COUNTRY REPORT

Cameroon

Central African Republic

Chad

1st quarter 1996

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The Economist Intelligence Unit

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Summary

Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad 1st quarter 1996

January 30, 1996

Cameroon

Political and economic structures **_Pages 3-4_**

Outlook: The president, Paul Biya, will claim credit for relatively peaceful municipal elections and constitutional reform, but some irregularities may return to haunt him. Although order is returning to public finances, growth will remain sluggish. The external accounts will remain precarious, even after a fairly generous debt agreement with the Paris Club and an anticipated loan from the World Bank. **_Pages 5-8_**

Review: Cameroon's first multiparty elections have passed with only isolated violence despite calls by the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) for disruption after the discovery of irregularities. Mr Biya has slipped a new constitution through the Assemblée nationale and has been searching for new government allies. An anglophone pressure group has embarrassed the government with a document released at the Commonwealth summit. The IMF has completed its first stand-by review, and quarterly fiscal targets have been met. Civil service cuts continue, as the government runs out of funds for severance pay. Inflation has risen to 6.5%, and growth forecasts differ. The cotton outlook has improved, but cocoa forecasts have been revised downwards. A Paris Club debt relief deal has been signed, although the benefits are not due until March. France and China have approved new credits. **_Pages 8-18_**

Central African Republic

Political and economic structures **_Pages 19-20_**

Outlook: A new opposition front may make an impact. The president, Ange-Félix Patassé, is suggesting bond issues to cover salary arrears. The new tourism minister will face a daunting task. **_Pages 21-22_**

Review: The ruling Mouvement pour la libération du peuple centrafricain (MPLC) has held its first-ever party conference and has chosen a new party executive. The opposition has hardened its attitude and has formed a new alliance, the Conseil démocratique de l'opposition centrafricaine (Codepo). Mr Patassé has come out in support of the French military presence in Bangui, and Bouar and has claimed improved relations with Paris. An Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) may be granted by the IMF. The government is seeking investment in the tourism sector. **_Pages 22-28_**

Chad

Political and economic structures **_Pages 29-30_**

Outlook: The credibility of the president, Idriss Deby, is still in the balance. Presidential elections have been rescheduled for June 1996 and legislative polls for the end of the year. An accommodation with several armed groups will remain both politically and economically vital. **_Pages 31-32_**

Review: Mr Deby has pledged to continue with Chad's drawn-out transition to multiparty democracy. A roundtable meeting of representatives of the government, opposition and armed groups has ended in failure. Voter registration has been carried out. Rebel violence has declined. Chadians have been expelled by Libya. Recurrent budget spending has been increased. The state cotton company, Cotontchad, has received further French support.

Franc Zone news

Jacques Chirac has reassured Franc Zone leaders of France's continuing sympathy and has bolstered the Ministry of Cooperation. France has injected new capital into Air Afrique. The creation of the Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale (CEMAC) has again been delayed.

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Political structure: Cameroon

Official name: République du Cameroun

Form of state: unitary republic

Legal system: based on English common law and the Code Napoléon

National legislature: Assemblée nationale; 180 members, elected by universal suffrage, sit twice yearly and serve a five-year term

Last elections: March 1992 (legislative); October 1992 (presidential)

Next elections due: March 1997 (legislative); October 1997 (presidential)

Head of state: president, elected by universal suffrage, serves a five-year term and is re-electable

National government: a coalition government (RDPC and MDR), reshuffled in July 1994. It consists of the prime minister and his Council of Ministers

Main political parties: a law authorising multiparty politics was published in December 1990. There are currently more than 70 registered parties. The Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC)—English name, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM)—holds 88 seats in the National Assembly. The Union nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès (UNDP) has 68 seats, the Union des populations du Cameroun has 18 and the Mouvement pour la défense de la république (MDR) six. Several parties, notably the Social Democratic Front (SDF), boycotted the legislative elections in March 1992

President	Paul Biya
Prime minister	Simon Achidi Achu
Deputy prime ministers, responsible for	
territorial administration	Gilbert Andzé Tsoungui
town planning & housing	Hamadou Mustapha
Ministers of state	
communications	Augustin Kontchou Koumegni
post & telecommunications	Dakolé Daissala (MDR)
Ministers-delegate	
in charge of the stabilisation plan	Nana Sinkam
relations with the National Assembly	Maididi Sadou
Key ministers	
agriculture	Augustin Frédéric Kodock
civil service & administrative reform	Sali Dairou
economy & finance	Justin Ndioro
foreign affairs	Ferdinand Léopold Oyono
health	Joseph M'bede
higher education	Professor Peter Agbortabi
industrial & commercial development	Pierre Eloundou Mani
justice, keeper of the seals	Douala Moutome
labour & social security	Simon M'bila
Secretary-general at the presidency	Titus Edzoa
Governor of the Banque des états de l'Afrique centrale (BEAC)	Jean-Félix Mamalepot

Economic structure: Cameroon

Latest available figures

Economic indicators	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995[a]
GDP at market prices CFAfr bn	3,286	3,135	2,941	4,294	4,644
Real GDP growth %	–4.9	–2.2	–9.5	–1.7	3.6
Consumer price inflation[b] %	2.5	3.9	30.0[a]	27.0	7.5
Population m	11.9	12.2	12.6	12.9	13.2
Exports fob $ m	1,957	1,934	1,508	1,246[c]	1,295
Imports fob $ m	1,173	983	1,005	810[c]	935
Current account $ m	–404	–338	–565	–590	–610
Reserves excl gold $ m	43	20	2	2	1[d]
Total external debt $ m	6,162	6,530	6,601	6,939	7,400
External debt-service ratio %	17.0	17.4	21.8	19.2	n/a
Crude oil production ’000 b/d	144	136	120[a]	110[a]	94
Coffee production[e] ’000 tons	115.0	49.3	67.7	70.0	n/a
Cocoa production[f] ’000 tons	109.0	96.0	99.4	108.5	110.0
Exchange rate (av) CFAfr:$	282.1	264.7	283.2	555.2	499.0

January 26, 1996 CFAfr512.04:$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1994	% of total
Agriculture	28.6
Industry	24.9
Manufacturing	11.3
Services	46.5
GDP incl net indirect taxes	100.0

Components of gross domestic product 1994	% of total
Private consumption	71.8
Government consumption	7.7
Gross domestic investment	15.5
Exports of goods & services	27.8
Imports of goods & services	–22.8
GDP at market prices	100.0

Principal exports 1994	$ m
Crude oil	402
Timber	282
Cocoa	100
Coffee	64

Principal imports cif 1991	$ m
Manufactures	1,181
Non-fuel primary products	246
Fuel	21

Main destinations of exports 1994[g]	% of total
France	19
Spain	16
Italy	11
Netherlands	7

Main origins of imports 1994[g]	% of total
France	37
Belgium-Luxembourg	8
Japan	5
USA	5

[a] EIU estimates. [b] Fiscal years starting July 1. [c] French government estimate. [d] End-August actual. [e] Crop years starting December 1. [f] Crop years starting October 1. [g] Drawn from partners’ trade returns, subject to a wide margin of error.

Cameroon

Outlook

Mr Biya glosses over election irregularities—

With municipal elections completed on January 21 with relatively few serious disturbances, and a new constitution approved by the Assemblée nationale (parliament) in December, the president, Paul Biya, claims that his democratisation process is proceeding smoothly and methodically. His confidence could prove premature. While largely devoid of the violence that marred the multiparty legislative and presidential elections in 1992, the latest polls were punctuated by a number of malpractices and irregularities which appeared clearly to favour candidates representing the ruling Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC). These deficiencies, including a failure to disclose critical information on registrations and various ploys to ensure that opposition nominees were not represented in a large number of constituencies, are likely to return to haunt the president. So could the new constitution, which after much ado was slipped through the assembly while the country's attention was focused on preparations for the municipal elections.

—and constitutional reforms—

Full details of the new constitution were not available at the end of January. Ostensibly, it includes some hallmarks of the US system, with some circumscription of presidential powers, and some of the French system—two presidential terms, each limited to seven years. The bicameral parliament appears to differ from both, because it reportedly provides for a Senate to which 30% of members are nominated presidentially. In the meantime, in the wake of signs that Mr Biya is moving to shore up his support base, the government is reportedly exploring a new alliance with the more radical parties, given its unwillingness to meet conditions set by its former coalition partner, the Union nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès (UNDP), for the latter's re-entry into government. The RDPC has also reportedly put out feelers to leaders of the Mouvement pour la démocratie et le progrès (MDP) and the Mouvement progressiste.

—yet political chickens could come home to roost

The president's strategy of appearing to comply with international pressure for democracy, while bending the rules in favour of his own party, could backfire. If, as expected, the municipal results are much more favourable to the RDPC than a fair election would have delivered, the (albeit weak and divided) opposition will move to delegitimise the elections by exposing the irregularities to international donors. It remains to be seen how the latter will react. Most are cynical about Mr Biya's reforms and some bilaterals have long distanced themselves—and their aid budgets—from Cameroon. The rest will probably endorse the elections on the grounds that some reform, however imperfect, is better than none. France's president, Jacques Chirac, will continue doing business with Mr Biya, on the basis that he is the only francophone leader in Cameroon with sufficient clout to take care of French business and national interests. This is a perception Mr Biya himself has exploited to the full in mobilising France to press for adjustment funds at the IMF and World Bank.

The IMF and World Bank give satisfactory reports—

The IMF and the World Bank, both of which had serious problems with the government early last year, have cautiously given Cameroon satisfactory report cards in the last quarter of 1995. The IMF's November programme review was concluded successfully, paving the way for the second—albeit delayed—stand-by drawdown of around $20m in February. Despite some reports to the contrary, sources close to the discussions say Cameroon met its first quarterly budget target for fiscal 1995/96 almost in full, and that tight fiscal and demand management has kept inflation largely under wraps, with a year-on-year rate of 6.5% recorded in December. Assuming this trend continues, the EIU sees no reason to alter its prognosis that the annual average inflation rate will fall slightly to 6% in 1996 and halve to 3% in 1997.

—but analysts differ over growth prospects

While the IMF is maintaining its 5% GDP growth forecast for 1996, local economists argue that austerity and retrenchment are depressing demand and investment, with business organisations reporting falling production capacity utilisation. For such reasons, and assuming the expected fall-off in world commodity prices for Cameroon's key primary products this year, we are maintaining our more pessimistic projection of average growth of 3.4% in calendar 1996.

Other reforms appear on course—

The government has also forged ahead on civil service retrenchment, having laid off 7,000 workers in all by December 1995, sold more parastatals, speeded up preparations for further divestment and prepared the ground for financial-sector reform. These moves, which include the "prior actions" for a much-needed $150m adjustment credit from the World Bank, appear to have secured Cameroon a place on the agenda at the World Bank's executive board meeting on February 8. Both the Bank and the IMF will be monitoring the government's performance carefully through a set of fiscal, monetary, retrenchment and divestment targets which, if not met, will trigger an immediate halt in disbursements. While the IMF's conditionality is focused on fiscal improvements, a concern the Bank shares, the latter will be watching carefully to ensure that poverty alleviation and other development expenditure will be adhered to in the expenditure targets. After the recent years of political drift and corruption, administrative inertia and slow macroeconomic asphyxiation, the more enlightened elements in Mr Biya's government will be well aware that foreign partners will no longer tolerate foot-dragging. A continued turnaround in fiscal and economic fortunes would strengthen their position considerably, while undermining the strand of opinion in donor and multilateral circles which favours the suspension of relations altogether.

—and desperation for cash will force the pace—

We anticipate that such conditionalities and desperation for funds, rather than any inherent conviction on the merits of reform, will drive the government towards meeting the targets. Although Cameroon secured a Paris Club debt-service reduction based on Naples terms in November, we have learned that relief will not be accorded until March. The Paris Club has become so mistrustful of the government's debt management—shown in regular arrears worth hundreds of millions of dollars—that it intends to force Cameroon to “earn” its relief. In an unusual move, it is insisting that the government should honour an undisclosed amount of non-rescheduled obligations before March, as proof of its commitment to meeting the terms of the deal. Seen in this context, the World Bank’s quick-disbursing adjustment loan therefore becomes even more critical. Full details of the Paris Club deal are not available. However, creditors say the arrangement has been specially designed to enable Cameroon to manage remaining debt-service obligations and thus stabilise arrears, while continuing policy reforms to promote growth. The agreement should cut 50% of eligible payments on export credit debt falling due to the Club during the stand-by, while also rescheduling arrears. A glance at Cameroon’s contractual obligations to bilateral creditors—some $440m in 1996—suggests relief could be in the region of $200m excluding arrears, although some reports put the total relief package at a rather high $659m. Even so, since Cameroon has been servicing only around 20% of its Paris Club obligations anyway, it is not clear how the agreement will translate into payment flows. If correct, the more cautious assumption would still leave annual total debt service of around $648m, excluding short-term and some private debt, while total debt service actually paid in 1994 was some $444m.

—but Cameroon will remain virtually bankrupt

Thus the current account will remain under severe pressure. Cameroon’s export recovery will be slow, while the slow turnaround in the domestic market will probably result in light industrial and other firms replaced capital equipment. We expect world prices for Cameroon’s major commodities to drift down in 1996-97 and the invisibles deficit will dwarf the weak positive trade balance. The current-account deficit will stand at a projected $515m in 1996 and $535m in 1997, levels which are clearly unsustainable without major investment and debt-stock inflows.

