
COUNTRY REPORT

Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad

3rd quarter 1997

The Economist Intelligence Unit
15 Regent Street, London SW1Y 4LR
United Kingdom

The Economist Intelligence Unit

The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide.

The EIU delivers its information in four ways: through subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through specific research reports, whether for general release or for particular clients; through electronic publishing; and by organising conferences and roundtables. The firm is a member of The Economist Group.

London The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent Street London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom Tel: (44.171) 830 1000 Fax: (44.171) 499 9767 e-mail: london@eiu.com	New York The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Building 111 West 57th Street New York NY 10019, USA Tel: (1.212) 554 0600 Fax: (1.212) 586 1181/2 e-mail: newyork@eiu.com	Hong Kong The Economist Intelligence Unit 25/F, Dah Sing Financial Centre 108 Gloucester Road Wanchai Hong Kong Tel: (852) 2802 7288 Fax: (852) 2802 7638 e-mail: hongkong@eiu.com
---	---	--

Website: <http://www.eiu.com>

Electronic delivery EIU Electronic Publishing

New York: Lou Celi or Lisa Hennessey Tel: (1.212) 554 0600 Fax: (1.212) 586 0248
London: Moya Veitch Tel: (44.171) 830 1007 Fax: (44.171) 830 1023

This publication is available on the following electronic and other media:

Online databases	CD-ROM	Microfilm
FT Profile (UK) Tel: (44.171) 825 8000	Knight-Ridder Information Inc (USA)	World Microfilms Publications (UK) Tel: (44.171) 266 2202
DIALOG (USA) Tel: (1.415) 254 7000	SilverPlatter (USA)	
LEXIS-NEXIS (USA) Tel: (1.800) 227 4908		
M.A.I.D./Profound (UK) Tel: (44.171) 930 6900		

Copyright

© 1997 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited.

All information in this report is verified to the best of the author's and the publisher's ability. However, the EIU does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it.

ISSN 0269-4336

Symbols for tables

"n/a" means not available; "-" means not applicable

Contents

- 3 Summary

Cameroon

- 5 Political structure
- 6 Economic structure
- 7 Outlook for 1997-98
- 10 Review
- 10 **The political scene**
- 14 **The economy**
- 17 **Agriculture and forestry**
- 18 **Energy and industry**

Central African Republic

- 19 Political structure
- 20 Economic structure
- 21 Outlook for 1997-98
- 23 Review
- 23 **The political scene**
- 27 **Health**
- 28 **The economy**
- 28 **Foreign trade and payments**

Chad

- 30 Political structure
 - 31 Economic structure
 - 32 Outlook for 1997-98
 - 33 Review
 - 33 **The political scene**
 - 37 **The economy**
- 40 Quarterly indicators and trade data

List of tables

- 10 Cameroon: forecast summary
- 13 Cameroon: Representation in the National Assembly
- 40 Cameroon: quarterly indicators of economic activity
- 40 Central African Republic: quarterly indicators of economic activity
- 41 Chad: quarterly indicators of economic activity
- 41 Chad: direction of trade
- 42 Cameroon: foreign trade
- 43 Central African Republic: foreign trade
- 44 Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad: French trade

List of figures

- 10 Cameroon: gross domestic product
- 10 Cameroon: real exchange rates
- 23 Central African Republic: gross domestic product
- 23 Central African Republic: real exchange rates
- 33 Chad: gross domestic product
- 33 Chad: real exchange rates

August 13, 1997 **Summary**

3rd quarter 1997

Cameroon Outlook for 1997-98: The prospects for the president look increasingly good. Improved relations with the IMF mean new assistance can be expected from donors, including debt relief from the Paris Club. This should strengthen economic growth, already benefiting from buoyant global commodity prices. This will enhance Mr Biya's image in the run-up to the presidential elections scheduled for October, where his victory appears as inevitable as complaints of irregularities by opposition groups and foreign observers. While the manipulation of the political environment is feeding potentially violent tensions, the security situation is likely to remain broadly manageable in the short to medium term.

Review: The governing RDPC scored an emphatic if controversial victory in the May 17 legislative elections, winning 109 of the 180 seats in the National Assembly. Foreign observers criticised several aspects of the conduct of the poll, but opposition parties decided to take up their seats in the assembly. The government has signed a letter of intent with the IMF for a three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, while the 1997/98 budget promises higher growth and lower inflation. New export taxes were introduced on cocoa and coffee, while exports of palm oil have been banned.

Central African Republic Outlook for 1997-98: Peace and stability will remain elusive unless the president, Ange-Félix Patassé, commits himself to agreed reforms of the military. The adoption of structural adjustment policies will also be important, as many of the government's problems with the army and civil service were triggered by complaints over salaries. Donors, however, have little confidence in Mr Patassé, and without their assistance, economic recovery will be all the more difficult.

Review: Tensions between the government and mutinous soldiers have ebbed and flowed in recent months, including reconciliation initiatives, the collapse of the national unity administration and finally a concerted offensive against the rebels by the multinational African peacekeeping force based in Bangui. France indicated its exasperation over events in its former colony by choosing to concentrate defence cuts on its bases in the CAR. While the political turbulence has affected the economy in general and donor confidence in particular, farmers have benefited from improved prices for the CAR's main exports, coffee and cotton. The framework agreements has been signed for an EU aid package for seven countries in the region.

Chad Outlook for 1997-98: At least in the short term, Chad seems set to experience near unprecedented political stability and economic growth. The president, Idriss Déby, has coopted, neutralised or eliminated his most serious rivals and opponents, and can expect to receive further plaudits from the donor community, which is already alive to the opportunities presented by the expected oil boom in a few years' time.

Review: A new government was appointed on May 17. It includes opposition leaders as well as a handful of strategically placed southerners, which should help promote stability. Its technocratic credentials will also please donors. Mr Déby paid a highly successful visit to France in July, his first since seizing power in 1990. The prime minister has set ambitious targets for economic growth, while promising to reduce the budget deficit. A record cotton crop was produced in 1996/97. There has been delay in beginning construction of the oil pipeline to Cameroon because of environmental protests, but the contracts are due to be awarded in September.

Editor: Antony Goldman
All queries: Tel: (44.171) 830 1007 Fax: (44.171) 830 1023

Cameroon

Political structure

Official name	République du Cameroun	
Form of state	Unitary republic	
Legal system	Based on English common law and the Napoleonic Code	
National legislature	National Assembly; 180 members, elected by universal suffrage, sit twice yearly and serve a five-year term	
National elections	October 1992 (presidential) and May 1997 (legislative); next elections due by October 1997 (presidential) and May 2002 (legislative)	
Head of state	President, elected by universal suffrage, may serve a maximum of two five-year terms	
National government	Consists of the prime minister and his Council of Ministers. Includes representatives of the ruling RDPC, the UPC, the MDR and the ANDP. Last reshuffled September 1996	
Main political parties	A law authorising multiparty politics was published in December 1990. There are more than 100 registered parties. The Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC) holds 109 seats in parliament; the Social Democratic Front (SDF) 43 seats; the Union nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès (UNDP) 13 seats; the Union démocratique du Cameroun five seats. Other parties include the Union des populations camerounaises (UPC) and the Mouvement pour la défense de la république (MDR)	
	President	Paul Biya
	Prime minister	Peter Mafany Musonge (RDPC)
	Deputy prime minister, minister of territorial administration	Gilbert Andzé Tsoungui (RDPC)
Ministers of state	Agriculture	Augustin Frédéric Kodock (UPC)
	Information	Augustin Kontchou Koumegni (RDPC)
	Economy & finance	Edouard Akame Mfoumou (RDPC)
	Telecommunications	Dakole Daïssala (MDR)
Key ministers	Foreign relations	Ferdinand Léopold Oyono (RDPC)
	Higher education	Peter Agbor Tabi (RDPC)
	Labour & social insurance	Simon Mbila (UPC)
	Livestock, fisheries & animal husbandry	Hamadjoda Adjoudji (RDPC)
	National education	Robert Mbella Mbappe (RDPC)
	Public service & administrative reforms	Sali Dahirou (RDPC)
	Scientific & technical research	Djingaer Bava (MDR)
	State audit	Joseph Owona (RDPC)
	Trade & industrial development	Justin Ndioro (RDPC)
	Transport	Joseph Tsanga Abanda (RDPC)
BEAC governor	Jean-Félix Mamalepot	

Economic structure

Latest available figures

Economic indicators	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996 ^a
GDP at market prices ^b CFAfr bn	3,103	3,425	4,131	4,571	n/a
Real GDP growth ^b %	-3.2	-2.6	3.3	5.0 ^c	5.0 ^c
Consumer price inflation ^b %	-3.7	12.7	26.9	6.4 ^c	8.0 ^c
Population m	12.2	12.6	12.9	13.2	13.5
Exports fob ^b \$ m	1,934	1,508	1,963 ^c	1,932 ^c	1,890
Imports fob ^b \$ m	983	1,005	1,194 ^c	1,296 ^c	1,200
Current account ^b \$ m	-338	-565	-390 ^c	-568 ^c	-400
Reserves excl gold \$ m	20	2	2	4	3 ^d
Total external debt \$ m	7,349	7,452	8,254	9,350	n/a
External debt-service ratio %	16.4	21.2	17.0	13.3	n/a
Crude oil production '000 b/d	136	132	116	95 ^a	90
Coffee production ^e '000 tons	47.9	75.9	56.7	64.9	n/a
Cocoa production ^f '000 tons	96.0	110.9	109.0	132.0	n/a
Exchange rate (av) CFAfr:\$	264.7	283.2	555.2	499.2	511.6

August 11, 1997 CFAfr626.0:\$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1995 ^b	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 1995 ^b	% of total
Agriculture	33.5	Private consumption	67.8
Industry	21.1	Government consumption	8.3
Manufacturing	10.2	Gross domestic investment	17.9
Services	45.4	Exports of goods & services	23.2
GDP at factor cost	100.0	Imports of goods & services	-17.2
		GDP at market prices	100.0

Principal exports 1995 ^b	\$ m	Principal imports cif 1994 ^{bc}	\$ m
Crude oil	457	Capital goods	190
Timber	239	Food	89
Cocoa	95	Fuel	7
Coffee	93		

Main destinations of exports 1995 ^g	% of total	Main origins of imports 1995 ^g	% of total
France	22	France	42
Italy	15	Belgium-Luxembourg	6
Spain	13	Italy	5
Netherlands	8	USA	4

^a EIU estimates. ^b Fiscal years starting July 1. ^c Official estimates. ^d End-November actual. ^e Crop years starting December 1. ^f Crop years starting October 1. ^g Drawn from partners' trade returns, subject to a wide margin of error.

Outlook for 1997-98

Mr Biya scores two big victories—

The mood will be ebullient in Cameroonian governing circles, with the signing in late July of a letter of intent with the IMF for an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and a big victory at the polls for the ruling party in May's legislative elections. With these two major hurdles now overcome, the only problem facing the president, Paul Biya, is the presidential contest, likely to take place in October. If before then he can succeed in keeping his opponents divided and off-balance, quash any stirrings of a Zairean-style rebellion and continue to perfect the art of electoral manipulation, the Cameroonian leader looks set to win a new and—according to the constitution—final five-year term of office.

—as the ranks of presidential aspirants thin

The fact that the field of presidential contenders is narrowing will also improve Mr Biya's prospects. In June the former cabinet minister, Victor Ayissi Mvodo, a Beti like the president and a defector from the ruling Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC), died. A close associate of Mr Biya, Titus Edzoa, has been imprisoned facing embezzlement charges, while Bello Bouba Maigari's Union nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès (UNDP) put up an extremely poor showing at the legislative polls. This means John Fru Ndi of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) is again likely to emerge as Mr Biya's most serious opponent.

Mr Fru Ndi needs opposition unity—

The dwindling months before the election will, however, prove critical. There is not much time left for Mr Fru Ndi to forge the alliances necessary to propel him to the highest office. It is far from certain that Mr Biya's other opponents will rally behind the SDF leader, even though he represents the best chance of unseating the president, although negotiations have reportedly begun between the SDF and UNDP.

—as the SDF enters parliament—

Mr Fru Ndi appears to have learned some lessons from the past. Having boycotted the previous legislative elections in 1992, the SDF had been confined for the last five years to sniping from the margins of Cameroonian politics. This time, it not only participated in the elections but also took up its 43 seats in the new National Assembly which opened in June, despite widespread allegations of fraud.

