Eighteen months into his five-year term, the president, Jacob Zuma, will find it increasingly difficult to maintain the cohesion of the tripartite alliance because of growing divisions between its members-the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and its partners in the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The president will endeavour to keep together the "broad church" of the ANC and its allies, but his attempts to placate all wings of the party will continue to raise doubts about his leadership skills. Mr Zuma's backing for economic policy continuity and for centrists such as the finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, will please markets but will continue to anger the left, especially COSATU, which could spark fresh strikes.

Apart from long-standing disputes between the centre and the left on economic policy (which the centre has largely won so far), Mr Zuma faces bitter divisions between the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) and the ANC's alliance partners, which could escalate. The ANCYL backs left-style policies-such as nationalisation-but is deeply opposed to the SACP and its influence on the ANC, and is best described as "nationalist" (or even right-wing). The faction aims to oust key communists from the ANC leadership, including the secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, at the party's 2012 electoral conference. However, the ANCYL's controversial leader, Julius Malema, was disciplined in 2010 and ordered to apologise for insulting the president-and failed to get the punishment overturned at the ANC's national general council in September. This has weakened Mr Malema and bolstered the president, but the fault lines in the party are expected to remain.

Mr Zuma's main strength is his status as a unifier and a facilitator, although his direct involvement in policymaking is minimal (for better or worse). However, the president's attempts to please all the factions that brought him to power suggest indecisiveness-when firm leadership is required-and his personal indiscretions have not helped. Any further erosion of his credibility could fuel in-fighting and slow the implementation of policy. Mr Zuma is by no means a "lame duck" president-and felt confident enough to carry out a significant cabinet shuffle in October-but his position is not totally secure. He could become a one-term rather than a two-term ruler as factional battles escalate in the run-up to the ANC elective conference in 2012, although it seems highly unlikely that the ANC will ditch him.

How the government deals with judicial independence, press freedom and corruption will be watched closely, especially given Mr Zuma's past links to alleged graft and his long legal battle to clear his name. The charges against him were dropped (just before the election) because of supposed executive interference in the prosecution, but the claims have not been fully tested in a court of law. The eruption of any major scandals during Mr Zuma's presidency would therefore be particularly damaging, but despite the launch of new anti-corruption initiatives the government will struggle to contain the problem. The conviction in July of a former police chief, Jackie Selebi, on bribery charges suggests that high-profile figures are not completely immune, but the decision in October to scrap a probe into a questionable arms deal in the 1990s sends a different message. The ANC's latest proposals to muzzle the press and restrict access to official information have serious implications but will probably be watered down. Mr Zuma's initial legal appointments-a new chief justice and four members of the Constitutional Court-did not threaten judicial independence, but his subsequent appointments, including that of Menzi Simelane to head the National Prosecuting Authority, have been partisan and will continue to generate suspicion.

Over the forecast period high unemployment, income inequality, slow land reform and poor service delivery are likely to spark regular protests by disgruntled shanty-town dwellers and other disaffected groups, some of which may turn violent. Most unrest will be at a low level, but some could become more serious, echoing the xenophobic attacks on foreign Africans in 2008, caused in part by the Zimbabwe refugee crisis. Other potential flashpoints include labour unrest and strikes, and conflict between the ANC and the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) in the Western Cape. However, South Africa's strong institutions, established democratic traditions and widely respected constitution will curtail the risk of instability. Furthermore, Mr Zuma's appointment of loyalists to key security portfolios signals his intention to respond firmly to significant threats.