Outlook for 2011-12

• The president, Ali Bongo Ondimba, will continue to secure his rule over the country and the governing Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG), but grievances against his rule and reform programme will lead to protests and strikes.
• The diverse membership of the opposition Union nationale presents a risk to party unity ahead of the next legislative election in 2011. The president's rapprochement with Pierre Mamboundou would set back its cause further.
• Turning Gabon into an "emerging" economy will remain the guiding policy principle, but success will depend on the government's ability to develop much-needed infrastructure and diversify into higher value-added activities.
• Real GDP growth is forecast to average 5.6% in 2011-12 as a new oil well comes online, following the estimated rebound of 5.7% in 2010, supported by public spending and sectors such as wood and manganese.
• Consumer price growth will become positive again after estimated deflation of 1.4% in 2010. External price pressures and a weaker currency will see average inflation of 4.4% in 2011 and of 3.2% in 2012, despite price caps and tax cuts.
• The current-account surplus/GDP ratio is forecast to improve from an estimated 12.6% in 2010 to 17.3% in 2011 on the back of elevated oil prices and rising non-oil exports, before falling to 11.5% in 2012 as export prices fall.

Monthly review

• Following pronouncements by the party's secretary-general, André Mba Obame, that he is the rightful president of Gabon, the Union nationale was officially dissolved by the government on January 25th.
• Despite some protests, civil order has not been disrupted. Mr Mba Obame's move has attracted marginal domestic and no international support. TV+, the television channel that he owns, was suspended for three months.
• The president, Ali Bongo Ondimba, conducted his first cabinet reshuffle. Defying expectations, the prime minister, Paul Biyoghé Mba, retains his position, but no members of the opposition have been brought in.
• The French-based Electricité de France (EDF) has bought half of the 51% stake of another French company, Veolia, in the failing power and water utility, Société d'énergie et d'eau du Gabon, for a reported EUR15m (US$20m).
• The government has announced plans to create a national mining company to help to manage and boost the mining sector. Despite considerable gold, iron and rare earths reserves, oil will remain the lynchpin of the economy.
• The GOC was announced in March 2010 and was due to be operational by year-end, a deadline that passed without explanation from the government.

Political risk has spiked in Gabon-one of the region's most stable countries-16 months after the election of the president, Ali Bongo Ondimba. Although many leading opposition politicians continue to contest his legitimacy, the potential for short-term instability stems from the insistence of André Mba Obame, the former leader of the Union nationale (UN) party, that he is the rightful winner of the 2009 presidential election. Strengthened by recent unsubstantiated allegations by former French officials that the poll was rigged, he proclaimed himself as such in January, leading to the UN's official dissolution by the government. Despite early public rejection of Mr Bongo's victory, popular support for Mr Mba Obame has been limited, as has been that from his UN colleagues. Foreign governments have reiterated their support for Mr Bongo, and the Economist Intelligence Unit does not expect the election result to be overturned. Nevertheless, the likelihood has increased of localised unrest as the 2011 legislative elections approach. Port-Gentil, Gabon's economic centre and the scene of the worst unrest after the 2009 presidential election, is a likely flashpoint.

There have been recent signs of a rapprochement between another opposition veteran, Pierre Mamboundou, who came second in 2009's presidential election and leads the Union du peuple gabonais (UPG), and the ruling Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG). Such a move would entail the UPG-the largest opposition party in the National Assembly-both recognising Mr Bongo's legitimacy and supporting his policy agenda in parliament, which would benefit political stability. However, perhaps fearful of upsetting senior PDG members, Mr Bongo did not offer any positions to the opposition in his January cabinet reshuffle. This does not necessarily preclude co-operation between the parties. If there is no agreement to work together, Mr Mamboundou's credibility will have been damaged by his willingness to negotiate with a regime that he previously decried as illegitimate. Such a rapprochement would increase the government's support among the Punu-Lumbu ethnic group, comprising around 20% of the population and based mainly in the south-west, including Port-Gentil.