Forecast summary

($ m unless otherwise indicated; calendar years)

	1994[a]	1995[b]	1996[c]	1997[c]
Real GDP growth (%)	–1.7	3.6	3.4	3.5
Consumer price inflation (%)	50	7.5	6.0	3.0
Merchandise exports	1,246[d]	1,295	1,260	1,350
of which:				
petroleum	402[e]	380	360	325
timber	282[e]	300	300	280
cocoa & coffee beans	164[e]	180	180	180
Merchandise imports	810[d]	935	1,010	1,100
Current-account balance	–590	–610	–515	–535
Average exchange rate (CFAfr:$)	555.2	499.0	505.0	500.0

[a] Actual. [b] EIU estimates. [c] EIU forecasts. [d] French Ministry of Cooperation figure. [e] Official estimate.



(a) Estimates. (b) Forecasts. (c) Nominal exchange rates adjusted for changes in relative consumer prices.
Sources: EIU; IMF, *International Financial Statistics; World Economic Outlook.*

Review

The political scene

The elections pass relatively smoothly—

Despite many irregularities in the run-up and numerous ploys by the ruling Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC) to give its candidates maximum advantage, Cameroon's long-delayed municipal elections took place on January 21 without major incident on the day itself, according to local reports. The vote—Cameroon's first multiparty local elections since independence—covered 10,000 municipalities in 336 communes, although only the RDPC was represented in all wards. Some 37 of Cameroon's 70-odd political parties took part. Initial reports depicted a high voter turnout, especially in the capital, Yaounde, and the major economic centre of the south, Douala, with long queues forming outside polling stations at dawn. Technical hitches including the late arrival of voting equipment forced some polling stations to open very late. At others, voting was interrupted because there were insufficient ballot papers. Initial speculation predictably pointed to a strong RDPC showing in Central, Southern and Eastern Provinces, while the Social Democratic Front (SDF), the Union des forces démocratiques du Cameroun (UFDC) and the Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) were expected to carry the Eastern, North-western and South-western provinces.

—and predictably—

Full results, made available on January 30, confirmed initial impressions. The RDPC won in 219 of the 336 communes. The party carried 62 seats, including all six at issue in Douala. The SDF was initially credited with three of the six seats in Yaounde, but these results were later reversed, the RDPC being given victory in all six; such a strong SDF presence in the capital itself would have been a considerable embarrassment to the president, Paul Biya, and the government. The Union nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès (UNDP) captured 29 seats in the north and the CDU took nine. Among the more surprising results, the Sultan of the Bamouns and RDPC candidate, Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya, reportedly lost Foumban to a relative and prince of the sultanate, Adamou Ndam Njoya of the CDU. In the northern town of Garoua, the son of the former president, Ahmidou Ahidjo, won for the UNDP, against Issa Tchiroma, the transport minister and a former UNDP member, who was expelled for refusing to give up his government portfolio. According to the international news organisation, Reuters, two SDF supporters were killed in Douala on January 23, when police forcibly dispersed a demonstration demanding the proclamation of results. Other relatively minor disturbances were reported in Yaounde and the north.

—despite SDF unhappiness and widespread irregularities

Many people had expected a greater number of violent clashes following a call by the anglophone leader of the SDF, John Fru Ndi, for the partial disruption of the elections on the grounds of their probable bias in the RDPC's favour. On January 9, the third day of the campaign, Mr Fru Ndi led a demonstration in Yaounde, attended by thousands, to the office of the president's prefect. The SDF repeatedly alleged that the election authorities had confiscated more than 100 SDF candidate lists. (Under electoral law, political parties must submit lists of candidates for the approval of the electoral commission.) According to Mr Fru Ndi, the party received no information about the government's decision to reject or approve the lists. Ultimately, the SDF appears to have recovered only half of the 243 lists originally submitted, suggesting that it was represented in only one-third of constituencies. In December, local press reports cited other parties' complaints of similar treatment. The UNDP claimed that it had been disqualified in at least 30 constituencies and the UFDC claimed that its lists were annulled in 12. The opposition alleged the disqualifications were illegal because they took place several days after the December 19 deadline for annulments. This also raised problems with the printing of ballot papers, which were published after the January 1 deadline. Other irregularities included the failure to publish the official number of registered voters—thought to number about 4 million in total—and rules favouring the RDPC. The latter included an initially high CFAfr25,000 ($50) candidate's deposit. While this amount was affordable for government candidates with the state's financial, media and administrative resources at their disposal, it was well beyond the means of many contenders, who called for it to be lowered. Although Mr Biya conceded this by decree on December 12, lowering the deposit to CFAfr10,000, it was by then too late for many would-be candidates to enter.

Parliament approves the constitution—

On December 23 the Assemblée nationale (parliament) approved the new constitution by 160 votes to two, with eight abstentions. Full official details of the new constitution had not been promulgated by the end of January. However, its basic characteristics include a presidential system, with presidential powers tailored on the US model, and a bicameral parliament with a Senate to which 30% of members would reportedly be nominated. The constitution also extends the presidential term of office to seven years, from the current five-year limit, but restricts the number of terms to two. It provides for a constitutional council, regional assemblies and what is described as a financial administrative organ.

—while minds are focused on municipal elections—

Mr Biya's bid to push the new constitution through parliament was carefully timed to minimise opposition, on the calculation that many opposition politicians, preoccupied with their campaigns for the municipal elections, would be less attentive than usual. However, although the constitution was accepted in principle, it was not all plain sailing for the president. Further ploys were needed and informed observers say some changes had to be made.

—after prolonged argument

Moves to revise the old 1972 constitution have been under way since 1991. While most activists have demanded a constitutional conference and a referendum on the issue, Mr Biya has consistently resisted this, claiming that such measures would prove expensive, and instead opting for a simple bill to be voted through parliament. In November 1994, after much procrastination, he appointed a hand-picked panel to carry out a seven-day constitutional review, amid much protest and controversy among opposition and legal figures. The group's findings were never formally disclosed. However, numerous leaks suggested that it proposed a weaker presidency (through checks and balances on the office) and significant decentralisation. This included autonomous regions with elected indigenous governors and assemblies; special status for anglophones; and a house of chiefs for the latter. It is not clear whether the leaks were a ploy to defuse opposition, or whether Mr Biya dropped the "unofficial" draft because it was unfavourable to the presidency, as opposition press reports suggested. In the event, the draft debated in late November 1995 was very different. According to some reports, a number of Mr Biya's own cabinet members had not even seen it. Many MPs—including some in the RDPC—said they would not support the bill, because the executive had not answered their questions satisfactorily and clearly on issues such as the separation of powers and the structure of regional political systems, while the SDF launched a campaign against it. On December 6, having previously ordered MPs not to turn up, Mr Biya ordered the (clearly tactical) suspension of a planned debate on the grounds that insufficient attendance would prevent the necessary quorum. In the event, the assembly was quorate because some RDPC MPs had not got the president's message; Mr Biya suspended the debate anyway. According to some reports, the suspension was a face-saving measure for Mr Biya, and provided time for him to make further concessions, after which MPs approved the bill.

Mr Biya seeks a government of national unity

In an effort to widen his power base, Mr Biya has put out feelers to radical opposition parties proposing talks on forming what the speculative Paris-based newsletter, La *Lettre du continent*, described as a government of national unity. The prime minister, Simon Achidi Achu, has reportedly sent emissaries to four parties. So far, Samuel Eboua's Mouvement pour la démocratie et le progrès (MDP) and Jean Jacques Ekindi's Mouvement progressiste have indicated an interest in seeing what Mr Biya will offer them. In contrast, the SDF and the UFDC cold-shouldered the approach. The report attributes the latter's cool reception to a wish to avoid associating with the government before the municipal elections. As for the SDF, even though it has reportedly lost influence compared with its heyday of 1991-92, it is difficult to imagine the party's high command willingly entering into a friendly relationship with Mr Biya's government. The UNDP, led by Bella Bouba Maïgari, has reportedly put too high a price on rejoining the government after the elections, with conditions that are unlikely to be met. These include: the dismissal of old northern allies of Mr Biya, including the deputy prime minister, Hamadou Mustapha, and the transport minister, Issa Tchiroma Bakary, both of whom had previously been expelled from the party for remaining in Mr Biya's cabinet; the release of several UNDP militants from prison; more important posts in the cabinet; and a fulfilment of as yet unkept promises under earlier agreements between the two parties.

The government denies persecuting the opposition

In late October the French news agency, Agence France-presse, reported that the government had banned several meetings and rallies of the main opposition SDF. On October 30 some 200 police are reported to have turned Mr Fru Ndi from the outskirts of Mbalmayo, near Yaounde, where he was due to conduct a meeting. Information ministry officials denied the reports. The government also ordered a fresh clampdown on the press. On November 3 the government took over the offices of several independent publications, including *Galaxie, Challenge Hebdo, La Messagère* and *L'Expression*, which had been banned earlier with a swathe of other publications and reappeared on the streets published under different names.

The SCNC cramps the president's Commonwealth style—

Mr Biya's long cherished hope of joining the Commonwealth was finally fulfilled in November when he led the delegation from Cameroon, the Commonwealth's newest and 52nd member, to the organisation's summit in Auckland. However, his calculated move to appease constituents in Cameroon's anglophone regions and to present an ethnically coherent democratising image abroad were partly frustrated by the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC), the anglophone pressure group that is rapidly gaining ground in southern English-speaking areas at the SDF's expense. The SCNC filed a separate application for membership on behalf of the Southern Cameroons, the name by which it refers to the region and under which it was known before union with the freshly independent francophone Republic of Cameroon in 1961, and sent its own delegation with the stated aim of embarrassing the president and drawing attention to political repression at home.

—with an embarrassing document

The SCNC also circulated a document detailing the reasons for its claims to self-determination, which carried several appendices of data highlighting the government's spending record and alleged favouring of francophone areas in infrastructure, education and other public investment. The document said that agricultural investment in fiscal 1990/91 was four times higher in the francophone regions than in the former Southern Cameroons. It also claimed show francophone elites occupying more than 80% of ministerial and key public service posts. Road infrastructure data showed former Southern Cameroons having only 109 km compared with the francophone region's 2,587 km. Central government had closed some 15 public corporations in the anglophone area but only one, the Société des transports urbains du Cameroun, in the francophone area. The latter also had several higher education establishments and airports, while former Southern Cameroons had only one of each. Both the SCNC and opposition francophone parties had earlier tried unsuccessfully to dissuade the Commonwealth from accepting Cameroon, arguing that there had been progress neither on human rights nor on the democratisation requested as a precondition for membership at the last summit in October 1993.

The economy

The IMF completes its first stand-by review—

The IMF completed its first review of the economy under the stand-by programme agreed in September (4th quarter 1995, page 12). The review, which covered the first quarter of fiscal 1995/96 (July-September), went well, reliable Washington sources told the EIU; it paved the way for the second disbursement, worth $19m, after the IMF's board gives its approval in early February. However, all did not go totally according to plan. For reasons not explained, this second disbursement will be made more than one month later than the end-December date originally intended. The next review is scheduled for February.

—and quarterly fiscal targets are met in full

In another illustration of Cameroon's reviving fiscal credibility, sources close to the review report that the quarterly revenue target of CFA142bn ($281m) was met in full, while the primary budget outturn (which excludes interest payments on foreign debt) bettered its target. Revenue was 35% up on the corresponding quarter in 1994/95, boosted by improved customs collections—due to the appointment of the Swiss-based customs inspection firm, Société générale de surveillance—and to improved performance on direct taxation. Petroleum taxes were reportedly performing well, despite a temporary shortfall after some September revenue arrived a few days late and had to be recorded in the accounts for October. The target deficit was CFAfr9bn. However, the spending outturn of around CFAfr141bn—some CFAfr10bn below target—implies a broad budgetary balance. Well-placed sources attribute the shortfall to government overprudence in its efforts to hit target. The government received no credit for underspending. Indeed, the IMF is thought to have cautioned that necessary services should be fully financed. A report in the Paris-based weekly magazine, *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, outlines the budgetary detail in full. It shows the government projecting a CFAfr42bn deficit in the second quarter (ending last December) before turning in a surplus in the third quarter. It anticipates a CFAfr35bn deficit for the final quarter.

Civil service cuts continue—

Surprisingly, structural reforms are also on target, despite reports to the contrary from Yaounde in November. During the IMF review, the international news organisation, Reuters, cited IMF representatives as being concerned at the "slow pace of privatisation". Well-placed insiders deny saying anything as specific, although others say that the Fund did set a condition that CFAfr30bn ($59m) should be raised from privatisations by June 1996 (see table below). According to the latest data, the government had cut some 7,000 jobs by the end of December.

—and the EU will help fund severance payments

The payroll cuts have proved more expensive than originally planned, with costs exceeding the adjustment loan allocated for severance packages from France's state development bank, the Caisse française de développement (CFD). The funding shortage threatened serious ramifications for the rationalisation, because the government cannot legally dismiss civil servants without honouring severance obligations. The European Union (EU) has agreed to make up the difference.