—and finds a new platform

SDF representatives now have an official platform from which to promote their cause. Quick to take advantage of their new status, they have already attacked the government's hardline stance on the media and walked out of the presentation of the 1997/98 budget on the grounds that it was "unlawful and unrealistic". It will not be enough, however, merely to attack the government at every turn. The SDF has been unable so far to prove that it can effectively articulate its own position on issues. This has undermined its hopes of being regarded as a credible alternative to the status quo.

Mr Biya holds the tactical advantage—

The other major concern for the opposition will be Mr Biya's proven abilities as a manipulator of his enemies and patron of political favours amongst his supporters. His appointment last year of Peter Mafany Musonge from the

South-west province as prime minister and of the northerner Amadou Ali as secretary-general of the president's office won the RDPC many votes in the legislative contest, which might otherwise have gone to the SDF and the UNDP. Mr Biya is rumoured to be planning to name a new government soon in the hope of garnering similar electoral advantages.

—and will milk the renewed relationship with the IMF

Mr Biya will also seek to capitalise on Cameroon's renewed relationship with the international financial community. After lengthy negotiations, IMF officials finally decided to recommend approval of an ESAF for Cameroon. More than the actual sum of money involved (SDR162m—\$220m), the deal is significant because it symbolises Cameroon's re-entry to the world of international finance and diplomacy. Creditors, bilateral and multilateral, had all but closed the door for nearly a year; and even earlier, relations were at best rocky. In addition to the economic implications of this isolation, there has also been a psychological impact, with Cameroon becoming something of an international pariah.

An ESAF agreement is likely to go ahead—

While it had not been thought likely that an ESAF would be signed before the presidential vote—given the inherent instability and potential for financial laxity in an election year—it appears that domestic politics have proved not to be a prominent consideration for the Bretton Woods institutions; if they were, Cameroon would still be out in the cold, having just emerged from another round of fraud-plagued elections and with the possibility of civil unrest ever present.

—despite uncertainty over commitment to reform

In theory, access to the ESAF should provide a stable economic framework for the next three years. However, ESAF conditions are tougher than those of an IMF stand-by agreement, and Cameroon has four consecutive failed stand-bys under its belt—not a good omen. As one banker put it, the key question is sustainability: whether the government will see the reforms through in the coming months, especially with elections on the horizon. Revenue targets were slightly off in the period leading up to the legislative vote and the presidential election offers offer even wider scope for the politics of patronage. It is therefore possible that the ESAF agreement will not run smoothly.

Debt rescheduling is on the cards—

If the government can meet its macroeconomic targets and keep the reform programme on track, the respectability conferred by the ESAF agreement means it will probably gain renewed external funding from the World Bank and bilateral donors, and could qualify for a rescheduling of its Paris Club debt. However, talks on debt relief are due to take place around the time of the presidential election later this year, and a whole series of political and economic factors could yet prevent an agreement being reached.

—but unrest could derail progress

The threat of violence has been hanging over Cameroon since early in the year, when a series of armed attacks in the North-west province were blamed on the Southern Cameroons National Council, a separatist movement. The incidents were never adequately explained, and there has been much speculation in opposition circles that the government staged the entire affair as a pretext to strengthen security measures in the run-up to legislative elections. Whatever

the truth of the matter, there is discontent bubbling beneath the surface. Widespread perceptions of government-orchestrated fraud at each election stir tensions further. While there are few real signs of the emergence of the kind of rebellion which ultimately brought about the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire, the danger of an explosion remains real.

Socialists in France are not likely to help

In such an event, it is unlikely that the French government will bail Mr Biya out. Although France has a defence agreement with Cameroon, the new Socialist administration of Lionel Jospin has announced it will be reviewing accords with France's former African colonies. Indeed, France has never seemed especially keen on coming to Mr Biya's aid, refusing, for example, to play a more interventionist role on Cameroon's side in its dispute with Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula, where tensions and the potential for renewed conflict remain high.

There could be an improvement in the economy—

Were it not a presidential election year, there might have been cause to revise substantially upwards the EIU's forecast for growth in 1997-98. New infusions of funds from the IMF, World Bank and bilateral donors, and a likely Paris Club rescheduling, will take some pressure off the current account. The government has met a series of tough Fund conditions over the past year and is credited for the first time with a reasonably transparent budgeting process. It has transferred oil receipts to the national budget and used some \$450m to pay off non-reschedulable arrears to official creditors. In the real economy, the volume of non-oil exports continues to grow, led by timber, cocoa and cotton. These are all marked signs of improvement.


—but it remains tenuous

A number of variables could spoil this more positive outlook, however. Cameroon's economic recovery has remained fragile and shallow, heavily dependent on volatile primary commodity exports to fuel growth. The necessary deepening of the process is unlikely to occur in an election year, as investors who are the key to jump-starting sluggish domestic demand remain distinctly cautious. At best, therefore, assuming there are no major upsets due to domestic political instability or failed compliance with the IMF's terms, we can project a moderately increased rate of real GDP growth of 4% for fiscal year (FY) 1997/98, rising to 4.5-5% in FY 1998/99. However, in all his years in power, Mr Biya has proved a poor champion of either sustained growth or stable political and economic management. What Cameroon really needs to enable it to play the role of economic powerhouse in Central Africa is new leadership—a break with the corrupt and inept past represented by Mr Biya and his administration. An opposition victory in the forthcoming presidential election would be a major upset, however, and it is more likely that there will be continuity in both style of government and personnel in the short to medium term. This means there must also be a reasonable chance of a Biya administration again falling out of favour with the IMF and World Bank.

Cameroon: forecast summary

(\$ m unless otherwise indicated; fiscal years beginning July 1)

	1994/95 ^a	1995/96 ^a	1996/97 ^b	1997/98 ^b
Real GDP growth (%)	3.3 ^c	5.0	5.0 ^a	4.0
Consumer price inflation (%)	26.9 ^c	6.4	8.0 ^a	3.0 ^a
Merchandise exports	1,963	1,932	1,890	1,900
of which:				
timber	296	310 ^d	340	350
petroleum	565	375 ^d	380	270
cocoa & coffee beans	235	230 ^d	220	190
Merchandise imports	1,194	1,296	1,200	1,250
Current-account balance	-390	-568	-400	-300
Average exchange rate (CFAfr:\$)	518.6	501.8	594.0	623.0

^a Official estimates. ^b EIU forecasts. ^c Actual. ^d EIU estimate.

Review

The political scene

The RDPC wins the legislative elections—

As predicted, Cameroon's May 17 legislative elections were fraught with irregularities and much criticised by foreign observers and domestic opposition groups. Official results gave another resounding victory to the ruling Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC). Taking 109 of the 180 seats in the National Assembly—up from 88—the RDPC now has a clear parliamentary majority and can dispense with coalition partners. In the old assembly, the RDPC had found it necessary to form an alliance with a much smaller party, the Mouvement pour la défense de la république (MDR), to ensure its majority. Its success also gives the party a strengthened edge against its opponents as the critical presidential election nears in October.

—but the SDF plans to fight from within—

In 1992 the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), boycotted the election and found itself left on the political margins and labelled a

sectarian movement. In this May's contest, however, the SDF played its cards differently, entering into the electoral fray and winning 43 seats—well below what it might have scored had the vote been free and fair. The SDF seats, together with those of other parties, brings the opposition a combined total of 71. Now “fighting the system from within”, as its leader John Fru Ndi put it, the SDF will be a noisy player on the political stage in the months leading up to the presidential election. The National Assembly will provide it with a new, more prominent platform to conduct its campaign against the RDPC.

—as violent tensions build

The president, Paul Biya, may feel slightly more secure after his party's controversial election victory. Nevertheless his position still rests less on democratic legitimacy than on the threat or actual use of strong-armed security force tactics, harassment of the opposition, muzzling of the independent press and fraudulent electoral practices. The recent turn of events in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) must be instructive. Indeed, dire forecasts of a repeat of the Zairean experience have consumed the opposition press: pro-opposition writer Mongo Beti warned: “There will be a Kabila in Cameroon in the next two to three years.” Even the moderately pro-Biya French bi-weekly magazine *Jeune Afrique* raised the spectre of insurrection in a cover story entitled, “Is it Cameroon's turn?”—which, the magazine concluded, it was not.

Pressures mount during
campaigning—

There is no doubt a certain amount of hyperbole in these predictions. For despite a restive opposition and blatant electoral machinations by the RDPC, the legislative elections passed off in relative peace. From early April, when, after repeated delays, the May 17 election date was finally announced, concern had been expressed by the opposition and foreign observers about the likelihood of fraud, given the government's past record in election tampering. Tensions ran high, with a dusk-to-dawn curfew in the anglophone opposition stronghold, North-west province, following a series of armed attacks in late March which left more than 10 people dead (2nd quarter 1997, pages 10-11). Mr Fru Ndi had characterised the incidents as a government ploy to prevent the holding of normal elections in the province.

—in the absence of an
independent electoral
commission

Some 2,000 candidates representing 45 political parties contested the vote, although only the RDPC was able to present candidates in all parts of the country. The absence of a fully independent electoral commission to monitor the vote provoked the loudest of a long list of complaints by opposition groups and donors, concerned over the integrity and legitimacy of the process. Instead, the Ministry of Territorial Administration under the powerful Gilbert Andzé Tsoungui—notorious in opposition circles for his alleged role in malpractices in the January 1996 municipal elections—was in charge of organising and supervising the vote. The government also refused offers by donors to train a force of Cameroonian electoral observers. The RDPC campaign director, Fonkam Azu'u, frankly acknowledged the scale of the problem: “There is no election organised without some amount of relative pilfering. We don't have angels running Cameroon.”

Irregularities are
rampant—

As with the 1996 municipal poll, there were irregularities, intimidation and fraud before, during and after the vote. During the two-week campaign period,

at least seven people died in clashes, five in Mayo-Rey in an incident involving soldiers of the Rey Bouba, the powerful northern traditional leader, and supporters of the opposition Union nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès (UNDP), led by Bello Bouba Maigari. Scores of others were detained. The RDPC made good use of its cultivation of traditional chiefs by placing polling stations near their homes. The Rey Bouba went so far as to use soldiers to prevent opposition members from entering his territory. The leader of the Hausa community at Obala, near the capital, Yaoundé, refused to distribute voters' cards to suspected opposition supporters.

—and publicly condemned
by foreign observers

A team of Commonwealth observers issued a report criticising several aspects of the conduct of the election. It said there were large discrepancies in the numbers of voters per constituency, that electoral rolls were incomplete and registration had been strictly limited, and that there were delays in the distribution of electoral registration cards and ballot papers. The SDF alleged that 20 of its supporters were badly beaten by security forces in Yaoundé when they tried to force officials to give them voting cards. A heavy security operation went into effect just prior to the May 17 vote, with land and sea borders sealed, travel between towns banned, and bars and places of entertainment closed on election day. Some people were able to vote twice, others not at all. Local electoral commission observers belonging to opposition parties were chased out of polling stations and access was blocked to polling booths. Hundreds of fictitious polling stations, as well as ballot boxes stuffed with ruling party papers, were said to have been uncovered. "The organisation of these elections leaves a lot to be desired," said Christine Desouches, coordinator of an observer team from the French Agence de co-opération culturelle et technique.

The opposition calls for
annulment of results—

Two days after the vote, the SDF and UNDP called for an annulment of the elections, alleging massive rigging. Three days later, troops were sent to the south-western town of Kumba, 80 miles from Yaoundé, after three SDF supporters were killed, according to the party, by "thugs loyal to local barons of the RDPC". The homes of the men had been attacked after officials at the supervision commission refused to sign returns which showed the RDPC winning in Kumba. The government, meanwhile, denied that the violence had taken place.

—while Mr Biya's strategy
succeeds

Mr Biya's strategy since the January 1996 local elections had been to strengthen alliances with the populous Far North and the South-west province, while conceding the North-west as lost to Mr Fru Ndi. It paid off. All the SDF's seats came from the North-west and West, while the Far North, from whence hails Mr Biya's secretary-general of the president's office, Amadou Ali, gave the overwhelming majority of their votes to the RDPC. The Sawas from the South-west and Littoral provinces also went solidly for the RDPC, in a pattern widely linked to the appointment of a local, Peter Mafany Musonge, as prime minister last September.

Results are announced
three weeks later—

Police used truncheons to disperse demonstrators outside the Supreme Court building in Yaoundé when the election results were finally announced on June 6, three weeks after the vote. During the demonstrations, 13 SDF members and supporters were arrested. The official results gave 109 seats to the RDPC, 43

to the SDF—although tallies by independent newspapers gave the latter 97, a clear majority—13 to the UNDP (down from 68 in the previous assembly), the Union démocratique du Cameroun five and three small parties one each. Results for seven seats in three constituencies were declared null and void owing to “severe irregularities and massive fraud”, the Supreme Court announcement said.