Maintaining the good relations with the armed forces that Mr Bongo fostered as defence minister will be essential to prevent them from becoming a threat. Corruption probes and reshuffles of the top military leadership are therefore unlikely. Army discipline is good, and the risk of a coup is low; the expanded French garrison in the capital, Libreville, will increase the deterrent. Nonetheless, the administration will remain under pressure to improve living standards; frequent power cuts and water shortages, decrepit infrastructure and inadequate provision of healthcare and education are a drag on economic growth and a source of popular anger. The government will need to address these if it is to stem the rise in trade union militancy.

Balancing his desire to root out the patronage networks that marked his father's 42-year regime with preserving political stability, Mr Bongo will continue to maintain a careful ethnic balance in his political appointments and allocate state funds selectively. To achieve this, the president, of Téké ethnicity, will need to appeal to political leaders of Fang origin-Gabon's largest ethnic group. Significantly, the Fang prime minister, Paul Biyoghé Mba, retained his position in the recent cabinet reshuffle, despite tensions between him and the president.

With a seven-year mandate, the next presidential election is not due until 2016, and Senate elections are due in January 2015. National Assembly elections, however, are due by December 2011. Although the PDG lost only two seats to the UN in the June 2010 by-elections-the PDG defectors seemingly unable to transfer personal support bases-it remains unclear to what extent members of the former UN will be able to contest the forthcoming election, if they choose to do so at all. The modest public support for Mr Mba Obame's self-proclamation as "president" suggests that the PDG is likely to retain its strong majority even if a new party is formed. Indeed, symptomatic of the UN's fragility-its heavyweight leaders had little in common beyond shared antipathy towards Mr Bongo-is that few have supported Mr Mba Obame. Thus, whether or not a new party contests the poll, the PDG is likely to remain dominant, particularly if it can co-opt the UPG. With no rapprochement, however, the PDG may try to tempt remnants of the UN leadership back into the fold.

Gabon's close relations with France (Gabon being France's preferred partner in central Africa since independence) are attested to by the hosting of France's regional military base and Mr Bongo's frequent visits to Paris. However, a French judicial probe into the Bongo family's French assets, as well as recent claims by former French officials that his election victory was stolen, may temporarily cool relations. This could hasten the warming of relations with China, which had cooled following delays to the giant Bélinga iron ore project. Links with the US-the main destination for Gabonese oil-will remain favourable, especially given Gabon's relatively good human rights record. Regionally, Gabon's influence may weaken, as its relatively heavy diplomatic sway depended largely on the late Omar Bongo Ondimba's close relations with African leaders. An ongoing border dispute with Equatorial Guinea over the potentially oil-rich zone around Mbañe, Conga and Cocotiers islands is unlikely to escalate into military confrontation. The support of the EquatoGuinean president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, for Mr Mba Obame will continue to strain relations.

Economic policy in 2011-12 will be driven by the goal of transforming Gabon into an "emerging" economy able to compete globally for foreign direct investment. Achieving this ambitious target will depend largely on the progress of efforts to accelerate economic growth. To this end, the government will accelerate investment and try to diversify the economy into more value-added activities in order to reduce its oil dependency, building on policies such as the ban on unprocessed timber exports. The country seeks to overtake Nigeria as Africa's largest palm oil producer within a decade. However, oil will remain the economy's primary pillar, although the creation of a new state oil firm, Gabon Oil Company, to increase its share of sector revenue and its control of logistics and infrastructure, has stalled. Addressing concerns about strong labour unions is still a key challenge to encouraging new investment. A similar entity is planned for mining projects. Fighting corruption and waste is another priority, building on the purge of "ghost" workers from the public payroll and increasing scrutiny of state spending. Despite an extension to its original Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative deadline, Gabon remains intent on compliance. A new deal to restart the Bélinga iron ore project is expected.

