The temporary withdrawal from the government of a major coalition partner, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), in January added to Pakistan's already extensive political woes. The government has survived the recent crisis, but the events of January have highlighted its weakness. Having lain dormant throughout much of 2010, tensions between political parties had been rising since September, and inter-party relations remain extremely volatile. Much political conflict during the forecast period will remain highly personalised, and prospects for a substantial improvement in political effectiveness are therefore remote. The resolution of the most recent crisis, and the fact that the government avoided facing a confidence vote and possible collapse, should be seen as a temporary reprieve rather than a harbinger of greater political stability in the months ahead.

The main political forces in the country-the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which leads the coalition government; the MQM; and the largest opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), or PML (N)-will continue to try to advance their own agendas even at the expense of government effectiveness and political stability. The PPP's actions in recent months have demonstrated that it will prioritise the aim of preserving the ruling coalition above other considerations, but its policy reversals smack of desperation and merely serve to underscore its weakness. A major risk is that the government has set a precedent, so that any future inter-party squabbles will again trigger a threat to the existence of the coalition, once more leading officials to make concessions in order to avoid collapse. (In early March the government diluted a policy announcement that it had made just days earlier, after consultations with the MQM. The policy concerned fuel-price rises-the same issue that triggered the MQM's withdrawal from the coalition in January.)

The position of the unpopular president, Asif Ali Zardari, will also remain tenuous. The recent crisis occurred against a backdrop of attempts by other political participants, including the judiciary, to capitalise on Mr Zardari's increasing weakness, and there remains the risk that he could be forced out of office by judicial intervention. The government's failings notwithstanding, the removal of Mr Zardari through quasi-legal means would highlight the shallow nature of the recent return to full democracy in Pakistan.

One slightly positive factor for the government is the fact that the parties that have pitted themselves against the PPP-the PML (N) and MQM-are arch-rivals. Notwithstanding the two parties' agreement on some issues, it is unlikely that they will be able to band together to form a united opposition. Nevertheless, the extent to which the opposition is currently able to exploit the government's weakness was highlighted by the PPP's decision in early February to dissolve the entire cabinet and replace it with a new, smaller one. The decision was driven by the ten-point list of demands that the PML (N) had issued the government in January, and the threat that the PML (N) would take an increasingly tough stance against the government if its demands were not met by a mid-February deadline. The PPP's predicament was underscored again in late February, when the PML (N) ousted the PPP from the Punjab provincial assembly on the grounds that it had failed to deal with its ten-point agenda.

Under the leadership of General Ashfaq Kayani, the army has withdrawn from direct participation in politics. However, in a country with a long history of military coups, it remains possible that continued bungling by a civilian government might prompt the army to assert itself politically once more. That said, there are numerous reasons why the army would prefer not to take direct control in the near future.