Cameroon: representation in the National Assembly
(seats held by the parties)

	1997	1992
Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC)	109	88
Social Democratic Front (SDF)	43	0
Union national pour la démocratie et le progrès (UNDP)	13	68
Union démocratique du Cameroun	5	0
Others	10	24

Source: Local newspapers.

—while the opposition discusses cooperation

The leaders of the SDF and UNDP met in mid-July for talks “to evaluate the socio-political situation ... especially after the bad experience of the recent legislative elections”, in the words of the participants. Discussions reportedly centred on cooperating to ensure opposition victories in seven seats where elections had to be held again because of irregularities. The talks also fuelled speculation about a new initiative to reach agreement on a single opposition candidate to contest the October presidential election. Pressure on opposition leaders to put aside personality and ideological differences to present a united front in October has mounted following the RDPC’s relatively strong performance in the legislative elections. With the poor showing of Mr Maigari’s UNDP and the death in June from a pulmonary embolism of the presidential hopeful Victor Ayissi Mvodo—a potentially strong candidate from the same ethnic group as the president, who had recently broken with the RDPC—the field seems to have narrowed to Mr Fru Ndi.

A former Biya associate is arrested —

Another declared candidate, the former health minister, secretary-general to the president’s office and close associate of Mr Biya, Titus Edzoa, was placed under house arrest and had his passport seized in June. He was then arrested in early July for alleged embezzlement of public funds while serving in government. He had resigned his government post and announced his candidacy for the presidency in May. While he was already under investigation for mismanagement of the Committee on Road Projects, his involvement in the liquidation of the Bank of Credit and Commerce was the ostensible cause for his arrest. But the hidden agenda may have been an effort to discredit and silence Mr Edzoa before the presidential campaign begins in earnest. Running for office against his former close ally had fuelled rumours about the revelations Mr Edzoa could make, if so inclined, about the inner workings of Etoudi Palace.

—as he makes revelations

The public received an idea of the danger Mr Edzoa poses to ruling circles when, in a long interview with the French magazine *L’Expression*, the former Biya confidant alleged that CFAfr1.5bn (\$2.4m) from an EU fund established to aid Cameroonian farmers had been diverted by the government, some of it to pay for a favourable article in the French magazine, *Jeune Afrique Economie*. The EU delegate to Cameroon, Friedrich Nagel, issued an immediate denial,

claiming that the fund was well managed. The issue of *L'Expression* carrying the interview was seized from news-stands by the security forces.

Mr Fru Ndi seeks to project a new image

Announcing that his party was sending its members to the assembly “to open up a new front there in the struggle for freedom”, the SDF leader told a news conference on June 19—the opening day of the new assembly—that he wanted to present a different image of his party, which had been accused of many evils, such as fomenting destruction and insurrection. Mr Fru Ndi said his party had no plans to create a militia as the ruling party had done, but intended to achieve power through democratic means. But he maintained that what he called the “Mobutu effect” and other recent events elsewhere in Central Africa had shown that patience had its limits. It is possible that it was just such fears that caused Mr Biya to stay at home from the June summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Mr Biya’s absence marked the first time in the organisation’s history that a head of state failed to relinquish the OAU chairmanship in person to his successor, in this case the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe. Coming just weeks after Cameroon’s own, controversial legislative elections, Mr Biya’s handover speech, read by his prime minister, called on Africans to forge a democratic culture “to enable people to take part in shaping the democratic process in their country”.

The government threatens the media—

In early July, the information minister, Augustin Kontchou Koumegni, withdrew press accreditation for the local Radio France International correspondent, David Ndathe Tagne. The minister had warned journalists accredited to cover the elections against the “manipulation and intoxication of international opinion”. Noting that the press conference he was presiding over was the “first warning” against diffusing “false news”, Mr Kontchou reminded the media of the “panoply of measures” available under the Penal Code to deal with infractions by the press. He singled out for criticism an unnamed “certain international radio station” for its reports on the post-election violence in Kumba.

—while arrests and bannings continue

Meanwhile, harassment of the independent media has continued. The weekly newspaper *Mutation* was banned for three weeks in late June, and in May, the director of the independent daily, *Révélation*, Bosco Tchoubet, was arrested. The director of the *Indépendent-Hebdo* was also being held, for “divulging military secrets” and inciting rebellion. The publishing manager of *Le Procès*, a weekly, was sentenced to one year in prison for libel.

The economy

An ESAF is to be approved—

After four failed stand-by programmes with the IMF, it appears likely that the government will finally succeed in reaching agreement over a long-awaited Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). During a visit by a Fund team in late July, the Cameroon government signed a letter of intent committing itself to a series of reforms in return for which it is expected to receive a three-year ESAF, running to the year 2000, reportedly worth SDR162m (\$220m). The agreement is likely to be approved at the IMF Executive Board meeting on August 20. Among the major elements of the medium-term economic programme laid out in the letter of intent are an economic growth rate

averaging at least 5% over the next three years, annual inflation held to 3% and a budget deficit reduced to 2% of GDP.

—which is good news for
Mr Biya

There could be no better news for Mr Biya's government, especially as the presidential election approaches. After nearly a year without access to external financing, the ruling party will now be able to point to having finally broken the IMF impasse. Agreement over the ESAF will encourage other donors and should clear the way for additional external flows, for example, the unblocking of World Bank structural adjustment lending. "The effects of signing the letter of intent are immediate," explained Cameroon's finance minister, Edouard Akame Mfoumou. He said that within two weeks of the ESAF formally being ratified, he expected the World Bank to release two \$50m tranches of its suspended Structural Adjustment Loan, as well as a supplemental International Development Association (IDA) credit of \$25m. France will also release \$32m, according to the finance minister.

Paris Club rescheduling is
likely

The ESAF will permit a possible rescheduling of around \$6bn of Cameroon's official bilateral debt, on Naples terms, by its Paris Club creditors. This will provide some relief for a government which has a total external debt that is expected to rise to \$10.5bn by the end of 1997. Scheduled debt service for the fiscal year (FY) 1996/97 (July/June) was a hefty CFAfr540bn (\$980m), equivalent to 75% of budget revenue. This posed a serious constraint on growth, which according to EIU estimates averaged 3.5% in FY 1996/97. With the ESAF and some Paris Club relief, Cameroon's external debt could be reduced by \$200m by the end of 1998, but it remains unsustainable in the medium term. The government has been able to pay off a not inconsequential amount of \$450m in non-reschedulable arrears to official creditors in recent months—an IMF condition—doing so by using oil revenues which in the past had been kept in extra-budgetary accounts.

Finance officials are
praised over the ESAF
agreement—

Much credit for winning over the IMF has gone to Mr Mfoumou, a Biya confidant who tenaciously pushed through the required reforms and has championed transparency in economic governance. His stewardship may have been the key to mending relations with the IMF and World Bank. IMF officials were reported to have been impressed that, in a major change from the past, the government's economic team was anxious to negotiate a relatively modest programme which could realistically be implemented. Previously, far more ambitious commitments had been made, but, as four failed stand-by agreements demonstrated, targets were quickly missed. First, Mr Mfoumou saw to it that a range of IMF conditions were met. No new external arrears accrued, while the primary budget balance was kept to a surplus of 7-8% of GDP. Demands to improve revenue collection—a constant Fund concern—including personal taxes, turnover tax and customs dues, were also met. This was attributed to the imposition of better discipline on the system, although revenue fell off slightly in May, perhaps as a consequence of distractions associated with the legislative elections. Payments of Paris Club and multilateral arrears were also made. It was expected that, in addition, an outstanding \$200m in non-reschedulable debt to official creditors would be cleared—a prerequisite for a Paris Club rescheduling, expected in September or October. Other conditions for the ESAF agreement

which were met included an increase in petrol prices (see below), the transfer of oil receipts to the national budget, the liquidation of the scandal-ridden local bank, *Crédit agricole du Cameroun* (CAC) and the adoption of an FY 1997/98 budget in line with the IMF's medium-term programme.

—as a new and prudent budget is passed—

The newly elected National Assembly approved the budget in mid-July—already into the new fiscal year—despite a walkout by the SDF, which called the budget unlawful and unrealistic. The presentation of the new budget, which provides for a 13% increase in overall spending on the previous year, had been delayed until July 4 because of the postponement of the legislative elections from March to May. The FY 1996/97 budget, therefore, had to be extended a month by presidential decree. The prime minister told the National Assembly that the government intended to balance the budget at CFAfr1,256.75bn (\$2bn). He highlighted a large increase in spending for education—up to CFAfr95bn from CFAfr55bn. An increase in public-sector spending was among IMF demands, as was the raising of fuel prices by an average 7.2%. The cost of a litre of top-grade petrol increases by CFAfr20 to CFAfr380, while diesel is up from CFAfr275 to CFAfr295. The new budget is considered broadly consistent with what the IMF had advised in the areas of revenue mobilisation, transparency and increased expenditure on health, education and infrastructure. The budget targets a GDP growth rate of 5.5% for the coming fiscal year and an inflation rate of 3%, down from 8% in FY 1996/97.

—despite opposition criticism

The SDF finance commission's vice-chairman, Fopoussi Fotso, described the budget as a propaganda exercise to promote an official GDP growth rate estimate of 5% which he said was wilfully over-optimistic. However, the IMF and other donors have produced similar figures to those of the government, indicating that there has been an improvement in the real economy, with real GDP growth of 5% for FY 1996/97 which ended in June, led by increased volumes of non-oil exports. The IMF also forecasts a minimum 5% rate of growth for the coming fiscal year.

The government woos investors—

However, there appears to be recognition in government circles that without a significant increase in domestic and foreign private investment, there is little chance of Cameroon exceeding what has been a fairly stable, but not spectacular, rate of growth since the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994. The prime minister has been actively wooing the domestic business community, while on June 10-13 the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the Ministry of Trade and Industrial Development sponsored a Cameroon Investors' Forum in Yaoundé. On offer was a portfolio of 51 investment proposals in agro-industry, textiles, leather goods, wood and paper products, chemical and pharmaceutical products, building materials, metal products, and tourism. The aim, said UNIDO, was to promote business cooperation agreements between foreign partners and Cameroonian entrepreneurs, as well as the establishment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises. According to *Jeune Afrique Economie*, although only 29 entrepreneurs from outside Cameroon attended, 17 pre-contracts were signed at an estimated value of CFAfr10bn. In addition, the Forum provided the government with an opportunity to raise

Cameroon's profile as an attractive investment prospect, which could help facilitate the process of overcoming investor caution.

Agriculture and forestry

- A new agribusiness deal is struck— A recent agreement deal between Société Pelenget, a Cameroonian company based in Bamenda, and American Chemical Export Corporation (ACE), based in Deerfield, Illinois, may provide a boost to Cameroonian agriculture. The deal licenses the Cameroonian firm to package and market ACE's fertilisers and other chemicals locally. One of ACE's products is a spray, for use on cocoa, coffee, mangoes and tomatoes, effective against blackpod disease. ACE said in May that if the company's products were well received by Cameroonian farmers, it would set up an agro-chemicals industry to serve the Central African region. The agriculture minister, Augustin Frédéric Kodock, confirmed that Cameroonian farmers lose over 60,000 tons of cocoa, with an estimated annual value of \$28m, as a result of disease and improper handling.
- while export taxes on cocoa and coffee are applied Cameroon remains dependent on cocoa and coffee exports to fuel growth. An official statement in late July indicated that the government would apply cocoa and coffee export taxes of CFAfr3,500 (\$5.75) per ton from around the end of August. In addition, a CFAfr850 per ton contribution to Cameroon's Inter-professional Cocoa and Coffee Council and another CFAfr1,500 per ton to the international cocoa and coffee organisations will also be levied. Cameroon exported 98,736 tons of cocoa between October 1996 and March 1997 against 91,611 tons in the same period the previous year.
- Quality control improvements are promised— The government has recently pledged to tackle quality problems which followed the liberalisation of internal and external marketing of cocoa and coffee in 1991 as part of donor-sponsored reforms. The liberalisation increased the number of inexperienced and unregulated exporters and buyers and put pressure on farmers to harvest crops earlier and skimp on fermenting and drying times. Farmers have also complained of poor access to finance for labour costs and crop treatment, while customers have been unhappy with product quality.
- as coffee and cotton output increase The specialist journal *International Coffee Report*, published by the industry analyst F O Licht, forecasts that Cameroon's coffee production will exceed 1m bags in 1996/97, up from 870,000 bags in 1995/96. A record cotton crop is forecast for the 1996/97 crop year—235,000 tons on 194,000 hectares. Further ahead, however, the prospects for commercial agriculture appear less encouraging. The UK trading house, E D & F Man, expects changing weather patterns to bring poor rains to West and Central Africa in 1998 which should reduce coffee and cocoa output. So the gains from increased production and higher world prices this year are likely to prove short-term.
- Palm oil exports are halted— The minister of trade, Justin Ndioro, announced in late July that the government was halting exports of palm oil in order to guarantee supplies to the domestic market. Cameroon normally produces about 220,000 tons of palm oil per year, 60,000 tons of which is consumed locally. It is the major supplier of palm oil to five neighbouring countries—Central African Republic, Chad,

Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Government officials say the export ban followed reports that opposition parties were trying to create an artificial shortage to raise prices and create discontent in the run-up to the presidential election later this year. Before the last presidential contest in 1992, speculators had interfered with the domestic market to such an extent that there was indeed a shortage of basic consumer goods.