Gabon's fiscal surplus is forecast to improve in 2011 owing to buoyant oil revenue-its primary driver-narrowing in 2012 on lower oil prices, ambitious public investment plans and costly populist concessions that would increase current spending. The draft 2011 budget submitted to the state council for review in December, full details of which remain unavailable, sees spending increase from CFAfr2.2trn (US$4.4bn) in the supplementary 2010 budget to CFAfr2.37trn, funded by buoyant international oil prices. Fulfilling government rhetoric to invest in infrastructure and development, capital spending will accelerate faster than current spending. This will still grow strongly, however; further to an enlarged public payroll, trade union-appeasing tax cuts and price caps on various consumer essentials came into effect in January, following the bread subsidy implemented in October in response to higher wheat prices. The president has also stated his intention to clear long-standing arrears to the private sector, increasing borrowing from local banks to CFAfr911bn to fund such payments. The public payroll audit will generate some efficiency gains.

The government intends to finance spending through higher oil and other extractive sector receipts. Yet, despite higher current spending, the government is unlikely to achieve its overall spending goals owing to limited structural capacity to implement capital spending plans. Reform will improve both revenue collection and budget execution. The historically strong fiscal surpluses should remain relatively low over the forecast period, coming in at 4.9% and 4% of GDP in 2011 and 2012.

Monetary policy is managed by the regional central bank, Banque des Etats de l'Afrique centrale (BEAC), which prioritises controlling inflation and maintaining the franc's euro peg. The BEAC thus broadly tracks European Central Bank (ECB) policy. However, in July the BEAC cut its main policy rate, taux des appels d'offres (the auction rate), by 25 basis points to 4%, slightly narrowing the differential with record low ECB policy rates. The latter are unlikely to rise until late 2012, given the benign regional inflation outlook, and the BEAC's are unlikely to do so either. The bank plans to increase access to credit by standardising and capping loan charges across member countries with two new rates, the taux effectif global and the taux d'usure, which should be in operation by early 2011, suggesting possible further loosening of the auction rate.

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With real GDP growth estimated to have rebounded by 5.7% in 2010, following a 1% contraction in the previous year, growth is expected to accelerate in 2011 to 6.1%, easing slightly to 5.1% in 2012. The key driver in 2011 will be a new oil well coming online that could boost waning output by up to 10% to 245,000-250,000 barrels/day (although output at other fields may continue to weaken as fields mature and labour remains restive). Growth will be further supported by investment in and output from other sectors-such as forestry and manganese-that are increasing value-added operations. Take-home pay may be rising, but purchasing power will be undermined in 2011 by rising inflation. Fixed investment, such as the construction of Gabon's first special economic zone, will also be important, driven by the government's generous spending plans, which are supported by buoyant oil prices. Banking and telecommunications should also drive non-oil growth.

A combination of base effects, a weaker currency, higher commodity-especially food-and import prices, and higher wages and government spending, will see average consumer price growth return to positive territory over the forecast period after 2010's estimated deflation of 1.4% resulting from aggressive price competition from a new mobile telecoms provider. Despite subsidies and cuts in the value-added tax rate, we envisage average consumer price inflation of 4.4% in 2011 and 3.2% in 2012.

Being pegged to the euro-at CFAfr655.96:EUR1-the CFA franc fluctuates in line with euro:dollar movements. Even if the US recovery were to stall, the dollar will continue to strengthen in 2011 and 2012 in the expectation of continued low ECB interest rates due to ongoing euro-zone fiscal and sovereign debt concerns more than outweighing the impact of the new round of quantitative easing by the Fed (the US central bank). The CFA franc will continue to weaken, although we have moderated our forecasts slightly, sliding from an average of CFAfr495:US$1 in 2010 to CFAfr547:US$1 in 2012. The French Treasury will continue to guarantee the CFA franc's peg to the euro.

Exports are forecast to rise from an estimated US$7.3bn in 2010 to US$8.7bn in 2011 on the back of both elevated oil prices and output boosted by a major new well coming on line to reverse hitherto waning production, as well as a strong recovery in mining and forestry output. Exports will fall back to US$8bn by 2012 as oil and manganese prices retreat. Imports are forecast to rise from an estimated US$2.5bn to US$3.1bn over the same period, owing to higher import prices and robust demand for capital goods to service the investment programme. That said, a weaker CFA franc could pare demand for non-capital goods imports. The services deficit will rise, being largely determined by import-associated transport costs and technical services. The income deficit typically reflects fluctuations in export receipts, being mainly driven by the repatriation of profits by foreign oil and mining companies. We envisage a current-account surplus of 17.3% of GDP in 2011, driven by higher oil prices and output, as well as by iron output possibly coming on stream, narrowing to 11.5% of GDP in 2012 on lower commodity export prices.

