Country Report Libya April 2011

The political scene: In focus

Islamists among the rebels

The possible presence of Islamists among the rebels has raised concern that Western moves to arm the rebels may have unintended negative consequences. The US military has stated publicly that it has discerned "flickers" of Islamist activity in Libya and is clearly alarmed at the thought of a well-armed Islamist group emerging in the country.

It is not inconceivable that this might happen. Islamists, specifically the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), previously posed the gravest threat to the regime of the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, fighting a low-intensity civil war with the government in the late 1990s. The LIFG attempted to assassinate Colonel Qadhafi on three separate occasions, provoking a harsh crackdown that led to the group's virtual elimination. By 2005 the LIFG was in effect moribund domestically, with much of its leadership and membership incarcerated. However, riots in Benghazi in 2006, which the LIFG purportedly instigated, showed that it remained a latent force. Al-Qaida documents discovered in Iraq at around the same time revealed that Libyans made up the second-largest contingent of foreign jihadis in the country.

It is possible that, encouraged by the instability in Libya, many jihadis fighting abroad may now have returned, perhaps bringing some of their militant co-religionists with them. They will also have links to the North African regional Islamist network, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), whose militants may have already infiltrated their way into Libya.

Since 2007 the Qadhafi International Charitable Foundation, headed by Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, Colonel Qadhafi's second son, has conducted a dialogue and rehabilitation programme, which led the LIFG leadership in prison to renounce violence, denounce al-Qaida and offer their allegiance to the Qadhafi regime. As a result, over the past four years some 700 members of the LIFG have been released from prison. However, concerns persist over the efficacy of the rehabilitation programme, and many Islamists are not believed to have genuinely recanted. More Islamists were freed at the start of the unrest in mid-February, in an abortive effort to relieve tensions.

That said, the Libyan revolution is driven by a popular desire for freedom and an end to the Qadhafi regime, not by Islamist ideology. The LIFG is merely exploiting events to its advantage.

Whether the rebels' demands for more arms from the West are met or not, their chances of wresting control of the country from Colonel Qadhafi's forces are limited. The huge distance between Tripoli and Benghazi (the capitals of Libya and "Free Libya" respectively) militate against a rebel victory. About 1,000 km separate the two cities, and the amorphous rebel army has neither the armour nor the supply lines to operate effectively over such a long and narrow corridor. In addition, the regime strongholds of Sirte and Tripoli will prove extremely challenging military targets, making it very difficult to dislodge pro-Qadhafi forces. Equally, with the destruction of the Libyan air force and as much as one-third of his armour and artillery in the last two weeks of March, Colonel Qadhafi's chances of launching a sustained military offensive are looking increasingly slim.

The combination of these factors suggests Libya is facing a prolonged military stalemate, with Colonel Qadhafi holed up, but more or less impregnable, in Tripoli and the opposition likewise ensconced in the east. In this context, it is difficult to see what options remain open to the international community if it is to avoid becoming embroiled in a prolonged a civil war. Sending in peacekeepers would be highly problematic, and the US has explicitly ruled out putting "boots on the ground".

Assuming that the West baulks at increasing its active military engagement, there seem to be three broad scenarios going forward: a swift internal collapse of the regime; a negotiated settlement; or a stalemate in which Libya is divided into two de facto states-a NATO-protected "liberated" zone in the east and a sanctions-beset rump of Colonel Qadhafi's jamahiriya (republic of the people) in the west.

© 2011 The Economist lntelligence Unit Ltd. All rights reserved
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