Public finances, 1995/96[a]
(CFAfr bn)

	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	Total
Total revenue	142	169	197	200	707
Petroleum products taxes	24	26	29	33	111
Sales & profits tax	14	17	18	18	66
Special taxes on petrol products	11	14	15	15	55
Taxes on goods & services	53	64	68	68	253
Customs	27	31	32	34	124
Non tax	14	17	33	33	98
Total expenditure	151	211	190	235	787
Recurrent	133	186	164	202	684
Salaries	48	48	48	48	190
Operating funds	11	23	21	29	95
Transfers	15	16	16	17	64
Foreign debt	48	89	68	99	305
Domestic debt	8	8	8	8	31
Capital	19	25	27	33	103
Own resources	4	5	8	6	23
Externally financed	14	16	17	22	70
Restructuring expenditure	1	4	1	4	10
Balance	–9	–42	6	–35	–80
Memorandum items					
Privatisation revenue	15	15	0	0	30
Interest due	56	97	76	107	335

[a] Some totals do not sum in original, generally due to rounding.

Source: Government and IMF data, as published in *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*.

Inflation is running at 6.5%

Tighter fiscal policy and demand management have also kept inflation in check, with the year-on-year rate to December standing at 6.5%. This is slightly higher than the rate for September, which usually dips for seasonal reasons relating to the food harvest. The government has maintained a particularly tough wage policy, and civil service salaries, which were slashed by up to 50% before the 1994 devaluation, have still not been adjusted upwards.

The IMF is optimistic about growth—

For such reasons, the IMF, which plans another review in February, is maintaining its projection of 5% real GDP growth for 1996, despite local analysts' concerns that retrenchment and austerity are reducing domestic consumption, especially in urban areas, and worsening the economy's growth prospects.

—but others disagree

The Groupement interprofessional pour l'étude et la co-ordination des intérêts économiques au Cameroun (GICAM), the organisation that groups Cameroon's principal economic operators, expressed concern in December about what it described as the slowdown in economic growth in the 15 months between July 1994 and October 1995. A document circulated at the organisation's general assembly claimed that after accelerating during the six months immediately following the January 1994 devaluation, the economy had "seized up". According to GICAM, the 3.3% real growth registered in July 1994-June 1995 slowed in the quarter to October 1995 on very weak domestic consumption, a fall-off in production capacity utilisation (which it estimates at 40%) and a decline in public investment.

The World Bank plans a loan for February—

World Bank officials have earmarked February 8 as the date for presenting Cameroon's long-delayed $150m Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) to the Bank's board. No further delays are expected because all necessary prior actions (a euphemism for preconditions agreed between Bank and government) have been carried out. Completed prior actions have not been disclosed but are thought to include the following.

- Privatisation: the government has drawn up a schedule for various categories of divestment, and progress is being made (see below).
- Retrenchment: this reportedly affects some 6,000 workers in the Ministries of Health, Education, and Labour and Social Security. By late January the government had done its part, having identified the jobs due to go, and having completed the legal procedures for staff retrenchment. A number of workers were thought still to be awaiting severance pay, which was partly dependent on foreign disbursements. The retrenchments reportedly follow some 2,500 redundancies in the economy, public service and commerce ministries. By October 31, 1,622 employees had been laid off from the Ministry of the Economy and Finance alone, according to the national press.
- Financial-sector reform: the government has prepared five institutions for restructuring, which will be tackled simultaneously during coming months. Neither the government nor the World Bank has formally disclosed preparations carried out so far, or the nature of the intended restructurings. They want to preserve confidentiality in order to avoid misunderstandings or panic that might damage the institutions concerned. This follows a bitter lesson during the previous adjustment programme from 1989, when moves by the government to restructure three banks were impeded by a run on deposits after news of the initiative. Reports in mid-1995 said the institutions involved in the current round were Société générale des banques au Cameroun (SGBC), Banque internationale pour le commerce et l'industrie du Cameroun (BICIC), Société commerciale de banque-Credit Lyonnais (SCBC) and BIAO-Meridien Banque Cameroun (BMBC; 3rd quarter 1995, page 18).

—but further disbursements hinge on sustained reform

The adjustment programme sets out a schedule of further actions, policies and targets to which further disbursements will be linked. The conditionalities have two specific strands: public-sector management and financial-sector adjustment. Any straying on these, or on general overall conditions in the fiscal arena, could lead to delays in disbursements. The Bank shares the IMF's concern with meeting fiscal targets, but is particularly worried that specific spending commitments must be fulfilled. These include designated amounts for poverty alleviation, agriculture, feeder roads and strengthening of the judiciary. Any shortfalls here could also scupper the next disbursements and it is thought unlikely that the government will be tempted to sacrifice social expenditure to meet its targets.

The privatisation programme gathers steam—

The government's commitment to privatisation appears to have strengthened perceptibly since 1994, with significant progress during the final quarter of 1995. However, many in the cabinet and the civil service continue to oppose the process, and the social costs of adjustment suggest that broad-based national consensus is still far off. While the programme's acceleration owes something to the slowly dawning realisation of the budgetary savings to be made, pressure from donor and Bretton Woods institutions remains the most persuasive influence on the government. The Paris-based weekly magazine, *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, has published an update on all designated enterprises. This, and information from sources close to the privatisation, gives the following picture.

- Phase one, June 1986-June 1994: Twenty-two public-sector organisations and 57 *sociétés anonymes* (limited companies) were declared effectively dissolved or liquidated. However, while all have stopped operating, the most critical step required, many liquidations remain to be completed. Three enterprises, including the Société générale des travaux metalliques, have been legally liquidated. Another 25 companies were put under management performance contracts, but only three or four of these were successful. Many of these companies were rolled over into the subsequent privatisation programme. Companies actually sold were: the Office camerounais de banane, which became the Société bananière de la Mbome; SEPBC; Cocamac; Contreplaqués de Cameroun, a timber-processing concern; and SCDM.

- Phase two, from July 1994: After fresh pressure from creditors, the government agreed to broaden the programme to include 15 new enterprises, mainly in the agro-industrial and transport sectors. Since then, disposals have included Sofibel, which has been sold to a private entrepreneur in Cameroon. The Office national pharmaceutique, Société camerounaise de tourisme and Société des transports urbains au Cameroun are among firms which have ceased operating, after designation for liquidation. Aeroports du Cameroun and Plantations CDC d'Ekona have been put under private-sector management contracts. Minority stakes were sold in three other concerns.

—although problems remain with Camsuco—

Other initiatives are still in progress with varying degrees of success. The sugar refining concern, Cameroon Sugar Company, is still open to offers despite having been put on the market in 1991. It is often cited as an example of the government's earlier privatisation inadequacies because, although the government received two offers for its assets in good time, the transaction has still not been completed due to a lack of administrative commitment and expertise, and excessive red tape.

—and hard decisions are being weighed up

The government has, meanwhile, invited management contract bids for various agro-industrial concerns. It has yet to decide on whether the three utilities, Société nationale d'électricité du Cameroun, Société nationale des eaux du Cameroun (the water utility) and the state telecommunications company, should be put under management contracts or completely sold. Well-placed sources expect a decree shortly. In the meantime, the French construction conglomerate Bouygues has been courting SNEC, while Electricité de France and Canada's Hydro Quebec have been vying for the attentions of Sonel, according to national press reports. Consultants are carrying out preliminary studies on the Régie nationale des chemins de fer du Cameroun (railways) and the state shipping company, Camship, was scheduled to go on the market by the end of January. The national airline, Camair, was originally expected to go under a two-year foreign management contract. However, since an air crash in early December destroyed one of its three aircraft, the president, Paul Biya, is thought to favour an outright asset sale (see below). The rubber company, Société des héveas du Cameroun, was advertised for sale in December 1995 and consultants are now working on tender specifications and asset valuation. France's Terre Rouge and Indonesia's Panwell have shown interest in buying it, it has been reported locally. Société camerounaise de palmairies (palm plantations), Société de développement du coton au Cameroun, the cotton parastatal, and the major agro-industrial parastatal, the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), are expected to go on the market shortly, despite the considerable political controversy that could be generated by a sale of the CDC in particular.

The BEAC reduces its interest rates

The central African Franc Zone's regional central bank, the Banque des états d'Afrique centrale (BEAC), has announced a reduction in its money market base rate by 0.75 percentage points to 8%, and has lowered the rate for repurchase agreements by half a percentage point to 10%. BEAC's director for Cameroon, Sadou Hayatou, said the moves were designed to eliminate the favourable differential with key trading partners, and to stabilise reserves. Cameroon's foreign reserves position has been catastrophic for several years; according to data from the IMF, total reserves minus gold dropped from an already insignificant $20m in 1992 to $2.2m in 1994, and have broadly continued to dwindle since. Our Country Risk Service reports project a slight recovery in reserves in 1996-97, but Cameroon's import cover will still number days rather than weeks.

Total reserves minus gold, 1995
($ m)

Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
2.57	2.01	2.04	2.30	1.62	1.12	1.33	0.87

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

Agriculture

The cotton outlook improves

After a lull in Cameroonian cotton data flows lasting many weeks, new information appears to have prompted the Liverpool-based trade weekly, *Cotton Outlook*, to improve output projections for 1995/96 cotton fibre to 70,000 tons compared with earlier forecasts of 65,000 tons (4th quarter 1995, page 16). However, it has lowered estimates for 1994/95 to 62,000 tons, from 62,070 tons.



(a) Provisional.
Source: Banque de France, *Rapport Zone Franc*.

Meanwhile, cocoa output appears to be running short against the official 114,000-ton production target for the current 1995/96 season, which runs from October-September (4th quarter 1995, page 16). In late December the National Cocoa and Coffee Board's director-general, Sona Ebai, said that he expected output to total only 110,000 tons, and exports to total 95,000 tons. The new estimates should not make a significant difference over the longer term. After an end-season tally, 1994/95 yielded 107,000 tons, much better than the anticipated 100,000 tons.

Energy and infrastructure

A fatal crash on December 3 caused a national tragedy and also destroyed one of three aircraft belonging to the state-owned airline, Cameroon Airlines (Camair). Initial reports said one of Camair's three aircraft—a Boeing 737—had overshot the runway at Douala airport, killing 72 of 78 people aboard. Boeing safety experts sent to investigate had not filed a report of their findings at the time of writing. The loss of the aircraft also reduced Camair's asset value and prompted the president, Paul Biya, to change the privatisation strategy.

Foreign trade, aid and payments

A new Paris Club agreement is signed—

On November 16 the government signed a fresh rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club of Cameroon's official bilateral creditors. The deal, triggered by last September's IMF stand-by loan and its implicit endorsement of Cameroon's economic reform programme, covers eligible debt falling due for the duration of the one-year stand-by agreement (4th quarter 1995, page 12). The agreement provided Naples terms, an initiative launched in December 1994 which offers deeper debt relief than previously to poor and highly indebted countries. In Cameroon's case, this means a 50% reduction in eligible debt and debt service due during the life of the agreement. (As a middle-income economy according to World Bank criteria Cameroon would not qualify for the full 67% relief accorded to the poorest countries.) Moreover, the poor management of debt-service obligations over the past few years and the wider economy would also exclude Cameroon from a full stock reduction; such a move normally requires the country concerned to have maintained good relations with the IMF for three years, a record to which Yaounde cannot lay claim.

Production and export of oil
m tons—left-hand scale;
CFAfr bn—right-hand scale



(a) Fiscal years, Jul-Jun.
Sources: SNH; Minefi; *Marchés tropicaux*.

The value of relief was not formally disclosed. However, sources close to the deal put it at CFAfr341bn ($675m at late January exchange rates), according to the Paris-based weekly, *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*. This amount appears rather high, since Cameroon's scheduled obligations to all bilateral creditors in 1996 stand at only $439m, according to the World Bank's *World Debt Tables*, and normal Paris Club rules would restrict relief to portions of debt falling due before December 31, 1998, the cut-off date of Cameroon's first rescheduling. This suggests that either the figure is inaccurate, or that some confidential accommodation was also reached regarding Cameroon's enormous arrears. Officials say they designed an agreement sufficient to enable Cameroon to service current obligations while continuing with policy reforms. However, given the lack of information—the budgetary figures outlined in the above table (see The economy) do not take account of the deal—it is difficult to see how much pressure will be taken off the external accounts.

—but there are strings attached

Prior to the agreement, the 1995/96 budget calculates principal and interest payments at more than CFAfr600bn (about $1.2bn). The current edition of the *World Debt Tables* projects total long-term debt service in 1996 at about $848m, made up of $578m in principal repayments and $270m in interest. Given that the agreement applies to limited eligible bilateral debt, it appears likely that relief would total in the region of $200m, unless more generous terms were extended. According to *Marchés tropicaux*, Cameroon had honoured only 20% of obligations due to public creditors since March 1994, the date of its last Paris Club deal. Had it not paid off a FFr330m ($66m) chunk of arrears last November—made possible by a French adjustment loan and a few other clearings—Cameroon's finance team might not have made it to the negotiating table at all, one source is quoted as saying. Even so, creditors are taking no chances. In an unusual move, the Paris Club has, in what is termed a "binding test", required the government to honour a portion of non-rescheduled debt by the end of March as a condition for the new agreement to become effective.

France approves new loans—

France—which until September appeared to be propping up the Cameroonian economy singlehandedly—has approved a further three aid loans. The first, for FFr60m, will help to fund water projects in villages in east and south-west Cameroon. The project, which is valued at a total of FFr74m, is intended to benefit more than 150,000 villages. Another loan, for FFr105m, has been agreed to strengthen the telecommunications system in Bafoussam, a town in south-east Cameroon. The third loan, for FFr58m, will fund rehabilitation of 1,400 km of rural dirt tracks.