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In a move that sharply raises political risk, the government of Gabon announced the dissolution of the main opposition party, Union nationale, on January 25th. The disbanding, which was formally confirmed on January 28th, follows the recent pronouncements by the party's secretary-general, André Mba Obame, that he is the rightful president of Gabon (January 2011, The political scene). Mr Mba Obame named as his "prime minister" an academic, Raphaël Bandega-Lendoy, who in turn nominated his cabinet. The fact that only one other founding leader of the Union nationale-Bruno Ben Moubamba, a journalist-was included in the aspirant administration suggests that the UN's five other co-leaders (and former rivals) may be keen to distance themselves from what is a risky gamble.

Mr Mba Obame and the rest of his aspirant government face the prospect of being tried in the courts for treason or insurrection. Indeed, the government has announced its intention to lift the self-declared president's parliamentary immunity from prosecution and dismiss any of his collaborators currently in state employment from their posts. Mr Mba Obame, well aware of this likelihood, took refuge in the offices in Libreville of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) on January 25th, along with a retinue of supporters. A demonstration held by Union nationale activists outside the UNDP building in the early hours of January 26th was quickly broken up by the security forces using tear gas. Another protest, held three days later in a poor part of the capital, Rio de Libreville, was similarly dispersed by the police. Tens of arrests and injuries reportedly resulted from the two episodes of unrest.

The timing of Mr Mba Obame's announcement is in one sense odd, given that the disputed presidential election results were published in September 2009. Although there was significant unrest in the opposition's heartlands immediately after the poll, this was soon suppressed by the regime of the victorious candidate, Ali Bongo Ondimba (the son of the previous president, Omar Bongo Ondimba). Since then, the president has managed to consolidate his rule and has won broad popular acceptance-or at least the benefit of the doubt to honour his reform promises; even the opposition appeared to accept his rule, however grudgingly, as a fait accompli, with signs of a rapprochement between Mr Bongo and the leader of a major opposition group, Union des peuples gabonais (UPG), for example. (The UPG leader, Pierre Mamboundou, who came second in the 2009 presidential poll, has hedged his bets with regard to Mr Mba Obame's self-proclamation as president, neither condemning nor endorsing it.)

External events seem to have bolstered Mr Mba Obame's confidence. Françafrique, a documentary about Franco-African relations that was recently broadcast in France, included incendiary allegations by several former French officials that seemed to suggest that the 2009 presidential poll was indeed rigged, with French assistance, and that Mr Mba Obame was the rightful winner (January 2011, The political scene). Recent events elsewhere on the continent may also have inspired the Union nationale leader. A popular uprising in Tunisia led to the ousting of the president of 23 years, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Meanwhile, in Côte d'Ivoire the international community has unanimously backed the claim to victory of the challenger, Alassane Ouattara, over that of the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, following that country's October-November presidential election. More recently still, mass demonstrations in Egypt in late January have led to the dissolution of that country's government and may yet result in the ousting of its president, Hosni Mubarak. Nonetheless, these external factors are unlikely to propel Mr Mba Obame into office as he hopes.

