Is the Syrian president immune?

As the region is rocked by popular protests that have already brought down the autocratic rulers of Tunisia and Egypt, Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, has seemed outwardly confident that his own authoritarian regime is not in danger. Speaking to The Wall Street Journal on January 31st he predicted that Syria would remain stable and avoid the popular unrest seen elsewhere in the Arab world because its foreign policy was more aligned with the will of its people than the pro-US stances of Tunisia and Egypt. This appeared to be borne out on February 5th when a Syrian "day of rage", organised via the Internet by Syrian exiles and opposition members to mimic similar successful protests in Egypt and elsewhere, drew barely a handful of demonstrators. However, since then the dissent has spread across the Arab world in the wake of the fall of the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, including to Bahrain, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen and Libya. Is Mr Assad's confidence in his own regime's immunity justified?

The president's explanation that it is its popular foreign policy that has insulated his regime from popular discord offers an only partial explanation of the relative calm seen in Syria so far. Certainly Syria's posture of resistance towards Israel and Western imperialism has given the state a popular legitimacy that pro-Western Tunisia and Egypt lacked. However, it is notable that very few anti-Western or even anti-Israeli slogans were being shouted on the streets of Cairo or Tunis, with protesters focusing on domestic issues such as jobs, corruption and democracy. In these areas, Syria certainly shares many of the features with the countries that have witnessed unrest. The young population faces inequality, high unemployment and rising food prices, and there is widespread regional poverty. Moreover, the country has been run by the same ruling party for four decades, and there is corruption and rent-seeking among those close to the ruling family.

However, there are also key differences with Tunisia and Egypt other than just foreign policy that have made unrest less likely in Syria. Although the possibility of tawrith, or dynastic succession, has driven unrest across the region, particularly in Egypt and Libya, the fact that Mr Assad succeeded his father ten years ago means that he has had the chance to establish his own legitimacy. He retains the support of multiple intelligence agencies, making a coup unlikely. Unlike relatively homogenous Tunisia, Syria is a melting pot, with a Sunni Arab majority alongside Alawis, Christians, Ismailis, Druze, Kurds and Armenians, as well as Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. There is a fear on all sides that any revolt against the regime could descend into sectarian conflict, as seen in neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq. Supporting these fears are memories of the last time the regime was challenged-a Sunni Islamic insurgency that ended in the 1982 siege and bombardment of Hama, a city to the north of Damascus (the capital), in which thousands of people died.

Underpinning all of this is Mr Assad's personal popularity. The president retains the reputation of being an approachable moderniser who has overseen a decade of gradual market liberalisation, giving Syrians access to such luxuries as the Internet, mobile phones and satellite television, previously forbidden under Mr Assad's sterner and more feared father, Hafez al-Assad. Though segments of the regime are widely disliked, notably the feared security services and the police, Mr Assad is largely immune from public resentment. An example of this was on February 17th when several hundred from the Hariqa district of central Damascus protested against regime brutality, allegedly shouting pro-Assad chants while simultaneously complaining of police torture.

Yet Mr Assad does have increasing reason to be nervous if not yet worried about his position following the wave of recent revolts in other Middle Eastern states. Although he enthusiastically welcomed the fall of Egypt's ruler as a blow to the US-Israel regional alliance, the spread of unrest to Bahrain, Yemen and, especially, Libya, as well as Syria's ally, Iran, raise the possibility that the whole region could undergo democratic transformation, and not only those with unpopular foreign polices as he maintains. The Economist Intelligence Unit still expects Mr Assad to remain in power over the forecast period, although he may face growing dissent, particularly if more regimes are toppled, and if successful democratic governments begin to be established across the region. Unfortunately for Mr Assad, Syria's parliamentary election is due this April and, with the constitution guaranteeing the ruling Baath party two-thirds of the seats, it will provide a very visible example of how unrepresentative and undemocratic the regime is. Another potential source of embarrassment could be the president's term in office. A by-product of the recent regional unrest has been the trend that, to avoid dictatorships, constitutions are being amended to limit future presidents to only two terms in office-a move already seen in Egypt and Tunisia. Mr Assad is currently midway through his second seven-year term and would have expected to stand again, unopposed, in 2014. However, to do so might place him quite obviously out of step with regional trends and diminish any carefully built personal popularity. Mr Assad may seem immune from protest at the moment owing to factors unique to Syria that separate it from other Arab states. However, although this may sustain him in power for now, inaction on political reform could be storing up problems for the future.