—as does China

Meanwhile, the Chinese government agreed in November to open a line of credit equivalent to CFAfr7bn to finance small and medium-sized joint ventures. The deal was signed at the fourth Sino-Cameroon joint commission meeting, which also discussed several other projects including the extension of a paediatrics hospital in Yaounde, which received Chinese funding in late 1993.

Political structure: Central African Republic

Official name: République centrafricaine

Form of state: unitary republic

Legal system: based on 1986 constitution

National legislature: Assemblée nationale, 85 members elected by universal suffrage serve a five-year term

Last elections: August-September 1993 (presidential and legislative)

Next elections due: August-September 1998 (legislative); 1999 (presidential)

Head of state: president, elected by universal suffrage to serve a six-year term

National government: the prime minister (nominated by the president) and his nominated Council of Ministers; the government is dominated by the MLPC. Last cabinet reshuffle: April 1995

Main political parties: Mouvement pour la libération du peuple centrafricain (MLPC); Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain (RDC); Parti libéral démocrate (PLD); Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès (ADP); Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement (MDD, formerly Mouvance David Dacko); Convention nationale (CN); Mouvement d'evolution sociale de l'Afrique noire (MESAN); Parti sociale démocrate (PSD)

President	Ange-Félix Patassé
Prime minister	Gabriel Koyambounou (MLPC)
Ministers of state	
defence, veterans & war victims	Jean Mete-Yapende (MLPC)
finance & the budget	Emmanuel Dokouna (MLPC)
parliamentary relations	Nestor Kombot-Naguemon (PLD)
Key ministers	
agriculture & livestock	Gabriel Dote Badekara (MLPC)
civil service, labour, social security & training	Eloi Anguimate (CN)
decentralisation & regionalisation	Gérard Gaba (PSD)
education, research & technology	Albert Mberio (MLPC)
economy, planning & international cooperation	Dogonendji Be (MLPC)
energy & minerals	Charles Massi (Independent)
foreign & francophone affairs	Simon Bedaya-Ngaro (MLPC)
health & population	Dr Gabriel Fio-Ngaindiro (MLPC)
industry, commerce & crafts	Joseph Agbo (Independent)
information & culture	Maurice Saragba (MLPC)
justice & legal reform	Betti Maras (MLPC)
post & telecommunications	Vincent Sakanga (MESAN)
territorial administration & national security	Thierry Bianzy (MLPC)
tourism & the environment	Daniel Emery Dede
transport & civil aviation	Albert Yomba-Eyamo (Independent)
water, forests, hunting & fishing	Laurent Ngom-Baba (MLPC)
Governor of the Banque des états de l'Afrique centrale (BEAC)	Jean-Félix Mamalepot

Economic structure: Central African Republic

Latest available figures

Economic indicators	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995[a]
GDP at market prices CFAfr bn	397	389	376	544	570
Real GDP growth %	–1.0	–2.5	–2.6	7.3	4.0
Consumer price inflation %	–2.9	–0.8	–2.9	27.0	15.0
Population m	3.00	3.08	3.16	3.30	3.40
Exports fob $ m	126	116	133	146	150
Imports fob $ m	179	189	158	131	140
Current account $ m	–62	–83	–13	–25	–20
Reserves excl gold $ m	103	100	112	210	252[b]
Total external debt $ m	819	840	904	910[a]	940
External debt-service ratio %	8.3	9.0	4.8	10.0[a]	n/a
Diamond production '000 carats	430	451	495	530	n/a
Seed cotton production[c] '000 tons	21.6	12.1	16.0	27.0	n/a
Timber production '000 cu metres	274	378	273	348	n/a
Exchange rate (av) CFAfr:$	282.1	264.7	283.2	555.2	499.0

January 26, 1996 CFAfr512.04:$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1993	% of total
Agriculture	49.9
Industry	14.1
Services	36.0
GDP at factor cost	100.0

Components of gross domestic product 1994	% of total
Private consumption	89.0
Government consumption	6.6
Gross domestic investment	12.8
Exports of goods & services	22.4
Imports of goods & services	–30.8
GDP at market prices	100.0

Principal exports 1994	$ m
Diamonds	85
Timber	38
Coffee	10
Cotton	8

Principal imports 1994	$ m
Miscellaneous	66
Capital goods	50
Fuel & energy	17

Main destinations of exports 1994[d]	% of total
Belgium-Luxembourg	61
Spain	9
France	6
Iran	6

Main origins of imports 1994[d]	% of total
France	12
Cameroon	4
Namibia	2
Japan	1

[a] EIU estimates. [b] June actual. [c] Crop years starting December 1. [d] Drawn from partners' trade returns, subject to a wide margin of error.

Central African Republic

Outlook

The opposition may at last make an impact

Although the new opposition alliance, the Conseil démocratique de l'opposition centrafricaine (Codepo), can muster only 18 seats out of 85 in the Assemblée nationale (parliament), the importance of its creation should not be underestimated. While the president, Ange-Félix Patassé, is personally popular with the electorate, the ruling Mouvement pour la libération du peuple centrafricain (MLPC) is open to easy attack at a time when it is about to be forced to adopt IMF-backed austerity measures. Codepo says it will campaign for a reform of the electoral code and the establishment of a national electoral commission to ensure transparent voting procedures and fair access to the media. But it is also pressing for a study of the feasibility of setting up a private opposition radio station, changes to the new constitution and a formal statutory definition of the role and rights of the opposition. It also accuses the government of corruption, discrimination and patronage. The key test for the new movement will be its ability to mobilise a broad level of popular support. Its precursor, the Concertation des forces démocratiques (CFD)—which spearheaded the campaign to establish a democracy in the CAR—lost momentum once that goal had been achieved, fragmenting back into its constituent groups. Codepo leaders do seem aware of the need for a new *raison d'être* and policy programme. Joseph Bendouga, the leader of one member party, the Mouvement démocratique pour la renaissance et l'évolution du [sic] Centrafrique (MDREC), said in an interview in December with the Gabon-based radio station, Africa No 1, that Codepo was not a resurrection of the CFD and that its statutes were different from those of the defunct group. "The CFD was working to seize power", he added, "while Codepo is for the safe-guarding of democratic achievements." He accused the MLPC of transforming itself during its recent congress into a "party-state". A key test of Codepo' s pulling power with the voters will be the alliance's electoral performance in Bangui, which was the bedrock of support for the CFD.

Mr Patassé suggests issuing bonds for salary arrears

Mr Patassé has made a point of publicly refusing to default on the state's salary debts, originally estimated at CFAfr18bn ($35.1m) but reduced, by October 1995, to CFAfr13.3bn after a payroll audit which checked allowance claims and deleted "phantom employees". Even this, though, is far beyond the government's means. There is almost no chance of help from foreign donors, although France might be willing to fund one or two months' payments, in return for commitments to other austerity measures. Mr Patassé has therefore proposed issuing staff with Treasury bonds for the outstanding amounts; recipients could keep the bonds to maturity or sell them in the market. This idea is less far-fetched than it might seem: Côte d' Ivoire has already securitised (converted into tradeable bonds) much of its domestic debt, the World Bank is designing a similar scheme for Cameroon, and Congo is expected to follow. The unspoken assumption behind any securitisation is that potential buyers in the local secondary market will judge payment in full at maturity unlikely; the market will therefore establish a heavily discounted price for the bonds and many employees will opt to sell them early for a small cash sum. Eventually, governments may be able buy the obligations out of the market at a fraction of face value (as some African governments are already doing for commercial foreign debt).

Mr Dede faces a daunting challenge

Charged with developing an industry that offers clear possibilities for boosting foreign exchange earnings, the new tourism minister, Daniel Emery Dede, appears to enjoy firm political backing from the prime minister, Gabriel Koyambounou. As Mr Dede's portfolio also includes the environment, he is further responsible for conserving the wildlife and scenery that visitors will come to see. There is no doubt of the CAR's potential, at a time when the reputation of traditional East African safari destinations has been marred by reports of crime and poaching. However, Mr Dede will face serious problems. In trying to protect the natural environment he may encounter powerful vested interests concerned with maximising short-term earnings, even at the risk of damaging long-term prospects; for example, timber firms may oppose further attempts to restrict logging, while safari firms catering for wealthy foreign hunters may be reluctant to keep to the strict number of kills for which they are granted permits. A previously lax permit regime has been tightened up recently, so that the number of kills is limited, to ensure that the survival of species is not threatened. Mr Dede will also have to find holiday firms and airlines interested in organising tours that are more affordable than those currently on offer—almost FFr13,000 ($2,600) for a one-week package from Paris, visiting Bangui and the northern wildlife parks. The minister recently told the Paris-based magazine, Jeune Afrique, that he wants to see "mass tourism, but not on a massive scale"; he is targeting the mainstream middle-income market of Europeans and the local market of expatriates resident in the CAR itself. There is also an image problem to be overcome; outside Africa the CAR is still best known as the land of Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa's murderous tyranny of the 1970s.

Gross domestic product
% change on previous year



(a) Estimates.
Sources: EIU; IMF, *World Economic Outlook.*

Review

The political scene

The MLPC holds its first-ever party conference—

The ruling Mouvement pour la libération du peuple centrafrician (MLPC) held the first party conference in its 18-year history in the capital, Bangui, on November 16-19. The meeting was attended by more than 1,000 delegates from all over the country, according to the MLPC's executive secretary, Joseph Vermond-Tchendo. It was a key step towards transforming a movement that had been forced by political repression to operate in semi-clandestinity for much of its existence. The MLPC needs to ensure that it has a strong grass-roots organisation and an effective system for ensuring that the mass membership is properly informed about the policy directions set at national level. This is particularly important at a time when the government—in which the MLPC is the dominant participant—is preparing to embark on an IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) programme, which is sure to include controversial austerity measures (see The economy). Moreover, the decentralisation plans put forward by the president, Ange-Félix Patassé, envisage the creation of regional councils (2nd quarter 1995, page 16) and voters may see municipal and regional elections as a chance to protest at the hardships of structural adjustment. Mr Patassé clearly recognises the need for his party activists to adapt their campaigning techniques to the new democratic era: in his speech to the conference, he called on them to abandon their "clandestinity complex" as he put it.

—and chooses a new party executive

On November 25 the MLPC replaced the provisional political bureau that had run its affairs since its foundation in 1978 with an official permanent executive. The first vice-president of the new body is Hugues Dobozendi, the man who had headed the provisional body and kept the MLPC show on the road during Mr Patassé's years of exile; he is now speaker of the Assemblée nationale. The second vice-president is the prime minister, Gabriel Koyambounou.

The opposition is taking a firmer approach—

The same day, the opposition Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès (ADP) threw out a public challenge to Mr Patassé by calling on its members to boycott the procession on December 1 commemorating the 37th anniversary of self-government, which preceded independence in 1960. This gesture was intended as a protest: the ADP said that Mr Patassé was behaving like a party or clan leader, rather than a head of state, and allowing the MLPC to intervene in every aspect of government. Another opposition party, the Front patriotique pour le progrès (FPP), led by Abel Goumba, also called for a boycott.

—and forms a new alliance

The boycott call appeared to indicate a new willingness among the disparate opposition forces to make common cause and at the end of November seven parties formed a new alliance, the Conseil démocratique de l'opposition centrafricaine (Codepo). This represented at least a partial resurrection of the Concertation des forces démocratiques (CFD) umbrella group under which various groups joined forces to campaign against the government of General André Kolingba in the early 1990s and secure multiparty democracy (a campaign in which the MLPC and Mr Patassé played little role). This time, Codepo's members have opted for a catchy name that can be chanted at rallies, used in posters and is likely to be remembered by voters. The seven members of Codepo are the ADP, the FPP, the Forum civique (led by the former reformist transitional prime minister, Timothée Malendoma), the Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement (MDD, founded by a former president, David Dacko), the Mouvement démocratique pour la renaissance et l' évolution du [sic] centrafrique (MDREC), the Union des démocrates pour le renouveau centrafricain (UDRP) and the Parti social démocrate. The latter is led by another former transitional prime minister, Enoch Derant Lakoué; his participation appears to mark the final healing of a rift with the other parties, originally caused by his willingness to serve under Mr Kolingba and abide by the latter's snail's-pace movement toward reform. The impression that an old alliance is being revived was reinforced by the conspicuous absence from the new grouping of Mr Kolingba's Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain (RDC). All seven Codepo parties boycotted the independence parade as did four of the CAR's five labour federations. This was the first successful show of force by the opposition since it was trounced in the constitutional referendum of late 1994.

Mr Patassé supports the French military presence—

Mr Patassé, always ready in the past to exploit local resentment of the French military forces based in the CAR, has now come out with a brief but clear statement of approval for their presence. In an interview with the Paris-based magazine, *Jeune Afrique*, published in late October—after his talks in Paris with the French president, Jacques Chirac, but before the Cotonou francophone summit—Mr Patassé said that the existing bilateral accords between France and the CAR would have to be revised to meet today's changed situation; but he then went on to state that the French army should remain in the CAR in order to protect democracy in the subregion. Privately, Mr Patassé may be glad that French troops are staying: they may dissuade pro-Kolingba diehards from attempting a putsch, an important consideration at a time when military coup leaders in The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Niger and Nigeria are successfully defying international protests. Of course, Mr Patassé also knows the CAR would get much less French aid if he were to force the troops out.