• Although the allegations aired in Françafrique have certainly raised tensions in Gabon, they are neither new nor backed up with evidence. Allegations about electoral manipulation were made by former French officials with unclear agendas of their own. This has allowed Mr Bongo's camp to dismiss their claims as "lies" put about by the corrupt Franco-Gabonese old guard to defend its privileges against his drive to clean up politics. Moreover, one of the former French officials in question, Michel de Bonnecorse-who was the adviser on Africa to a former French president, Jacques Chirac-subsequently disavowed the allegation, claiming that his words had been taken out of context.
• The international reaction to the Ivorian political crisis has little bearing on Mr Mba Obame's claim, as Mr Bongo has been universally recognised by foreign governments as the legitimate winner of the 2009 poll. They are unlikely to reverse this position, especially in the absence of damning evidence of fraud. The secretary-general of the African Union, Jean Ping-himself Gabonese-condemned Mr Mba Obame's self-proclamation as president for jeopardising the country's legitimate institutions and stability. Meanwhile, the US embassy in Libreville issued a statement reaffirming the US government's recognition of Mr Bongo as Gabon's legitimate head of state.
• Although the Tunisian uprising may inspire the radical elements of Gabon's opposition to take to the streets, the levels of popular frustration with the government, although considerable, are not comparable. The dispute between the disbanded opposition party and Gabon's ruling Parti démocratique gabonais has not greatly interested the general public, who view it primarily as a squabble between members of an out-of-touch elite.

However, perhaps the most crucial factor weighing against Mr Mba Obame's ambition to take power is the fact that Mr Bongo apparently still commands the loyalty of the army, which he cultivated as defence minister for over ten years in his father's government. The risk of the incumbent being toppled in a coup is therefore low, albeit not negligible.

Despite all this, however, Mr Mba Obame's bold gambit may pay off to some extent. The huge media attention garnered by his self-proclamation as president will rally his supporters, who are likely in the short term to stage more protests and in the long term to regroup in a new party. If he were jailed he could gain yet more popularity by acquiring the status of a political prisoner. Meanwhile, any brutal police response to demonstrations by his supporters could yet galvanise broader public anger with the authorities and threaten the regime's survival, although this is not the Economist Intelligence Unit's core forecast at present.

In any event, his actions cast the legislative election due in December this year into grave doubt. If the Union nationale regroups under a new identity to participate in the poll the campaign is likely to be highly vitriolic, with claims of fraud inevitable. Alternatively, the opposition may boycott the election outright, which would raise tensions further. In either scenario, outbreaks of rioting in opposition strongholds, such as the economically crucial city of Port-Gentil, are to be expected. In particular, Mr Mba Obame's actions could radicalise the Fang-the biggest ethnic group in the country, of which he is a member-who are angry at their perceived marginalisation since Mr Bongo came to power, not least as their access to patronage has shrunk. Mr Bongo, meanwhile, is likely to try to head off growing popular anger by taking swift action to improve people's day-to-day lives. In particular, his government is likely to persist with its efforts to increase the fitful supply of water and electricity, and to intervene to try to keep consumer prices down-although this will be a difficult challenge given global inflationary pressures. That said, although the likelihood of public protest may increase, a replay of events in Tunisia is unlikely even if economic development stalls.

Gabonese media minus TV+

In a worrying development for media freedom in the country, on January 26th the government suspended for three months broadcasting by TV+, a television channel owned by the leader of the now disbanded Union nationale opposition party, André Mba Obame. In a press statement the official communications watchdog, Conseil national de la communication (CNC), explained that the channel had been banned owing to its broadcast of the supposed swearing-in ceremony of the Union nationale leader as president, which the CNC judged be a threat to public order.

Relative both to the rule of the previous president, Omar Bongo Ondimba, and to elsewhere in central Africa, press freedom has been fairly well respected since the incumbent, Ali Bongo Ondimba, came to office. However, the recent suspension of TV+ is not the first clampdown on the media since then. Soon after Mr Bongo's election in late 2009 the communications watchdog suspended another privately owned television channel, Canal Espoir, and several local newspapers for allegedly misinforming the public, fomenting inter-ethnic tensions and propagating insults and slander (December 2009, The political scene). Even after the febrile post-election atmosphere had dissipated, in May 2010 the CNC suspended publication of a satirical newspaper, Ezombolo, for its "repeated outrages" against the president's honour. Local campaigners for press freedom, as well as an international lobby, Reporters sans frontières, have strongly condemned such curbs on free speech by the authorities.