—and Asia becomes a major timber importer

Figures published by Société générale de surveillance (SGS), contracted by the government to monitor the performance of the management of Cameroon's ports and customs authorities, indicate that timber exports increased by 56% between November and December 1996, from 85,320 cu metres to 133,788 cu metres. Total timber exports monitored by the SGS reached 1.26m cu metres in 1996, an 8% increase over the previous year. More than half was exported to Europe. Trade with Asia, which officially accounted for 37% of Cameroon's timber output, is, however, growing rapidly. The London-based newsletter, *Africa Analysis*, alleges that one Malaysian company alone was illegally exporting more than 30,000 cu metres of timber a month via a specially constructed harbour. The World Bank has reportedly urged the finalisation of new forestry regulations to curb what it calls the "aggressive behaviour" of Asian firms. Environmentalists have also raised concerns about current levels of exploitation of Cameroon's forests.

Energy and industry

Work on the Chad-Cameroon pipeline is finally to begin—

The acting energy minister, Jean-Baptiste Bokam, said in mid-July that final agreement had been reached between the governments of Chad and Cameroon over the long-delayed construction of an 1,100-km oil pipeline from the Doba oil fields in land-locked Chad to the Cameroonian port of Kribi, expressing the hope that construction work might begin as early as August. His optimism was not, however, shared by his Chadian colleagues (see Chad: The economy). Exxon and Royal Dutch Shell will each hold a 34.6% stake in the project, with France's Elf Aquitaine taking 17.3%, the Chad government 5% and Cameroon's National Hydrocarbon Company 8.5%. The partners are looking for additional funding from international financial institutions. The project area is said to contain about 900m barrels of recoverable reserves.

—while environmentalists protest

The original framework agreement for the project was signed in January 1995. In May of this year, the Chadian president, Idriss Déby, laid part of the blame for the delay in beginning construction on environmentalist groups which have lobbied the French government to veto World Bank plans to fund the project. It is estimated that some \$3bn in external assistance is needed to exploit the oil reserves, with an additional \$2bn required for the pipeline.

Central African Republic

Political structure

Official name	République centrafricaine	
Form of state	Unitary republic	
Legal system	Based on 1986 constitution	
National legislature	National Assembly, 85 members elected by universal suffrage serve a five-year term	
National elections	August-September 1993 (presidential and legislative); next elections due by August-September 1998 (legislative) and 1999 (presidential)	
Head of state	President, elected by universal suffrage to serve a six-year term	
National government	The prime minister (nominated by the president) and his nominated Council of Ministers; the government is dominated by the MLPC. Last cabinet reshuffle: February 1, 1997	
Main political parties	The presidential majority includes: Mouvement pour la libération du peuple centrafricain (MLPC); Parti libéral démocrate (PLD); Convention nationale (CN); Mouvement d'évolution sociale de l'Afrique noire (MESAN) and the Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain (RDC). The seven member parties of the opposition alliance Conseil démocratique de l'opposition centrafricaine (Codepo) include: Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès (ADP); Front patriotique pour le progrès (FPP); Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement (MDD, formerly Mouvement David Dacko)	
	President	Ange-Félix Patassé (MLPC)
	Prime minister	Michel Gbezera-Bria
	Minister of state for foreign affairs	Jean Mette Yapende (MLPC)
Key ministers	Defence, army reform & veterans	Pascal Kado (MLPC)
	Economic reform, planning & cooperation	Christophe M'Breemaïdou (CN)
	Education	Albert Mberio (MLPC)
	Environment, water, forestry, fisheries & hunting	Joseph Gnomba (MDREC)
	Family & social affairs	Eliane Mokodopo (MESAN)
	Finance & budget	Anicet Georges Dologuele (MLPC)
	Health & population	Fernand Djengbot (ind centrist)
	Human rights & democratic culture	Laurent Gomina Pampali (RDC)
	Justice	Marcel Metefara (MLPC)
	Mining & energy	Joseph Agbo (MLPC)
	Post & telecommunications	Michel Bindo (RDC)
	Public works & infrastructure	Jacquesson Mazette (MLPC)
	Security & regional administration	General François N'Djadder Bedaya (MLPC)
BEAC governor	Jean-Félix Mamalepot	

Economic structure

Latest available figures

Economic indicators	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
GDP at market prices CFAfr bn	365	354	483	582	n/a
Real GDP growth %	-2.6	2.6	3.9	4.7	n/a
Consumer price inflation %	-1.4	-2.9	24.6	19.4	n/a
Population m	3.08	3.16	3.30	3.40	3.50
Exports fob \$ m	116	133	146	181	n/a
Imports fob \$ m	189	158	131	176	n/a
Current account \$ m	-83	-13	-25	-9	n/a
Reserves excl gold \$ m	100	112	210	234	236 ^a
Total external debt \$ m	814	873	824	944	n/a
External debt-service ratio %	9.3	5.0	13.0	6.8	n/a
Diamond production '000 carats	414	495	529	484	n/a
Seed cotton production ^b '000 tons	12.0	15.9	27.5	32.0 ^c	n/a
Timber production '000 cu metres	211	311	299	326	n/a
Exchange rate (av) CFAfr:\$	264.7	283.2	555.2	499.2	511.6

August 11, 1997 CFAfr626.0:\$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1995	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 1995	% of total
Agriculture	46.5	Private consumption	80.4
Industry	13.3	Government consumption	12.0
Services	40.2	Gross domestic investment	14.6
GDP at factor cost	100.0	Exports of goods & services	20.4
		Imports of goods & services	-27.4
		GDP at market prices	100.0

Principal exports 1995	\$ m	Principal imports 1995 ^c	\$ m
Diamonds	92	Miscellaneous	129
Coffee	29	Capital goods	31
Timber	28	Fuel & energy	16
Cotton	23		

Main destinations of exports 1995 ^d	% of total	Main origins of imports 1995 ^d	% of total
Belgium-Luxembourg	40	France	37
France	16	Japan	24
Zaire	1	Cameroon	6
Congo	1	Germany	4

^a End-November. ^b Crop years starting December 1. ^c Official estimates. ^d Drawn from partners' trade returns, subject to a wide margin of error.

Outlook for 1997-98

Army reform and careful budgeting will be crucial to peace

The prospects for durable reconciliation between rebels and the regime of the president, Ange-Félix Patassé, will depend crucially on the latter's willingness to allow the long-promised reforms that can restore the credibility of government and create a sense of national cohesion. Mr Patassé must show that he is prepared to allow proper implementation of the recommendations of last year's conference on the role of the military. This means breaking with his past tendency to rely on loyalist troops from his home area in the north-west and accepting the principle of an army recruited on purely professional and technical lines. In the long term, this would imply a much reduced role for the presidential guard. Mr Patassé will also need to allow the technocrats in government to take control of budgets and concentrate on getting the finances of both central government and parastatal companies in order. Unless the state finances are run in a way that regains the confidence of aid donors and ensures a reliable stream of tax revenue, the government will be sure to run into financial problems again. Without money, it will be unable to pay the army on time and the risk of mutiny, and industrial unrest among civil servants, will remain. While the instability of the past year is directly attributable to the readiness of some soldiers to resort to rebellion and robbery, the fundamental causes lie in Mr Patassé's failure to ensure stable and competent economic management, highlighted by his political dependence on ethnic and factional loyalties in politics. In spite of the hard lessons of the past year, there must be doubts over whether Mr Patassé is able or willing to change his style. Nor are the prospects for competent moderation enhanced by the readiness of opposition leaders such as Abel Goumba to opt for confrontation rather than statesmanlike compromise.

Bangui is a testbed for French Socialist policy—

The parallel crises in the CAR and neighbouring Congo have encouraged the new French Socialist government to press ahead with the promised rethink of its Africa policy, particularly with regard to defence issues. The CAR will be one of the countries most affected by the reforms, both because it is a strategic linchpin of French military operations in Africa and because it has often been treated as a private backyard, where Paris felt free to intervene in much the same way as US governments used to do in the small states of Central America. Under the former president, François Mitterrand, the Socialists, in spite of their left-wing credentials, did little to change this approach. But, since taking over the party leadership in the wake of his unexpectedly strong performance in the 1995 presidential election, Lionel Jospin has shifted party policy in a decisively reformist direction. Now, following the Socialists' surprise victory in the recent parliamentary elections, he is prime minister. The way he shapes France's future role in the CAR will have special significance because it was over this issue that he broke with the cross-party consensus in January this year, with blazing criticism of the frontal attack by French troops on the rebels in Bangui. France should not, he said, "combine interference with impotence".


—as a military base closes

Already the Socialists are reviewing France's military presence in Africa, with a view to making big forces cuts (see The political scene). At the beginning of August, the defence minister, Alain Richard, confirmed earlier leaks indicating

the closure of one of the two French bases in the CAR at Bouar in the west of the country, where the presence of foreign troops has long been a source of local tension. The second base, in Bangui, will be scaled back, while a presence at the M'poko air base will be maintained. Reform of the political aspect of relations will be more difficult in the case of the CAR. The reformist pre-election programme drafted by the Socialist Party's Africa secretary, Guy Labertit, promises a "new partnership with the Africa of young democrats" and a break with the "politics of networks [*réseaux*] and clientelism", a specific reference to the system of personal contacts developed over decades by Jacques Foccart, the veteran Africa adviser to Gaullist presidents—including the current incumbent, Jacques Chirac—who died earlier this year. French relations with the CAR and Gabon have long been seen as epitomising the network system. In the CAR, however, France has faced the difficult choice of how far to go in supporting Mr Patassé, who has proved to be neither a successful economic manager nor a credible, consensus-building national leader, but who was nevertheless elected in conditions generally accepted as reasonably free and fair. Last year, the then right-wing government in Paris tried to support a reformist prime minister in the CAR, Jean-Paul Ngoupande, but he was elbowed aside by Mr Patassé. The Socialists' new line is unlikely to have much effect in the short term over such dilemmas. In the longer term, though, it may begin to change the climate, giving reassurance of more active French support to reformist democratic African leaders and distancing Paris from association with authoritarian strongmen or corrupt incompetents.

A regional electronic stock market is on the cards

There is growing expectation that the Central African Franc Zone will follow the lead set by its West African counterpart in preparing the establishment of a regional stock market, based on electronic screen-based trading. This would allow local companies in the CAR, which is probably too small an economy to support a stock exchange of its own, to raise capital through the equity market. The exchange would also provide a mechanism for government to sell shares in parastatals to a broad range of private investors, local and foreign. It would in addition help to soak up the excess liquidity in the region, estimated at CFAfr160bn (\$256m) by one expert. At the moment, surplus capital tends to be transferred out of Central Africa, or invested in relatively unproductive sectors, such as real estate. Local firms frequently have great difficulty in obtaining loans from banks at affordable interest rates; the equity market could offer them a fresh avenue, where they might be able to raise funds at lower cost. Brokers in each country would be linked electronically. There would be no central open outcry floor, just a central computer operation through which all the trades would pass. The operation could be set up at relatively low cost. The two serious candidates for the home of the central technical and regulatory institutions of a regional bourse are Gabon and Cameroon. While advocates of the scheme speak with great optimism, it is at best a prospect for the medium and long term.