These arguments may cut little ice with the resentful inhabitants of Bouar and Bangui, where French troops are stationed, but Mr Patassé now seems to have decided to abandon any pretence that he might ask the French military to leave. Instead, as a skilful populist, he is portraying their presence as a necessary self-sacrifice by the CAR in the interests of regional stability—and judiciously pointing to the compensating benefits. He claimed the French military presence contributed close to CFAfr18bn ($36m) to the economy in spending and jobs, adding that he now wanted to get the troops more involved in development work and the war against game poachers. He conceded that some French soldiers were involved in smuggling (by re-selling their own supplies, imported duty-free, into the local market), but played down the issue.

However, he avoided mentioning the long history of French military aid to the CAR; in 1995 the country was the third largest recipient of military aid (equipment and supplies) in sub-Saharan Africa (equivalent to $3.1m), and it had the largest number of French advisory personnel (63). Figures for 1994 were similar.

—claims a new warmth in relations with France—

This conciliatory tone was of a piece with the president's other comments on relations with France. He went out of his way to stress the warmth of his talks with Mr Chirac, describing himself as a fellow-Gaullist. He said relations had changed immensely since Mr Chirac became president in mid-1995, adding that the French president had asked him to continue mediation efforts in Chad and Congo. He even claimed that France would release delayed post-devaluation aid as soon as Bangui reaches an agreement with the IMF.

—and carves out a role as a regional diplomat—

Mr Patassé is exploiting the enhanced status conferred by his strong democratic mandate to carve out a regional diplomatic role. Gabon's head of state, Omar Bongo, is undoubtedly the pre-eminent figure in this regard, but

Mr Patassé is emerging as a credible second string; he enjoys popular support at home, while potential rivals for the role are all discredited by accusations of authoritarianism and corruption (Cameroon’s Paul Biya and Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko), or have their hands full domestically (Congo’s Pascal Lissouba). Mr Patassé has been particularly well placed to mediate in Chad, because he comes from northern CAR and has relatives on the Chadian side of the border; in the latest stage of this process, the Chadian prime minister, Djimasta Koïbla, visited Bangui for talks on December 22 in the run-up to the failed roundtable between the Chadian government, opposition parties and armed groups in January (see Chad: The political scene). Mr Patassé also claims to have played a mediating role between Congo’s government and its ex-president, Denis Sassou-Nguesso.

—visiting Tripoli, the USA and elsewhere

Mr Patassé told *Jeune Afrique* that he had also been asked by Libya to sound out the possibilities for an improvement in relations between Tripoli and France and the USA. Paris and Washington remain deeply antagonistic towards Libya, which has been accused of links with the Ténéré (UTA) and Lockerbie (PanAm) mid-air bombings. Mr Patassé said that he had hesitated over accepting the Libyan request but had gone ahead after consulting Mr Chirac, the US ambassador in Bangui, the former French prime minister, Edouard Balladur, and the late François Mitterrand, the former French president. On October 10 Mr Patassé left Bangui for Tripoli (en route to the ceremonies for the 50th anniversary of the UN in New York). The next day he held talks with the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. After this, CAR national radio announced that the CAR would make the case at the UN for lifting international sanctions on Libya. Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso have also advocated the lifting of sanctions. It seems that countries that have to share the Sahara-Sahelian region of Africa with Colonel Qadhafi’s government feel it politic to take this line. They may also have a serious economic motive: many African expatriate workers in Libya stand to suffer if the Libyan economy declines, a concern vindicated by Libya’ s expulsion of thousands of these guest workers in late 1995—poor reward for African diplomatic support.

On November 8 Mr Patassé held talks with Sudan’s foreign minister, Bakary Saleh, about crossborder movements of Sudanese war refugees and security issues such as game poaching. In early December Mr Patassé attended the francophone summit in Cotonou.

Efforts are made to improve women’s access to credit

During the latter part of 1995 the government launched a range of programmes designed to ease women’s access to loans for improvements to their farms and small businesses. As in much of Africa, women play a key role in the economy, particularly as farmers and market traders; because they are usually responsible for the care of children and preparation of food, raising their income levels can be a vital factor in improving standards of basic health and welfare. However, they are often unable to offer security or save an initial deposit, to reassure sceptical and conservative-minded bank officials. The CAR already operates a savings and credit scheme supported by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the African Development Bank (ADB), and a mutual credit scheme financed by the French state development bank, the Caisse française de développement (CFD). Now the minister for promotion of women, Marie-Noëlle

Andret-Koyara, is preparing the launch of a more extensive rural savings and credit network. The ministry has also launched a campaign to overcome the traditional tendency to give the education of boys greater priority than that of girls.

Other recent developments in social programmes include:

- an expansion of vaccination campaigns;
- the preparation of a $15m credit from the International Development Association (IDA—the World Bank's soft-loan affiliate) to strengthen the health ministry and establish a network of health districts providing basic services; the Bank is also preparing a $15m credit for basic education;
- the establishment by the government of a unit to promote the distribution of generic medicines (which are cheaper than branded drugs); and
- a FFr9.5m ($1.9m) grant from the Fonds d'aide et coopération (FAC—the French cooperation ministry's main funding window) to improve education inspection and teacher advice services, train Central Africans to replace French expatriates in secondary and vocational education, adapt job training to the realities of the local economy, and improve local and national education administration.

The economy

An ESAF is at last in sight—

The IMF has been encouraged by the government's efforts to step up progress towards economic reform and stronger finances over recent months. It hopes to begin detailed negotiations over the much-delayed Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in the near future; a mission will visit Bangui to hold routine "Article IV" consultations, and also discuss the ESAF. The Fund has been pleased by improvements in the previously poor record of revenue collection and stronger economic management and fiscal reporting.

—and political changes have helped prepare the ground

Another contributory factor has undoubtedly been the changed political climate in Bangui in recent months. In this respect, the visit of the president, Ange-Félix Patassé, to his French counterpart, Jacques Chirac, in September (4th quarter 1995, page 23) has been a vital catalyst: Mr Chirac made it clear that a warmer diplomatic relationship between Paris and Bangui did not mean an end to France' s insistence that major budget and structural adjustment aid disbursements were conditional on an agreement with the IMF. It was this encounter that seems to have persuaded Mr Patassé to write to the Fund and the World Bank, formally committing his government to following their prescriptions for economic reform. In Bangui itself the finance minister, Emmanuel Dokouna, who had been antagonistic towards the Bank and the IMF and had allowed temporary arrears to accumulate, now appears to be taking a back seat. He is no longer standing in the way of those members of the interministerial economic committee (such as the minister of the economy, Dogonendji Be) who are trying to prepare the ground for an ESAF programme.

The government fails to borrow against diamond output—

In late 1995 the government attempted to borrow $100m by issuing promissory notes secured against diamonds, according to the speculative Paris-based newsletter, *La Lettre du continent*. The money was reportedly to have been used to pay civil service salaries or clear loan repayment arrears to the African Development Bank (ABD), or even to buy two helicopters from the Eurocopter consortium for the state oil marketing company, Petroca. However, gem dealers and financiers were not convinced: CAR diamonds are readily available through the Antwerp market, and the government' s financial credibility is low.

—while Canadian groups step up exploration—

Mining firms from Canada are fast emerging as a major force in the application of modern industrial techniques to diamond production in the CAR, where output has in the past been heavily reliant on the efforts of artisanal producers. United Reef, which last year announced a major extension to its operations, has now been joined by Radisson Mining Resources, based in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec and listed on the Montreal Stock Exchange. Radisson has just announced the purchase of diver-operated mining systems from South Africa's PR Mining and Exploration; the plant is already on site and will be operated by the South African company. Radisson is a small mining company founded in 1983 and active in gold prospecting in Canada until 1993, when it took an interest in African diamonds. In December 1994 Radisson acquired a permit in the CAR covering 110,000 acres, in an area 35 miles west of Bangui; these interests are now held through its local subsidiary, Radisson Centrafrique. Initial prospecting has revealed alluvial deposits covering 36 sq km along the Lobaye river. It believes that past artisanal mining in the area has touched only 3% of the alluvial deposits. Meanwhile, United Reef has reported the sale of 1,819 carats of rough diamonds from its Bamingui river concession, for $305,722, an average of $168/carat. This, the third sale of stones from the property, takes total receipts for the year to November 30, 1995, to 3,267 carats (worth $590,834). A further rise in income is forecast in 1996. Recent data from the Franc Zone Secretariat show a steady increase in diamond output.

Production of uncut diamonds
('000 carats)

1991	1992	1993	1994
429.7	451.3	494.9	529.8

Source: Secrétariat du comité monétaire de la Zone franc, *La Zone franc, rapport annuel 1994.*

—and United Reef moves into gold

United Reef is also moving into gold. The Ministry of Energy and Minerals has granted permission for the company to acquire exploration rights to deposits at Roandji, 460 km north-east of Bangui. Gold was first found at the site in 1912 and by 1950 1.7 tons had been produced. Since independence, however, the site has only been exploited by local artisanal miners. A survey was carried out in 1987/88 by the French agency, Bureau des recherches géologiques et minières (BRGM), and United Reef believes there is potential for a large tonnage open-pit mine.

The government seeks hotel investors—

Anxious to revive the tourism industry, in late 1995 the newly reorganised tourism and environment ministry (see below) began talks with a South African investor who it hopes will back the completion of a 500-room hotel in Bangui that was abandoned part-way through the construction process. (According to

Bangui sources it was originally supposed to be part of the Intercontinental chain.) Once complete, the hotel will be privatised. The government may also seek new investors for another hotel whose original private owner bequeathed it to the French medical research foundation, the Pasteur Institute, in his will. Having no experience of the industry, the institute did not want to run the property. At present, Bangui has only two international class hotels. These may be sufficient to cater for the small number of business and development agency personnel who visit the CAR at present, but it leaves little scope for an expansion in tourist traffic.

—and commissions a tourism development study

The government has also commissioned a study of the prospects for expanding tourism. The rich variety of fauna and flora in a country that has both rainforest and savannah regions offers obvious potential, but at present, other than the occasional back-packer, the CAR caters mainly for small up-market groups on private hunting trips and safaris. However, allocation of ministerial portfolios by the prime minister, Gabriel Koyambounou, has given the tourism industry greater priority. Previously, tourism was the responsibility of a minister who also had to look after water, forestry, fisheries, hunting and the environment, but in the cabinet reshuffle of April 1995 (2nd quarter 1995, page 23), tourism and the environment were hived off into a new ministry of their own, headed by Daniel Emery Dede. Mr Dede has had to set up the department from scratch, recruiting staff and making contacts with relevant interest groups and donors. Consequently, it was only on August 1 that the cabinet approved the official structure of the new department and on September 14 that Mr Dede’s key staff formally took up their posts.

Foreign trade, aid and payments

Exports recover after devaluation

Latest data from the Franc Zone authorities have confirmed signs of a resurgence in the CAR’ s export base in the wake of the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994. Earnings from diamonds and timber rose sharply and exports of cotton and coffee also both bounced back strongly. However, until full figures are published for 1995, it will remain unclear whether the positive trend has been maintained.

Main exports
(CFAfr bn)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Diamonds	19.7	18.7	18.3	22.9	47.1
Timber	9.2	4.1	6.0	5.5	20.9
Cotton	4.5	5.8	1.9	2.7	4.8
Coffee	2.7	2.0	1.3	1.4	5.3

Source: Secrétariat du comité monétaire de la Zone franc, *La Zone franc, rapport annuel 1994.*

Political structure: Chad

Official name: République du Tchad

Form of state: unitary republic

Legal system: based on the Code Napoléon. The 1989 constitution was suspended in December 1990. The national conference, held from January to April 1993, approved the transition charter, which has been extended until April 1996

National legislature: the 57-member Conseil supérieur de la transition is the interim legislature, elected by the national conference

Last elections: December 1989 (presidential); July 1990 (legislative)

Next elections: mid-1996 (presidential); end-1996 (legislative)

Head of state: president, confirmed by the transition charter

National government: the prime minister, elected by the national conference, and his appointed Council of Ministers; last major cabinet reshuffle: April 1995

Main political parties: Mouvement patriotique du salut (MPS); Convention pour la démocratie sociale (CDS); Mouvement pour la démocratie et le socialisme au Tchad (MDST); Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le progrès (RDP); Union démocratique pour le progrès du Tchad (UDPT); Union pour le renouveau et la démocratie (URD)

President	Idriss Deby
Prime minister	Djimasta Koïbla
Key ministers	
armed forces	Youssouf Togoimi
civil service & labour	Salibou Garba
commerce & industrial promotion	Mahamat Ambadi
communications	Youssouf Mboudou Mbami
culture, youth & sports	Mahamat Said Fara
environment & tourism	Moïse Ketté
finance & computerisation	Mahamat Ahmat Alhabo
foreign affairs	Ahmat Abderamane Haggar
interior & territorial administration	Mahamat Nouri
livestock & water	Mahamat Nour Mallaye
mines, oil & energy	Paul Mbainodoum
national education	Nassour Waidou
planning & cooperation	Mariam Mahamat Nour
public health	Dangde Laoubele
public security	Noudjalbaye Ngaryanam
public works	Gali Gatta Ngothe
rural development	Mahamat Adoum Kalapoum
secretary-general to the government	Koumtog Laoagguelnodji
social affairs & women’s promotion	Achta Selgue
Governor of the Banque des états de l’Afrique centrale (BEAC)	Jean-Félix Mamalepot

