid-2009 by race riots in Xinjiang in which nearly 200 people were killed. Separatism in Xinjiang poses a greater risk of escalating into a full-blown insurgency than unrest in Tibet, given the proximity of Xinjiang to separatist and Islamist groups in Central Asia. But a new generation of Tibetans is less receptive to calls from their own leaders (including the Tibetan spiritual head, the Dalai Lama) for a peaceful approach, and this increases the potential for violence. Both regions are likely to see further protests. The Dalai Lama is growing old, and the Chinese authorities will worry that his eventual death could be a catalyst for further Tibetan instability. The government continues to take a harsh approach, including the use of the death penalty, to curbing separatist and ethnic unrest. It is also increasing development spending in Xinjiang and Tibet in an attempt to pacify these regions by boosting economic opportunities, although this tactic has failed in these areas of China in the past.