Review

The political scene

Real peace remains elusive—

Durable stability remains an elusive prospect in the Central African Republic. It is now clear that the wave of mutinies which began more than a year ago tapped into much wider ethnic and political antagonisms than the initial complaints about pay and conditions might have suggested. An originally narrow dispute involving just a few hundred people has become the expression of a generalised disenchantment with the president, Ange-Félix Patassé, and his failure to bring about steady economic growth and prosperity. Recent months have brought persistent reminders of the fragility of a peace accord built around the award of ministerial portfolios to officers sympathetic to the grievances of the mutineers. On April 12 the defence minister, Pascal Kado, only escaped a kidnap attempt by armed men in Bangui's Kouanga district thanks to the resistance put up by his aide de camp. Just days earlier, newspaper claims that the rebel leaders, Captain Anicet Saulet and Lieutenant Parfait Mbaye, might be bribed into accepting exile provoked outbursts of firing from their Kassai barracks stronghold. Both men, and the African mediator in the CAR, the respected former Malian head of state, General Amadou Toumani Touré, denied the claims. Meanwhile, some rebel soldiers complained that they were not being properly consulted about the timetable for their reintegration into the armed forces, while Mr Patassé, in a private meeting with fellow heads of state at regional summit of the Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale (UDEAC) regional summit in Brazzaville on April 9, accused "certain circles in France" of trying to destabilise his regime.

—despite initial optimism—

The following days saw useful progress towards reducing tensions. For example, on April 23 there was a reconciliation meal between rebels and the Chadian peacekeepers whom they had attacked in March. On April 28 the junior minister responsible for army reform and a rebel sympathiser, General Didier Ndayen, announced a detailed timetable for reintegration of the

mutineers into regular military units: the process would last until May 16, and a specific date was given for each unit's integration. The rebel spokesman, Parfait Mbaye, indicated agreement with this timetable; indeed, some soldiers had already returned to barracks (2nd quarter 1997, page 29). According to one opinion poll, 86% of the population thought that Mr Patassé's policy towards the rebels would encourage reconciliation, while 62% regarded the coalition administration of Michel Gbezera-Bria, the prime minister, as fundamentally a "good government".

—as tensions persist and violence returns

Continuing unease in Bangui was, however, only too evident. In the current mood of suspicion and uncertainty, the moves towards compromise and reintegration were not enough to stabilise a fundamentally unstable situation. Lieutenant Mbaye claimed that his men were still being threatened and harassed by the Patassé loyalists of the presidential guard. April 30 brought a hint of troubles to come, with the murder of a senior presidential security guard. A former rebel was arrested over the killing, provoking other mutineers into briefly re-erecting street barricades until the authorities conceded his release on bail. Then, on May 3, the barricades went up again in south-western districts of Bangui around Petevo—a rebel stronghold—after government forces shot dead three mutineers, who had apparently been disarmed by peacekeepers of the Mission inter-africaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui (MISAB). Lieutenant Mbaye dismissed fears that mutineers were planning an attack on central Bangui and called for calm. His stance gave the distinct impression that he and Captain Saulet were no longer in effective control of many of the rebels. The discipline and sense of common purpose evident among the mutineers in earlier months seemed to have crumbled, and the leadership were clearly no longer able to prevent random acts of violence and robbery by many of the discontented troops.

The opposition coalition withdraws from the government—

Mr Patassé's office did its best to maintain calm and defuse the threat of resurgent violence. A presidency spokesman assured the rebels that those who had killed three of their comrades would not go unpunished. Opposition political parties opted for a more confrontational stance. On May 5 members of the so-called G11 alliance headed by Abel Goumba—who lost the 1993 presidential contest to Mr Patassé—suspended their membership of the governing coalition in protest at the deaths of the three mutineers. The G11 had held nine of the 26 ministerial portfolios in the Gbezera-Bria government. Mr Goumba, whose own Front patriotique pour le progrès (FPP) has been one of the most hardline opponents of Mr Patassé, accused the government of using the state security and intelligence services as "instruments of repression and crime". He called for the closure of some of these agencies. Only four G11 parties had held government posts: the FPP, the Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès (ADP), the Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement (MDD, founded by the former president, David Dacko) and the Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain (RDC, led by another former head of state, André Kolingba, and the party closest to the mutineers). But these parties were the heart of hardline opposition to Mr Patassé. Their entry into government was a crucial achievement for Mr Gbezera-Bria; their withdrawal effectively ended his claims to be leading a government of national unity. However, the impact

of the G11 move was dampened by the lack of public response to its call for a protest strike in Bangui on May 6, in contrast to a widely observed strike over salary arrears a few days later. Clearly, many workers saw the G11 action as little more than a spiteful attempt to gain party advantage from the killing of the mutineers. Mr Gbezera-Bria speeded the return to partisan squabbling by treating the G11 suspension of government membership as a definitive resignation, and promising a reshuffle to replace the G11 ministers, which only served to anger the opposition even more. Each side appeared anxious to blame the other for the collapse of the Bangui accords, the political compromise agreed in January in a bid to restore peace to the CAR. On May 19 the junior ministers appointed to represent mutineer interests, General Ndayen and Lieutenant Evariste-Martial Konzale, also resigned from government.

—despite public pressure
for compromise

The party leaders' politicking inspired increasing frustration among the ordinary citizens of Bangui. The former president, David Dacko, so often a figure of moderate commonsense in Central African politics, called for calm in an interview with the Libreville-based Africa No 1 radio station on May 22, and appealed to the G11 ministers to return to government. He argued that the ministers should have registered their anger over the killing of the three rebels simply by staging a public walk-out from a cabinet meeting, rather than by pulling out altogether. "I think that if we change the composition of a government after two months, it projects an image of instability and a lack of seriousness to our foreign partners," Mr Dacko declared. These views seemed to be shared by many ordinary voters. Two days later, several hundred women marked Mother's Day by marching through the centre of Bangui calling for an end to fighting. They also urged the unions, which have staged several strikes, to work for peace in the workplace, and called on politicians to save the national unity government.

The government claims
Mobutuists have joined
the rebels

On May 22, two days after the government recognised Laurent Kabila's new regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), officials claimed that refugees loyal to the ousted president, Mobutu Sese Seko, had fled across the Oubangui river and joined the forces of the army mutineers, an accusation promptly denied by the rebels. According to Mr Patassé's office, the rebels were recruiting foreigners in Petevo and Ouango (two Bangui districts under rebel control) and in Mobaye, which is just over the border from Gbadolite, the home village of the former Zairean president. Certainly, some 5,000-10,000 refugees from the former Zaire, and from Burundi, have fled into the CAR, where they have been housed in camps set up by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). However, the accuracy of the government's allegations is difficult to ascertain. Behind the claims lies the longstanding wariness of Mr Patassé, who is from the north-west, towards the Yakoma tribe from the southern river valley, to which Mr Kolingba and many of the mutineers belong. The Yakoma do have kinship links with inhabitants of northern former Zaire and Mr Mobutu is a cousin of Mr Kolingba. However, the former CAR president has been scrupulous in his public show of loyalty towards the country's new democracy and it seems unlikely that he harbours thoughts of a putsch. He is well aware that his own regime is not especially popular and of the risk that, should he abandon his commitment to peaceful politics, he

might find himself on trial for the abuses that occurred under his rule. By early June, the number of refugees from Congo had reached 52,000, but the government appeared to back away from its earlier claims that some had joined the rebels. Attending the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in Harare, Mr Patassé said that no members of Mr Mobutu's presidential guard had entered the CAR and that the refugees had not been armed. Mr Patassé nevertheless insisted he wanted good relations with the new authorities in Kinshasa.

Calm briefly returns as rebels start to rejoin the military—

French and US diplomats in Bangui were increasingly worried by the growing signs that rebels were coming to regard MISAB peacekeepers as an enemy. According to the usually well-informed Paris-based journal, *Lettre du Continent*, the US ambassador in Bangui, Mosina Jordan, wrote to the rebel leader, Captain Saulet, calling on him to remain committed to the peace process and not to allow occasional incidents to derail progress towards peace. This pressure seemed to have an effect: the process of reintegrating the 300 remaining rebels back into the 4,500-strong regular armed forces began as planned in early June. A number of ex-rebels were formally reintegrated into the army in a ceremony attended by the MISAB chief-of-staff, Colonel Talla Niang of Senegal, and by Captain Saulet. Meanwhile, Mr Patassé indicated that he was considering the postponement until next year of local and regional elections scheduled for August because of the current instability, although he nevertheless asked mayors to press ahead with drawing up voters' lists.

—before renewed clashes between rebels and peacekeepers

The calm did not last long. On June 20 the rebels killed a Senegalese peacekeeper, sparking a fresh round of fighting. This time, MISAB troops responded much more vigorously than in some past incidents. Within two days, the Chadian contingent in MISAB launched a violent offensive against the rebels. MISAB's commanders had clearly concluded that the apparently moderate and responsible leadership of the dissident troops was not really in control of many hot-headed elements, who seemed only too eager to engage in robbery or provocative firefights. On June 23 Chadian and Burkinabè troops, with French helicopter support, launched a heavy bombardment of the Kassai barracks, the main rebel base in the east of Bangui. In the south-west of the city Gabonese and Senegalese MISAB troops carried out a mopping-up operation, after asking civilians to move out temporarily. France publicly restated its strong support for MISAB and the African mediation effort, but was anxious not to be seen as interfering in local affairs. Its soldiers had fired at the rebels only after shells from rebel-held areas landed close to the French embassy (which happens to be near a government forces army base), the French lycée and the Sofitel hotel. The MISAB offensive appeared to have broken the back of rebel resistance; about 100 mutineers were caught by government forces as they tried to flee across the river and some were reportedly executed on the spot. However, the Kassai barracks remained in the hands of the rebels, who now offered to surrender their heavy weapons and asked for a ceasefire. Casualty numbers are necessarily hard to ascertain; but it seems that close to 100 people were killed, mainly rebels. Four MISAB troops were injured. The mediator, General Touré, negotiated a truce based on the surrender of heavy weapons and this was signed by rebel leaders on June 28 after some last-minute haggling over details. A formal ceasefire followed on July 2. But, as General

Touré himself admitted, weapons were still widely distributed in Bangui. Many inhabitants remained sceptical that even the full integration of the rebels into the armed forces would ensure lasting peace. General Touré staged a reconciliation ceremony on July 9, bringing together supporters and opponents of Mr Patassé for discussions over how best to establish lasting stability.

The CAR suffers French military cuts

The newly elected French Socialist government led by Lionel Jospin has moved rapidly to exploit confusion among the defeated right-wing parties and translate its ideas for a rethink of Africa policy into concrete action. On June 25, the defence minister, Alain Richard, announced that France would reassess its defence pacts with African governments. The Socialists feel that France can no longer be seen as the continent's gendarme, propping up friendly governments, even if they are corrupt or undemocratic. The party wants French troops to take a background role, staying out of domestic affairs in African countries. Where peacekeeping forces are needed, French troops would generally stay out of the front line and confine themselves to providing logistical back-up for African forces. Mr Richard specifically cited MISAB—where 50 French soldiers provide technical support to a 750-strong African force—as a model for the future. Less than a month later, the respected Paris newspaper *Le Monde* revealed that the Socialists were drawing up plans for a 40% cut in the number of French troops in Africa, which now stands at 8,350—including 1,850 in the CAR, stationed at Bangui and Bouar. In August, after a visit to the region, Mr Richard confirmed that the Bouar base would be closed in a few months' time, while the Bangui base would be substantially reduced in size. This move is partly dictated by the rethink of Africa policy and partly by France's move to phase out compulsory national military service, with the long-term goal of creating purely professional armed forces. There is also a political component, with the cuts regarded as a symbolic reproach to Mr Patassé, who has in the past sought to make capital out of the presence of French troops in the CAR.

Health

Mass vaccination campaign against polio

The health minister, Fernand Ndjengbot, announced the launch of a mass vaccination programme against polio in late April, beginning with three days of concentrated action (April 25-27) and continuing over subsequent weeks. The nationwide campaign was designed radically to curb the incidence of an often crippling disease which afflicts 40% of children in the CAR. The main cause of polio's prevalence is the fact that barely one-third of children are given all the vaccinations on the UN World Health Organisation (WHO) recommended list, according to studies by the government statistics department. Some 55% of children receive between one and three of the vaccinations, but 18% have none at all. In urban areas around 58% of children are inoculated, while in rural areas the figure drops to less than one in four. Infants aged 12-23 months are the least vaccinated. The CAR is a predominantly rural society, but successive governments have failed to develop the effective grassroots primary healthcare networks pioneered in some even poorer rural states, such as Burkina Faso. Such networks can help prevent disease and provide rapid reporting of epidemics when they do occur. The last outbreak of German

measles, which affected 60 children, of whom seven died, in the north-west early this year, was only reported after a month.