Economic structure: Chad

Latest available figures

Economic indicators	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
GDP at market prices CFAfr bn	372	350	300	447	n/a
Real GDP growth %	8.3	–6.1	–15.9	7.2	n/a
Consumer price inflation %	4.2	–6.5	–2.8	45.0	6.3[a]
Population m	5.8	6.0	6.1	6.2	n/a
Exports fob $ m	194	182	152	146	n/a
Imports fob $ m	250	243	215	160	n/a
Current account $ m	–66	–86	–116	–50	n/a
Reserves excl gold $ m	120	80	39	76	40[b]
Total external debt $ m	610	710	757	n/a	n/a
External debt-service ratio %	4.4	4.7	7.5	n/a	n/a
Seed cotton production[c] '000 tons	175	122	95	137	n/a
Exchange rate (av) CFAfr:$	282.1	264.7	283.2	555.2	501.2[d]

January 26, 1996 CFAfr512.04:$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1993	% of total
Agriculture	48.8
Industry	17.7
Manufacturing	16.5
Services	33.5
GDP at factor cost	100.0

Components of gross domestic product 1993	% of total
Private consumption	93.4
Government consumption	16.6
Gross domestic investment	9.4
Exports of goods & services	13.4
Imports of goods & services	–32.8
GDP at market prices	100.0

Principal exports 1994	$ m
Cotton	54
Livestock & carcassing	50

Principal imports cif 1991	$ m
Manufactures	262
Non-fuel primary products	85

Main destinations of exports 1994[e]	% of total
South Africa	23
Portugal	22
Germany	16
France	10

Main origins of imports 1994[e]	% of total
France	39
Cameroon	26
Nigeria	8
USA	6

[a] EIU estimates. [b] May actual. [c] Crop years starting December 1. [d] January-September. [e] Drawn from partners' trade returns, subject to a wide margin of error.

Chad

Outlook

Mr Deby continues to stretch his credibility—

As 1996 begins, the credibility of the president, Idriss Deby, and his much-prolonged, much-delayed political transition, are once more on the line. After having finally exasperated the French into inspiring press stories that they would rather like to see him replaced, the Chadian leader has renewed his commitment to seeing the transition through, and has finally arranged for the oft-promised voter registration exercise to be held, an exercise long bogged down in Mr Deby's continuing manoeuvring with opposition political parties and personalities. Although registration began a month later than Mr Deby had promised and had to be extended by ten days, at least it occurred. The government has proclaimed it a success. Presidential elections scheduled for June and presidential voting in December may take place on time if France maintains pressure on Mr Deby but many Chad-watchers are understandably sceptical of this outcome.

—plays games with armed external groups—

In a parallel process, Mr Deby has been pushed into agreeing to roundtable talks with Chad's various "politico-military" groups at Franceville in Gabon, under the seasoned mediation of Gabon's president, Omar Bongo. Some observers feel that it was France, anxious to diminish its military role in Chad, that was doing the pushing. The failure of the first roundtable in January, as it became clear that consensus was currently out of the question, has strengthened Mr Deby's hold on the situation; if the roundtable is resumed, as seems likely once the dust has settled, it is likely to be prolonged. It may last well into 1996 and although Mr Deby has promised that it will not divert attention from the transitional programme (especially the constitutional referendum in May and the presidential elections), there are likely to be increasing protests if the external groups are excluded from the transitional process.

—as the transition remains in doubt

There have been persistent rumours in Ndjamena that the whole transition process might again be postponed, especially if Mr Deby can make it look like his opponents' fault. For Mr Deby, the confusion surrounding the roundtable could, if he so wished, offer a pretext for further prolonging his stay in office, especially if the roundtable is definitively abandoned and there is an increase in armed activity on Chad's borders. This, however, could be an increasingly risky course of action with diminishing returns. If it is possible to resuscitate the roundtable it could prove to be a way of distracting the armed groups, who in any case are said to be running short of backers and causing growing annoyance to neighbouring countries—the Central African Republic, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan—which have been largely unwilling hosts to their activities. It has even been suggested that a prolonged roundtable might be the best way of securing a *de facto* ceasefire, with a corresponding increase in security during the difficult electoral period.

The prospect of oil remains crucial

Promising economic indications continue, seen in the new international backing from the Bretton Woods institutions and reinforced by new inflows of French aid. Even if some of the statistics are slow in reflecting it, others—especially in the merchandise exports sector—continue to encourage optimism. Although cotton and livestock still form the bedrock of the present recovery, the pivot of whatever cautious optimism exists is the as yet embryonic oil sector, centred upon the Doba Basin scheme in the south of the country. The long-term prospects opened up by Doba will continue to depend, however, on a satisfactory evolution of the political situation. This, in turn, is where some form of attempt to include the various politico-military groups in the mainstream of Chadian domestic politics will remain vital. It has not gone unnoticed that the major activities of the armed groups are in precisely those areas (Lake Chad and the far south) where oil deposits have been found.

Review

The political scene

Mr Deby pledges again to complete the transition—

Following increasing signs of exasperation in France at the repeated delays to Chad's political transition programme, the president, Idriss Deby, made a fresh declaration of his intent to pursue the programme to the end. He chose the medium of radio, in the form of the Gabon-based station, Africa No 1, to make this announcement. First he said that the much-postponed voter registration exercise would finally begin on November 1. "Chad cannot continually to be in a transition," he stated. While he appeared to shift his position on the possibility of a meeting between his government and the "politico-military groups" (armed factions operating outside Chad or along its borders), he still appeared to reject the idea of a "roundtable" with these groups as well as internal opposition parties, as had been suggested. He also committed himself to respect the judgement of the ballot box, even if his own ruling party, the Mouvement patriotique du salut (MPS), were to go into opposition.

—and mollifies the French

The president also tried to make light of his differences with France. "The irritation of the French government is well-founded," he said, noting that France had put at Chad's disposal cash and materials for voter registration and for the election itself. But for the president, this irritation was at the delay to the process, not against Mr Deby himself. He stressed his own friendship with France but added that there was a difference between friendship and "the subordination of a head of state to a [foreign] power".

A new transition programme is announced—

In fact, it proved impossible for voter registration to start on November 1 due to continuing administrative difficulties. In the meantime the government had announced through its spokesman, Youssouf Mboudou Mbami, that in conjunction with the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), it had decided that the schedule for elections adopted earlier in the year (3rd quarter 1995, page 37) could not be observed. This was in part because the government had now agreed to a roundtable meeting with the politico-military groups, to be held in Gabon, which had been announced on November 10 (see below).

—ending in December 1996

The CENI then published a new electoral timetable: voter registration would be held from December 3, 1995, to January 2, 1996, and the electoral lists would be published on March 4. A constitutional referendum would take place on March 31 and presidential elections on June 2. The legislative elections, however, would only take place on December 22-24, 1996. Therefore, the transition had effectively been extended by a further six months, to the end of the year.

Mr Deby registers to vote—

Voter registration did indeed begin on December 3, with Mr Deby himself choosing to go to register in Mongo in central Chad, where he had been for ceremonies to mark his fifth anniversary in power. Deploying some 5,000 agents, the registration exercise was funded mainly by external donors—France, the USA and the UN Development Programme (UNDP)—which made available CFAfr90m ($180,000) for printing 4 million cards and 7,000 registers. The exercise was carried out by the Commission nationale de recensement electorale (CNRE), which was chaired by the interior minister, Mahamat Nouri, but which included representatives of political parties. On December 16 Mr Nouri claimed that registration was at “cruising speed”, but figures he produced suggested a certain lack of public interest. In four typical subprefectures mentioned by the minister the registration rate varied between 14% and 30%, but in Faya in the north it had been 87%, and in Bere in the south 60%. In five localities in the capital, Ndjamena, participation had been running at 50%.

—and the deadline is extended

Following Mr Deby’s observation in his New Year’s speech to the nation that the registration exercise had been disappointing, the next day it was announced that the process would be extended by presidential decree to January 12, to permit the exercise to be completed properly. Earlier Mr Nouri had admitted that in some areas logistics had made the exercise difficult. In addition, a special appeal was made for women to register, as data so far received from the different regions showed that women constituted the “least-registered” category of the population. Some political circles in Chad were said to be critical of the lack of preparation for the exercise and also of the fact that it had begun before the roundtable involving Mr Deby and government representatives, opposition politicians and politico-military groups, due to be held in Franceville Gabon, in early January.

Mr Bongo is asked to mediate

It was after a lightening visit by Mr Deby to the Gabonese capital, Libreville, that the roundtable between the Chadian government, domestic opposition and politico-military groups was announced. The Chadian president told journalists that he had come round to the idea because a “global negotiation” with the various armed groups was probably better than a series of separate negotiations. He insisted that it would not be a repeat of the Sovereign National Conference of 1993—for which the armed groups appeared to be agitating—because all discussions would have to take place within the framework for transition worked out at that conference. Mr Deby announced that he had asked the Gabonese president, Omar Bongo, to mediate and chair the meeting. On November 10 it was officially announced by the Chadian prime minister, Djimasta Koïbla, that the “roundtable for national reconciliation” would be held in Franceville on December 13-20. Against earlier expectations, domestic opposition parties would be represented, he added, but not all 54 of them.

Meanwhile, rebel activity diminishes—

In the last quarter of 1995 the activities of the armed groups were probably at their quietest levels of the year. For the Franceville meeting a total of ten groups were identified, but those taken particularly seriously were: the Forces armées pour la république fédérale (FARF), led by Laokein Frisson Barde in the south; the various factions of the Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement (MDD) in the Lake Chad area; and sympathisers of the former army chief-of-staff, Abbas Koty (killed in mysterious circumstances in 1993), who launched an attack to seize arms and equipment at Adre in eastern Chad on November 20.

—and reconciliations are announced

The government received a number of defectors from the MDD in early October, reportedly after a Nigerian drive against Chadian immigrants in Maiduguri, where MDD elements were thought to be sheltering. In the meanwhile, on December 11 the government signed an agreement at Douguia in the Lake Chad area with an MDD faction led by Oumar Kachalami, hitherto unknown. The deal was said to involve the reintegration of officers into the army and two months’ pay for rank-and-file fighters. A similar exercise had taken place two days before when a group of former Chadian army soldiers from the south, led by Lieutenant Marcellin Zenian, surrendered to the environment minister, Lieutenant Moïse Ketté (himself a former rebel) at Beladja in Logone Occidentale. On December 22 a further group of former soldiers was reported to have surrendered and on January 25 another armed movement, the Action pour l’unité et le développement, reportedly arrived at an agreement with the government, signed in the capital of the CAR, Bangui.

The Franceville meeting is postponed—

Some observers saw these exercises as window-dressing for the Franceville meeting, which had to be postponed to January 5 at the request of the armed groups. It was also reported at the end of November that Mr Deby was still opposed to any participation by any of the internal opposition parties, despite representations from opposition representatives and he spent less than 24 hours at the francophone summit in Cotonou (Benin) at the beginning of December. According to the independent weekly newspaper, *Ndjamena-hebdo*, he did not wish to take part in a meeting that Mr Bongo had organised with a number of other African leaders and the French president, Jacques Chirac, to discuss the Chad question with him. In the end the meeting was postponed by mutual agreement.

—but Mr Deby says it will not delay elections

Mr Bongo announced the postponement on December 12 after the delivery by Chad’s minister of culture, Mahamat Said Fara, of a memorandum from the Ndjamena government to the armed groups. Mr Fara described the roundtable as a “last-chance meeting”. He also clarified the government’s position on the participation of the domestic political partiesthat they could not take part as parties, but that “several political parties and independent personalities would form part of the government delegation”. Mr Deby, in his New Year’s message, said that his concern to see the Franceville talks succeed meant receiving as many contributions as possible from the various political parties in Chad. He claimed, referring to Chadians who had resorted to armed struggle, that the days were gone when the only way of achieving power was through the barrel of a gun. They would not impede the country's political advance, he argued, and the preparations for Franceville should not compromise or delay the electoral process.

The roundtable opens

The conference finally opened on January 5 with Mr Bongo in the chair, in the presence of the president of the CAR, Ange-Félix Patassé, and the then Nigerian head of state, Mahamane Ousmane. Observer delegations were present from neighbouring countries such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Benin, and from France, the USA and the European Union. Most of the armed groups were represented, while Mr Deby had made provision to include in his delegation representatives of ten domestic political parties (later extended to include another five). However, not all of these turned up because of arguments between the opposition parties as to who should go, divisions cleverly manipulated by the government in its original selection.

Mr Bongo appeals for dialogue—

In his opening statement, Mr Bongo made an appeal: "Try, my dear brothers, to understand each other, dialogue with each other, love each other." The meeting very rapidly ran into difficulties.