Nonetheless, the various temporary bans handed down by the CNC have not yet cowed the local media. Editorials and news reports that are critical of the government, or embarrassing to it, continue to be published. Moreover, as Internet connections are quick and ubiquitous in Gabon, at least in the main cities, ordinary Gabonese have access to entirely uncensored and often vitriolic political commentary. The suspension of TV+ is arguably a heavy-handed reaction and could herald further curbs on free expression, but few governments in the world would tolerate a similarly seditious live broadcast. Moreover, it is unlikely to herald a return to the repression of the Omar Bongo era. His son and successor in the presidency knows that he can ill-afford to curtail freedom of expression. Domestically, his loosening of press control has allowed him to present himself as a reformer and has created a safety valve through which popular frustrations can be vented. Internationally, the president would jeopardise the support of his Western backers, in particular the French and US governments, if he gained a reputation as an enemy of free speech.

On January 14th Mr Bongo conducted his second cabinet reshuffle, with six new or returning ministers and five changes of portfolio, to enlarge it by one member to 21 as part of the process of bringing in younger personalities and retiring the old guard in a bid to quicken the pace of reform in the country. The secretary-general, the director of the cabinet and the chief-of-staff were also replaced. Defying expectations, however, Mr Bongo retained the prime minister, Paul Biyoghé Mba, despite growing tension between the two (October 2010, Outlook for 2010-11), and also appointed no opposition members despite signs of a rapprochement with the UPG. Mr Mba's putative replacement, Julien Nkoghé Békalé, was demoted from the Ministry of Mines, Oil and Hydrocarbons to the Ministry of Transport because of the president's waning confidence in his handling of the strategically important ministry.

In January the French-based Electricité de France (EDF) acquired a 25.5% stake in the failing power and water utility, Société d'énergie et d'eau du Gabon (SEEG), for a reported EUR15m (US$20m). EDF bought its interest from another French-owned company, Veolia, which has retained a 25.5% stake in SEEG, meaning that together the two companies have majority control of the Gabonese utility.

That Veolia should wish to reduce its involvement in SEEG is unsurprising given its unhappy experience to date. Power cuts and water shortages remain an unwelcome feature of daily life in Gabon. This has led to a public spat between the government and the utility, which accuse each other of failing to honour investment commitments. However, the appeal to EDF of buying a one-quarter interest in the failing company is less obvious, all the more so given that the government is due to publish a long-delayed audit of SEEG (January 2010, Economic policy). The audit is widely expected to lead to the renegotiation of the utility's current contract, which is not due to expire until 2017.

However, EDF has recently signalled its intention to increase its presence in Africa, where growth potential is greater than in the developed and highly competitive European market. Thus, gaining a toe-hold in Gabon, a middle-income country with relative political stability, would fit well with that strategy. Moreover, the deal means that EDF and Veolia can focus on their respective specialisms, electricity and water, in trying to turn SEEG around.

On January 28th the government announced plans to create a national mining company as part of the government's stated strategy of boosting the mining sector to wean the country off its long-standing dependence on oil. Currently, manganese extraction, by the Compagnie minière de l'Ogooué (Comilog), is the most important non-oil mining activity in the country. Although there is untapped potential in manganese mining, the country has considerable reserves of other minerals, including gold, iron and rare earths. A US$3bn iron mining mega-project at Belinga has been on hold since late 2007 but is expected to restart once negotiations between the state and the Chinese majority shareholder in the project, China National Machinery and Equipment, are concluded.

We estimate that world prices for metals in 2010 rose by a strong 39%. We forecast that prices will rise yet further in 2011 and 2012, albeit at the slower rates of 8.9% and 1.6% respectively. Therefore, the government's strategy of encouraging diversification into other minerals appears to be sound, at least in the medium term. However, it will not break the economy's more general dependence on the export of primary commodities, which leaves it vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations resulting from downturns in global industrial demand or speculative activity. Prices for the mainstay of Gabon's extractive sector, oil, are also estimated to have picked up in 2010, to US$80/barrel (Brent blend). We expect oil prices to average US$90/b in 2011, which should keep investor interest in the country's oil sector keen for when the postponed deepwater licensing round eventually takes place.