The economy

There are encouraging signs in the coffee market—

Market observers are cautiously optimistic about the continued strength of the world coffee market. This year has seen a significant recovery from the price falls of 1996. The decision taken on May 21 by the Association of Coffee Producing Countries to maintain export quotas should help minimise the risk of over-supply and a new price decline. Prices for robusta coffee—the type grown in the CAR—rose during the first quarter of this year. The background environment therefore presents some relief to the CAR's growers, who already have many other problems to cope with, given the disruption to normal trading and government extension activities caused by the upheavals in Bangui. Analysis by industry specialists F O Licht suggests that African coffee output could be as high as 19m bags this year (1996/97), some 8% up on the previous season and a marked improvement on the 14.4m-bag low of 1993/94. However, there may be some concern that quality could suffer in the CAR because the instability in Bangui may lead to more coffee being traded informally or smuggled out of the country.

—while cotton prices hold steady

Meanwhile, the International Cotton Advisory Committee has forecast that prices for the crop—the other main source of income for CAR farmers, especially in areas too arid to support coffee—will remain steady. This judgment is shared by the journal *Cotton Outlook*, which comments on the “remarkable stability” of price levels. Indeed, African Franc Zone producers, generally regarded as a source of quality output, have been among the main beneficiaries of a drop in production in Uzbekistan and other states of Central Asia, filling much of the global supply shortfall. As with coffee, the ability of CAR farmers to benefit from the situation may be limited by political developments in Bangui, but the resilience of demand and prices has been one encouraging factor in an otherwise difficult period.

United Reef continues to invest, despite instability

The Canadian diamond mining company, United Reef, has continued to develop its operations in the CAR, in spite of the continuing violence in Bangui. Its Bamingui and Bangoran river alluvial concessions are in the north of the country, well away from the troubles in the capital. A new gem recovery system, with the capacity to process 30 tons of gravel per hour, has now been installed at Mbala to service Bamingui. Monthly output of diamonds is expected to be 600-800 carats. Since it started mining in September 1995, United Reef has produced 5,731 carats from Bamingui at an average price of \$182 per carat. The South African firm, Trans Hex, is also active in the area.

Foreign trade and payments

The EU agrees a CFAfr55bn package for Central African states

EU representatives and delegates from seven Central African states (the CAR, the other five members of the Banque des états de l'Afrique centrale, and former Zaire) met in Yaoundé on March 6-7 to sign the framework agreement

for a five-year, CFAfr55bn (around \$95m) regional aid programme. Some 70% of the money will be allocated to support efforts to promote regional economic integration, including improvements to transport links and assistance over the technical aspects of economic and monetary union. However, the integration initiative has been hampered by a number of factors, including the instability in the CAR and Congo, Cameroon's reluctance to open its market to outside competition, and rivalry between Gabon and Cameroon over the role of regional leader. A further 20% of the EU money will be allocated to environmental programmes, such as the conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity and the development of sustainable forestry. The Central African states contain some of the last remaining relatively undamaged tropical rainforest, the protection of which is an increasingly important priority for donors. The remaining 10% of EU funds will go to a range of projects in education, health, training, research, culture and regional cooperation.

Chad

Political structure

Official name	République du Tchad	
Form of state	Unitary republic	
Legal system	Based on the Napoleonic Code. The 1989 constitution was suspended in December 1990. The national conference, held from January to April 1993, approved the transition charter, which was extended until April 1996, when a new constitution was adopted by referendum	
National legislature	The National Assembly, with 125 members elected by universal suffrage	
National elections	June 1996 (presidential); January-February 1997 (legislative)	
Head of state	President, elected by universal suffrage and sworn in on August 8, 1996	
National government	The prime minister and his appointed Council of Ministers, sworn in on May 17, 1997	
Main political parties	Mouvement patriotique du salut (MPS, with 65 seats in the National Assembly); Union pour le renouveau et la démocratie (URD, 29 seats); Union nationale pour la démocratie et le renouveau (UNDR, 15 seats); Union pour la démocratie et la république (UDR, four seats); Parti pour la liberté et la démocratie (PLD, three seats); Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le progrès (RDP, three seats)	
	President	Idriss Déby
	Prime minister	Nassour Guelendouksia Ouaidou
Key ministers	Agriculture	Ali Mahamat Zene Ali Fadel
	Civil service & labour	Ousmane Djidda
	Communications	Salibou Garba
	Culture, youth & sports	Nassingar Massoungaral
	Defence & reintegration	Mahamat Nimir Hamatta
	Education	Abdelrahim Breme Hamit
	Environment & water	Edgar Ngarbaroum
	Finance, economy & territorial development	Bichara Cherif Daoussa
	Foreign affairs & cooperation	Mahamat Saleh Annadif
	Health	Younouss Kedellah
	Industrial development & trade	Albert Pahim
	Interior & decentralisation	Abdraman Sallah
	Justice	Nadjita Beassoumal
	Mines, energy & petroleum	Pascal Yoadimadji
	Post & telecommunications	Mahamat Ahmat Karambal
	Public works, habitat & transport	Saleh Kebzabo
	Social action & family	Monique Ngaralbaye
	Tourism	Oumar Kadjallami
BEAC governor	Jean-Félix Mamalepot	

Economic structure

Latest available figures

Economic indicators	1992	1993	1994	1995 ^a	1996 ^b
GDP at market prices CFAfr bn	351	292	461	493	n/a
Real GDP growth %	8.0	-15.9	10.2	6.9	5.2
Consumer price inflation %	-3.2	-1.4	41.3	9.5	11.3 ^a
Population m	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.4	6.5
Exports fob \$ m	182	152	135	250	259 ^a
Imports fob \$ m	243	205	212	280	301 ^a
Current account \$ m	-86	-41.8	34.6	42.9	13.1 ^a
Reserves excl gold \$ m	80	39	76	150	165 ^c
Total external debt \$ m	728	771	825	908	n/a
External debt-service ratio %	4.8	8.4	9.3	5.9	n/a
Seed cotton production ^d '000 tons	122	95	156	180	157 ^a
Exchange rate (av) CFAfr:\$	264.7	283.2	555.2	499.2 ^e	511.6 ^e

August 11, 1997 CFAfr626.0:\$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1995	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 1995	% of total
Agriculture	48.8	Private consumption	92.6
Industry	17.7	Government consumption	11.3
Manufacturing	16.5	Gross domestic investment	10.6
Services	33.5	Exports of goods & services	28.5
GDP at factor cost	100.0	Imports of goods & services	-43.0
		GDP at market prices	100.0

Principal exports 1995 ^a	\$ m	Principal imports cif 1991	\$ m
Cotton	109	Manufactures	262
Livestock & meat	58	Non-fuel primary products	85


Main destinations of exports 1995 ^f	% of total	Main origins of imports 1995 ^f	% of total
Portugal	30	France	34
Germany	18	Cameroon	24
South Africa	16	Nigeria	7
France	7	USA	6

^a Official estimates. ^b EIU estimates. ^c November actual. ^d Crop years starting December 1. ^e Actual. ^f Drawn from partners' trade returns, subject to a wide margin of error.

Outlook for 1997-98

- Stability remains assured— The prospects for the regime of the president, Idriss Déby, continue to look more favourable than for some time. Chad's successful transition to democracy (albeit over seven years) and its improved economic situation have brought the country a much-needed breathing space, prior to the tensions that are likely to arise when oil comes on stream in three years' time. One key aspect has been the evolving process of reconciliation amongst the country's political-military factions, notably from the turbulent south. Other groups, such as those abroad in Sudan, Niger and Nigeria, have also been quiescent, in part because the Chad army has not gone out of its way to provoke them. The potential threat posed by prominent political exiles, like the two former presidents, Hissène Habré (1982-90) and Goukouni Oueddei (1975-82), appears to have been neutralised by Mr Déby's election victory, even though the process itself was far from perfect.
- as efforts are made to accommodate the opposition— Mr Déby has good reason to congratulate himself on the ease with which he has executed the final stage of the transition to democracy. Firstly, he was able to push through a questionable electoral manoeuvre in March which gave the ruling Mouvement patriotique du salut (MPS) an outright majority in the National Assembly without provoking serious protest. He then nevertheless went on to set up a coalition government, not because he was obliged to do so, but because it looked good for him voluntarily to pursue a policy of *ouverture*—“openness”. He may also have judged it wiser to have the two main opposition leaders—Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué of the Union pour le renouveau et la démocratie (URD) and Saleh Kebzabo of the Union nationale pour la démocratie et le renouveau (UNDR)—working within the administration rather than grumbling from the outside.
- which win favour with donors These are just the kind of gestures that delight donors. The reward came in the form of an official visit to the former colonial power, France, Mr Déby's first since seizing power six and a half years ago. The Paris trip was an opportunity to discuss aspects of the Chadian economy, notably the oil sector, in which the French company, Elf, has significant interests. Indeed, the emerging opportunities in Chad have engendered new care and attention in Paris. Delays in setting up the Chad-Cameroon pipeline deal were played down during the visit, although there is private annoyance on the Chadian side both at the political problems the pipeline has seemed to generate in Cameroon and at the environmentalist campaign against the pipeline (see The economy). Other donors, too, have chosen to highlight the more successful aspects of the current structural reforms to the economy, and are likely cautiously to continue support for aid programmes. The IMF, for example, concluded Article IV consultations with Chad in June with a broadly optimistic assessment of progress. It projected real GDP growth for 1997 at 6% and a drop in inflation to 5%. Public finances were also expected to improve, while structural reform was expected to focus on large parastatal enterprises, the privatisation of the two remaining state-owned commercial banks and the restructuring of the civil service.

Mr Déby is also well-placed to exploit French concern that the new stability which soon-to-be oil-rich Chad now enjoys may be undermined by the insecurity so prevalent elsewhere in Central Africa. Indeed, Mr Déby has directly voiced his anxiety over a possible domino effect resulting from the problems in both Congo (Brazzaville) and the Central African Republic, where Chadian troops have played a controversial role as part of the multinational peacekeeping force (see Central African Republic: The political scene). This kind of rhetoric will help efforts to ensure that the 800 French troops permanently based in Chad should not be significantly affected by the defence cuts proposed by the new government in Paris. Sudan, which has been trying to organise a tripartite summit with Chad and the CAR, will also be eager to promote the stability of its western neighbour under a friendly government, at a time when Khartoum feels both isolated and threatened by other regional powers.



Review

The political scene

A new prime minister is appointed—

The completion of the long transition from ad hoc military regime to constitutional civilian government was completed with the formation, after prolonged negotiations between political parties, of a new broad-based administration on May 17. A new prime minister, Nassour Guelendouksia Ouaidou, was appointed by the president, Idriss Déby, to head a coalition government of three political parties, the majority Mouvement patriotique du salut (MPS), the Union pour le renouveau et la démocratie (URD) of Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué and the Union Nationale pour la démocratie et le renouveau (UNDR) of Saleh Kebzabo.

—heading a coalition government—

Mr Kamougué, a foreign minister in the early 1980s who had been Mr Déby's main opponent in last year's presidential elections, and whose URD ended up with 29 of the 125 seats in the National Assembly as against 65 for the MPS, was elected president of the new National Assembly. With MPS backing, the

voting was 109 votes in favour and 15 against. "I have agreed to manage the country with President Déby," declared Mr Kamougué, "to preserve democratic gains, unity and peace in Chad, which is still a fragile country."

Mr Kebzabo, who ran third in the presidential elections and whose support helped clinch victory for Mr Déby in the second round, became minister of state for public works, habitat and transport in the new administration. Although he had been foreign minister following the last reshuffle in August 1996, any appearance of demotion was offset by the fact that he was ranked number two in the order of precedence after the prime minister. In an interview with the Libreville-based radio station Africa No 1, Mr Kebzabo said that he was glad that Mr Déby had once again placed trust in his party, which had accepted the ministerial post as "a new mission that we have to accomplish for the benefit of the country."

—although the MPS holds the main strategic posts

Mr Déby's MPS kept control over the most important ministries, including justice, interior and security. There was nevertheless a considerable shake-up of personnel, with the appointment of 16 new ministers. Only ten members of the old administration remained, with five taking on new portfolios. Bichara Cherif Daoussa stayed on at the super-ministry of finance, economy and territorial development. New appointees took over as secretaries of state at foreign affairs, interior, security and the civil service. Mariam Mahamat Nour, the outgoing livestock minister, was moved to the key post of secretary-general to the government, with the rank of minister (see Political structure for a full ministerial list).