First, Major Adam Yacoubonce an aide to Mr Deby's predecessor, Hissène Habré, now said to be representing the MDD and claiming to speak for all the armed groupscalled for the resignation of Mr Deby and the appointment of a transitional head of state. To this, ex-president Lol Mahamat Choua, said to be speaking for the legalised political parties, said that Mr Deby should remain as head of state but cease to be head of a political party and, if he were to stand in the presidential elections, should instantly cease to be president. Major Yacoub also called for a general amnesty for the armed groups, their transformation into political parties, security for all returnees and the recognition of their civil and "military" rights. He added demands for the dissolution of "all parallel armies" and the creation of a new national army composed of "the army of [Mr] Deby, residual elements of the national army, and the armies of the politico-military movements". Finally, he wanted what he described as the demilitarisation of Ndjamena and the "disarmament of the civilian population".

—but rapidly suspends the talks

On January 9 Mr Bongo halted the talks. A statement said that he had done so after deciding that most of the armed groups were not about to sign the text giving the framework for the negotiations. The groups' representatives said they had been presented with a *fait accompli* in the form of a text entitled "the Franceville general agreement" handed to them by Mr Bongo and other heads of state. The text, they alleged, had been circulated even before the open debate had reached its conclusion. Mr Bongo was later quoted as criticising the call for Mr Deby's resignation, saying he could not be party to a coup d'état. To this, the armed groups replied that it was a negotiating position, not a final demand.

Chadians are expelled from Libya

The Franceville meeting and debate over the transition diverted attention from other issues. Despite growing arrears in salary payments, the trade unions stayed quiescent. In October Chadian government reaction was also comparatively muted on the expulsion of large numbers of Chadians (estimated at up to 1,500) from Libya, despite a recent visit by Mr Deby. Some figures had put the number of Chadians in Libya at 300,000-500,000, but those expelled were a fraction of these estimates. After a Chadian government statement complaining of lack of warning, the Libyans said that there had been an agreement on the return of Chadians with irregular papers and that the Chadian embassy in Tripoli had been involved. In mid-November a human rights organisation, the Ligue tchadien des droits de l'homme (LTDH), denounced "extortion, torture and arbitrary arrests" committed upon Chadians in Libya, especially in the southern Libyan town of Koufra.

A minor government reshuffle

A presidential decree on December 7, proposed by Mr Koïbla, replaced the ministers of public health and the armed forces. At the latter ministry, Youssouf Togoimi replaced Ali Abasikine. Youssouf, previously the government representative in Ouaddai province, had been justice minister under Mr Habré, a position he subsequently held in an earlier transitional government under Mr Deby in 1990-91. At health, Dangbe Laoubele replaced Ngare Ada, who had come under criticism during health-sector strikes in 1995. Another decree named Koumtog Laoagguelnodji, a former communications minister, to the key position of secretary-general to the government, replacing Dadi Abderahamane.

The economy

Mr Deby looks on the bright side—

In his New Year message the president, Idriss Deby, wished that 1996 would be a year of hope for Chad and that the country would see a breakthrough to economic prosperity. He recalled that on September 1 the government had signed an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the IMF, and would shortly be concluding another agreement with the World Bank (4th quarter 1995, page 33). The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) agreed with the Fund and the Bank, and which lays down a "coherent macroeconomic framework", was made possible by Chad's economic performance, the president noted. He added that in the longer term the deal should enable the country to set aside resources for financing its own investments, while achieving annual GDP growth of 5%. The object of the SAP was that Chad should be able to balance its budget with its own resources in 1998. The president added, with a note of triumph, that for the first time since independence the state had recovered all projected internal revenue (set in the 1995 budget at CFAfr42bn, or $83m) and that the target might even be exceeded, as final figures were not yet available.

—and stresses prospects for mining

In his speech Mr Deby also predicted that the economy would soon undergo a profound change due to the contribution of the mining sector. He noted that promotional events in late November (see below) had helped to highlight Chad's mineral resources abroad. There would also, he added, be a donors' roundtable meeting in the near future, aimed at finding the necessary funds to exploit the country's mineral potential.

JIPROMIT highlights Chad's minerals potential—

The Premières journées internationales de la promotion minière au Tchad (JIPROMIT 95), a promotional mining conference organised by the government in conjunction with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), took place in Ndjamena on November 28-30. Topics covered included the geology and mining potential of Chad, the new mining code of 1995, the fiscal regime to be applied to mining enterprises and the investment code. Two days of excursions were organised afterwards to enable delegates to look at the country's mining sites.

—which remains enigmatic—

According to the Franc Zone Secretariat's annual report for 1994, Chad's mining resources are currently limited, as only natron (carbonate of sodium phosphate) and salt are being exploited, as well as rock for construction from the Mani quarry. The report notes that knowledge of Chad's mineral resources is very inadequate, although at the opening of JIPROMIT 95 the minister of mines, oil and energy, Paul Mbainodoum, described the failure to exploit these as a "geological scandal". Apart from the well-known oil resources, he stated, there were gold deposits in Ouaddai and Mayo Kebbi, as well as tin and tungsten in Tibesti and important bauxite deposits near Guidari in Tandjile. The UNDP was helping the ministry to make a geological map which would confirm these deposits, as well as iron ore, wolfram, manganese, zinc, lead and copper, Mr Mbainadoum added. Rumours continue to circulate of great mineral wealth under the Aouzou strip (returned to Chad by Libya in 1994—3rd quarter 1994, page 34) but no reliable survey has yet been done there.

—although oil continues to promise better tomorrows

The Franc Zone report also summarises the current state of play in the oil sector, where Chad's reserves have been evaluated at 150m tons in the Seduigui area, near Lake Chad, and in the basins of Bongor, Doba, Doseo and Salamat. In December 1994 the exploiting consortium of Exxon, Shell and Elf carried out horizontal explorations in the Doba area, and in January 1995 signed a framework pipeline agreement with Cameroon to pump the Doba oil 1,000 km to Kribi on Cameroon's Atlantic coast (2nd quarter 1995, page 35). According to the Franc Zone report, work on the development of the deposits could begin in 1998 and by 2000 production could reach 150,000-200,000 barrels/day (or 7.5m-12.5m tons/year).

Budgeted recurrent spending is up—

The budget for 1996 was approved by the Council of Ministers on December 26. It was reported to total CFAfr200.4bn ($397m) including both recurrent and development budgets. The recurrent element is put at CFAfr74.6bn, with development spending, largely aid-driven, accounting for the rest. Although recurrent expenditure is up substantially from 1995, when it stood at CFAfr61.7bn, development expenditure is slightly below last year's figure of CFAfr129.7bn. The budget was still to be approved by the Conseil supérieur de la transition (CST—the interim parliament) before becoming law.

—but public finances were in crisis in 1994

According to the Franc Zone report, any economic recovery from the crisis of the 1980s was still less than evident in 1994. The report states that customs collection had been compromised by the reduction in imports of petroleum and other products due to the Cameroon-Nigeria conflict over the Bakassi peninsula (Cameroon—3rd quarter 1994, pages 11-12), which led to the closure of both countries' borders. (This had not prevented, as the report records elsewhere, a significant increase in exports of Chadian livestock to Nigeria.) Prolonged public-sector strikes in 1994 aggravated the already weak state of public finances. Even so, the report notes, fiscal receipts increased by 11.9% in the year, to CFAfr28.2bn ($51m), mainly due to the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc at the start of the year.

France hands over more adjustment support—

On December 8 an agreement was signed with France for a grant of FFr100m ($20.1m) under the rubric of structural adjustment. Specifically, the sum was to cover budgetary assistance in July-December, taking into account Chad's efforts to conform to IMF conditionalities which had led to the ESAF agreed in September. The grant will be used mainly to pay off debt arrears accumulated in 1995, of which 35% are domestic and 65% external. France also agreed to a total cancellation of Chad's debts up to the end of 1993. This had been approved by the late French president, François Mitterrand, in 1994 under an arrangement known as "Dakar II".

—and backs up Cotontchad

The Caisse française de développement (CFD—the French state development bank) is to provide a soft loan to the state-controlled cotton company, Société cotonnière du Tchad (Cotontchad), for an investment programme. The total programme, approved by Cotontchad's board of directors, is for FFr62m ($12.5m), covering all the Chadian company's activitiesseed transportation, fibre evacuation, spinning, stocking of products and the manufacture of oils and soaps. The remainder of the programme is to be funded by Cotontchad itself. The CFD, which has provided a series of loans to Cotontchad to help with restructuring since its crisis of 1986-87, hopes that with the latest tranche the company will be back to financial viability by 1997.

Franc Zone news

Mr Chirac reassures his friends at Cotonou—

At the sixth francophone summit, held in Cotonou on December 2-4, the French president, Jacques Chirac, and his many advisers from Paris delivered the strong message that France will stand by its traditional allies and will seek to prevent the marginalisation of the French language and culture. Mr Chirac insisted that he was not among those who denigrated the English language but was adamant that the influence of French would be defended. He stressed that his government's efforts would be concentrated on the information highway, and sought the support of the summit. The president's public interventions at the summit did not reflect the suspicions of *le monde anglo-saxon* that are felt by many who were present. In an interview with the Paris-based weekly, *Jeune Afrique*, in late September, his cooperation minister, Jacques Godfrain, claiming to echo the sentiments of Mr Chirac, had said that in 300 years' time the mosque at Casablanca and the basilica at Yamoussoukro will remain monuments to African spirituality: "In 30 years, I am not sure if we will be still be eating hamburgers." Also in Cotonou, Mr Chirac vehemently denied reports in the Paris daily, *Libération*, that the French military presence in sub-Saharan Africa, totalling 8,000 troops garrisoned in six countries, was to be reduced. He did not rule out an "evolution" of French military policy and did not contest that a review, reportedly launched by the former prime minister, Edouard Balladur, was under way.

The summit, which cost an estimated CFAfr20bn ($39m) and gave a boost to the Beninese economy, agreed that it would elect a secretary-general of the francophone movement, rather in the mould of the Commonwealth, at its next meeting in Vietnam in 1997. It also welcomed São Tomé and Príncipe, and Moldova as permanent members. The summit in 1999 (it alternates with the Franco-African gathering) is expected to be held in either Romania or New Brunswick (Canada).

—and bolsters the Ministry of Cooperation

The summit also gave Mr Chirac an opportunity to support the position of Mr Godfrain, pledging that under his presidency the Ministry of Cooperation would remain independent, with its own resources and identity. This promise is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the ministry is already attached to the Quai d'Orsay although it did appear to rebuff the aspirations of the foreign affairs minister, Hervé de Charette, who had anticipated the "fusion" of the two bodies in a speech at the end of August. Cooperation policy, like military policy in the region, is under review. Mr Godfrain's position was, however, strengthened at Cotonou, and he hopes that his ministry will secure the post of secretary-general in the proposed Comité interministériel de l'aide au développement (CIAD). African leaders were told at the summit that the ministry would remain their principal point of contact in Paris. The Ministry of Finance already controls 85% of France's bilateral development aid budget, but Mr Godfrain has reportedly been angling for control over structural adjustment lending and the disbursement policy of the Caisse française de développement (CFD, the French state development bank, which currently answers to the Treasury).

France pumps new money into Air Afrique—

The 12 African governments (ten in the Franc Zone plus Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania), which together own a 72% interest in Air Afrique, met on the fringes of the Cotonou summit to discuss the crisis in the regional carrier. The Abidjan-based airline reported an operating profit of CFAfr1.4bn ($2.5m) in 1994, and trimmed its net loss from CFAfr8.4bn in 1993 to CFAfr1.9bn. Despite higher turnover and an improved occupancy rate, it was not, and is not able to service its CFAfr200bn long-term debt from its operations. This debt is four times its capital and reserves combined, and Air Afrique is in dire need of new funds. Privatisation has been urged, *inter alia*, by the Senegalese minister of state, Abdoulaye Wade, although this option was roundly condemned by the airline's unions, which met in Paris in mid-January. As a stop-gap measure, France, which has a 21.5% stake in the carrier, has approved a FFr92m ($18.4m) loan to Air Afrique. The funds will enable the African government shareholders to subscribe to a planned cash call.

—and calls for investment in the region

At a conference in Paris part-funded by his ministry on October 31, Mr Godfrain targeted the mining sector in a seminar on French private-sector investment in Africa. The ministry and the CFD have developed a three-pronged strategy, with official support for upstream and downstream development, and for mining research. They estimated that their funding for sectoral projects could help to create 100,000 jobs in the Franc Zone. Proparco, the CFD's private-sector arm, has invested in two venture capital funds, Cauris investissement and the Fonds de garantie des investissements de l'Afrique de l'ouest (3rd quarter 1995, page 41). Cauris, based in Lomé and managed by the Banque ouest-africaine de développement (BOAD) which has a 50% share in the CFAfr2.5bn capital, made its first three investments in mid-November, committing CFAfr325m to three Ivorian businesses. French investment in the zone has, of course, continued since the devaluation without direct official support, led by Bouygues, Bolloré and Saga.

The creation of CEMAC is again delayed—

The 31st summit of the Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale, due to be held in Bangui in mid-December, has been postponed until March. Funding difficulties at the subregion's Yaounde-based customs union influenced the decision, but the main reason is understood to have been the failure of the six members to agree the definitive texts for the proposed Communauté économique et monétaire d'Afrique centrale (CEMAC). The community is to be the subregion's answer to West Africa's Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), which has been up and running for one year.