A national mining company may be good news for foreign investors, as it could co-ordinate activity in the sector while managing the state's interests better than the mines ministry has done hitherto. However, the government's plan to create a national oil firm, Gabon Oil Company (GOC), has not kept to schedule. The GOC was announced in March 2010 and was due to be operational by the end of the year, a deadline that has passed without explanation from the government. The resulting uncertainty is a cause for concern for foreign investors. If officials are hoping that the new national mining company will avoid a similar experience, its role will need to be clearly defined, as will its start date.

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Please see graphic below

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Land area

267,667 sq km

Population

1.48m (2009 estimate, IMF)

Main towns

Population ('000; 2009 World Gazetteer estimates)

Libreville (capital): 733

Port-Gentil: 138

Franceville: 54

Climate

Tropical

Weather in Libreville (altitude 35 metres)

Hottest month, January (23-31°C); coldest month, July (20-28°C); driest month, July (3 mm average rainfall); wettest month, November (373 mm average rainfall)

Languages

French (official), Fang, Myene and other Bantu languages: Batéké, Bapounou, Eshira, Bandjabi

Measures

Metric

Currency

CFA franc (CFAfr), fixed to the euro, backed by a guarantee from the Banque de France. It was devalued from CFAfr50:FFr1 to CFAfr100:FFr1 in 1994, and then converted at par when France adopted the euro in 1999 to trade at CFAfr655.96:EUR1

Time

1 hour ahead of GMT

Public holidays

Fixed public holidays: January 1st (New Year's Day), April 17th (Women's Day), May 1st (Labour Day), August 15th (Assumption), August 16th-17th (Independence Day), November 1st (All Saints' Day), December 25th (Christmas Day)

Movable public holidays: Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, Easter, Pentecost

Official name

République Gabonaise

Form of state

Unitary republic

Legal system

Based on the constitution of March 1991, amended by the National Assembly in 2003 to remove the restriction on the number of terms that a president may serve

National legislature

The National Assembly (the lower chamber) has 120 members, who are elected for five years by universal adult suffrage; the Senate (the upper chamber) has 91 members, who are elected for six years by municipal and regional councillors

National elections

December 2006 (legislative) and August 2009 (presidential); next legislative election due in 2011 and next presidential election in 2016

Head of state

Ali Bongo Ondimba was elected president in late August 2009 and was sworn in to office in mid-October following a recount of votes

National government

The government is led by the prime minister and an appointed Council of Ministers

Main political parties

Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG, the ruling party); Union nationale (UN); Union du peuple gabonais (UPG); Parti gabonais du progrès (PGP); Rassemblement pour le Gabon (RPG; formerly Rassemblement national des bûcherons); Parti social démocrate (PSD); Union gabonaise pour la démocratie et le développement (UGDD); Alliance démocratique et républicaine (Adere); Cercle des libéraux réformateurs (CLR)

Prime minister: Paul Biyoghé Mba

Key ministers

Agriculture, livestock & rural development: Raymond Ndong Sima

Budget, state reform & civil service: Emmanuel Issozet Ngondet

Communications, post & the digital economy: Laure Olga Gondjout

Defence: Ruffin Pacôme Ondzounga

Economy, trade, industry & tourism: Magloire Ngambia

Education: Séraphin Moundounga

Energy & hydro resources: Régis Immongault

Equipment, public works & infrastructure: Léon Nzouba

Foreign affairs: Paul Toungui

Health, social affairs, national solidarity & family: Flavien Nzengui Nzoundou

Housing, urbanisation & sustainable development: Blaise Louembé

Interior, public security, immigration & decentralisation: Jean-François Ndongou

Justice: Ida Réteno Assonouet

Labour, employment & welfare: Angélique Ngoma

Mines, oil & hydrocarbons: Alexandre Barro Chanbrier

Small & medium-sized businesses & crafts: Jean-Félix Mouloungui

Transport: Julien Nkoghé Békalé

Water & forestry: Christian Magnagna

Central bank governor

Lucas Abaga Nchama