Southerners increase their representation—

The former MPS secretary-general and new prime minister, Nassour Ouaidou, is a southern technocrat from Mayo Kebbi province. He replaces another southerner, Djimasta Koibla. Mr Ouaidou is reportedly much closer to the president than his predecessor and an influential figure in the MPS. Also a significant appointment was that of another southerner, Pascal Yoadimadji, to the strategically sensitive Ministry of Mines, Energy and Petroleum. This may have been a reward for the difficult role he played as president of the independent electoral commission (CENI) which organised the series of elections in 1996-97. The appointment was also popular in the south, which is increasingly preoccupied with the future administration of the oil revenues due to start flowing in the year 2000. However, some observers question the extent of the new minister's true authority over decisions affecting the oil sector, and suggest that the real master on oil matters is Abderramane Dadi, one of Mr Déby's special advisers.

—while an old loyalist falls from favour

Three weeks after the government was formed, one of its most prominent members, the interior and decentralisation minister, Youssouf Togoimi, was abruptly dismissed by presidential decree. According to the independent weekly newspaper, *Ndjamena-Hebdo*, he had intended to resign, but Mr Déby had pre-empted him. The paper reported that Mr Togoimi had been involved in an altercation with members of the republican guard outside the presidential palace. A magistrate by training from Tibetsi in the north, Mr Togoimi has been a close associate of the head of state since 1990, and has been in every government since then. He has been replaced by Abdraman Sallah, another of Mr Déby's close associates.

- One former dissident returns to Ndjamen—
—while another still holds out
- Mr Déby's policy of openness was seen not just in the composition of the new government, but in further attempts to ensure that southern dissidents were on board. As previously reported (2nd quarter 1997, page 38) an agreement has been reached with the last important rebel movement, the Front d'action pour une république fédérale (FARF), led by Laokein Frisson Bardé. This seven-point agreement providing for substantial reintegration of FARF members into the army and civil service was signed in Moundou on April 19. Mr Bardé was, however, reluctant to leave the countryside for Ndjamen because of fears for his security, and it was only after seven supporters of his movement were released from detention in Moundou in mid-May that the former rebel came to the capital to meet the president. Mr Bardé subsequently announced his intention of converting his movement into a political party.
- Other politico-military groups in the west, east and north have remained quiet in the wake of the successful democratic transition. A new weekly publication in Paris, *L'Autre Afrique*, carried a report in May from a journalist who spent some days with one wing of the very factional Mouvement pour le développement et la démocratie (MDD). These were the fighters of the original MDD set up in 1991 by Moussa Medella, which has operated from Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon, and mainly targets the Lake Chad area. Mr Medella claimed to lead the one remaining active rebel group, following the elimination of the MDD-Habré (loyal to the former president, Hissène Habré) by the army in October 1996. The reporter was told that the most recent contact with the Chad military had been in December 1996, with the last serious confrontation six months earlier, explaining "for those who know the Chadian maquis, the Lake remains the most difficult terrain, and the most awkward to capture".
- Mr Déby makes an official visit to France—
- The successful democratic transition and the continuing favourable economic prospects provided the background for Mr Déby's first official visit to France, at the beginning of July. The visit is widely regarded as having consolidated Chad's formal ties with the former colonial power, and marked the beginning of a campaign to launch the idea of Chad as a favourable investment prospect after 30 years of civil conflict. Mr Déby met his French counterpart, Jacques Chirac, the new Socialist prime minister, Lionel Jospin, and the cooperation minister, Charles Josselin. He also met the head of the Caisse française du développement (CFD), Antoine Poullieute. Mr Déby described Mr Chirac as "a man with a perfect knowledge of Africa who defends African interests in all international meetings", while Mr Jospin took the opportunity to note the responsibility shared by his government and the presidency to ensure the maintenance of warm relations with Chad.
- but does not discuss the future of the French garrison in Chad
- According to Mr Déby, the rumoured reduction of the 800-strong French military contingent based in Chad under Opération Epervier was not discussed during the visit. By mid-July, however, there were indications from Paris that bases in the neighbouring Central African Republic would bear the brunt of cuts in defence ministry spending (see Central African Republic). With Chad presently so stable, the maintenance of a garrison there is an act principally of symbolic importance—an endorsement of the Déby administration—but it is

also of some economic relevance to local communities surrounding French military installations.

Demobilisation continues, though reintegration is more doubtful

France has also put at least CFAfr 5bn (around \$8m) into the programme of demobilisation of the Chad army, which at the time of Mr Déby's seizure of power in December 1990 may have been as large as 60,000 men, including many irregulars from eastern Chad and Sudan. According to the chief of defence staff, Colonel Moussa Django Kataye, numbers are now down to about 20,000, with around 10,000 having left recently. The military says the figures also take into account reintegration of rebels into the army's ranks. The US embassy in Ndjamená estimates the army's strength at around 25,000, following a "structural-adjustment-assisted downsizing programme". In its commercial guide, the embassy says that more than 7,000 soldiers returned to civilian life in early 1997. "Unfortunately no viable reinsertion programme was put in place to complement the effort," the guide concludes.

Mr Déby defends his human rights record

While in France, Mr Déby responded to criticisms from Amnesty International on the human rights situation, saying in an interview with the Paris-based magazine, *Jeune Afrique*, that there were "no political prisoners in Chad and no press censorship". He added that "in contrast to those who preceded me, my rule is not based on human rights violations but on the democratic process". He suggested that Amnesty reports contained 20% truths and 80% lies. The justice minister, Nadjita Beassoumal, who took office in May, also defended Chad's record, saying that Amnesty's 1997 annual report was out of date. He drew attention to the comment of the UN Human Rights Commission in March that Chad had been making "laudable efforts" in the field of human rights.

In the same *Jeune Afrique* interview, Mr Déby noted that central Africa was acutely prone to instability. He pointed to the recent upheavals in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), persistent army mutinies in the CAR and the continuing violence in the capital of Congo (Brazzaville). "A stable country like Gabon, an African democracy, could at any moment be penetrated by arms coming from Congo," Mr Déby declared. He added that if Gabon were affected, Cameroon and then Chad, which had known a long period of civil war, could also become victims. "Already," he said, "all our commercial and human contacts with Brazzaville, which are important, are paralysed." He went on to declare that it ought to have been possible to see the Brazzaville crisis coming because "in a sense, Congo is a democracy without democrats".

Relations with Libya remain mixed—

Relations with Libya continued to see-saw. On the one hand, official contacts appear cordial. Mr Déby has appointed his elder brother, Daoussa Déby, as ambassador to Tripoli, while at the end of June the Libyan air force commander, General Risi Ali Sherif, paid a visit to Ndjamená, saying he had come to help strengthen ties between the two countries. But this followed another hiccup in relations in which Chad accused Libya of expelling over 400 of its nationals, who, according to state-controlled television news, were destitute in the northern town of Faya Largeau. The broadcast called on international humanitarian organisations to bring in relief for them, claiming that it was "just the beginning" of a new crisis.

—while recognition of SADR is withdrawn

Chad has withdrawn recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, the disputed territory in the western Sahara to which Morocco lays claim. This was announced on May 9 during a visit to Morocco by Djimasta Koibla on his last mission as prime minister. The event signalled the resumption of cooperation between the two countries, and during the visit a Morocco-Chad joint commission was established. Mr Koibla told newsmen that Chad wanted Morocco “to be present in all African institutions, including the Organisation of African Unity”.

The economy

A heavyweight delegation accompanies Mr Déby to France—

The visit of the president, Idriss Déby, to Paris in July had an important economic aspect. His delegation included the ministers of finance and economy, foreign affairs and cooperation, public works and transport, mines and energy as well as businessmen responsible for Chadian state enterprises and newly elected members of parliament. Among those they met were the president of the Conseil d'investissement d'Afrique noire (CIAN), Jean-Pierre Prouteau, who hosted a breakfast for the delegation and over 100 business leaders and industrialists at the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

—as foreign investors are courted—

Mr Déby told the meeting that the establishment of democratic institutions and national consensus would guarantee the security and stability investors sought. He added that the present restructuring of the economy brought promising opportunities in the fields of agriculture, tourism, mining and industry. He then stressed that France still enjoyed a privileged position in Chad, adding that it was up to the French to justify this status. Following the visit, it was indicated that the two governments would help set up links between employers' organisations in both countries, with a view to encouraging investment.

—while France remains the major donor

Information released at the time of the visit confirmed that France is the leading aid donor in Chad, contributing 30% of international assistance. The Caisse française du développement (CFD) alone committed Fr1.6bn in aid between 1990 and 1996 (around \$260m), of which Fr698m went to support structural adjustment policies and 892m to particular aid projects.

A new IMF tranche is awarded—

The second tranche of Chad's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), amounting to a credit of CFAfr6.6bn (around \$11m), was approved by the IMF board on June 13. The directors' assessment of the progress of economic reform was generally very favourable. They welcomed “the continued improvement in Chad's overall economic performance since 1995 and the headway made in some structural reform areas, in particular the steady decline in the external current-account deficit and the rebound of economic activity in the non-agricultural sectors”. The board, however, went on to express disappointment about a series of policy slippages during 1996, “particularly the budgetary slippage stemming from expenditure overruns”. It urged a strengthening in fiscal discipline and the speeding up of civil service reforms and the process of privatisation. While directors praised changes in the cotton, electricity and water sectors, they expressed disappointment over delays to reform of the state-owned sugar company. Government officials promised to adopt measures proposed by the IMF, with the finance minister, Bichara Cherif Daoussa,

- publicly promising to halve allowances paid to the military and to civil servants and to freeze new recruitment for the rest of 1997.
- while the USA sounds a warning note
- A statement from the commercial service of the US embassy in Ndjamená confirmed that the government had met its performance targets for increased revenues. New fiscal measures include a turnover tax and a vigorous campaign to stop smuggling. There was a criticism, however, that the execution of the 1996 budget had been a disappointment, as day-to-day budget management and control of extra-budgetary expenditure were lacking. “Chad needs to reinforce its administrative capacity if it is to properly manage anticipated oil revenues,” the embassy stated.
- The new prime minister talks sober economics to the National Assembly
- The first address by the new prime minister to the National Assembly in May focused on economic questions. He called for a policy of what he described as active diplomacy in the service of national development. The heritage of war, he said, brought serious problems in setting up and reorganising the national economy and finances. Mr Ouaidou argued that his government’s macroeconomic policies would increase GDP growth in real terms from an average 5.2% in 1996 to 6% in 1997. Inflation had also been brought under control, Mr Ouaidou added. The prime minister went on to say that economic growth could not be sustained unless further reform measures were adopted. Public finances were a priority target; in 1997, the head of state had proposed a general budget amounting to CFAfr206bn in expenditure and CFAfr195bn in income. On expenditure, additional efforts would be made to reduce the wage bill and thus prevent further slippages. The reorganisation of services would be more vigorous, enabling an improved performance in the collection of revenue.
- A record cotton crop is confirmed
- The cotton harvest was completed in May with a record 212,000 tons for the 1996/97 season, a remarkable increase on the 157,000 tons produced in 1995/96. The production increase had been assisted by the rise in prices paid to producers and by well-distributed rainfall. National radio said that Cotontchad, the 75% state-owned cotton company, had paid CFAfr36bn to producers to purchase the crop. Cotontchad is due to be privatised soon under pressure from the World Bank and IMF, although managers have expressed concern that privatisation will mean the loss of Cotontchad’s monopoly.
- The oil pipeline to Cameroon suffers a setback—
- There has been a slight setback to Chad’s oil prospects with the announcement of a delay of several months in beginning work on the construction of the 1,100-km oil pipeline which will connect the Doba oilfields in southern Chad to the Cameroonian port of Kribi. At the end of May Mr Déby said that the two governments of Chad and Cameroon had not yet completed the details of the project. He complained that the French branch of the environmental group Friends of the Earth had campaigned, with the complicity of certain Chadians, to delay the exploitation of oil because the population of the south had not been associated with the project. He stressed that oil was “national wealth” and its revenues would be “budgetised”. The administration of the resource “would be carried out with transparency for the benefit of Chadians”, he said. Mr Déby also confirmed that a small oil refinery would be built in Ndjamená to produce fuel for local consumption, using oil from the Sedigui field near Lake Chad.