—as the subregion's recovery stutters—

Comparisons between the subregions invariably favour the UEMOA, a fact which was again underlined at a seminar on recovery prospects in Central Africa in Paris on December 12. At the gathering, organised by the Centre français du commerce extérieur, the managing director for Central and Sahelian Africa at the CFAO, René Dupraz, asked why Cameroon had not enjoyed the same post-devaluation take-off as Côte d'Ivoire. Cameroon's inability to grasp the opportunities of the currency adjustment has held back the Central African subregion, while the Ivorian recovery has boosted the small Sahelian economies. Poor communications and illegal road levies push up transport costs to such an extent that the freight costs between Pointe-Noire and Douala are higher than those between Pointe-Noire and Rouen. The subregion's fiscal reforms have introduced a standard *Tarif extérieur commun* and a single-rate *Tarif préférentiel généralisé* of 20%, which is scheduled to be abolished for trade between the six members of the proposed CEMAC. There is also a turnover tax, the *Taxe sur les chiffres d'affaires* (TCA), which is to be replaced by value-added tax. The TCA, however, is levied at different rates, with a sole rate of 18% in Cameroon and rates in Gabon varying between 12.5% and 17%.

—as borne out by the Prouteau report

The different perceptions of the two subregions were highlighted when the president of the Conseil des investisseurs français en Afrique noire (CIAN), Jean-Pierre Prouteau, released his seventh survey of French business attitudes in Africa—known as the "Prouteau report"—in Abidjan in November. In the survey, 91% of French investors in Côte d'Ivoire and 74% of those in Burkina Faso felt that the devaluation had had a positive impact on their operations. In Central Africa, 64% of those surveyed in Gabon and Chad had the same perception, followed by 58% in Cameroon. Investors' feelings about turnover in 1995 told the same story. In West Africa, 77% in Côte d'Ivoire, 65% in Burkina Faso and 60% in Mali expected an increase in sales, compared with 39% in Gabon and only 25% in Cameroon. Across the zone, France still enjoys the leading market share of (reduced) imports but faces growing competition, notably from Europe (in timber industries), the USA (oil, arms and telecommunications), China (medicines) and South Africa (consumer goods and agricultural equipment).

France relaunches a debt initiative

The burden on the zone's public finances will not be greatly eased by the Fonds de conversion de créances pour le développement, a French government fund of FFr4bn for debt relief launched at the Franco-African summit in Libreville in October 1992 and modified by Mr Chirac on September 11. If a middle-income Franc Zone government (Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon) includes a contribution towards a capital project, which has donor funding and is aimed at furthering "sustainable development", in its investment budget and has it approved by the directors of the French fund, then borrowings of a corresponding value from France are cancelled. However, by mid-1995 only FFr1.2bn had been drawn from the FFr4bn in the fund, the field of which has now been enlarged, *inter alia*, to include public-enterprise restructuring. With the possible exception of Côte d'Ivoire, the governments in question are still operating under severe budgetary pressure and are not in a position to avail themselves greatly of the fund.

Appendix 1

Quarterly indicators of economic activity in Cameroon and Central African Republic[a]

		1993			1994				1995		
		2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr
CAMEROON											
Mining production	Prodn/day										
Crude petroleum	'000 barrels	122	115	110	110	108	110	110	100	100	100[b]
Prices	Monthly av										
Consumer prices:	1990=100	103.3[c]	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
change year on year	%	1.4[c]	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Money	End-Qtr										
M1, seasonally, adj:	CFAfr bn	251.8	244.0	269.6	296.6	310.7	325.7	364.2	346.9	325.4	330.5[d]
change year on year	%	–42.4	–39.6	–14.1	2.5	23.4	33.5	35.1	16.9	4.7	n/a
Foreign trade[e]	Annual totals										
Exports fob	$ m	(	1,828	)	(		2,062	)	(	n/a	)
Imports cif	"	(	1,011	)	(		956	)	(	n/a	)
Foreign exchange	End-Qtr										
Central Bank	$ m	21.6	4.9	1.9	2.0	1.4	0.5	1.7	1.5	0.5	0.2[d]
CAR											
Prices	Monthly av										
Consumer prices[f]:	1990=100	93.1	92.9	92.4	98.6	113.7	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
change year on year	%	–3.1	–3.6	–3.6	2.4	22.1	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Money	End-Qtr										
M1, seasonally adj:	CFAfr bn	53.59	58.35	61.07	70.64	87.51	96.49	106.37	117.43	114.90	117.67[d]
change year on year	%	–1.2	11.9	16.8	32.3	63.3	65.4	74.2	66.2	31.3	n/a
Foreign trade[e]	Annual totals										
Exports fob	$ m	(	132	)	(		140	)	(	n/a	)
Imports cif	"	(	422	)	(		472	)	(	n/a	)
Foreign exchange	End-Qtr										
Central Bank	$ m	108.44	113.61	111.81	152.77	190.43	208.92	209.86	248.00	252.29	241.22[d]

Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile.
[a] See Appendix 2 on Chad for exchange rate. [b] Figure for October 1995, 100. [c] Average for 1992. [d] End-August. [e] *DOTS* estimate. [f] "African" households, Bangui.

Appendix 2

Quarterly indicators of economic activity in Chad

		1993			1994				1995		
		2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr
Prices	Monthly av										
Consumer prices:	1990=100	89.9	94.6	94.0	109.7	136.9	142.6	138.9	n/a	n/a	n/a
change year on year	%	–11.0	–8.2	–3.4	13.6	52.3	50.7	47.8	n/a	n/a	n/a
Money	End-Qtr										
M1, seasonally adj:	CFAfr bn	56.34	66.18	47.71	66.57	76.88	80.56	62.87	50.65	52.92	58.76[a]
change year on year	%	–14.3	19.3	–27.4	18.2	36.5	21.7	31.8	–23.9	–31.2	n/a
Foreign trade[b]	Annual totals										
Exports fob	$ m	(	66	)	(	82		)	(	n/a	)
Imports cif	“	(	141	)	(	143		)	(	n/a	)
Exchange rate	End Qtr										
Cameroon, CAR, Chad[c]	CFAfr:$	284.8	283.2	294.8	571.0	547.2	528.2	534.6	484.9	485.3	491.5[d]

Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile.
[a] End-August. [b] *DOTS* estimate. [c] Market rate. [d] End-October 1995, 490.0.

Appendix 3

Chad: direction of trade[a]

($ m)

Exports fob	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Imports cif	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994
South Korea	n/a	n/a	6	19	France	87	94	61	56
Portugal	26	23	18	18	Cameroon	14	22	29	37
Germany	13	16	13	13	Nigeria	9	10	11	11
France	5	4	7	8	USA	15	6	9	8
Costa Rica	n/a	n/a	4	5	Belgium-Luxembourg	8	2	6	6
Belgium-Luxembourg	1	3	2	3	Japan	5	4	4	4
Total incl others	94	73	66	82	Total incl others	169	164	141	143

[a] *DOTS* estimate.

Appendix 4

Foreign trade of Cameroon

($ m)

Exports fob	Jan-Dec 1989[a]	Jan-Dec 1990[b]	Jan-Dec 1991[a]
Coffee	214.68	209.36	86.51
Cocoa & products	196.16	220.38	361.27
Wood & cork	141.32	165.28	231.13
Cotton, raw	68.69	121.21	110.00
Petroleum, crude	229.59	1,134.94	1,371.89
Machinery & transport equipment	66.81	n/a	217.29
Total incl others	1,281.61	1,873.21	2,892.47

Imports cif[ac]	Jan-Dec 1987	Jan-Mar 1988	Jan-Dec 1989	Jan-Dec 1991
Food	202.68	54.80	179.57	314.29
Beverages & tobacco	47.42	9.08	21.03	27.45
Crude materials	42.65	12.20	47.88	162.63
Chemicals	258.91	47.16	193.89	339.62
Paper etc & manufactures	43.96	7.75	36.27	81.50
Textile yarn, cloth & manufactures	94.16	19.87	41.03	80.42
Non-metallic mineral manufactures	70.59	11.37	49.04	69.67
Iron & steel	36.57	8.91	41.87	105.97
Metal manufactures	89.87	17.78	78.42	163.97
Machinery incl electric	362.62	70.99	233.42	469.03
Transport equipment	263.90	45.94	158.52	156.81
Total incl others	1,749.02	352.36	1,273.33	2,306.23

Exports fob[d]	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992[e]	Jan-Dec 1993[e]	Jan-Dec 1994[e]	Imports cif[d]	Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992[e]	Jan-Dec 1993[e]	Jan-Dec 1994[e]
France	817	464	342	383	France	478	517	378	338
Italy	173	203	200	286	Belgium-Luxembourg	62	69	59	63
Spain	131	302	288	285	USA	79	63	50	59
Senegal	3	67	131	196	Germany	127	108	48	54
Netherlands	311	153	129	119	Senegal	18	30	42	54
Germany	46	94	98	106	Japan	72	56	54	38
USA	44	82	101	55	Italy	58	52	39	37
Total incl others	1,909	1,803	1,828	2,062	Total incl others	1,345	1,304	1,011	956

[a] Source, UN. [b] Estimate. [c] Figures for 1990 are not available. [d] Source, *DOTS*. [e] Estimates.

Appendix 5

Foreign trade of Central African Republic

Exports fob	CFAfr bn Jan-Dec 1989	Jan-Dec 1990
Coffee	8.5	2.7
Wood & cork & manufactures	6.3	9.2
Cotton, raw	3.9	4.5
Diamonds	22.6	19.7
Total incl others	47.2	41.2

Imports cif	$ '000 Jan-Dec 1980	Jan-Dec 1989
Meat & products	758	1,156
Dairy products	2,005	2,788
Fish & products	718	1,423
Cereals & products	5,400	8,192
Fruit, vegetables & products	820	1,105
Sugar & products	901	6,232
Beverages	4,396	1,991
Tobacco & manufactures	739	3,715
Petroleum & products	1,184	10,390
Chemicals	9,490	22,239
Rubber manufactures	1,525	2,412
Paper & manufactures	1,813	3,325
Textile fibres & manufactures, incl clothing	4,589	7,118
Miscellaneous non-metallic mineral manufactures	3,418	6,780
Iron & steel	1,187	1,852
Metal manufactures	4,764	5,939
Machinery incl electric	14,090	28,491
Transport equipment	13,153	24,385
of which:		
road vehicles	13,120	23,638
Total incl others	80,461	159,124

Exports fob[a]	$ m Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994
Belgium-Luxembourg	71	69	77	86
Spain	12	12	7	12
Iran	7	8	8	8
France	8	3	4	8
Germany	1	2	2	4
Taiwan	13	4	22	1
Total incl others	261	200	132	140

Imports cif[a]	$ m Jan-Dec 1991	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994
France	60	67	48	58
Cameroon	21	21	21	21
Namibia	6	7	8	10
Japan	11	8	6	7
USA	1	1	6	5
Germany	5	6	5	5
Belgium-Luxembourg	4	6	5	5
Total incl others	389	392	422	472

[a] *DOTS* estimate.

Appendix 6

French trade with Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad

($ '000)

	Cameroon			CAR			Chad		
	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994
Imports cif									
Fruit & vegetables	70,066	97,407	106,490	1	0	10	9	0	0
Coffee, cocoa, tea & spices	41,761	41,827	45,694	1,335	1,938	5,241	0	0	0
Tobacco, unmanufactured	103	0	0	977	1,895	608	0	0	0
Rubber, crude	16,571	20,292	16,097	0	0	21	0	0	0
Wood & cork & manufactures	47,492	53,144	107,144	333	110	312	0	0	0
Textile fibres & waste	3,144	956	1,164	18	138	109	556	318	196
Petroleum & products	257,138	135,731	73,930	0	0	0	0	0	0
Textile yarn & manufactures	456	1,258	4,933	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-ferrous metals	71,301	37,889	68,309	61	0	0	0	0	0
Total incl others	516,892	394,676	431,252	3,647	4,660	8,457	4,795	8,148	9,236
Exports fob									
Cereals & preparations	38,379	22,728	22,725	5,251	7,292	5,797	5,911	5,549	5,072
Sugar & preparations	4,453	3,237	7,336	58	0	15	21	0	621
Beverages	6,644	4,265	3,748	1,391	553	554	128	266	239
Chemicals	114,323	94,413	66,889	10,915	11,998	12,189	6,738	11,654	9,720
Rubber manufactures	4,790	4,460	5,075	789	451	685	553	546	818
Paper etc & manufactures	11,107	10,608	7,852	1,651	1,023	1,322	1,016	1,250	1,363
Textile fibres & manufactures, incl clothing	14,140	11,100	8,845	1,892	954	981	977	628	486
Non-metallic mineral manufactures	14,898	8,235	6,983	389	285	163	1,535	788	466
Iron & steel	5,777	3,794	2,025	339	273	308	553	433	932
Non-ferrous metals	1,933	4,704	2,690	136	0	138	446	341	110
Metal manufactures	21,706	18,417	15,002	2,340	1,237	1,976	7,975	2,255	1,984
Machinery incl electric	114,977	87,647	80,406	20,075	11,029	14,928	32,476	18,789	14,919
Road vehicles	36,878	20,068	26,883	7,481	3,248	6,561	17,589	5,449	8,806
Other transport equipment	4,841	6,527	8,820	91	0	717	275	0	163
Scientific instruments etc	10,529	7,921	5,484	1,267	1,262	1,232	1,664	1,002	1,840
Total incl others	473,031	360,418	305,143	60,783	46,277	52,546	84,793	58,503	51,829