—but contracts will be awarded in September

Prior to the announcement of the delay, the journal *African Energy and Mining* had announced that the contracts for the Kribi pipeline would be awarded by September. They are reportedly already virtually clinched, but it is suggested that negotiations have yet to be finalised between the winners of the tenders and the project's operator, Exxon Exploration. A framework agreement which laid down the structure of the Chad Oil Transport Company (TOTCO) and the Cameroon Oil Transport Company (COTCO) was approved in 1995, and a protocol was signed six months ago on the development plan. The COTCO accord was signed in May, as was another between the Exxon-Shell-Elf consortium and the Chad and Cameroon governments. The new parliament in Cameroon, elected in May, had by mid-July failed to ratify the accord on the pipeline. The Chad-Cameroon pipeline commission, meeting in early June in Yaoundé expressed the wish that the ratification be done speedily to permit the route of the pipeline to be finalised before the end of the year. The route of the pipeline is one of the matters of concern with environmentalists, who demonstrated against the project during Mr Déby's visit to Paris. The political repercussions appear to be more complex in Cameroon, however, than in Chad, at least for the moment.

Quarterly indicators and trade data

Cameroon: quarterly indicators of economic activity

		1994	1995				1996				1997
		4 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1 Qtr
Mining production	Prodn/day										
Crude petroleum	'000 barrels	110	100	100	100	100	90	90	90	100	100 ^a
Prices	Monthly av										
Consumer prices:	1990=100	143.1	148.0	147.1	148.4	152.7	154.6	154.0	155.6	n/a	n/a
change year on year	%	46.8	26.7	16.0	8.6	6.7	4.5	4.7	4.9	n/a	n/a
Money	End-Qtr										
M1, seasonally adj:	CFAfr bn	359.1	337.8	326.9	295.4	317.0	328.9	308.7	323.0	298.0 ^b	n/a
change year on year	%	34.8	16.1	4.5	-10.9	-11.7	-2.4	-5.6	9.3	n/a	n/a
Foreign trade ^c	Annual totals										
Exports fob	\$ m	2,062	(2,245)	(n/a)			n/a
Imports cif	"	956	(1,141)	(n/a)			n/a
Foreign exchange	End-Qtr										
Central Bank	\$ m	1.7	1.5	0.5	0.2	3.2	1.9	1.2	0.9	2.2 ^b	n/a
Exchange rate											
Market rate	CFAfr:\$	534.6	484.9	485.3	491.5	490.0	503.2	515.3	517.2	523.7	564.4 ^d

Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile.

^a Figure for April 1997, 100. ^b End-November. ^c DOTS estimate. ^d End-2 Qtr 1997, 587.8.

Sources: Oil & Gas Journal; IMF, International Financial Statistics; Direction of Trade Statistics, yearly.

Central African Republic: quarterly indicators of economic activity

		1994		1995				1996			
		3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr
Prices	Monthly av										
Consumer prices ^a :	1990=100	125.0	129.4	139.7	138.7	137.9	140.0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
change year on year	%	34.6	40.0	41.7	22.0	10.3	8.2	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Money	End-Qtr										
M1, seasonally adj:	CFAfr bn	95.91	107.03	118.84	113.88	114.95	115.39	102.20	110.90	116.43	119.64 ^b
change year on year	%	65.2	74.7	66.9	31.0	19.9	7.8	-14.0	-2.6	1.2	n/a
Foreign trade ^c	Annual totals										
Exports fob	\$ m	(140)	(187)	(n/a)	
Imports cif	"	(472)	(189)	(n/a)	
Foreign exchange	End-Qtr										
Central Bank	\$ m	208.92	209.86	248.00	252.29	244.90	233.48	210.32	230.76	237.25	236.1 ^b
Exchange rate											
Market rate	CFAfr:\$	528.2	534.6	484.9	485.3	491.5	490.0	503.2	515.3	517.2	523.7 ^d

Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile.

^a "African" households, Bangui. ^b End-November. ^c DOTS estimate. ^d End-1 Qtr 1997, 564.4; end-2 Qtr 1997, 587.8.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Chad: quarterly indicators of economic activity

		1994		1995				1996			
		3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr
Prices	Monthly av										
Consumer prices:	1990=100	142.6	137.6	139.0	139.7	146.9	149.0	148.2	161.2	169.8	168.5 ^a
change year on year	%	50.7	46.4	26.7	2.0	3.0	8.3	6.6	15.4	15.6	n/a
Money	End-Qtr										
M1, seasonally adj:	CFAfr bn	76.58	61.90	51.80	52.87	71.50	88.33	103.61	105.40	99.91	106.26 ^b
change year on year	%	n/a	31.1	-23.7	-31.4	-6.7	42.7	100.0	99.4	39.7	n/a
Foreign trade ^c	Annual totals										
Exports fob	\$ m	(82)	(99)	(99)	(99)	(99)	(99)	(99)	(99)	(99)	(99)
Imports cif		(143)	(184)	(184)	(184)	(184)	(184)	(184)	(184)	(184)	(184)
Exchange holdings	End-Qtr										
Foreign exchange	\$ m	126.51	75.60	40.94	61.31	101.58	142.07	189.10	180.72	175.96	164.07 ^b
Exchange rate											
Market rate	CFAfr:\$	528.2	534.6	484.9	485.3	491.5	490.0	503.2	515.3	517.2	523.7 ^d

Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile.

^a October only. ^b End-November. ^c DOTS estimate. ^d End-1 Qtr 1997, 564.4; end-2 Qtr 1997, 587.8.

Sources IMF, *International Financial Statistics*; *Direction of Trade Statistics*, yearly.

Chad: direction of trade^a
(\$ m)

	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1995		Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1995
Exports fob					Imports cif				
Portugal	23	18	18	42	France	94	61	56	64
Germany	16	13	13	25	Cameroon	22	29	37	44
South Africa	n/a	6	19	23	USA	6	9	8	12
France	4	7	8	10	Nigeria	10	11	11	11
Costa Rica	n/a	4	5	6	Belgium-Luxembourg	2	6	6	8
UK	3	2	2	5	Japan	4	4	4	5
Total incl others	74	67	83	140	Total incl others	164	141	143	186

^a DOTS estimate.

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*, yearly.

Cameroon: foreign trade

	\$ m			
	Jan-Dec 1987	Jan-Mar 1988	Jan-Dec 1989	Jan-Dec 1991
Imports cif ^{ab}				
Food	202.68	54.80	179.57	314.29
Beverages & tobacco	47.42	9.08	21.03	27.45
Crude materials	42.65	12.20	47.88	162.63
Chemicals	258.91	47.16	193.89	339.62
Paper etc & manufactures	43.96	7.75	36.27	81.50
Textile yarn, cloth & manufactures	94.16	19.87	41.03	80.42
Non-metallic mineral manufactures	70.59	11.37	49.04	69.67
Iron & steel	36.57	8.91	41.87	105.97
Metal manufactures	89.87	17.78	78.42	163.97
Machinery incl electric	362.62	70.99	233.42	469.03
Transport equipment	263.90	45.94	158.52	156.81
Total incl others	1,749.02	352.36	1,273.33	2,306.23

	CFAfr bn			
	Jul-Jun 1991/92	Jul-Jun 1992/93	Jul-Jun 1993/94	Jul-Jun 1994/95
Exports fob				
Coffee	31.5	13.1	38.0	60.5
Cocoa & products	34.1	25.9	55.8	61.5
Wood	37.5	49.9	104.7	153.5
Cotton, raw	19.8	20.2	27.0	37.9
Petroleum, crude	262.1	195.6	253.4	293.2
Total incl others	543.0	444.0	825.2	1,018.2

	\$ m					\$ m			
	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1995		Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1995
Exports fob ^c					Imports cif ^c				
France	464	342	383	466	France	517	378	338	476
Italy	203	200	286	330	Belgium-Luxembourg	69	59	63	67
Spain	302	288	285	277	Germany	108	48	54	65
Netherlands	153	129	119	163	Italy	52	39	37	57
Germany	94	98	106	102	USA	63	50	59	50
Nigeria	49	62	75	89	Japan	56	54	38	48
USA	82	101	55	48	UK	37	27	38	44
Total incl others	1,730	1,683	1,826	2,138	Total incl others	1,304	987	893	1,144

^a Source, UN. ^b Figures for 1990 are not available. ^c DOTS estimate.

Sources: UN, *International Trade Statistics*, yearbook; National Sources; IMF, *Direction of Trade*, yearly.

Central African Republic: foreign trade

	\$ '000	
	Jan-Dec 1980	Jan-Dec 1989
Imports cif		
Meat & products	758	1,156
Dairy products	2,005	2,788
Fish & products	718	1,423
Cereals & products	5,400	8,192
Fruit, vegetables & products	820	1,105
Sugar & products	901	6,232
Beverages	4,396	1,991
Tobacco & manufactures	739	3,715
Petroleum & products	1,184	10,390
Chemicals	9,490	22,239
Rubber manufactures	1,525	2,412
Paper & manufactures	1,813	3,325
Textile fibres & manufactures, incl clothing	4,589	7,118
Miscellaneous non-metallic mineral manufactures	3,418	6,780
Iron & steel	1,187	1,852
Metal manufactures	4,764	5,939
Machinery incl electric	14,090	28,491
Transport equipment	13,153	24,385
of which:		
road vehicles	13,120	23,638
Total incl others	80,461	159,124

	CFAfr bn	
	Jan-Dec 1989	Jan-Dec 1990
Exports fob		
Coffee	8.5	2.7
Wood & cork & manufactures	6.3	9.2
Cotton, raw	3.9	4.5
Diamonds	22.6	19.7
Total incl others	47.2	41.2

	\$ m					\$ m			
	Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1995		Jan-Dec 1992	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1995
Exports fob ^a					Imports cif ^a				
Belgium-Luxembourg	69	77	86	75	France	67	48	58	70
France	3	4	8	30	Japan	8	6	7	46
Spain	12	7	12	0	Cameroon	21	21	21	12
Iran	8	8	8	n/a	Namibia	7	8	10	n/a
Germany	2	2	4	0	Germany	6	5	5	7
Taiwan	4	22	1	n/a	Belgium-Luxembourg	6	5	5	6
Total incl others	200	132	140	187	USA	1	6	5	5
					Total incl others	392	422	472	189

^a DOTS estimate.

Sources: National Sources, UN, *International Trade Statistics*, yearbook.

Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad: French trade
(\$ '000)

	Cameroon			CAR			Chad		
	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1995	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1995	Jan-Dec 1993	Jan-Dec 1994	Jan-Dec 1995
French exports fob									
Cereals & preparations	22,728	22,725	33,646	7,292	5,797	7,544	5,549	5,072	5,188
Sugar & preparations	3,237	7,336	4,255	0	15	32	0	621	1,575
Beverages	4,265	3,748	5,841	553	554	590	266	239	392
Chemicals	94,413	66,889	85,137	11,998	12,189	10,859	11,654	9,720	6,222
Rubber manufactures	4,460	5,075	5,242	451	685	741	546	818	1,171
Paper etc & manufactures	10,608	7,852	13,424	1,023	1,322	1,263	1,250	1,363	1,626
Textile fibres & manufactures, incl clothing	11,100	8,845	11,585	954	981	1,358	628	486	692
Non-metallic mineral manufactures	8,235	6,983	9,122	285	163	407	788	466	471
Iron & steel	3,794	2,025	5,060	273	308	224	433	932	601
Non-ferrous metals	4,704	2,690	7,160	0	138	544	341	110	153
Metal manufactures	18,417	15,002	20,189	1,237	1,976	2,134	2,255	1,984	2,241
Machinery incl electric	87,647	80,406	123,718	11,029	14,928	17,000	18,789	14,919	22,378
Road vehicles	20,068	26,883	30,462	3,248	6,561	7,805	5,449	8,806	6,966
Other transport equipment	6,527	8,820	7,247	0	717	119	0	163	309
Scientific instruments etc	7,921	5,484	8,273	1,262	1,232	1,203	1,002	1,840	1,557
Total incl others	360,418	305,143	431,713	46,277	52,546	59,649	58,503	51,829	57,521
French imports cif									
Fruit & vegetables	97,407	106,490	114,071	0	10	0	0	0	52
Coffee, cocoa, tea & spices	41,827	45,694	62,029	1,938	5,241	13,824	0	0	0
Tobacco, unmanufactured	0	0	0	1,895	608	138	0	0	0
Rubber, crude	20,292	16,097	16,944	0	21	41	0	0	0
Wood & cork & manufactures	53,144	107,144	103,162	110	312	276	0	0	1
Textile fibres & waste	956	1,164	0	138	109	616	318	196	1,200
Petroleum & products	135,731	73,930	113,231	0	0	0	0	0	0
Textile yarn & manufactures	1,258	4,933	4,527	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-ferrous metals	37,889	68,309	105,418	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total incl others	394,676	431,252	526,164	4,660	8,457	15,276	8,148	9,236	10,462

Source: UN, *External Trade Statistics*, series D.